Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 3: The arguments of Illyricus are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Nothing is so absurd but that it can be urged by some reason, if not true, at least likely. But Illyricus, not content with probable arguments, brought forward demonstrations from the divine writings, insoluble (as he indeed affirms) and very many. Whether, however, this be so will presently appear, God helping. For I shall propose and solve those which, gathered from his books, carry the greater difficulty before them.
The first objection: The Scriptures, in describing the sin of origin, use words signifying substance; therefore the sin of origin is a substance. Genesis 8: The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth — where the very mass of the heart, that is, the substance, is said to be evil. And Genesis 6 it is said that the imagination of the heart is only evil — that is, has nothing of good. Romans 6: Our old man is crucified… that the body of sin may be destroyed — in which place sin is called the old man, and is openly signified to have a body. In the same place: “Let not sin reign in your mortal body, so as to obey the lusts thereof.” But what reigns and lusts is not a dead accident, but a living substance. Response: Scripture, if at any time it uses words signifying substance in the description of sin, speaks not properly, but figuratively — which manner of speaking is most frequent in the Scriptures. Psalm 68: Shame hath covered my face. Certainly shame is not a substance, and yet it is so described as if it were some garment; but the figure is plain: for since they who are ashamed are suffused with blushing, therefore their faces seem to be covered. Luke 4: the Lord commanded the fever, and the fever left the fevered man. Who commands accidents? and how is that an accident which leaves a man and departs? Certainly, to do what is commanded, or at the voice of the commander to leave someone, is wont to belong not only to a substance, but to one living and understanding; and yet no one doubts that a fever is not a substance. But let us answer the several places. The imagination of the heart, which in Genesis is said to be evil, is not the very substance of the heart, but the thought which is fashioned by the heart, which is not substance but accident. For although in chapter 8 of Genesis the imagination of the heart is said to be evil, yet in chapter 6, where the same matter is narrated in more words, it is called the imagination of the thoughts. For thus we read Genesis 6, verse 5, word for word: “And every imagination of the thoughts of his heart only evil every day.” And that all the thoughts are said to be evil is without doubt a hyperbole familiar to the Scriptures. For in the same chapter 6 of Genesis we read: All flesh had corrupted its way; and yet in the same place it is said: Noe was a just and perfect man in his generations. Further, what we read in the epistle to the Romans, chapter 6, about the old man, is most ineptly solved by Heshusius; for he says that the old man extends more widely than sin, because the old man embraces the subject and the form — that is, human nature and its vice — but sin, the form only, that is, the vice. But if it were so, when blessed Paul, Colossians 3 and Ephesians 4, commands us to put off the old man, it would have to be understood that we ought to lay down human nature — that is, kill ourselves. The true response, then, which is gathered from the interpreters of that place, both Greek and Latin, is that by the old man is signified the old life, which is led in sins, and contrariwise by the new man, the new life, which is led through virtue. Properly indeed the old man is Adam, the new man is Christ; but we are said to put off the old man when the likeness of sinning Adam is no longer discerned in our actions, and contrariwise to put on the new man when we so live, imitating the virtues of Christ, that Christ manifestly appears in our conversation. For what the Apostle, Ephesians 4 and Colossians 3, will have — the old man put off and the new put on — he says more openly in 1 Corinthians 15: As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of the heavenly; and most openly Romans 13: Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ. And that all these things pertain to actions, not to substance, is plain from chapter 3 of the epistle to the Colossians, where the Apostle, explaining what are the members of the old man, says: Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth: fornication, uncleanness, lust, evil concupiscence, etc.; and in the same place, explaining what it is to lay down the old man: Lay down, says he, anger, indignation, malice, blasphemy, etc.; and in the same place, explaining what it is to put on the new man: Put ye on, says he, the bowels of mercy, benignity, humility, modesty, etc. Further, by the body of sin is understood, by a certain trope, the whole multitude and as it were heap of sins which we have contracted by living ill — so that the sentence of the Apostle, Romans 6, is this: Our old man was crucified together with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed — that is: by the power of the cross of Christ our evil and vicious life perished, that henceforth we may commit no sin, but walk in newness of life, bearing fruit in every good work, etc. A like trope is in Luke 11, in those words: If thy eye be evil, thy whole body shall be darksome — that is, if the intention be evil, all the actions too will be evil. By the body of sin could also be understood the strength and power of concupiscence; for the Apostle delights in Hebrew phrases, and the Hebrews are wont to call both body and strength by the same word; and so by the body of sin will rightly be understood the strength of sin — that is, of concupiscence, which by the Apostle is often called sin by metonymy, because it is the effect and cause of true sin, as St. Augustine teaches in many places, and especially book 1 against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 13. And consonant with this sense are the words that follow: “that we may serve sin no longer”; and: “Let not sin reign in your mortal body, so as to obey the lusts thereof” — in which places, by the consent of all, by the name of sin concupiscence is to be taken; which indeed is metaphorically said to reign and command, when, more ardently stirred, it wrings out the consent of the will. For otherwise it is neither a thing endowed with reason, so as properly to command, nor a substance; for concupiscence is nothing else than an immoderate power of desiring. Of which matter we shall say more in another place.
The second objection: The sin of origin is the fountain and root of all sins. For the Apostle, Romans 7, says that sin wrought in him all concupiscence; and without doubt he speaks of original sin, for he continues the disputation begun about original sin in chapter 5. But the fountain and root of all sins is the heart itself, or the rational soul itself, since the Lord says, Matthew 15: From the heart come forth evil thoughts, adulteries, thefts, etc. But the heart is beyond controversy a substance; therefore the sin of origin is a substance. But because this argument was made so much of by Illyricus that he even set it at the beginning of his book, before the preface, it pleases me to write out his words: “The treasury or primary cause of all actual evil — namely, the most wicked heart, the old and animal man, or the flesh perpetually lusting and warring against the spirit, God, and his law — is the very essence itself of man, Scripture and the Theologians being witnesses. Original sin is the primary cause, or treasury, origin, root, and fountain of all actual sins, the same being witnesses. Therefore original sin is the essence itself.” Response: Many are the faults of this argument. For first, if it be truly reduced to syllogistic form, it will be in the second figure from pure affirmatives. For in that first proposition — the treasury of all actual evil is the very essence of man — the attribute is “treasury,” and the subject is “the essence of man”; and therefore, if the parts of the proposition be set in right order, it must be said: the essence of man, or the most wicked heart, is the treasury of all actual evil; and then the other proposition is to be subjoined: original sin is the treasury of all actual evil. From which it no more follows — therefore original sin is the very essence of man — than if one should say: the devil is a liar; Illyricus is a liar; therefore Illyricus is the devil. Next, whatever be of the form of the argument, that assumption is false: original sin is the treasury and fountain and root of all actual sins. For the first Adam and Eve, and all the evil angels, fell into actual sin, though they lacked original sin. And we too, if we did not draw original sin from our parents, could nevertheless without doubt be tempted by the devil and sin — as also, after the sin of origin has been remitted in Baptism, we not rarely sin. And that of the Apostle, Romans 7 — Sin wrought in me all concupiscence — is not to be taken of original sin, but of the tinder, which is called sin by metonymy, because it is the effect and cause of sin. Just as in the same chapter, when the Apostle says: What then? Is the law sin? God forbid, etc., he does not ask whether the law is properly sin, which could not come into question, but whether the law is sin — that is, the cause of sin; and he answers that it is not the cause, but the occasion: because, though it is itself holy and good, yet from it the tinder takes occasion of lusting the more, because we strain after the forbidden. Nor is it repugnant to these things that the Apostle seems to continue the disputation begun in chapter 5; for he so continues the disputation that, having discoursed in chapter 5 of the sin of origin, he afterwards, in chapters 6 and 7, discourses of concupiscence, which is the effect and punishment of the sin of origin. Add thirdly that even concupiscence itself is not the fountain and root of absolutely all actual sins, if by concupiscence we understand the concupiscence of the flesh, of which the Apostle speaks in that chapter, where he calls it also the law of the members. For St. John, in epistle 1, chapter 2, shows three fountains of sins: the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life. And what the Apostle says — sin, that is, the tinder, by the commandment wrought in me all concupiscence — can be understood in two ways. First, that he wished to signify that every kind of actual concupiscence against the commandment can come forth from the tinder — that is, from the concupiscible power — though they can also come forth from elsewhere; in which way the same Apostle, 1 Timothy 6, says that the root of all evils is cupidity — that is, avarice, for in Greek it is the love of money. Next, that by “all concupiscence” we understand the utmost and most ardent concupiscence — and this seems to be the most literal explication. For the Apostle says that sin, by the commandment, wrought all concupiscence; but from the commandment the tinder did not so much gain to be the fountain of various sins, as to stir up a more vehement concupiscence. Finally, fourthly it can be added that, even if we conceded that original sin is simply the fountain of all actual sins, yet it is not thence rightly gathered that original sin is the essence of man, either the whole or a part, as the heart or the soul. For to be the fountain and treasury of actual sins would not belong in the same way to the sin and to the heart or soul. For the heart, or the soul, is truly the fountain of sins by way of an active and internal principle; and properly the Lord says: From the heart come forth evil thoughts, adulteries, thefts, blasphemies, etc. But the sin of origin, if it be taken for the lack of original justice, which is the opinion of the Catholics, is not the fountain of sins except by way of removing an obstacle; if it be taken for the tinder, as most of the Lutherans seem to hold, it is the fountain of sins by way of an extrinsic cause proposing an object to the will — in which way even the devil can be called the fountain of sins. For the devil too is named the tempter in the Gospel, Matthew 4; and of concupiscence St. James writes in his epistle, chapter 1: Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. Thus, then, in four ways is solved the primary argument of Illyricus.
