Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 2: The error of Illyricus is refuted, who asserted that the sin of origin is a substance
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The divine Scripture teaches, not obscurely, that sin is not a substance or some nature, but a privation and defect. For St. John says: All things were made by him: and without him was made nothing, John 1. And St. Paul adds: Every creature of God is good, 1 Timothy 4. From which two places it evidently follows that no substance or nature is evil, and thereby that none is sin. For since sin, by the consent of all, is evil, if the same sin were a substance, either not every substance would have been made by God, which is repugnant to the Gospel, or not every creature of God would be good, which is repugnant to the Apostle.
Next, we can argue from Scripture according to the common explication of the Lutherans. For blessed Paul (as the Lutherans commonly teach) discourses of original sin in Romans 7, when he says: “I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good. For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I hate, that I do. And if I do that evil which I hate, it is no more I that work it, but sin that dwelleth in me.” From which place we perspicuously understand that the sin which the Lutherans define to be original is not the man himself, but dwells in the man; and has its seat not in the mind, but in the flesh. For that in this place “flesh” signifies not the whole man, but one part only, is certain from this, that it is distinguished over against the mind. For to the mind pertains that “I will the good,” and that “I hate the evil.” And most openly a little below: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind. And again: Therefore I myself, with the mind serve the law of God; but with the flesh, the law of sin. But if the sin of origin is not in the mind, but in the flesh, how much less can the mind itself be said to be sin, as Illyricus contends? Nor can it be answered that the Apostle, who says these things of himself, had been justified from sin. For by the common opinion of the Lutherans, the sin of origin is not so remitted in justification that it is not, but that it is not imputed; nay, from this very place, where blessed Paul, who without doubt was justified, speaks of himself, the Lutherans prove that in just men sin always cleaves, and is truly and properly sin. Wherefore, since in the Apostle Paul there was the sin of origin, as the Lutherans would have it, and in the same there was a good mind, fighting with that sin, as he himself testifies, it follows most openly that the sin of origin is nothing less than that which Illyricus dreams — who affirms that not so much something in the mind, as the mind itself, is sin.
Now the symbol of the faith no less openly destroys from the foundations that paradox of Illyricus. The first article is: “I believe in one God.” But the delirium of Illyricus makes as many gods as there are minds remaining in original justice. For as original sin pertains to the substance of man after the fall of Adam, by Illyricus's opinion, so also original justice pertained to the substance of man before the fall of the same. But because it is proper to God alone to be just not by an accidental gift, but substantially, as St. Gregory teaches, homily 14 [al. 11] on the Gospels, it follows that the minds of the first men before the fall were certain gods, and that even now there are as many gods in heaven as there are Angels endowed with original justice; for all are substantially just and good. The same first article teaches that “the one God is the creator of all things.” But if the opinion of Illyricus were true, God would not be the creator of the souls of men, but the devil — which is the heresy of Manichaeus. For after the fall of Adam the very substance of the human soul is sin, by Illyricus's opinion; but of sin the author is not God, but the devil, as that same Illyricus confesses. Illyricus answers that God is truly called the creator of all things, because he himself created this nature good, which afterwards, by the work of the devil, was made evil. But the question is about that evil substance: who made it, and daily makes it. For if the devil, then the devil is the creator of some substance, and God is not the creator of all things. If God, then he is the author of sin — which nevertheless is condemned in express words in the Augsburg Confession, article 19, of which confession Illyricus professes himself a follower. Illyricus answers that that substance is wholly from God and wholly from the devil: from God indeed, because he preserves and propagates this nature so corrupted and vitiated; from the devil, because he so vitiated it and (as he himself, with his distinguished decency, speaks) utterly befouled it; and he adds that