Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 1: The opinion, or rather most absurd heresy, of Illyricus is set forth
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We explained in the preceding book that first question: whether there is any true sin which is carried over to posterity through carnal generation. There follows now the other question, on the nature and notion of the same sin. Now there are five errors to be avoided in this part, of which we shall discourse in order, before we come to explaining and defending that opinion which we judge to be most true.
The first error, then, is of Matthias Illyricus, a man in a certain manner born for devising monstrosities. He wrote many books on the nature of the sin of origin, of which one is entitled: Most Evident Demonstrations on the Essence of the Image of God and of the Devil; another: On the Occasion of Avoiding Error; a third: On the Eminent Utility of This Doctrine; a fourth: Know Thyself; a fifth: Refutation of Certain Persons Holding the Contrary. There is also extant a book of a certain disciple of Illyricus, which is entitled: Methodical Proof of the Proposition that Original Sin Is a Substance — in which book sin is everywhere called something subsisting, present and working in man, etc. His opinion can be comprehended in these propositions. First proposition: Sin, if it be taken generally, is a thing transcending all the predicaments; but taken specially, certain sins pertain to the predicament of substance, others to the predicament of quantity, or of quality, or of where, or of habit, and so of the rest. Second proposition: The sin of origin is a substance, not a quality, or a relation, or anything of that kind. Third: The sin of origin is nothing else than the substantial image of the devil. Fourth: The rational soul, through the sin of the first man, was substantially corrupted whole, and transformed from the image of God into the image of the devil — so that, as in a dead man the substantial form of the corpse is in place of the soul, so after the sin of Adam there is in the soul a certain most hideous substantial form in place of that which had been before. Fifth: That change cannot properly be called generation, or creation, but transformation — such as when wine is turned into vinegar.
This his opinion Illyricus strives to confirm with very many arguments, of which some are drawn from Scripture and reason — which we shall refute a little later in their place; others are sought from various testimonies of Martin Luther — which we leave to Chemnitz and Wigand, and also to Heshusius and Mörlin, to unravel. For those four Lutheran theologians wrote against Illyricus — although otherwise John Wigand was a colleague of the same Illyricus in writing the Centuries.
And perhaps, if we were willing to search the writings and opinions of Luther, and from them, as Illyricus demands, to make judgment on the present controversy, not those four Masters, but Illyricus alone would carry off the victory. For certainly Martin Luther, in the commentary on chapter 3 of the book of Genesis, explaining those words — Then the eyes of them both were opened — signifies not obscurely that the sin of origin pertains to the substance of man: “See,” says he, “what follows from that opinion, if we determine that original justice was not of the nature, but a certain superfluous gift, superadded. As thou dost posit that justice was not of the essence of man, will it not likewise follow that the sin which succeeded is not of the essence of man?” These words of Luther favor Illyricus openly enough; nor do the glosses of certain men satisfy, who endeavor to twist them elsewhere. The same Luther also, in the explication of Psalm 50, treating those words — For behold I was conceived in iniquities — says thus: “David speaks not of any works, but simply of the matter and the very being; and he says: the human seed — that is, the mass from which I was conceived — is wholly corrupted with vice and sin. The matter itself is vitiated. That clay from which this little vessel began to be formed is damnable.” And a little after: “The offspring in the womb, before we are born and begin to be men, is sin.” Thus Luther.