The third objection: Sin is all that which fights with the law. For in the epistle of blessed John, chapter 3, sin is defined in these words: sin is lawlessness. But the heart itself, the soul itself, the whole man himself fights with the law. For where we read — The flesh lusteth against the spirit, Galatians 5 — by the name of flesh is understood the whole man; since among the works of the flesh are numbered not only adulteries and fornications, but also heresies, envies, sects, etc. And John 3 the whole man is called flesh, when the Lord says: That which is born of the flesh, is flesh. Finally, adulteries, murders, and the like, which in Galatians 5 are called works of the flesh, in Matthew 15 are said to come forth from the heart. Since, then, all that which fights with the law is sin, and the whole man fights with the law, it follows that the whole man is sin; but man is a substance; therefore sin is a substance. Response: This objection can in no way be solved by Chemnitz, since he himself concedes that all is truly and properly sin which is repugnant to the law, whether it be an action, or a power, or a substance. But we shall dilute the proposed argument with easy labor. For sin is not the thing contrary to the law, but the contrariety itself, or repugnance to the law; for this “anomia” signifies: a declining or deviation from the law. But declining, deviation, contrariety, and repugnance signify not a substance, but an accident — and that not positive, but privative: that is, a lack of rectitude, or a privation of conformity to the rule. And since this privation properly inheres in an action (for it is action that is commanded or forbidden by the law), therefore an action is properly said to be according to the law, or against the law. From which it follows that, as the privation of conformity to the law is sin formally, so an action not conformed to the law is sin materially; but the substance, which is the principle of the action, ought to be named not sin materially or formally, but sinning, or sinful. And so St. Augustine, in book 22 against Faustus, chapter 27, defining sin, does not say: Sin is the heart, or the soul, or the whole man; but: something said, or done, or desired against the law of God.
The fourth objection: The image of God in man was not some accident, but a substance. For as it is said, Genesis 1: God created man to his own image, so it is said, Genesis 5: Adam begot a son to his own image. But it is certain that a son is to the image of his father not on account of accidents alone, but on account of the likeness of nature. But if the image of God was a substance, assuredly the image of the devil also must be a substance. Now man through sin lost the image of God, and put on the image of the devil, according to that of John 8: You are of your father the devil; and Colossians 3: Putting on the new, him who is renewed… according to the image of him that created him. I answer: that the image of God is the very nature of the rational soul we gladly admit; nor was there need that Illyricus should sweat so much to prove what no one denies. But that this image was lost through sin, or substantially transformed into another, we altogether deny; for that is the error of Origen, refuted by the holy Fathers, as can be understood from Epiphanius, heresy 64. And that of John 8 — You are of your father the devil — does not signify that sinful men bear the natural or substantial image of the devil. For the devil does not beget or procreate sinful men — unless by metaphor he be said to beget those whom he deceives, as the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4, says that he begot those whom he taught. And so sinners are sons of the devil by imitation, not by nature; and they can be said to bear a certain image of him because they are like him — not in substance, but in vice; not in nature, but in manners. See St. Augustine, book against Adimantus, chapter 5, where he shows that in three ways some are called the sons of others: first, by nature, as Abel was the son of Adam; second, by doctrine, as the Apostle calls the Corinthians his sons, 1 Corinthians 4; third, by imitation, as we all are called sons of Abraham when we imitate his faith, Romans 4 and Galatians 4 — and sinners are called sons of the devil, because they imitate him, being of his side, Wisdom 2. And to that of Colossians 3 — who is renewed according to the image — I answer that man is renewed through grace in that part of himself according to which he is the image of God, according to that of Ephesians 4: Be renewed in the spirit of your mind. But this renewal of the human mind, which is the image of God, signifies that that image was obscured, not blotted out. Which, that it may be more easily understood, it is to be known that the image of God can be considered in three ways: according to nature, according to habit, and according to act; of which ways the second and the third are nothing else than perfections of the image considered in the first way. For as a painted image, if it be only sketched with lines, will be a true image, but rude; if colors be added, it will be rendered more perfect; if the veins, muscles, and every minutest part be expressed, it will be judged most perfect: so also the very substance of the rational soul is the image of God, but with the habit of grace and wisdom added it is perfected and adorned; and when in act it knows and loves God, it is most perfect and most adorned. And sin indeed could not take away the substance of the image, yet it took away that perfection and eminent likeness which was set in the habit and act of knowledge and love. And so the image did not perish, but was obscured and deformed, as though the colors were extinguished; and therefore it is said to be reformed when grace and wisdom are repaired in us — as a painted image could be said to be renewed if colors almost extinguished were again added to the same image.
The fifth objection: Original justice in the first parents was not an accident, but a substance; therefore also the original injustice which succeeded that justice is not an accident, but a substance. The antecedent of this argument is proved from the preceding argument. For it was said that the image of God in man is the very nature of the rational soul; and that the image of God and original justice are the same is gathered from the Apostle Paul, who, what he had said in Colossians 3 — Put on the new man, who is reformed according to the image of him that created him — seems to explain in Ephesians 4, when he says: Put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth — where he seems to take for the same the image and the justice, or holiness. Response: He who says that original justice was of the essence of man or of an angel plainly confounds the creature with the creator. For the creator alone has this as proper to himself: to be just by essence. Nor are the image of God and original justice the same; but original justice is a certain adornment and perfection of the image of God; and because the first man was founded to the image of God not in any manner whatever, but to an image distinguished by justice and wisdom and the other adornments, therefore blessed Paul says that man is reformed according to the image of God when he puts on the new man, created in justice and holiness of truth — because, namely, the image of God, deformed by the loss of justice, returns again through justification to its pristine luster. To these it can be added that, even if it were true that original justice was a substance, yet it would not follow that the sin of origin is a substance; since the sin of origin is not some form contrary to original justice, but is the privation of original justice, as we are going to demonstrate in its place.