there is no razor of the sophists so sharp as to be able to distinguish, in the soul of a sinful man, what is of God and what of the devil. But this response, to remove one error, brings in two. For first, if God propagates and preserves this nature which is so utterly corrupted and vitiated that truly and properly it is itself vice and sin, certainly it follows that God is the author of sin. For what is it to propagate and preserve sin, but to be the author of sin? And so the true and good God will be the author of evil, by Illyricus's opinion — an impiety which far surpasses the impiety of Manichaeus and Marcion, since they referred the cause of sin to a certain evil God, not to the good. Next, if the devil so depraved the nature of the first-born that through that depravation the good substantial form perished, and an evil substantial form was produced, who does not see that the devil can be called the creator of a substance? Illyricus answers that the devil is not a creator, because he created no substance, but transformed a good one into an evil: “Just as,” says he, “simple women know how to turn milk into cheese or butter, and to transmute wine into vinegar, and yet are neither called nor are creatresses.” But these things make nothing to the matter; since milk and wine are things naturally transmutable, and therefore it ought not to seem wonderful if, natural causes being applied by man, they are easily transmuted. But spiritual substances, such as rational souls and Angels, are not naturally corruptible or substantially mutable, since they lack matter; and therefore God alone can found them from nothing, or reduce them to nothing, or even make others from others; nor does the creation of such things require the omnipotence of the founder less than the substantial transformation of the same things. Nor does it much help Illyricus that he sometimes, when hard pressed, says that not the whole substance of the soul was converted into another whole by the work of the devil, but only the supreme part — that is, reason. For (to omit that he himself very often says that the whole soul, nay the whole man, is corrupted) there are not in the soul of man several substances, but one, and that indivisible, though by reason we distinguish in it several grades and as it were parts. But that one substance can in no way in very deed be partly preserved, partly destroyed; but either it must be wholly preserved, or wholly perish.
Next, that doctrine of Illyricus fights with the articles of faith in which the mystery of the Lord's Incarnation is contained. For the Christian faith teaches that a human nature was assumed by the divine Word, of the same species with ours — that is, flesh and soul, such as we have: “His flesh” (says St. Leo, in epistle 11 to Julian) “was not of another nature than ours, nor was a soul breathed into him from another principle than into the rest of men — a soul which excelled not by diversity of kind, but by sublimity of virtue.” But by Illyricus's opinion our soul is sin; therefore either Christ assumed sin into the unity of his person — than which nothing more absurd can be feigned — or he had not a soul of the same nature with ours, which (as we said) is manifestly repugnant to the Symbol of faith. Illyricus answers that Christ assumed a human soul, not such as we have, but such as was in Adam before sin; and that the one is distinguished from the other not by species or physical genus, but only theological. And by the theological difference he understands that the highest grade of the rational soul is not the same in us and in Christ, though the rest of the soul is the same. But the highest grade, if we will philosophize rightly, pertains to the physical species; for it is that through which we are physically distinguished from the other animals. Wherefore Arius and Apollinaris were judged by our Fathers to destroy the mystery of the Incarnation, because they did not acknowledge in Christ a mind of the same nature with ours. See Epiphanius, heresies 69 and 77, and Augustine, heresies 49 and 55. Moreover, the error of Illyricus fights with the article on the resurrection. For there will not rise again the same substance of man which now is, and which through death ceases to be; for this whole, by Illyricus's opinion, is sin, and sin without doubt will not rise again. Therefore another substance will be produced, and thereby it will not be a true resurrection, but a new production; for there is no resurrection except of that which fell. Illyricus answers that the very same individual will rise, but with the substantial form changed. But in what way will it be the same individual, if it will not have the same substantial form? It fights finally with the article on eternal life. For if the same who fell will not rise, neither will the same be crowned who strove in the contest.
