Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book III: On the Sin of the First Man
Chapter 2: Why God permitted man to be tempted, whom he knew would fall
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Since it is now sufficiently agreed that the first men were tempted, and by the temptation overcome, another question follows: why God willed or permitted those to be tempted whom he was not ignorant would be conquered by the temptation.
Known are the errors of Zwingli, of Calvin, and of those who have wished to be called Zwinglians and Calvinians rather than Christians and Catholics. For (as we taught in the preceding book) it pleased those innovators to assert that God willed and decreed that the first men should fall, and that therefore they were tempted not only by the permission, but also by the will and ordination of God. Further, God willed the fall of the first parents, if we believe Zwingli, because sin was necessary that justice might be known by man, since contraries become known from contraries; or (if we believe Calvin) because God could not lay open an entrance for his mercy and justice unless man were made, through sin, wretched and worthy of punishment. But these things have already been refuted in the preceding book; and we believe rather the Apostle Peter, saying that God wills no one to perish, 2 Peter 3; and his fellow-apostle, affirming that evils are not to be done that goods may come, Romans 3; and the wise preacher, that sinners are not necessary to God, Ecclesiasticus 15.
These, then, being dismissed: St. Prosper, book 2 On the Contemplative Life, chapter 19, seems to have been of this opinion, that he judged the first men, before the temptation, lifted up into a certain pride, to have sinned secretly, and therefore to have been permitted to be tempted in punishment of the sin: “They would not be tempted,” says he, “unless deserted; nor would they be deserted, unless they themselves had first deserted God,” etc. Which same thing St. Augustine seems to say, book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 30, where he speaks thus: “When would the woman have believed these words, unless there were in her mind a certain proud presumption concerning herself, which through that temptation was to be convicted and humbled?” But this opinion is convicted of being false — both from the Scripture, which says that the devil was a murderer from the beginning, John 8; but he himself would not have slain, if the first men had already before perished through pride; and from this, that the first men had the occasion of being proud from that promise, you shall be as Gods. Further, St. Augustine, in the place cited, speaks not absolutely of the temptation, but of the temptation as conquering. Which he wrote more openly, book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 5, in these words: “Nor is it to be thought that this tempter would have cast man down, unless there had preceded in the soul of man a certain elation to be pressed down, so that through the humiliation of sin he might learn how falsely he had presumed of himself.” And so that hidden pride was not the cause why God permitted man to be tempted — since the temptation preceded the pride — but why he permitted him to be led into the temptation, or by the tempter to be brought through into open disobedience. Perhaps also the words of St. Prosper can be understood in the same way in which we have said the words of St. Augustine are to be understood. But whatever be of this, that stands firm: sin was not the cause of the permission of the temptation.
This opinion, then, being rejected, let us hear St. Augustine, who teaches three things. First, that God did no injury to man in permitting him to be tempted by the devil, since he had furnished him with such strength that he could easily have overcome the adversary. Second, that the primary cause of this permission is known to God alone. Third, that reasons can with probability be rendered: because the omnipotence, the providence, the mercy and justice of God, the beauty of the universe, and man's own glory and profit required it.
That God did no injury to man, Augustine teaches, book 14 of the City of God, chapter 27: “Why should he not permit,” says he, “that the first man be tempted by the evil Angel, seeing he had been so constituted that, if he trusted in the help of God, the good man would conquer the evil Angel?” And in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 12: “That Adam,” says he, “with no one terrifying him, and moreover using free choice against the command of God who terrified, did not stand in so great felicity, in so great facility of not sinning.” And below: “Such strength had his will, which had been constituted without any sin, and nothing from itself resisted it concupiscentially, that the choice of persevering was worthily committed to such goodness and to the felicity of living well.” And below: “To the strongest (Adam, namely) he left and permitted to do what he would; for the weak he reserved that, by his own gift, they should most invincibly will what is good, and most invincibly refuse to desert it.” Adam, then, could not justly complain that he was permitted to be tempted by the devil, since with such ease he could have triumphed over his enemy.
Now that the primary cause of this permission is known to God alone, the same Augustine teaches, book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 4: “If, then, it be asked,” says he, “why God permitted man to be tempted, whom he foreknew would consent to the temptation, I cannot penetrate the depth of his counsel, and I confess it to be far above my strength.” And epistle 106 to Paulinus, to a like question — why, namely, God procreates those whom he foresees to be condemned to eternal fire — he answers: “God does this because he wills; but why he wills — who art thou,” says he, “that shouldst answer God? Or hath not the potter power to make vessels, some unto honor, some unto dishonor?”