The sixth objection: An accident is what can be present and absent without the corruption of the subject; but the sin of origin altogether corrupts the substance of the rational soul. For it is written, Genesis 2: In what day soever thou shalt eat, thou shalt die the death. And Colossians 2: And you, when you were dead in your sins… he hath quickened together with him. Therefore the sin of origin is not an accident, but a substance. Response: Tilemann Heshusius could not answer this argument except with injury to Porphyry, whom, discoursing of the five terms, almost all the schools follow. And so, the definition of accident which Porphyry had handed down being repudiated, he approves the definition which Philip Melanchthon hands down in these words: “An accident is what does not subsist of itself, nor is a part of the substance, but is in another mutably.” Which definition (to omit other faults) seems to fight against Heshusius himself and his author Philip. For if the sin of origin so cleaves in the soul, by the opinion of all the Lutherans, that it can be plucked out neither through Baptism nor by any other means so long as we are in this life, certainly it follows that it is not in another mutably, and thereby is not an accident, but a substance. But whatever be of this, the argument of Illyricus can be solved without great labor. For first, the destruction, or death, which sin brings to the soul is not substantial and proper, but accidental and metaphorical. For through sin there perishes not the essence of the soul, seeing it is immortal, but grace, or justice. For the grace of God is by metaphor called the life of the soul, on account of the likeness which it has with the soul itself, which is the life of the body. And therefore the same sin is now called the death of the soul, as in the place cited, Colossians 2; now weakness, as Romans 5; now sleep, as Ephesians 5. Next, even if sin properly and substantially took away the life of the soul, as corporal death properly and substantially takes away the life of man, yet not for that reason would sin be not an accident but a substance, nor would the definition of Porphyry be to be reprehended. For corporal death, by the consent of all, is an accident, not a substance; and yet it so destroys its subject as not to destroy the definition of Porphyry. For what Porphyry says of the destruction of the subject is understood not efficiently, but formally. For he did not wish to signify that those qualities or actions are not accidents which efficiently corrupt the subject, as pestilent fevers, burning, cutting, and other things of that kind; but that those things are not accidents whose presence or absence makes the subject not retain its essence. If in thought thou addest whiteness to a crow, the crow still retains its essence; if thou addest a rational soul, it will now no longer be a crow: therefore whiteness would be to the crow an accident, the rational soul a substance. Contrariwise, if thou takest blackness from the crow, it will still be a crow; if thou takest the sentient soul, it will not be a crow: therefore blackness is to the crow an accident, the sentient soul is substance. But the qualities which efficiently corrupt the subject are so far from being formally repugnant to it that they cannot be except in it; and therefore, it being destroyed, they too must straightway perish. Wherefore, according to Porphyry's definition, sin is not a substance, but an accident: because, both while it remains through guilt and stain, and when it is taken away through justification, the subject — that is, the soul — still retains its essence; and if (what naturally cannot be done) the substance of the soul perished, sin itself also, which had its seat in the soul, would without doubt perish.
The seventh objection: Justification is the creation of a new heart, according to that of Psalm 50: Create a clean heart in me, O God. And Ezechiel 36: I will take away… the stony heart, and will give you a heart of flesh. Likewise it is the regeneration of the whole man, as is plain from John 3, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1, and James 1, and other places. But the heart of flesh and the stony heart are substances; and regeneration and creation pertain to substance, not to accidents. Response: All those things are metaphorical, not proper — which no one, unless altogether dull, can deny. For certainly sin, or a heart hardened by sin, is not properly stony, but is so called on account of the likeness which is between the obstinacy of the sinner and the hardness of stone. By like reasoning a just mind is not properly a heart of flesh, but is so named on account of the likeness which the mind, made pliant to the command of God through justice, has with soft and tender flesh. Finally, though the grace of justification and sin are accidents, yet rightly, by metaphor, are men said to be regenerated, and even created again, when they are justified from sin, on account of the likeness which is discerned between sin and death, and between justice and life.
The eighth objection: Christ is by the Apostle called sin, 2 Corinthians 5; but Christ is a substance; therefore sin also is a substance. If thou say: Christ is called sin by a trope, because he was a victim for sin — rightly indeed; but Christ would not be called sin because he was a victim for sin, unless man himself, for whom Christ died, were truly and properly sin. For Christ was called sin because he suffered that which was owed to sin itself — namely, he was a piacular victim in the stead of men, who deserved by right to be slain. Response: Christ was called sin — that is, a victim for sin — not because he was immolated in the stead of sin (for who would speak so absurdly?), but because by his death he appeased God, who on account of sin was hostile to the race of men. And so that phrase “for sin,” when Christ is called a victim for sin, signifies not “in place of sin,” but “for the expiation of sin” — which John explained when he said: Behold the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sins of the world, John 1.
The ninth objection: Sinful men are called, on account of original sin, by nature children of wrath, Ephesians 2; and their malice is called natural, Wisdom 12; and contrariwise, just men are said naturally to do the things of the law, Romans 2. Therefore both justice and sin pertain to the very nature and essence of man. I answer: men are called by nature children of wrath, not because sin itself is nature, but because from birth, and through natural propagation, original sin is transmitted; and that malice is called natural which, received in a long series from the fathers, can with difficulty be put off. For the Wise Man speaks not of all (which nevertheless he would do, if the sin of origin pertained to the essence of man), but of the Chanaanites, who were cursed in their parent Cham: For it was, says he, a seed accursed from the beginning. And what is said in Romans 2 — the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law — does not signify that justice is so natural to just men that it is the whole essence, or a part of the human essence, but that it is conformed and consonant to nature. For vice is against nature, virtue according to nature; because by vice nature is corrupted, by virtue perfected. And so the gentiles justified through Christ are said naturally to do the works of justice, because those works are consonant with nature reformed through grace. And this indeed is the explication of St. Augustine, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 26. But there is also another explication, which Chrysostom and very many other authors follow, and which approves itself more to me: that the Apostle speaks of gentiles ignorant of Christ, who, enlightened by the natural light alone, sometimes do something of good. And according to this explication that “naturally” is opposed to the law written on tables, and is the same as “from the law of nature.” And so the sense is: the gentiles, who have not the (written) law, naturally — that is, from the law and instinct of nature — do the things that are of the law. For if perchance they honor their parents, do not kill, do not commit adultery, do not steal, they do this not because they have read these things on the tables of Moses, but because natural reason dictates: what thou wilt not have done to thee, do not to another. Of which explication we shall say more in book 5 On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 2. Now this is to be added: that this place, which Illyricus adduces for himself, fights most of all against him. For if the gentiles not yet justified naturally do the things that are of the law, how is that true which Illyricus says — that the nature of unjustified man is so corrupted that it is sin itself? Can sin itself naturally do the things that are of the law?