Thirdly, against the dream of Illyricus can be produced the clearest testimonies of the Fathers. St. Basil, in the oration That God Is Not the Author of Evils: “Do not imagine,” says he, “that there is some proper substance of evil. For malice is not something subsisting.” St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the oration on Holy Baptism, near the end: “Believe,” says he, “that there is no essence of evil, and that it neither subsists of itself, nor was created by God.” St. Epiphanius, heresy 37: “Evil,” says he, “at one time was not; nor was there any root of malice; nor is evil something subsisting of itself.” St. Ambrose, book 1 of the Hexaemeron, chapter 8: “Assuredly,” says he, “malice is not substantial, but an accident.” And a little after he affirms that it is the pestilent heresy of Valentinus, Marcion, and Manichaeus that malice is a substance. St. Jerome, in the epistle to Ctesiphon: “Never,” says he, “wilt thou hear from me that nature is evil.” St. Augustine, book 7 of the Confessions, chapter 12: “That evil,” says he, “whose origin I sought, is not a substance; for if it were a substance, it would be good.” And in the explication of Psalm 68: “I sought what iniquity might be, and I found not a substance, but a perversity of will, twisted away from the highest substance, thee, O God, toward the lowest.” And book 1 against Julian, chapter 3 [al. 8]: “We do not resist the Manichaeans, unless we maintain that evils have not arisen save from goods, and that those evils are not a substance, but the vices of created substances.” Finally, all the Fathers execrate Manichaeus as a heretic, because he said that evil is a substance which God had not made, and which in man was the fountain and origin of all sins. Which same thing Illyricus says of the sin of origin: namely, that it is a certain substance which God did not make, and which is the cause of all the sins that are perpetrated by men. He himself answers that his opinion is very far distant from the error of Manichaeus: for Manichaeus introduces two eternal natures, one good, the other evil; but he acknowledges only one eternal nature, and that good — for the evil came on afterwards. He adds also that his Lutheran adversaries seem rather the Manichaeans, seeing they set up two natures in man, one good — that is, the substance — the other evil — that is, sin, which they will have to be a true and positive quality; but that he himself posits only one nature in man, either good or evil: good, namely, before the fall of Adam; evil, after the fall of the same. But in very truth both seem Manichaeans — both Illyricus and his Lutheran adversaries — but he the more. They indeed, while they define the sin of origin to be a real and positive quality, are altogether compelled to say either that God is not the cause of that evil quality, and thereby is not the cause of all the things which in very deed exist — which is one of the errors of the Manichaeans — or certainly that he is the cause of sin, which is an error graver than was the Manichaeans'. But Illyricus, even if he clears himself of one error of the Manichaeans, because he does not teach that the nature of evil is without beginning and everlasting, yet will never clear himself of the other three errors of Manichaeus: namely, that some substance is evil, and procreated not by God, but by the devil; that the cause of our sins is not free choice, but that evil substance; finally, that there are in man two substances, one good, the other evil. For although in the book On the Substance of the Image of God and of the Devil he says that the whole man is evil, yet in the Refutation of Those Holding the Contrary he says that not the whole man, nor the whole soul, but only that which is highest in the soul — that is, the heart — is corrupted and evil. There are, then, in the same man, by Illyricus's opinion, the substance of the body, and of the soul as to its lower part, good; and the substance of the heart, or the higher part, evil. But if the other Lutherans (Illyricus being witness) are to be reckoned Manichaeans because they posit in man a good substance and an evil quality, how much more must Illyricus himself be held a Manichaean, who posits in man one good substance and another evil substance?