But although these things stand thus, yet those reasons are probable which we touched a little before. And first, concerning the omnipotence of God, which is discerned in this permission, Augustine speaks thus in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 10: “He who created all things very good, and foreknew that evils would arise out of goods, knew that it pertained more to his most almighty goodness even to do well from evils than not to suffer evils to be.” The same he teaches in the Enchiridion, chapter 11.
Concerning providence, the same Augustine speaks in book 7 of the City of God, chapter 30: “So,” says he, “does he administer all things which he created, that he suffers them also to exercise and act their own proper motions.” For this reason, then, God permitted the first men to fall: because it pertained to his providence to suffer men, endowed with free choice, according to their own choosing to resist or to yield to the tempter. Which same he teaches in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 10, where he writes that God so constituted the nature of angels and of men that in it there should first be shown what free choice could do, then what the benefit of his grace and the judgment of his justice could do.
Concerning mercy and justice, Augustine speaks in the place last cited, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 10. God, then, permitted man to be tempted, whom he knew would fall, because at the same time he saw that he could use that fall for declaring his mercy and justice, when from the condemned mass he will justly punish some, and mercifully deliver others.
Concerning the beauty of the universe, which rises from this permission, the same Augustine speaks in book 3 On Free Choice, chapter 9, where, the question being proposed — why God did not bring it about that no creature should come to misery, for neither could he not do this, being almighty, nor did he, being good, begrudge it — he answers that the order of creatures, from the highest even to the lowest, runs down by just degrees in such wise that he is grudging who should say “let this not be,” and he too is grudging who should say “let this be such.” For if anyone said that the moon ought either not to be made at all, or certainly to be made equal to the sun, he would grudge no small adornment to the universe of things; so also he who should say that rational souls either ought not to have been created, or ought so to have been created that they never sinned — so that there should be no soul which by sinning became wretched — would grudge a certain adornment to the world. Since that soul, though wretched, is better than any body whatever, and adorns the place in which it is set by God according to the desert of its action. Just as (as the same Augustine says) nothing in a house is nobler than the man, nothing more abject than the sewer; and yet a slave caught in such a sin as to be held worthy of cleansing the sewer adorns it even by his disgrace; and both of these — the disgrace of the slave and the cleansing of the sewer — now joined and brought into a certain unity of their own kind, are fitted and woven into the well-ordered house so as to suit its whole with a most ordered comeliness. But although the omnipotence of God draws that good out of sin, and thence adorns the universe of things, yet not for that reason either were sins necessary, or could not God have delivered all angels and men from sin and misery; for not sins or misery adorn the order of the universe, but the angels or souls which, according to the desert of fault, are ordered to punishments; nor could a way of adorning the universe of things have been wanting to God, if no angel and no man had willed to sin — just as (as Augustine says in the same place), if the slave had refused to sin, there would not have been wanting to the discipline of the household another provision whereby the sewers and the other places should be cleansed. And so it made for the beauty of things that God permitted the first men to be tempted, whom he had foreseen would fall; yet in another way the beauty of things could have been provided for, if either man had not been going to fall, or God had refused to permit what he had foreseen would be. On which matter see the same Augustine, book 3 On Free Choice, chapter 12.