Again, those very men who put forth the longest disputations against Illyricus write not a few things which seem to make the cause of Illyricus better. For John Wigand, in the propositions on the sin of origin, proposition 119, writes that the sin of origin is a guilty thing, and by its nature worthy of eternal death, and condemned by God, unless remission be made through Christ. But assuredly, to be a guilty thing and worthy of eternal death unless remission be made befits not an accident, but a substance — and a living and rational substance. For it is not the theft that is worthy of the gibbet, but the thief; nor can remission be made to the theft, but to the thief. Wherefore Wigand seems to assert the very thing he assails: namely, that the sin of origin is a substance, not an accident. The same author, proposition 213, writes that through the sin of the first man the whole substance of man was corrupted and depraved, and not his accidents only, as the Sophists taught. But the scholastic theologians, whom this man after his manner calls Sophists, say for this reason that not the substance of man, but his accidents, were corrupted through sin: because no part of the human essence or substance, nor even any power, perished; but justice was lost, and in its place injustice and depravity succeeded; and that both justice and injustice are accidents was, up to this age — in which monsters of opinions are everywhere born — beyond controversy. This Wigand, then, who against the opinion of the sophists teaches that not the accidents only, but also the substance of man was corrupted — what else does he signify but that justice and injustice are not accidents, but substance? And this is what Illyricus was endeavoring to effect with so many of his books. Again, Tilemann Heshusius, another antagonist of Illyricus, in the book written on this very question, not only confesses that the whole substance of man was corrupted and depraved through sin, but also openly teaches that the image of God in man was a substance; and that the image of God was lost through sin, and the image of the devil succeeded into its place, not Tilemann alone, but all the Lutherans concede. From which it follows that the former substance of man perished, and another came on through a certain transformation. And I know not what else Illyricus could wish, than what these his adversaries so liberally give. Finally, Martin Chemnitz, who among the first professes himself an enemy of Illyricus, in the Resolution on the Sin of Origin says that the whole mass of the soul is corrupted with the highest and extreme depravation. The same, in the Examination of the Council of Trent, session 5, page 154, says that sin is whatever is repugnant to the divine law, whether it be a defect, or an inclination, or reason. And so Chemnitz will have even reason itself, which is the supreme part of man, to be sin, because it too is repugnant to the law of God. But what else, I ask, does Illyricus teach? We see, then, the enemies of Illyricus, whether unawares or by collusion, not rarely passing over into his camp. But whatever be of them, we contend that the opinion of Illyricus is false and absurd, and repugnant to the Word of God, to the symbol of the faith, to the tradition of the Fathers, and to most manifest reason.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
Explicuimus lib. superiore primam illam quaestionem, sitne aliquod verum peccatum, quod per carnalem generationem trajiciatur ad posteros. Sequitur nunc altera quaestio de natura et ratione ejusdem peccati. Sunt au¬ tem quinque errores in hac parte vitandi, de quibus ordine disseremus, antequam ad eam sententiam explicandam, et defendendam veniamus, quam verissimam esse censemus. Primus igitur error est Matthiae Illyrici, hominis ad monstra excogitanda quodam modo nati. Is multos libros conscripsit de natura peccati originis, quorum unus inscri¬ bitur : Demonstrationes evidentissimse de essentia imaginis Dei et diaboli ; alter : De occasione vitandi erroris; Tertius : De ex¬ imia utilitate hujus doctrina; ; Quartus : Nosce teipsum ; Quintus : Refutatio quo¬ rumdam ; contrarium sentientium. Extat etiam liber cujusdam Illyrici discipuli, qui inscribitur Methodica probatio propositio¬ nis, quod peccatum originale sit substantia, per D. M. Pau. Rei. D. V. V. in quo libro peccatum passim dicitur subsistens quiddam, praesens et operans in homine etc. Sententia vero ejus his propositionibus comprehendi potest. Prima propositio. Peccatum si generatim sumatur, res est transcendens omnia praedi¬ camenta; speciatim vero quaedam peccata pertinent ad praedicamentum substantia;, alia ad praedicamentum quantitatis, vel qua¬ litatis vel ubi, vel habitus; et sic de cae- teris. Secunda propositio. Peccatum origi¬ nis substantia est, non qualitas, vel ratio, vel aliquid ejusmodi. Tertia. Peccatum origi¬ nis nihil est aliud nisi substantialis imago diaboli. Quarta. Anima rationalis per peci catum primi hominis substantialiter tota cor¬ rupta est, ac transformata in imaginem dia¬ boli ex imagine Dei : ut quemadmodum in homine mortuo forma substantialis cadaveris est loco animae, ita post peccatum Adae