But let us come to the reasons. The first reason: if sin truly and properly corrupts the substance of the soul, then the rational soul is corruptible, and in very deed is corrupted, and ceases to be — which is most openly against the Catholic faith, and against reason. The second reason: if through the sin of Adam the former substance of man perished, and another succeeded into its place, then God ineptly chides Adam, saying: Adam, where art thou? And: Who hath told thee that thou wast naked? And: Hast thou not eaten of the tree? And: Because thou hast hearkened to the voice of thy wife, etc. For that Adam who had eaten of the tree, and had hearkened to the voice of his wife, had already perished; and he with whom God was speaking after the fall was another, differing in kind from the former. The third reason: if the sin of origin is the very substance of man, as Illyricus says, then the sin of origin does many good things — understands, disputes, judges, writes against itself, believes, hopes, loves, exhorts others to believe, and, what is more wonderful, lives innocently. For Illyricus, who did not doubt that he himself was wholly sin, nevertheless writes of himself, at the end of the book on the essence of the image of God and of the devil, that he lived many years honestly and innocently: “I lived,” says he, “many years at Wittenberg; and of that time of life honestly and innocently passed I can produce many witnesses worthy of credit.” But who would believe that that which is nothing but evil, and the fountain of all evils, could do so many good things as even to deserve the title of innocence? The fourth reason: if the sin of origin is the substance of man, it is either his whole substance, or a part. If the whole, then that is false which Illyricus says in the Refutation, that sin is nothing but the highest grade of the rational soul; for that grade alone is not the whole man. If a part, then that is false which the same Illyricus so often repeats in the book on the essence of the image of God and of the devil — that the whole essence of man, and the whole man, is corrupted and transformed into another substance, as when a cask of wine is wholly turned into vinegar; and all those outcries which he uses against those who extenuate the sin of origin are not only empty, but can even be turned back upon himself. For as he said that Christ is made a half-redeemer by those who did not confess that the whole man is corrupted, so we can say that Christ is made by Illyricus not a half, but far less than a half redeemer. For if only one grade of the rational soul was corrupted, certainly Christ repaired only one grade of the rational soul; for he came to seek and to save that which had perished, Luke 19.
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CAPUT II Refutatur error Illyrici, qui asseruit peccatum originis esse substantiam. Scriptura divina non obscure docet, pec¬ catum non esse substantiam, sive naturam aliquam, sed privationem, ac defectum. Nam S. Joannes dicit : Omnia per ipsum fa¬ cta sunt , et sine ipso factum est nihil Joan. i. Sanctus autem Paulus addit : Omnis crea¬ tura Dei bona est 1 Timoth. iv (i). Ex qui¬ bus duobus locis evidenter sequitur nul¬ lam substantiam, sive naturam esse malam, ac per hoc neque esse peccatum. Nam cum peccatum omnium consensu sit malum, si idem peccatum substantia esset, vel non om¬ nis substantia essetfacta a Deo, quod repug¬ nat Evangelio, vel non omnis creatura Dei bona esset, quod repugnat Apostolo. Deinde argumentari possumus ex Scriptu¬ ra, juxta Lutheranoruin communem explica¬ tionem. Nam B. Paulus (ut Lutherani com¬ muniter docent) de peccato originali disserit ad Roman. yii. cum