There remains the last reason, which is taken from the profit of man himself. For first (as Augustine writes, book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 4), it seems that man would not have been of great praise if he could live well for this reason, that no one persuaded him to live ill. Next, God perceived that this would be very useful for the instruction of the saints: namely, that the fall of the first man should furnish to the saints to come an example of distrust of concupiscence, and should strike into them a pious fear against pride (as St. Augustine says in the same book, chapter 6). Moreover, God permitted the temptation and fall of the first man because he foreknew that by his seed, helped by his grace, the devil himself was to be conquered with the greater glory of the saints, as the same Augustine speaks, book 14 of the City of God, chapter 27. Finally we can add that, by occasion of the sin of the first men, Christ was given to us, through whom we have received greater gifts of God than those were which we lost through Adam. For (as the Apostle testifies, Romans 5) where sin abounded, grace did more abound. And: Not as the offence, so also the gift. “Stronger,” says St. Leo, sermon 12 on the Passion of the Lord, “was the gift of liberty made than the debt of servitude.” And, as the same says in sermon 3 on Pentecost: “If man, deceived by diabolical fraud, had not through concupiscence fallen away from the law set for him, the creator of the world would not have become a creature.” Which also St. Augustine teaches, sermon 9 on the words of the Apostle, when he says: There was no cause for Christ the Lord to come, save to save sinners. And so the Church, with exultation and giving of thanks, sings in the paschal vigils: O happy fault, which deserved to have such and so great a redeemer.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT II. Cur Deus permiserit tentari hominem , quem sciebat casurum. Cum satis jam constet , primos homines tentatos, ettentatione devictos fuisse: sequi¬ tur alia quaestio, cur Deus tentari eos voluerit, aut permiserit, quos non ignorabat tentatione vincendos. (1) ITim. I, 9; Rom. VI, 44: Gal. V, 48. Notisunt errores Zwinglii, Calvni, et eorum qui Zwingliani et Calviniani potius , quam Christiani et Catholici dici voluerunt. Nam (ut in libro superiore docuimus) placuit no¬ vatoribus istis, assci'ei'e Deum voluisse, ac decrevisse, ut primi homines laberentur, et ideo non solum permissione, sed etiam vo¬ luntate, et ordinatione Dei fuisse tentatos. Porro lapsum primorum parentum voluit Deus, si Zwinglio credimus, quia necessarium erat peccatum, ut justitia ab homine cogno- sceretur, cum contraiia ex contrariis innote¬ scant, vel (si credimus Calvino) quia non po¬ terat Deus aditum patefacei'e misericordia;, et justitae suae, nisi homo per peccatum miser, et supplicio dignus efficeretur. Sed haec jam refutata sunt libro superiore, et nos magis credimus Apostolo Petro dicenti, Deum ne¬ minem velle perire II Pet. m. et coapostolo ejus affirmanti, Non esse facienda mala, ut veniant bona, Rom. iii. et sapienti coneio- nanti, Deo non esse necessarios peccatores, Eccles. xv. His igitur dimissis S. Pi'osper lib. ii. de vita contemplativa, cap. 49. videtur in ea fuisse sententia, ut existimaret, primos ho¬ mines ante tentationem in superbiam quam¬ dam elatos, occulte peccasse, et ideo per- missos fuisse tentai-i in poenam peccati : «Non tentarentur, inquit, nisi deserti, nec de¬ sererentur, nisi ipsi prius deseruissent Deum, etc. » Quod idem videtur d icere S. Augu¬ stinus lib. xi. de Genesi ad litteram, cap. 30, ubi sic loquitur : « Quando his verbis cre¬ deret mulier, nisi inesset menti quaedam de se superba praesumptio, qua; per illam ten¬ tationem fuerat convincenda et humilianda? » At haec opinio falsa esse convincitui-, tum ex Sci‘iptui’a, quae dicit diabolum fuisse homi¬ cidam ab initio, Joan. vm. non autem ipse occidisset, si jam antea primi homines per supcibiam periissent : tum ex eo, quod oc¬ casionem superbiendi primi homines habue¬ runt ex promissione illa, eritis sicut Dii. Porro S. Augustinus loco citato, non loquitur absolute de tentatione , sed de tentatione