The tenth objection is taken from the testimonies of the theologians. And indeed Illyricus adduces many testimonies of the holy Fathers, as of Ignatius, Irenaeus, and others, who teach almost nothing else than that the image of God pertains to the nature of man. Which, since we by no means deny it, there is no need to waste time in reciting them. He adduces also testimonies of Luther, of Melanchthon, and the like, which we leave to be explained by Heshusius and Mörlin and the other sectaries who take them up; for we make no more of Luther and Melanchthon than of Illyricus himself. He also adduces, with incredible impudence, Peter Lombard, St. Thomas, Cardinal Cajetan, Dominic Soto, Ruard Tapper, and Albert Pighius. From Peter Lombard he produces those words from book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 39, letter A: “Since the will is among the natural things, why is it not always good, even if it sometimes lie under vices? To this they easily answer who say that all things which are, insofar as they are, are good; because they assert that the will itself also, insofar as it is, or insofar as it is will, as we set down above, is a good; but insofar as it is disordered, it is evil and sin. Where it can reasonably be asked of them: if the will, insofar as it is disordered, is sin, why then are not the understanding, reason, and wit, and the like, when they are disordered, sins? and disordered they are, like the will, when they tend not to the right end, and their acts turn out transgressions.” These words of Peter Lombard recited, Illyricus sounds his triumph in this manner: “Hence” (says he, in the book on the essence of the image of God and of the devil, page 254) “thou plainly perceivest that the will, the understanding, reason, and wit, insofar as they are disordered, are sins. And indeed he speaks of the very powers of the rational soul, not of their acts or motions and actions. Manifestly, then, he thought with me — however often, by the subtleties and vehemence of others, he is snatched away to those sophistical tenuities — that sin is an accident, or even a certain nothing.” Thus Illyricus. But that thou mayest understand how little faith is to be had in heretics, read what Peter Lombard subjoined immediately after those words alleged by Illyricus. For thus he says: “To which they say that by the name of will is signified sometimes the power — namely, the natural potency of willing — sometimes the act of that power. Now the power itself, naturally implanted in the soul, is never sin, as neither is the power of remembering or of understanding; but the act of this power, which is also called will, is then sin, when it is disordered.” And a little below: “Behold in what manner the aforesaid question is solved by those who hand down that all things are good insofar as they are. But they who say that evil wills are sins, and in no way goods, answer more briefly, saying that the act of the will is not among the natural things, but the power itself and potency of willing, which is always a good, and is in all — even in little ones, in whom its act is not yet.” Thou seest, reader, how great is the impudence of the heretical man, who affirms that in that very place Peter Lombard says that the very power and potency of the will is sin, not its act — in which place the same author in express words says that not the very power and potency of the will, but its act, when it is disordered, is sin. As to the remaining authors whom Illyricus cites for himself, it can be answered in one word. For he adduces two of their sentences: one, that concupiscence is the material part of the sin of origin; the other, that concupiscence is the lower part of the soul. From these two he himself deduces a third: namely, that the sin of origin, at least as to one part, is the very substance of the soul. But in explaining this opinion of the theologians he sins in many ways. For first, the theologians do not judge the material part of the sin of origin to be sin properly, but to be called sin because it is the effect of sin; for they constitute the sin properly in the privation of original justice. Next, they do not call concupiscence a part of the soul as though it were a part of the essence, as Illyricus dreams, but because it is a certain power of the soul, and hence a quality, not a substance; for the theologians call the powers parts of the soul, but potential parts, not substantial. Third, the theologians do not teach that concupiscence is a power of the soul absolutely, but a power vitiated, or disordered — so that not so much the power itself as its vice is properly concupiscence. And so St. Thomas says that it is like a fever, and is called a languor of nature; but a fever and a languor no sane man would say to be a substance. Finally, the theologians place the concupiscence which they judge can in some manner be called sin in the lower part of the soul; but Illyricus contends that only the higher — or rather the supreme — part of the soul, which he calls now reason, now free choice, now the heart itself, is the sin of origin. The delirium of Illyricus, then, has nothing in common with the opinion of the theologians. There are many other objections of Illyricus, but so light that I have been ashamed to bring them forward.
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CAPUT III. Solvuntur argumenta Illyrici. Nihil est tam absurdum, quin' aliqua, si non vera, certe verisimili ratione suaderi possit. Sed Illyricus non contentus probabi¬ libus argumentis, demonstrationes ex divi¬ nis litteris insolubiles (ut ipse quidem affir¬ mat) et plurimas attulit. Quod tamen, an ita se habeat, Deo juvante, mox apparebit. Pro¬ ponam enim, et solvam ea, qua) ex libris ejus collecta, majorem prae se ferunt diffi¬ cultatem. Prima objectio. Scripturae in peccato ori¬ ginis describendo, utuntur verbis substan¬ tiam significantibus; igitur peccatum origi¬ nis est substantia. Genes, viii : Figmentum cordis humani malum est ab adolescentia sua (1). Ubi massa ipsa cordis, hoc est, sub¬ stantia, dicitur esse mala. Et Genes, vi. di¬ citur : Figmentum cordis tantum esse ma¬ lum (2), id est, nihil habere boni. Ad Ro- man. vi : Vetus homo noster crucifixus est, ut destruatur corpus peccati (3). Quo loco pec¬ catum dicitur vetus homo, et aperte corpus habere significatur. Ibidem : « Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore, ad obe- diendum concupiscentiis ejus. » At quod regnat, et concupiscit, non est accidens mor¬ tuum, sed viva substantia. Responsio. Scriptura, si quando verbis substantiam significantibus utitur in descri¬ ptione peccati, non loquitur proprie, sed figurate, qui modus loquendi in Scripturis frequentissimus est. Psalm. lxviii : Operuit confusio faciem meam (i) . Certe confusio non est substantia, et tamen ita describitur, ac si esset indumentum aliquod. Sed figura per¬ spicua est. Quoniam enim qui confunduntur, suffunduntur rubore, ideo facies eorum ope¬ riri videntur. Luca) iv : Imperavit Dominus febri, et febris febricitalem dimisit. Quis im¬ perat accidentibus? et quomodo est acci¬ dens quod hominem dimittit et recedit? certe imperata facere, sive ad imperantis vocem dimittere aliquem non solum substantia;, - (2) Gen. VI, 5, — (3) Roman. VI, 6. - (4) Psalm. LXVIII, 8. 392 UBER V. sod etiam viventis, et intelligentis esse solet, et tamen nemo dubitat, quin febris sub¬ stantia non sit. Sed respondeamus ad singula loca. Fig¬ mentum cordis, quod in Genesi malum esse dicitur, non est ipsa cordis substantia, sed co¬ gitatio, qua? a corde fingitur quic non est sub- stantiased accidens. Quamvis cnimcap. 