ait : « Scio quod non habitat in me, hoc est, in carne mea bonum. Non enim quod volo bonum hoc ago, sed quod odi malum hoc facio. Si autem quod odi malum, hoc facio, jam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum. » Ex quo loco perspicue intelligimjis, pecca¬ tum quod Lutherani originale esse definiunt, non esse ipsum hominem, sed in homine ha¬ bitare; et non in mente, sed in carne sedem habere. Quod enim hoc loco caro non signifi¬ cet totum hominem, sed alteram partem tan¬ tum, certum est ex eo quod distinguitur contra mentem. Nam ad mentem pertinet illud, volo bonum , et illud, odi malum. Et apertissime paulo inferius : Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae. Et rur¬ sus: Igitur ego ipse mente servio legi Dei, cor¬ ne. autem legi pecca' i. Quod si peccatum originis non est in men¬ te, sed in carne, quanto minus ipsa mens di¬ ci poterit esse peccatum, ut contendit Illy¬ ricus? neque vero responderi potest, Apo¬ stolum, qui de se haec dicit, justificatum fu¬ isse a peccato. Nam ex communi sententia Lutheranorum, peccatum originis non ita remittitur in justificatione, ut non sit. sed ut non imputetur, imo ex hoc ipso loco, ubi B. Paulus, qui sine dubio justificatus erat, de se loquitur, probant Lutherani, in homi¬ nibus justis peccatum semper haerere, et esse vere, proprieque peccatum. Quare cum in Apostolo Paulo esset peccatum originis, ut Lutherani volunt, et in eodem esset mens bona, cum peccato illo pugnans, ut ipse te¬ statur, sequitur apertissime peccatum origi¬ nis nihil minus esse, quam id, quod Illyricus somniat, qui non tam in mente, quam ipsam mentem affirmat esse peccatum. Jam vero symbolum fidei non minus aper¬ te paradoxum istud Illyrici funditus destruit. Primus articulus est: « Credo in unum Deum. » At Illyrici delirium tot facit Deos, quot sunt mentes in originali justitia perma¬ nentes. Nam quemadmodum originale pec¬ catum ad substantiam hominis pertinet post lapsum A dee, ex Illyrici sententia, sic etiam originalis justitia ad substantiam hominis pertinebat ante lapsum ejusdem. Quia vero proprium est solius Dei, ut sit non ex acci¬ dente dono, sed substantialiter justus, ut S. Gregorius docet hom. I i. inEvang., sequitur ut mentes primorum hominum ante lapsum, Dii quidam essent, et nunc etiam tot sint in coelo Dii, quod sunt Angeli, originali justitia praediti. Omnes enim substantialiter justi, et boni sunt. Idem primus articulus docet, <■ unum Deum esse creatorem omnium rerum. » At si vera esset Illyrici sententia, Deus non esset creator animarum hominum, sed diabolus, qiicC est heeresis Manichaei. Nam post lapsum Adae ipsa humanae animae substantia est pec¬ catum, ex Illyrici sententia; peccati autem non est auctor Deus, sed diabolus, ut idem ipse Illyricus confitetur. Respondet Illyricus, Deum vere dici crea-- torem omnium rerum, quia creavit ipse hanc naturam bonam, quae postea opera dia¬ boli facta est mala. At quaistio est dc ista substantia mala, quis eam fecerit, et quoti- die faciat. Nam si diabolus, igitur diabolus est creator alicujus substantiae, et non est Deus creator ominum rerum. Si Deus, igi¬ tur est auctor peccati. Quod tamen disertis verbis damnatur in confessione Augustana ari . 