vincente. Quod «apertius scripsit lib. xi. de Genesi ad litteram cap. 5. his verbis : « Nec arbitiamdum est, quod es¬ set hominem dejecturus iste tentator nisi praecessisset in anima hominis quaedam elatio comprimenda, ut per humiliationem peccati, quam dc se falso praesumpserit di- 4 CAPUT JJ. sceret. » Itaque superbia illa occulta non fuit causa, cur Deus permiserit hominem tentari, cum tentatio superbiam praecesserit, sed cur permiserit induci in tentationem, sive a tentatore perduci in apertam inobe- dientiam. Fortasse etiam verba S. Prosperi eodem modo intelligi possunt, quo S. Augu¬ stini verba intclligcnda esse diximus. Sed quidquid de hoc sit, illud constat, non fuisse peccatum causam permissionis tentationis. Hac igitur opinione rejecta S. Augustinum audiamus, qui tria qutedam docet. Primo, nullam fecisse Deum injuriam homini, quod eum a diabolo tentari permiserit, cum eum tantis viribus instruxerit, ut facile potuerit adversarium superare ? Secundo, primariam causam hujus pennissionis Deo soli esse no¬ tam. Tertio, rationes illas probabiliter reddi posse, quia id requirerent omnipotentia, pro¬ videntia, misericordia et justitia Dei, pul¬ chritudo universi, et ipsa hominis gloria, at¬ que utilitas. Non fecisse Deum injuriam homini, docet Augustinus lib xiv. de civit. Dei, cap. 27 : « Cur non permitteret, inquit, ut ab Angelo malo primus homo lentaretur, quando qui¬ dem sic erat institutus, ut si de adjutorio Dei fideret, bonus homo malum Angelum vin¬ ceret? » Et lib. de corrept. et grat. cap. 12 : a Ille Adam, inquit, et terrente nullo, et in¬ super contra Dei terrentis imperium libero usus arbitrio non stetit in tanta felicitate, in tanta non peccandi facilitate. » Et infra : «Tales vires habebat ejus voluntas, quai sine ullo fuerat instituta peccato, et nihil illi ex se ipsa concupiscentialitcr resistebat, ut digne tanta! bonitati, et bene vivendi felicitati per¬ severandi committeretur arbitrium. » Et in¬ fra : « Fortissimo (Adamo videlicet) dimisit atque permisit facere quod vellet; infirmis servavit, ut ipso donante invictissime quod bonum est , vellent , et hoc deserere invi¬ ctissime nollent. » Non igitur juste queri po¬ tuit Adam, quod a diabolo tentari permissus sit, cum tanta facilitate de hoste suo trium¬ phare potuerit. Jam vero primariam causam hujus permis¬ sionis soli Deo notam esse, docet idem Augu¬ stinus lib. xi. de Genesi ad litteram, cap. 4 : « Si ergo, inquit, quaeritur, cur Deus tentari permiserit hominem, quem tentationi consen¬ surum esse prasciebat, altitudinem quidem consilii ejus penetrare non possum, et longe supra vires meas esse confiteor. » Et epist. 106. ad Paulinum ad similem quaistionem, 303 cur videlicet Deus eos procreet, quos aeterno igni damnandos praevidet, respondet: «Dcuin id facere quia vult, cur autem velit., tu quis es, inquit, qui respondeas Deo ? an non ha¬ bet potestatem figulus faciendi vasa, alia in honorem, alia in contumeliam. » Sed quamquam haec ita se habent, tamen probabiles sunt rationes illae, quas paulo ante tetigimus. Ac primum de omnipotentia Dei, quae in hac permissione perspicitur, ita lo¬ quitur Augustinus in lib. de corrept. et gra¬ tia, cap. 10: « Qui creavit omnia bona valde, et mala ex bonis exoritura esse praescivit, scivit magis ad suam omnipotentissimam bonitatem pertinere etiam de malis bene¬ facere, quam mala esse non sinere. » Idem docet in Enchiridio, cap. 11. De providentia, idem August. loquitur in lib. vn. de civit. Dei, cap. 30 : « Sic, inquit, administrat omnia, qua! creavit, ut etiam ipsaproprios exercere, et agere motus sinat. » Ideo igitur permisit Deus primos homines labi, quia ad providentiam ejus pertinebat, ut homines libero arbitrio praeditos, sineret pro arbitratu suo resistere, vel cedere tenta- tori. Quod idem docet in lib. de corrept. et gratia, cap. 10. ubi scribit, Deum sic insti¬ tuisse angelorum, hominumque naturam, ut primum in ea ostenderetur, quid posset libe¬ rum arbitrium, deinde quid posset suas gra¬ tias beneficium, justitieeque judicium. De misericordia, et justitia loquitur Augu¬ stinus loco proxime citato de corrept. et grat. cap. 10 : « Deus igitur permisit hominem ten¬ tari, quem sciebat esse casurum, quia simul