8. Ge¬ nes. dicatur figmentum cordis malum, tamen cap.G. ubi res eadem pluribus verbis narratur, dicitur tTCSyrt hoc est figmentum cogita¬ tionum. Sic enim legimus Genes, vi. vers. 5. ad verbum : « Et omne figmentum cogita¬ tionum cordis ejus tantum malum omni die. » Quod autem cogitationes omnes dicuntur esse m alte, sine dubio hyperbole est Scri¬ pturis familiaris. Nam in eodem cap. 0. Ge¬ nesis legimus : Omnis caro corruperat inani suam : et tamen in eodem loco dicitur : Noe vir justus, atque perfectus fuit in generatio¬ nibus suis. Porro quod in epist. adRom. cap. vi. legi¬ mus de homine vetere, ineptissime solvitur ab Ileshusio : dicit enim veterem hominem latius patere, quam peccatum, quod vetus homo complectatur subjectum et formam, id est, naturam humanam et ejus vitium; peccati m autem solam formam, id est, vi¬ tium. Quod si ita esset, cum beatus Paulus ad Goloss. ni. et ad Ephes. iv. jubet nos exuere veterem hominem, intelligendum esset, opor¬ tere nos naturam humanam deponere, hoc est, ut ipsi nos interficeremus. Vera igitur responsio est, quie ex inter¬ pretibus ejus loci, tum Grmcis, tum Latinis colligitur, per hominem veterem significari vitam veterem, qua? agitur in peccatis, et contra per hominem novum, vitam novam, qua? agitur per virtutem. Proprie siquidem vetus homo est Adam, novus homo est Chri¬ stus ; sed nos dicimur exuere veterem homi¬ nem, cum non cernitur amplius in nostris actionibus similitudo peccantis Adami; et contra induere novum hominem, cum ita vivimus Christi virtutes imitantes, ut Chri¬ stus in conversatione nostra manifeste appa¬ reat. Nam quod ad Ephes. iv. et ad Coloss. m. Apostolus vult exui veterem hominem, et indui novum; apertius I ad Corinth. xv. dicit : Sicut portavimus imaginem terreni, ita portemus imaginem coelestis. Et apertissime ad Rom. XIII : Induimini Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum (1). Ha?c autem omnia ad actiones, non ad substantiam pertinere, per¬ spicuum est ex cap. m. epist. ad Coloss. ubi explicans Apostolus, qua? sint membra ho¬ minis veteris, ait : Mortificate membra vestra, quae sunt super terram , fornicationem, im¬ munditiam, libidinem, concupiscentiam malam , etc. (2), et ibidem explicans quid sit depone¬ re hominem veterem : Deponite, inquit, iram, indignationem, malitiam, blasphemiam, etc. Et ibidem explicans quid sit induere novum ho¬ minem : Induite, inquit, viscera misericordiae , benignitatem, humilitatem, modestiam, etc. Porro per corpus peccati intelligitur, per tropum quemdam, tota multitudo, et quasi congeries peccatorum, quam male vivendo contraximus, ut sententia Apostoli ad Rom. vi. luee sit : Vetus homo noster simul cruci- filius est, ut destruatur corpus peccati (3), hoc est, per vim crucis Christi vita nostra mala, et vitiosa periit, ut deinceps nullum peccatum admittamus, sed in novitate vita? ambu¬ lemus, in omni opere bono fructificantes etc. Similis tropus est Luc. xi. in illis verbis : Si oculus tuus fuerit nequam, totum corpus tuum tenebrosum erit (4), hoc est, si intentio fuerit mala , omnes actiones erunt etiam malae. Posset etiam per corpus peccati intel- ligi robur, cl potentia concupiscentiae; nam delectatur Apostolus phrasibus hebraicis ; Hebraei autem eadem voce et corpus, et robur appellare solent : itaque per corpus peccati recte intelligetur robur, peccati, id est, concupiscentiae, quae ab Apostolo saepe vocatur peccatum per metonymiam, quia est effectus, et causa veri peccati, ut S. Augu¬ stinus multis in locis docet, ac praesertim lib. i. contra duas epistolas Pelag. cap. 13, et consentanea sunt huic sententiae qua? se¬ quuntur : «Utnon ultra serviamus peccato » ; et : «Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corporeadobediendum concupiscentiis ejus.» Quibus in locis omnium consensu, nomino peccati concupiscentia accipienda est, qua? quidem metaphorice regnare, et imperare dicitur, cum ardentius incitata consensum voluntatis extorquet. Alioqui enim neque res praedita ratione, ut proprie imperare possit, neque substantia est. Nihil enim est aliud concupiscentia, nisi \is appetendi immode¬ rata. De qua re plura alio loco dicemus. Secunda objectio. Peccatum originis est fons, et radix omnium peccatorum. Nain Apostolus ad Homan. vii. dicit, peccatum ope- - (I) 1 Corin. XV, 49; Itom M I, : i. — <2) Colos. 111- 5 — (31 Rom. VI. 0. - (4i Luc. XI 3L CAPUT II!. SOI) latum esse in se omnem concupiscentiam. Et sine dubio de peccato originali loquitur; con¬ tinuat enim disputationem inchoatam de peccato originali in 5. cap. ac fons, et radix omnium peccatorum est ipsum cor, sive ipsa rationalis anima, cum Dominus dicat Matth. xv : De corde exeunt cogitationes malx , adul¬ teria , furta, etc. (1). Cor autem sine contro¬ versia substantia est ; igitur peccatum ori¬ ginis substantia est. Sed quia hoc argumentum tanti factum est ab Illyrico, ut etiam initio libri ante praefa¬ tionem illud posuerit, placet ejus verba ad- scribere : a Thesaurus, aut causa primaria omnis mali actualis, nempe cor pessimum, vetus animalisque homo, aut caro perpetuo concupiscens , et militans contra spiritum, Deum et legem ejus, est et ipsamet essentia hominis, teste Scriptura et Theologis : Ori¬ ginale peccatum est causa primaria, seu the¬ saurus, origo, radix, et fons omnium actua¬ lium peccatorum, testibus iisdem : igitur ori¬ ginale peccatum est essentia ipsa. » Responsio. Multa sunt vitia hujus argu¬ menti. Primum enim, si ad formam syllo¬ gisticam vere redigatur , erit in secunda figura ex puris affirmantibus. Nam in illa pri¬ ma propositione : Thesaurus omnis mali actu¬ alis est ipsa essentia hominis, attributum est thesaurus, etsubjectum est, essentia hominis, et ideo si recto ordine ponantur partes propo¬ sitionis, dicendum erit ; essentia hominis, sive cor pessimum, est thesaurus omnis mali actualis; ac deinde subjungenda est altera propositio : Peccatum originale est thesaurus omnis mali actualis. Ex quibus non magis se¬ quitur : Ergo peccatum originale cstxipsa hominis essentia; quam si quis diceret : Dia¬ bolus est mendax, Illyricus est mendax, ergo Illyricus est diabolus. Deinde quidquid sit de forma argumenti , assumptio illa est falsa : Peccatum originale est thesaurus, et fons, et radix, omnium ac¬ tualium peccatorum. Nam prima Adam ct Eva, et omnes angeli mali in Actuale pecca¬ tum inciderunt, cum tamen originali peccato caruerint. Et nos quoque, si peccatum origi¬ nale non traheremus a parentibus, tamen et a diaboli tenturi et peccare sine dubitatione possemus. Sicut etiam post peccatum ori¬ ginis in Baptismo dimissum, non raro pecca¬ mus. Illud autem Apostoli ad Roman. vn : Pec~ (i) Matth. XV, 19. - (2) Rom. VII, 8. Tom. V, catum operatum est in me omnem concupiscen¬ tiam (2) : non est accipiendum de peccato originali, sed de fomite, qui peccatum dicitur per metonymiam, quia est effectus et causa peccati. Quemadmodum in eodem capite, cum Apostolus dicit: Quid ergo, lex peccatum est? absit , etc. no nquamt, sitne lex proprie peccatum, quod in qusestionem venire non poterat ; sed, sitne lex peccatum, id est, causa peccati. Ac respondet, nonesse causam, sed occasionem, quia, licet ipsa sit sancta et bona, tamen ex ea fomes occasionem accipit magis concupiscendi, quia nitimur in vetitum. Neque his repugnat, quod Apostolus conti¬ nuare videatur disputationem inchoatam cap. 5. Nam disputationem ita continuat, ut cum c. o. disseruerit de peccato originis, postea cap. 6. et 7. disserat de concupiscentia, qu® est effectus et poena peccati originis. Adde tertio, quod ipsa etiam concupi¬ scentia non est fons et radix omnium omnino peccatorumactualium.siperconcupiscentiam intelligamus concupiscentiam carnis, de qua in eo capite loquitur Apostolus, ubi eam vocat etiam legem membrorum. Nam S. Joannes in epist. 