19. cuju.: confessionis sectatorem se Illy¬ ricus profitetur. Respondet Illyricus, istam susbtantiam to¬ tam esse a Deo, et totam a diabolo ; a Deo (1) Joan. I. 3: I Tiro. IV. 4. CAPUT If. 389 quidem, quia ipse conservat, et propagat hanc naturam ita corruptam ct vitiatam ; a diabolo autem, quia ipse eam sic vitiavit, et (ut ipse pro sua insigni honestate loquitur) penitus concacavit, et addit, nullam esse no¬ vaculam sophistarum ita acutam, ut possit distinguere in anima hominis peccatoris, quid sit Dei, et quid diaboli. At liacc responsio, ut unum errorem tollat, inducit duos. Primum enim si Deus propagat , et conservat hanc naturam qua- ita penitus corrupta et vitiata est ut vere et proprie sit ipsa vitium, atque peccatum, certe sequitur, ut Deus sit auctor peccati. Quid enim est pro¬ pagare, et conservare peccatum, nisi aucto¬ rem esse peccati ? Itaque Deus verus, ac bo¬ nus erit auctor mali, ex Illyrici sententia, quae impietas Manichaei et Marcionis impie¬ tatem longe superat. Siquidem illi peccati causam in Deum quemdam malum, non in bonum retulerunl. Deinde si diabolus, initio natorum ita de¬ pravavit, ut per eam depravationem forma substantialis bona perierit, et forma sub¬ stantialis mala producta fuerit, quis non vi¬ det, diabolum creatorem substantiae dici posse ? Hespondct Illyricus, diabolum non esse creatorem, quia non creavit substantiam ul¬ lam, sed bonam transformavit in malam : « Quemadmodum, inquit ipse, muliercula' norunt lac in caseum, vel butyrum convertere, ct vinum in acetum transmutare, et tamen neque dicuntur, neque sunt creatrices. » At nihil ista faciunt ad rem, siquidem lac et vinum, res sunt naturaliter transmutabi- les, et ideo non debet videri mirum, si adhi¬ bitis ab homine naturalibus causis, illa facile transmutentur. Substantia; vero spirituales, quales sunt animae rationales, et Angeli, non sunt naturaliter corruptibiles, aut substan¬ tialiter mutabiles, cum materia careant, et ideo solus Deus potest eas ex nihilo condere, aut in nihilum redigere : aut etiam ex aliis alias facere : neque minus requirit omnipo¬ tentiam conditoris, talium rerum creatio, quam earumdem rerum substantialis trans¬ formatio. Neque multum juvat Illyricum, quod ipse interdum, cum valde premitur, dicit, non totam anima; substantiam in aliam totam, diaboli opera, esse conversam; sed partem tantum supremam, id est, rationem. Nam (ut omittam, quod ipse idem sa' pissime dicat, tufam animam, immo tofum hominem, esse • • 1 ‘ < ■ " corruptum) non sunt in anima hominis plu- ros substantiaj, sed una, eaque impartibilis, licet ratione plures in ea gradus, ac veluti partes distinguamus. Illa autem una sub¬ stantia non potest ullo modo re ipsa partim conservari, partim destrui, sed aut tota con¬ servetur, aut tota pereat, necesse est. Pugnat deinde doctrina ista Illyrici cum articulis fidei, quibus Dominicaj Incarnatio¬ nis mysterium continetur. Siquidem fides Christiana docet, a Verbo divino naturam humanam assumptam, ejusdem speciei cum nostra, iri est, carnem et animam, qualem nos habemus : « Non alterius naturaj (inquit S. Leo in epist. xi. aci Julianum) erat ejus caro, quam nostra, nec alio illi, quam cal¬ leris hominibus anima est inspirata princi¬ pio, quaj excelleret, non diversitate generis, sed sublimitate virtutis. » At ex Illyrici, sen¬ tentia, anima nostra peccatum est, igitur aut Christus peccatum assumpsit in unitatem persona*, qui* nihil absurdius fingi potest; aut animam non habuit ejusdem naturaj cum nostra, quod (ut diximus) Symbolo fidei ma¬ nifeste repugnat. Respondet Illyricus, Christum assumpsisse animam humanam, non qualem nos habe¬ mus, sed qualis in Adamo fuit ante pecca¬ tum, distingui vero unam ab alia non specie, aut genere physico, sed tantum theologico. Intelligit autem per theologicam differen¬ tiam, quod summus graclus anima; rationalis non sit idem in nobis, et in Christo, tametsi reliqua anima sit eadem. At summus gradus, si recte philosophari velimus, ad speciem physicam pertinet. Ille siquidem est, per quem physice distingui¬ mur ab animantibus eseteris. Quocirca mysterium Incarnationis Arrius, et Apollinaris destruere judicati sunt a Pa¬ tribus nostris, quod mentem in Christo