sit in anima forma quaedam teterrima substan¬ tialis pro ea, quae ante fuerat. Quinta. Mu¬ tatio ista non potest proprie dici generatio, vel creatio, sed transformatio, qualis est, cum vinum vertitur in acetum. Hanc suam sententiam plurimis argu¬ mentis Illyricus confirmare nititur, quorum alia ducuntur a Scriptura et ratione, quae nos paulo post suo loco refellemus ; alia pe¬ tuntur ex variis Martini Lutheri testimoniis, quae nos Kcmnitio et Wighando, nccnon lleshusio efMerlino enodanda relinquimus.' Scripserunt enim adversus Illyricum quatuor isti theologi Lutherani, quamvis alioqui Joannes Wighandus ejusdem Illyrici collega fuerit in Centuriis conscribendis. Et fortasse, si Lutheri scripta et sententias scrutari vellemus, et ex iis, ut Illyricus po- (1) Gen. 111, 7. CAPUT I. 387 stulat, de praesenti controversiajudicium face¬ remus, non quatuor illi Magistri, sed unus Illyricus victoriam reportaret. Certe enim Martinus Lutherus in commcnt. cap. 3. lib. Genes, explicans illa verba: Tunc aperti sunt oculi amborum (1), non obscure signi¬ ficat, peccatum originis ad substantiam ho¬ minis pertinere : « Yide, inquit, quid sequa¬ tur ex illa sententia, si statuamus justitiam originalem non fuisse naturae, sed donum quoddam superfluum, superadditum. An non sicut ponis justitiam non fuisse de es¬ sentia homiDis, ita etiam sequetur, pecca¬ tum quod successit, non esse de essentia ho¬ minis? » Ilacc Lutheri verba satis aperte Illyrico favent, nec satisfaciunt glossa) quo¬ rumdam, qui aliorsum ea detorquere co¬ nantur. Idem etiam Lutherus in explicatione Psal. l. tractans illa verba : Ecce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, sic ait : « Non loquitur David de ullis operibus, sed simpliciter de materia, et ipso esse et dicit semen humanum, id est, massa, ex qua conceptus sum, tota est vitio et peccato corrupta. Materia ipsa est vitiata. Lutum illud, ex quo vasculum hoc fingi ere¬ pit, damnabile est. » Et paulo post: « Foe¬ tus, inquit, in utero, antequam nascimur, et homines esse incipimus, peccatum est. » Ha)c Lutherus. Rursus illi ipsi, qui adversus Illyricum disputationes longissimas ediderunt, non pauca scribunt, qua) causam Illyrici melio¬ rem facere videantur. Nam Johannes Wig- handus in propositionibus de peccato ori¬ ginis proposit. II 9. scribit, peccatum ori¬ ginis esse rem ream, et natura sua dignam morte aeterna, et damnatam a Deo, nisi per Christum remissio fiat. At profecto rem esse .ream et dignam aeterna morte nisi remissio fiat, non convenit accidenti, sed substantia), et substantia) viventi, ac rationali. Neque enim furtum dignum est patibulo, sed fur ; nec furto, sed furi potest remissio fieri. Quare videtur Wighandus id ipsum asserere, quod oppugnat, peccatum videlicet originis subs¬ tantiam esse, non accidens. Idem auctor pro¬ posit. 213. scribit, per peccatum primi ho¬ minis totam substantiam hominis esse cor¬ ruptam ac depravatam, et non accidentia ejus tantum, ut Sophistae docebant. At scholastici theologi, quos iste more suo Sophistas vocat, ideo dicunt, non substan¬ tiam hominis, sed accidentia per peccatum esse corrupta, quia non pars aliqua essentia), sive substantiae humanae, ac ne potentia qui¬ dem aliqua periit, sed justitia amissa est, et in ejus locum injustitia, pravitasque succes¬ sit, et tam justitiam, quam injustitiam acci¬ dentia esse usque ad hoc saeculum, in quo monstra opinionum passim nascantur, extra controversiam fuit. Iste igitur W ghandus, qui contra sophi¬ starum sententia o docet, non accidentia so¬ lum, sed etiam substantiam hominis esse cor¬ ruptam, quid aliud significat nisi justitiam et injustitiam non accidentia, sed substantiam esse ? atque hoc est, quod Illyricus tot suis libris conabatur efficere. Rursus Tilmannus Heshusius alter Illyrici antagonista, in libro de hac ipsa qua)stione conscripto, non solum fatetur, totam homi¬ nis substantiam per peccatum corruptam ac depravatam esse, sed etiam aperte docet, imaginem ] ei in homine fuisse substantiam; imaginem autem Dei per peccatum amissam, et in ejus locum imaginem diaboli succes¬ sisse, non Tilmannus solus, sed omnes Lu- therani concedunt. Ex quo sequitur, priorem hominis substantiam periisse, et aliam per transformationem quamdam videlicet acces¬ sisse. Nescio autem quid aliud Illyricus op¬ tare queat, nisi quod isti ejus adversarii tam liberaliter dant. Denique Martinus Kemnitius, qui inter pri¬ mos hostem se Illyrici profitetur, in Resolu¬ tione de peccato originis, dicit, totam mas¬ sam anima) corruptam esse summa atque extrema depravatione. Idem in Examine Goncilii Tridentini sessione 5. pag. 454. di¬ cit, peccatum esse, quicquid repugnat divi¬ na) legi, sive sit defectus, sive inclinatio, sive ratio. Itaque ipsam etiam rationem, qua) est suprema pars hominis, Kemnitius vult esse peccatum, quia ipsa etiam legi Dei repugnat. At quid, qua)so, aliud docet Illyricus? Yide- mus igitur hostes Illyrici, sive imprudentes, sive praevaricantes non raro in ejus castra transire ; sed quicquid de illis sit, sententiam Illyrici falsam, atque absurdam esse, et Verbo Dei, symbolo fidei, traditioni Patrum, et manifestissimae rationi repugnare conten¬ dimus. (i) Gen. III, 7. 388 LIBER V.