1. cap. 2. tres fontes pec¬ catorum ostendit, concupiscentiam carnis, concupiscentiam oculorum , et superbiam vitae. Quod autem Apostolus dicit : Peccatum, id est, fomes, per mandatum, operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam, duobus modis intelligi potest. Primum, ut significaro voluerit, omne genus concupiscenti® ac¬ tualis contra mandatum prodire posse ex fomite, id est, ex potentia concupiscibili ; quamvis etiam aliunde prodire possint, quo¬ modo idem Apostolus I. Timoth. vi. dicit, radicem omnium malorum esse cupiditatem, id est, avaritiam. Nam graece est eptXapyupt'*, Deinde, ut per omnem concupiscentiam in¬ telligamus summam, et ardentissimam con¬ cupiscentiam, et haec videtur esse maxime litteralis explicatio. Nam Apostolus dicit : Peccatum per mandatum operatum esse om¬ nem concupiscentiam; ex mandato autem non tam habuit fomes, ut esset fons variorum peccatorum, quam, ut vehementiorem con¬ cupiscentiam excitaret. Denique quarto addi potest, etiamsi con¬ cederemus, peccatum originale esse fontem simpliciter omnium actualium peccatorum, tamen non inde recte colligi peccatum ori- 26 394 LIBER V. ginale esse hominis essentiam, vel totam, vel partem, ut cor, aut animam. Nam non eodem inodoconveniret peccato, et cordi, vel animae esse fontem, et thesaurum actualium pecca¬ torum. Cor enim, sive ani i a, est vere fons peccatorum, per modum principii activi et interni. Ac proprie Dominus dicit, De corde exeunt cogitationes malx, adulteria, furta , blasphemix, elc. Peccatum autem originis, si accipiatur pro caricntia justitiae originalis, quae est Catholicorum sententia, non est fons peccatorum, nisi per modum removentis obstaculum. Si accipiatur pro fomite, ut ple- rique Lutheranorura sentire videntur, est fons peccatorum per modum causae extrin- sece proponentis objectum voluntati. Quo¬ modo etiam diabolus dici potest fons pecca¬ torum. Nam et diabolus tentatorin Evangelio nominatur, Matth. iv. et de concupiscentia scribit S. Jacobus in epist. sua cap. i. Unus¬ quisque tentcitur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus (1). Sic igitur quatuor modis sol¬ vitur primarium Illyrici argumentum. Tertia objectio. Peccatum est id omne, quod pugnat cum lege. Nam in epist. d. B. Joannis cap. 3. definitur peccatum his ver¬ bis : f, apapTia l<mv r, avopia ; At ipsum COI', ipsa anima, ipse totus homo pugnat cum lege. Ubi enim legimus : Caro concupissit adversus spiritum, ad Galat. v (2). nomine carnis in- telligitur totus homo ; siquidem inter opera carnis non solum numerantur adulteria et fornicationes, sed etiam hcereses, invidiaj, sectfe, etc. Et Joan hi. totus homo dicitur caro, cum Dominus ait : Quod natum est ex carne, caro est. Denique adulteria, homicidia et similia, quee ad Galat. 5. dicuntur opera carnis, Matth. do. ex corde prodire dicuntur. Cum igitur id omne quod pugnat cum lege peccatum sit, et totus homo pugnet cum lege, sequitur, ut totus homo peccatum sit; homo autem substantia est, igitur peccatum sub¬ stantia est. Responsio. Ileec objectio a Kemnitio solvi nullo modo potest, cum ipse concedat, id omne vere ac proprie esse peccatum, quod legi repugnat, sive sit actio, sive potentia, sive substantia. Nos autem facili negotio pro¬ positum argumentum diluemus. Neque enim peccatum est res contraria legi, sed ipsa con-' trarietas, sive repugnantia ad legem; id enim significat dvouia declinationem, seu devia¬ tionem, a lege. Declinatio autem, deviatio’ contrarietas et repugnantia, non substantiam significant, sed accidens, et id non posi¬ tivum, sed privativum, hoc est, carentiam rectitudinis, sive privationem conformitatis ad regulam. Et quoniam haje privatio in actione proprie inhaeret (actio enim est, quae imperatur, vel prohibetur a lege), ideo actio proprie dicitur esse secundum legem, vel contra legem. Ex quo sequitur, ut sicut pri¬ vatio conformitatis ad legem est peccatum fonnaliter, ita actio non conformis legi sit peccatum materialiter, substantia vero, quaj est actionis principium, non peccatum mate¬ rialiter, aut formaliter, sed peccans, vel pec¬ catrix nominari debeat. Itaque S. Augustinus in lib. 22. contra Faustum cap. 27. definiens peccatum, non ait : Peccatum est cor, vel anima, vel totus bomo, sed dictum, vel fa¬ ctum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei. Quarta objectio. Imago Dei in homine non erat aliquod accidens, sed substantia. Sicut enim dicitur Gen. i: Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ita dicitur Gen. v : Adam ge¬ nuit (ilium ad imaginem suam (4). Certum est autem filium esse ad imaginem patris, non propter sola accidentia, sed propter naturas similitudinem. Sed si imago Dei substantia erat, profecto etiam imago diaboli substantia esse debet. Amisit autem homo per peccatum imaginem Dei, et induit imaginem diaboli, juxta illud Joan. vm : Vos ex patre diabolo estis; et ad Coloss. iii : Induite novum hominem, qui renovatur secundum imaginem ejus , qui creavit eum (4). Respondeo : imaginem Dei esse ipsam ani¬ mae rationalis naturam, libenter admittimus, neque opus erat, ut ad hoc probandum, quod nemo negat, tam multum Illyricus desudaret. Caeterum, hanc imaginem per peccatum esse amissam, vel in aliam substantialiter trans¬ formatam, omnino negamus. Iste enim est error Origenis, a sanctis Patribus refutatus, ut intelligi potest ex Epiphanio hairesi 64. Illud autem Joan. vm. Vos ex patre diabolo estis, non significat, homines peccatores ge¬ rere imaginem diaboli naturalem, sive sub¬ stantialem. Nec enim diabolus gignit, aut procreat homines peccatores, nisi per meta¬ phoram dicatur gignere quos decipit, quem¬ admodum Apostolus I. ad Corinth. iv. dicit, se genuisse, quos docuit. Itaque peccatores ( l) Jacob. 1 14. - (2) Gal. V, 17. -(3) Joan. 111, 6. —(4) Gen. I, 27; ibid. V, 3. — (5) Joan. VIII, 44; Coi. III, 10, * CAPUT III. 395 filii diaboli sunt per imitationem, non per naturam, et imaginem quamdam ejus gerere dici possunt, quia similes ei sunt, non sub¬ stantia, sed vitio; non natura, sed mori¬ bus. Vide S. Augustinum lib. advers. Adimant, cap. 5. ubi ostendit Tribus modis aliquos dici filios aliorum. Primo, per naturam, quomodo Abel filius fuit Adami; secundo, per doctri¬ nam, quomodo Corinthios filios suos vocat Apostolus I ad Corinth. iv ; tertio, per imi¬ tationem, quomodo nos omnes filii dicimur Abrahae, cum fidem ejus imitatur, ad Roman. iv. et Gal. iv. et peccatores dicuntur lilii diaboli, quia imitantur eum, qui sunt ex parte ipsius, Sap. n. Ad illud autem ad Coloss. iii : Qui reno¬ vatur secundum imaginem, respondeo, homi¬ nem renovari per gratiam in ea parte sui, secundum quam est imago Dei, juxta illud ad Ephesios iv : Renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae (1). Haec autem renovatio mentis hu¬ mana;, quae est imago Dei significat imaginem illam obscuratam fuisse, non deletam. Quod ut facilius intelligatur, sciendum est, ima¬ ginem Dei tribus modis considerari posse, se¬ cundum naturam, secundum habitum, et se¬ cundum actum, ex quibus modis secundus et tertius nihil sunt aliud, nisi perfectiones ima¬ ginis primo modo consideratae. Nam quemad¬ modum imago depicta, si solum sit lineis adumbrata, vera erit imago, sed rudis ; si addantur -colores, reddetur perfectior ; si exprimantur venae, musculi, et minutissimae quaeque partes, perfectissima judicabitur. Sic etiam ipsa substantia animae rationalis imago Dei est, sed addito habitu gratiae, et sapientiae perficitur et ornatur, cum vero actu Deum cognoscit et diligit, perfectissima et ornatis¬ sima est. Ac peccatum quidem substantiam imaginis de medio tollere non potuit, sustulit tamen perfectionem illam, et eximiam similitudinem, quae in habitu, et actu cognitionis, et amoris posita erat. Itaque imago non periit, sed obscurata, ac deformata est, quasi coloribus extinctis : et ideo reformari dicitur cum gra¬ tia, et sapientia reparantur in nobis, quomodo imago depicta renovari dici posset, si colores ferme extincti eidem imagini iterum adde¬ rentur. Quinta objectio. Justitia originalis in pri¬ mis parentibus non fuit accidens, sed sub¬ stantia, igitur et injustitia originalis, qua; ju¬ stitiae illi successit, non accidens, sed substan¬ tia e st. Antecedens hujus argumenti probatur ex argumento superiore. Dictum enim est, imaginem Dei in homine esse ipsam naturam anima; rationalis : idem autem esse imaginem Dei, et justitiam originalem, colligitur ex Apostolo Paulo, qui quod dixeratad Coloss. iii : Induite novum hominem , qui reformatur se¬ cundum imaginem ejus , qui creavit illum ; explicare videtur ad Ephes. iv. cum ait : Induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est in justitia, et sanctitate veritatis (2). Ubi pro eodem videtur accipere imaginem, et justitiam, sive sanctitatem. Responsio. Justitiam originalem de essen¬ tia hominis, vel angeli fuisse qui dicit, is plane creaturam cum creatore contundit. Solus enim creator id proprium habet, ut sit per essentiam justus. Neque idem sunt imago Dei, et justitia originalis, sed justitia origi¬ nalis, ornamentum quoddam, et perfectio imaginis Dei, et quia conditus fuit primus homo ad imaginem Dei, non quocumque modo, sed ad imaginem, justitia et sapien¬ tia, aliisque ornamentis insignem ; ideo B. Paulus dicit, hominem reformari secundum imaginem Dei, quando induit novum homi¬ nem, creatum injustitia et sanctitate verita¬ tis, quia videlicet imago Dei per amissionem justitia; deformata, iterum ad pristinum ni¬ torem per justificationem redit. His addi potest, quod etiamsi verum esset, justitiam originalem fuisse substantiam ; non tamen sequeretur, peccatum originis esse substantiam. Siquidem peccatum originis non est aliqua forma justitiae originali con¬ traria, sed est privatio justitia; originalis, ut suo loco demonstraturi sumus. Sexta objectio. Accidens est quod potest adesse et abesse praeter subjecti corruptio¬ nem : Atqui peccatum originis substantiam anima; rationalis omnino corrumpit. Scri¬ ptum est enim Genes, i : Quacumque die co¬ mederis, morte morieris. Et ad Colossens. ii : Et vos cum essetis mortui in delictis, convivifi¬ cavit cum illo (3). Igitur peccatum originis non accidens, sed substantia est. Responsio. Tilmannus Heshusius ad hoc argumentum respondere non potuit, nisi cum injuria Porphirii, quem de quinque vo¬ cibus disserentem scholae pene omnes se¬ quuntur. Itaque repudiata definitione acci¬ ti) Eph. IV, 23. - (2) Eph. IV, 24. - (3) Gen. III, 5 ; Colo. II, 13. UBER V. 300 dentis, quam Porpliirius tradiderat, appro¬ bat definitionem, quam his verbis tradit Philippus Melanchthon : « Accidens est, quod non per se subsistit, nec est pars sub¬ stantia?, sed est in alio mutabiliter. » Quae definitio (ut omittam alia vitia) videtur con¬ tra ipsum Heshusium, et auctorem ejus Phi¬ lippum pugnare. Nam si peccatum originis ita ha?ret in anima ex sententia Luthcrano- rum omnium, ut neque per Baptismum, ne¬ que ulla alia ratione evelli possit donec in hac vita sumus, certe sequitur, ut non sit in alio mutabiliter, ac per hoc non sit accidens, sed substantia. Sed quidquid de hoc sit, argumentum Il¬ lyrici sine magno labore solvi potest. Pri¬ mum enim destructio, sive mors, quam ad- fert anima? peccatum, non est substantialis et propria, sed accidentalia et metaphorica. Non enim per peccatum perit essentia ani¬ ma?, quippe quae immortalis est, sed gratia, sive justitia. Dicitur enim gratia Dei per me¬ taphoram vita? animae, propter similitudi¬ nem, quam habet cum ipsa anima, qua? est vita corporis. Et idcirco idem peccatum nunc dicitur mors animae, ut loco citato ad Colos- sens. ii. nunc infirmitas, ut ad Rom. v. nunc somnus, ut ad Ephes. v. Deinde etiamsi peccatum proprie et sub¬ stantialiter vitam anima? tolleret, quemad¬ modum mors corporalis proprie et substan- t aliter tollit vitam hominis, non tamen pro- pterea peccatum non esset accidens, sed sub¬ stantia, aut reprehendenda esset Porphirii definitio. Nam corporalis mors omnium consensu est accidens, non substantia, et ta¬ men sic destruit subjectum suum, ut non destruat definitionem Porphirii. Quod enim Porpliirius dicit de subjecti destructione, non intelligitur efficienter, sed formaliter. Neque enim significare voluit non esse accidentia qualitates illas, aut actiones, qua? subjectum efficienter corrumpunt, ut febres pestilentes, ustionem, sectionem, et alia id genus; sed res illas non esse acciden¬ tia, quarum prresentia, vel absentia facit ut subjectum essentiam non retineat suam. Si corvo addis cogitatione candorem, adhuc corvus essentiam retinet, si addas animam rationalem, jam non erit amplius corvus ; igitur candor corvo esset accidens, anima rationalis substantia. Contra vero si tollas a corvo nigredinem, adhuc erit corvus, si tol¬ las animam sentientem, non erit corvus : igitur nigredo corvo est accidens, anima sentiens est substantia. Qualitates autem, qua? efficienter subjectum corrumpunt, tan¬ tum abest, ut eidem formaliter repugnent, ut nisi in ipso esse non possint : et idcirco illo destructo, ipsas quoque continuo interire ne- cesse sit. Quare juxta Prophirii definitionem, pec¬ catum non est substantia, sed accidens, quia ipsa et manente per reatum et macu¬ lam, et sublato per justificationem, adhuc subjectum, id est, anima suam essentiam re¬ tinet ; et si (quod naturaliter fieri nequit) a- nima? substantia interiret, ipsum quoque peccatum, quod in anima sedem habebat, sine dubio interiret. Septima objectio. Justificatio est creatio novi cordis, juxta illud Psal. lv : Cor mun¬ dum crea in me Deus. Et Ezechiel. xxxvi : Auferam a vobis cor cor lapideum , et dabo vo¬ bis cor carneum (i). Item est regeneratio to¬ tius hominis, ut patet ex Joan. m, ad Tit. ili, I Petri i, et II Jacobi i, et aliis locis. At cor carneum, et cor lapideum substantia? sunt, et regeneratio et creatio ad substan¬ tiam, non ad accidentia pertinent. Responsio. Ista omnia metaphorica sunt, non propria; quod nemo, nisi omnino hebes negare potest. Certe enim peccatum, aut cor peccato obduratum non est proprie lapide¬ um, sed ita dicitur propter similitudinem, qua? est inter peccatoris obstinationem, et duritiem lapidis. Pari ratione mens justa non est proprie cor carneum, sed ita nomi¬ natur propter similitudinem, quam habet mens per justitiam ad imperium Dei facilis cum carne molli, ac tenera. Denique tametsi gratia justificationis, et peccatum accidentia sint, recte tamen per metaphoram homines regenerari, et rursus etiam creari dicuntur, cum a peccato justificantur propter similitu¬ dinem, qua? cernitur inter peccatum et mor¬ tem, atque inter justitiam et vitam. Octava objectio. Christus ab Apostolo di¬ citur peccatum II. ad Corinth. v, sed Chri¬ stus est substantia, igitur et peccatum est substantia. Si dicas : Christus per tropum dicitur peccatum, quia fuit hostia pro pec¬ cato, recte id quidem, sed non diceretur Christus peccatum, quia fuit hostia pro pec¬ cato, nisi homo ipse, pro quo Christus mor¬ tuus est, vere ac proprie peccatum esset. (1) Psal. L. 12; Ezech. XXXVI, 2G. CAPIT III. 397 Christus enim peccatum appellatus est, quia passus est i<l, quod peccato ipsi debebatur ; nimirum fuit hostia piacularis, vice homi¬ num, qui jure interfici merebantur. Responsio. Christus peccatum, id est, vic¬ tima pro peccato dictus est, non quia vice peccati fuerit immolatus; quis enim tam absurde loqueretur; sed quia morte sua Deum placavit, qui propter peccatum homi¬ num generi infensus erat. Itaque illud (pro peccato) cum dicitur Christus hostia pro pec¬ cato, non significat loco peccati, sed, pro ex¬ piatione peccati, quod Joannes explicuit, cum