non agnoscerent, ejusdem naturae cum nostra. Vide Epiphanium haeresi 69. et 77. et Augu¬ stinum haeresi 49. et 53. Pugnat praeterea error Illyrici cum arti¬ culo dc resurrectione. Nam non resurget eadem substantia hominis, quae nunc est, et quae per mortem desinit esse. Haec enim tota ex Illyrici sententia peccatum est, et peccai- turu sine dubio non resurget. Igitur alia sub¬ stantia producetur, ac per hoc non erit vera resurrectio, sed nova productio. Resurrectio enim non est, nisi ejus, quod cecidit. Respondet Illyricus, resurrecturum idem omnino individuum, sed forma substantiali 390 LIBER V. mutata. At quo pacto idem erit individuum, si non habebit camdem formam substantia¬ lem? Pugnat denique cum articulo de vita a)ter- na. Nam si non resurget idem qui cecidit, non etiam coronabitur idem, qui in agone certavit. Tertio, adversus Illyrici somnium produci possunt clarissima testimonia Patrum. S. Ra¬ silius in oratione, quod Deus non sit auctor malorum : « Non imagineris, inquit, pro¬ priam aliquam esse substantiam mali. Nam malitia non est aliquid subsistens» » S. Gregorius Nazianzenus in oratione in S. Lavacrum, prope extrema : « Crede, in¬ quit, nullam esse mali essentiam, nec per se subsistere, nec a Deo creatam. » S. Epiphanius haeresi 37 : « Malum, in¬ quit, aliquando non erat,' neque radix ulla fuit malitiae, neque malum est quiddam per se subsistens. » S. Ambrosius lib. r. Hexameron, cap. S : <( Utique, inquit, non substantialis, sed acci¬ dens est malitia. » Et paulo post affirmat hccresim esse pestiferam Valentini, Marcionis et Manichaei, quod malitia sit substantia. S. Hieronymus in epist. ad Ctcsiphontcm : (i Nunquam, inquit, a me audies malam esse naturam. » S. Augustinus lib. vn. Confessionum, cap. 12 : « Malum, inquit, illud, quod quaerebam, unde esset, non est substantia, quia si sub¬ stantia esset, bonum esset. » Et in explica¬ tione Psal. lxyiii : « Quaesivi, inquit, quid esset iniquitas, et non inveni substantiam, sed a summa substantia, te Deo, detortam in infi¬ mam voluntatis perversionem. » Et lib. i. adversus Julianum cap. 3 : « Non, inquit, resistimus Manichaeis, nisi obtineamus, non esse mala orta nisi ex bonis, nec ea mala substantiam esse, sed substantiarum vitia creatarum. » Denique Patres omnes Manichaeum , ut haereticum exeerantur, quod diceret malum esse substantiam, quam non fecisset Deus, ct quse in homine fons esset, et origo omnium peccatorum. Quod idem Illyricus dicit de peccato originis, quod videlicet substantia quaedam sit, quam Deus non fecerit, et quae causa sit peccatorum omnium, quae ab ho¬ minibus perpetrantur. Respondet ipse, sententiam suam longis¬ sime a Manichaei errore distare. Manichaeum enim duas naturas aeternas introducere, u- nam bonam, alteram malam : se vero unam tantum naturam aeternam agnoscere, cain- que bonam, malam enim postea accessisse. Addit etiam adversarios suos Lutheranos vi¬ deri potius Manichaeos, quippe qui duas in homine naturas constituant, unam bonam, hoc est, substantiam, alteram malam, id est, peccatum, quod esse volunt veram, ac posi¬ tivam qualitatem : se autem unam tantum naturam in homine ponere, vel bonam, vel malam ; bonam videlicet ante lapsum Adae, malam post lapsum ejusdem. At revera utrique videntur Manichaei, et Illyricus, et adversarii ejus Lutherani, sed ipse magis. Illi quidem dum realem ct posi¬ tivam qualitatem peccatum originis esse de¬ finiunt, coguntur omnino dicere, vel Deum non esse causam illius qualitatis malse, ac per hoc non esse causam omnium rerum, quae revera existunt, qui est unus ex erro¬ ribus Manichaeorum ; vel certe causam esse peccati, qui est error gravior, quam fuerit Manichaeorum. Illyricus autem etiamsi se purgat ab uno