videbat, eo casu se uti posse ad misericor¬ diam, et justitiam declarandam, dum ex damnata massa alios juste puniet, alios mise¬ ricorditer liberabit. » De pulchritudine universitatis, qua! ex hac permissione consurgit, loquitur idem Augu¬ stinus in lib. ni. de libero arbitrio, cap. 9. ubi proposita qusestione : « Cur Deus non fe¬ cerit, ut nulla creatura ad miseriam perve¬ niret, » neque enim id aut omnipotens non potuit, aut bonus invidit, respondet, ordinem creaturarum a summa usque ad infimam gradibus justis ita decurrere, ut ille invideat, qui dixerit, ista non esset , invideat etiam ille, qui dixerit, ista talis esset. Si enim quis diceret, lunam aut omnino non fieri, aut certe aiqualem soli fieri debuisse, invideret non pa¬ rum ornatum rerum universitati ; sic etiam qui diceret, animas rationales aut creandas non fuisse, aut ita creandas ut numquam 306 LIBER III. peccarent, ita ut nulla esset anima, quae pec¬ cando misera fieret, is invideret ornatum aliquem mundo. Siquidem anima illa, quam¬ vis misera, melior est quolibet corpore, et ornat locum, in quo a Deo pro merito suae actionis ponitur. Quemadmodum, ut idem Augustinus ait, nihil est in domo nobilius homine, nihil ab¬ jectius cloaca, et tamen servus in peccato tali deprehensus, ut mundandae cloacae dignus habeatur, ornat eam etiam turpitudine sua, et utrumque horum, id est, turpitudo servi, et mundatio cloacae jam conjunctum, et reda¬ ctum in quamdam sui generis unitatem, ita dispositae domui coaptatur, atque subtexitur, ut ejus universitati ordinatissimo decore conveniat. Sed quamvis ex peccato omnipo¬ tentia Dei id bonum eliciat, atque inde rerum universitatem exornet: non tamen propterea, aut peccata necessaria fuerunt, aut non po¬ tuit Deus angelos, atque homines omnes a peccato, et miseria liberare, non enim pec¬ cata, aut miseria ordinem universitatis exor¬ nant, sed angeli, aut animae, quae pro merito culpae ordinantur ad poenas : neque Deo deesse poterat ratio exornandi rerum uni¬ versitatem, si nullus angelus, et nullus homo peccare voluisset, quemadmodum (ut ibidem Augustinus ait) si servus peccare noluisset, non defuisset domesticae disciplinae alia pro¬ visio, qua cloacae, et loca caetera munda¬ rentur. Itaque sic fecit ad rerum pulchritudinem, ut Deus permiserit tentari primos homines, quos casuros esse praeviderat, ut tamen alio modo rerum pulchritudini consuli potuerit, si aut homo non fuisset casurus, aut Deus id, quod futurum praeviderat, permittere no¬ luisset, de qua re vide eumdem Augustinum lib. in. de libero arbitrio, cap. 12. Superest ultima ratio, quae ab ipsius ho¬ minis utilitate sumitur. Primum enim (ut Augustinus scribit lib. xi. de Gen. ad litteram, cap. 4.) non videtur magnae laudis fuisse fu¬ turum hominem, si propterea posset bene vivere, quia nemo male vivere suaderet. De¬ inde perspiciebat Deus valde utile id futurum ad eruditionem sanctorum ; nimirum ut casus primi hominis praeberet futuris sanctis contra cupiditatem dubitationis exemplum, et incu¬ teret contra superbiam timorem pium (ut ait S. Augustinus in eodem libro cap. 6. Adhaec permisit Deus tentationem, et casum primi hominis, quia praescius erat, quod ab ejus semine adjuto sua gratia, ipse diabolus fuerat sanctorum gloria majore vincendus, ut idem loquitur Augustinus lib. xiv. de civit. Dei cap. 27. Denique addere possumus, occasione peccati primorum hominum Christum nobis donatum, per quem majora Dei munera sus¬ cepimus, quam ea fuerint, quae per Adamum amisimus. Nam (ut Apostolus testatur Rom» v.) ubi abundavit delictum, superabundavit et gratia. Et : Non sicut delictum, ita et do¬ num (1). « Validius, inquit, S. Leo.serm. 12. de passione Domini, donum factum est liber¬ tatis, quam debitum servitutis. »* Et, ut idem ait in serm. 3. de Pentecoste : « Si homo diabolica fraude deceptus, a lege sibi posita, per concupiscentiam mon devicisset, creator mundi creatura non fieret. » Quod etiam docetS. Augustinus serm. 9. de verbis Apo¬ stoli, cum ait : Nulla causa fuit veniendi Christo Domino, nisi peccatores salvos facere. Itaque Ecclesia cum exultatione, et gratiarum actione in vigiliis paschal bus canit : o felix culpa, quae talem, ac tantum meruit habere redem¬ ptorem.