ait : Ecce Agnus Dei, qui tollit peccata mundi, Joan. i (i). Nona objectio. Homines peccatores dicun¬ tur, propter originale peccatum, natura filii irae, ad Ephesios ii, et naturalis dicitur ma¬ litia eorum, Sap. xn, et contra, homines justi dicuntur naturaliter, quae legis sunt, facere, ad Roman. ii. Igitur tam justitia, quam peccatum ad naturam ipsam, et es¬ sentiam hominis pertinent. Respondeo : dicuntur homines natura filii ira}, non quod ipsum peccatum sit natu¬ ra, sed quoniam a nativitate, et per natura¬ lem propagationem peccatum originale tra¬ ducitur ; et naturalis dicitur malitia, qua} longa serie a patribus accepta, difficulter exui potest. Non enim de omnibus loquitur Sapiens (quod tamen faceret, si peccatum originis ad essentiam hominis pertineret) sed de Chananads, qui in parente suo Chain maledicti fuerunt : Erat enim , inquit, semen maledictum ab initio. Quod autem dicitur ad Rom. ii : Gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter, qux legis sunt faciunt ; non significat justitiam esse ho¬ minibus justis ita naturalem, ut sit tota es¬ sentia, vel pars essentia} humana}, sed esse conformem, et consentaneam naturae. An¬ tium enim est contra naturam, virtus secun¬ dum naturam, quia vitio natura corrumpitur, virtute perficitur. Itaque gentes per Chri¬ stum justificatae, naturaliter dicuntur facere opera justitiae, quia sunt opera illa consen¬ tanea natura} per gratiam reformatae. Atque haec quidem est explicatio S. Augustini in libro de littera et spiritu, cap. xxvi. Sed etiam alia explicatio, quam Chryso- stomus et plurimi alii auctores sequuntur, quaeque mihi magis probatur, ut loquatur Apostolus de gentibus, ignorantibus Chri¬ stum, qua; solo naturali lumine illustratae aliquid boni interdum agunt. Et juxta hanc explicationem illud ( naturaliter ) opponitur legi scriptae in tabulis, et idem est, quod ex lege natura}. Itaque sensus est, gentes qua} legem (scri¬ ptam videlicet) non habent, naturaliter, id est, ex lege, et instinctu naturali, quae legis sunt faciunt. Nam si forte parentes hono¬ rant, non occidunt, non moechantur, non furantur, id faciunt, non quia ista legerunt in tabulis Mosis, sed quia naturalis ratio di¬ ctat, quod tibi fieri non vis, non esse alteri faciendum. De qua explicatione plura dice¬ mus in lib. v. de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. ii. Nunc illud addendum est, hunc lo¬ cum, quem Illyricus pro se adducit, adver¬ sus eum maxime pugnare. Nam si gentes nondum justificatae, naturaliter qua; legis sunt, faciunt, quomodo verum est quod Illy¬ ricus dicit, naturam hominis non justificati, adeo esse corruptam, ut sit ipsum peccatum? An potest ipsum peccatum naturaliter ea quae legis sunt facere ? Decima objectio sumitur ex testimoniis Theologorum, et quidem Illyricus multa te¬ stimonia adducit sanctorum Patrum, ut Ignatii, Irenaei et aliorum, qui nihil fere aliud docent, nisi imaginem Dei ad naturam hominis pertinere. Quod quia nos minime negamus, non est frustra in illis recitandis tempus conterendum. Adducit etiam testi¬ monia Lutheri, Melanchthonis, et similium, quae nos explicanda relinquimus Heshusioet Merlino, aliisque sectariis, qui illa suscipiunt. Nos enim non pluris facimus Lutheruin et Melanchthonem, quam ipsum Illyricum. Ad¬ ducit quoque per incredibilem impudentiam, Petrum Lombardum, S. Thomam, Cardina¬ lem Cajetanum, Dominicum a Soto, Ruar- dum Tapperum et Albertum Pighium. Ex Petro Lombardo producit illa verba ex lib. ii. sententiarum dist. 39. littera A. « Cum voluntas de naturalibus sit, quare ipsa non semper bonum est, et si aliquando vitiis subjaceat ? Ad hoc facile respondent, qui dicunt, omnia qua; sunt, in quantum sunt, bona esse ; quia et ipsam voluntatem, in quantum est, vel in quantum voluntas est, ut supra posuimus, bonum esse asserunt ; sed in quantum inordinata est, mala est et peccatum. Ubi potest ab eis rationabiliter quaeri, si voluntas, in quantum inordinata (1) Joan, I, 29, 36. - Rom. II, 14. LIMEI! V. est, peccatum est, quare ergo intellectus, ratio, et ingenium, et hujusmodi, cum inor¬ dinata sunt, peccata non sunt ? inordinata vero sunt, sicut voluntas, cum ad rectum ti- nem non tendunt, eorumque actus praevari¬ cationes existunt. » His Petri Lombardi ver¬ bis recitatis, triumphum canit Illyricus in hunc modum : « Hinc » (inquit in lib. de es¬ sentia imaginis Dei, et diaboli pag. 254. ) « liquido perspicis, voluntatem, intellectum, rationem, et ingenium, quatenus inordinata sunt, esse peccata. Et quidem loquitur de ipsismet potentiis animae rationalis, non de earum actibus, aut motibus, action^jusque. Manifeste ergo sensit mecum quantumvis aliorum subtilitatibus, et vehementia non raro ad illas sophisticas tenuitates abripia¬ tur, quod peccatum sit accidens, aut etiam • quoddam nihil. » Haec Illyricus. Sed ut intelligas quam parum fidei sit ha¬ bendum haereticis, lege quae Petrus Lombar- dus immediate post verba illa ab Illyrico allegata subjunxit. Sic enim ait : « Ad quod illi dicunt, voluntatis nomine aliquando vim, scilicet, naturalem potentiam volendi, ali¬ quando actum ipsius vis significari. "Vis au¬ tem ipsa naturaliter animae insita numquam peccatum est, sicut nec vis memorandi, vel intelligendi ; sed actus hujus vis, qui et vo¬ luntas dicitur, tunc peccatum est, quando inordinatus est. » Et paulo infra : « Ecce qualiter solvitur praemissa quaestio ab his, qui tradunt, omnia esso bona, in quantum sunt. Qui vero dicunt, voluntates malas pec¬ cata esse, et nullo modo bona, brevius re¬ spondent dicentes, actum voluntatis non esse de naturalibus, sed vim ipsam, et potentiam volendi, quae semper bonum est, et in omni¬ bus est, etiam in parvulis, in quibus non¬ dum est ejus actus. » Vides, lector, quanta sit impudentia hominis haeretici, qui in eo ipso loco affirmat , Petrum Lombardum dicere , ipsam vim et potentiam volun¬ tatis peccatum esse , non ejus actum , in quo loco idem auctor disertis verbis dicit, non ipsam vim et potentiam voluntatis, sed ejus actum, cum inordinatus est, esse pecca¬ tum. Quod ad reliquos auctores attinet, quos pi-o se citat Illyricus, uno verbo responderi potest. Adducit enim duas eorum sententias. Unam» quod concupiscentia ut pars materia¬ lis peccati originis ; alteram, quod concu¬ piscentia sit pars animae inferior. Ex his duabus deducit ipse tertiam, quod videlicet peccatum originis faltem quoad unam par¬ tem, sit ipsa animae substantia. Sed in hac sententia Theologorum expli¬ canda, multis modis peccat. Primum enim Theologi partem materialem peccati originis non existimant esse peccatum proprie, sed ideo dici peccatum, quia est effectus peccati. Peccatum enim proprie in privatione justitiae originalis constituunt. Deinde, ipsam concu¬ piscentiam non vocant animae partem, quasi sit pars essentiae, ut Illyricus somniat, sed quia est potentia quaedam animae, ac proinde qualitas, non substantia. Vocant enim theo¬ logi potentias partes animae, sed potentiales, non substantiales. Tertio, non docent Theo¬ logi concupiscentiam esse potentiam animae absolute, sed vitiatam, sive deordinatam, ita utnon tamipsapotentia, quam vitium ejus sit proprie concupiscentia. Itaque S. Thomas, eam febri similem esse, et languorem naturae appellari dicit. Porro febrem, et languorem, nemo sanus substantiam esse diceret. Deni¬ que Theologi concupiscentiam, quam aliquo modo peccatum appellari posse censent, in parte inferiore animae constituunt; Illyricus autem superiorem tantum, vel potius supre¬ mam animae partem, quam nunc rationem, nunc liberum arbitrium, nunc ipsum cor ap¬ pellat, peccatum originis esse contendit : nihil igitur commune habet Illyrici delirium cum Theologorum sententia. Multae sunt aliae objectiones Illyrici, sed usque adeo le¬ ves, ut me puduerit eas adferre.