Manichaeorum errore, quia non docet, mali naturam esse absque principio, et sempiter¬ nam, tamen nunquam se purgabit ab aliis tribus erroribus Manichaei, quod videlicet aliqua substantia sit mala, et non a Deo, sed a diabolo procreata ; quod peccatorum no¬ strorum non sit causa liberum arbitrium, sed substantia illa mala, quod denique dua) sint in homine substantia), una bona, altera mala. Nam etiamsi in libro de substantia imaginis Dei, et diaboli, dicat totum homi¬ nem esse malum : tamen in refutatione con¬ trarium sentientium dicit, non totum homi¬ nem, nec totam animam, sed solum id, quod est in anima summum, id est, cor, esse cor¬ ruptum et malum. Sunt igitur in eodem ho¬ mine, ex Illyrici sententia, substantia cor¬ poris, et anima), quoad partem inferiorem, bona; et substantia cordis, sive partis supe¬ rioris, mala. Quod si Lutherani ea)tcri (Illy¬ rico teste) censendi sunt Manichaei, quia ponunt in homine substantiam bonam, et qualitatem malam : quanto magis Illyricus ipse Manichams habendus erit, qui ponit in homine unam substantium bonam, et aliam substantiam malam? Sed veniamus ad rationes. Prima ratio, si peccatum corrumpit vere et proprie substan¬ tiam animse ; igitur anima rationalis cor¬ ruptibilis est, et re ipsa corrumpitur, ac desinit esse, quod est apertissime contra fi¬ dem Catholicam, ct rationem? CAPUT m. 391 Secunda ratio. Si per peccatum Adami prior substantia hominis periit, et alia in lo¬ cum ejus successit, igitur inepte Deus Ada- mum increpat, dicens : Aciam ubi es? Et : Quis tibi indicavit , ejuod nudus esses ? Et : Nonne quia comedisti de ligno ? Et : Quia au¬ disti vocem uxoris tux ctc. Nam Adam ille, qui comederat de ligno, et audierat vocem uxoris, jam perierat. Ille autem, cum quo post lapsum loquebatur Deus, erat alius ge¬ nere differens a priore. Tertia ratio. Si peccatum originis est ipsa substantia hominis, ut Illyricus dicit, igitur peccatum originis multa bona facit, intclli- git, disputat, indicat, scribit contra seipsum, credit, sperat, diligit, hortatur alios ad cre¬ dendum, et, quod est mirabilius, innocenter vivit. Nam Illyricus, qui se totum peccatum esse non dubitabat, tamen scribit de se in extremo libro de essentia imaginis Dei et diaboli, se multos annos honeste, innocen- terque vixisse : « Vixi, inquit, multos annos Wittembergoe, cujus temporis honeste, inno- centerque actaj vita;, multos fide dignos testes producere possum. » At quis credat id, quod non est nisi malum, et fons omnium malorum, tam multa bona facere posse, ut etiam innocentias titulum mereatur ? Quarta ratio. Si peccatum originis est sub¬ stantia hominis, vel est tota ejus substantia, vel pars ; si tota, falsum igitur est quod Illy¬ ricus dicit in Refutatione, peccatum non esse nisi summum animae rationalis gradum. Non enim solus ille gradus est totus homo : Si pars, igitur falsum est quod idem Illyricus in lib. de essentia imaginis Dei, et diaboli toties repetit, totam essentiam hominis to¬ tumque hominem esse corruptum et trans¬ formatum in aliam substantiam, quemad¬ modum cum dolium vini totum vertitur in acetum : et omnes illi clamores, quibus ipse utitur adversus eos, qui extenuant peccatum originis, non solum inanes sunt, sed etiam in ipsum retorqueri possunt. Nam sicut ipse dicebat, Christum fieri dimidium redempto¬ rem ab illis, qui non confitebantur, totum hominem esse corruptum ; ita nos dicere possumus, Christum ab Illyrico fieri non di¬ midium, sed longe minus quam dimidium redemptorem. Nam si unus tantum anima) ratioualis gradus corruptus fuit, certe unum tantum animae rationalis gradum Christus (1) Gen. VIII, 21. (5) Luc. IV, 39. reparavit. Venit enim quaerere, et salvum facere quod perierat. Luc. 19.