Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 9: The same error is refuted by various reasons
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the last place we shall bring forward various reasons for routing the same error.
The first reason: Baptism does not free man from concupiscence; therefore either concupiscence is not the sin of origin, or Baptism does not free man from the sin of origin. Luther answers, in the assertion of article 2, that through Baptism the sin of origin is remitted as to the guilt, not as to the act. But this solution has already been exploded above, in chapter 7. Others answer that through Baptism concupiscence is not indeed taken away, but its dominion is taken away; for the grace which is conferred through Baptism effects this: that concupiscence should not have dominion. But this solution is easily refuted. For if concupiscence were the sin of origin, it would be so not on account of the dominion, but on account of the repugnance to reason, or the proneness to being repugnant. For the sin of origin is that with which we are born, and which even infants draw from their origin; and we are born with a proneness to resisting reason; but dominion is not found in infants — it comes on afterwards, from the consent of the will, and therefore is actual, not original sin. And so Baptism, even if it take away the dominion, yet does not take away the sin of origin, if concupiscence is the sin of origin. Further, what we said — that concupiscence would be the sin of origin not on account of the dominion, but on account of the repugnance or proneness — is manifestly gathered from Augustine. For in book 6 against Julian, chapter 5, he says thus: “Now such and so great an evil — merely because it is present — how would it not hold one in death, and drag one down to the ultimate death, unless its bond too were loosed in that remission of all sins which is made in Baptism?” In the same place, chapter 8: “For neither is there no iniquity when, in one man, either the higher parts basely serve the lower, or the lower contumaciously struggle against the higher, even if they are not suffered to prevail.” See also book 2 On Original Sin, chapter 39. But in what manner that ought to be understood which St. Augustine seems to say — that the concupiscence of the flesh is the sin of origin — we shall explain in the solution of the arguments. Now we wish only to demonstrate that their opinion does not agree with the doctrine of St. Augustine, who say that in Baptism the sin of origin is remitted because the dominion of concupiscence is taken away.
The second reason: Concupiscence is the effect and punishment of original sin; therefore it is not the original sin itself. For although one and the same thing can be both sin and the punishment of sin — I add too, and the cause of sin — yet this without doubt must be understood by comparison to diverse things. For it cannot be understood that one thing should be the sin, and the punishment and effect of the same sin; because it would be the punishment and effect of its very self, and thereby prior and posterior to itself. Now that concupiscence is the punishment and effect of original sin is proved first from those words of the Apostle, Romans 5: By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. For we have from this place that death is the punishment and effect of original sin; but death is one part of the corruption of human nature, and the other part of the same corruption is concupiscence, with ignorance and the other wounds of the same kind inflicted on our nature. Therefore the reasoning of death and of concupiscence seems to be the same; wherefore, as death is the punishment and effect of original sin, so also concupiscence is the punishment and effect of the same sin. Which same thing St. Augustine signifies, not obscurely, in many places. Book 5 against Julian, chapter 3: “Concupiscence,” says he, “is the punishment of sin, because it was paid back to the deserts of the disobedient one.” Book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 13 [al. 15], he says that man is born entangled in the guilt of Adam, and on that account liable to punishment; and by the punishment he understands concupiscence, of which he straightway subjoins that it is called sin by a trope, because it is the effect of sin. But St. Augustine has this most openly in book 14 On the Trinity, chapter 17, and the book On Continence, chapter 7, which were cited by us in the preceding chapter — where he compares original sin to fevers, and concupiscence to the languor which remains when the fevers are healed: “It is one thing,” says he, “to be free of fevers, another to grow strong again from the weakness which was made by the fevers.” And below: “The first cure is to remove the cause of the languor, which is done through the pardon of all sins; the second is to heal the languor itself, which is done little by little by advancing,” etc. Thou seest how openly the sin which is remitted in Baptism is called the cause of the languor — that is, of the remaining concupiscence. Concupiscence itself, then, cannot be the original sin, unless the same thing be the cause of itself.
The third reason: If a man were not born of Adam, and yet had the concupiscence which he now has, concupiscence could not in him properly be called sin; therefore concupiscence is not of itself, and from its nature, properly sin. The antecedent of this argument is St. Augustine's, book 3 against Julian, chapter 12 [al. 4], where St. Augustine concedes to Julian that a man cannot justly be reprehended, nor be guilty or a sinner on account of concupiscence, if with that concupiscence which he has he be not propagated from Adam, but created by the devil. And, besides Augustine's authority, the matter is altogether established and certain. For then concupiscence would be an altogether natural thing; but on account of natural things no one can justly be reprehended — as if one be born blind, or a simpleton. And if concupiscence would not be sin if it were natural, assuredly it is not sin of itself and from its nature. For what is sin from its nature is always sin; and from wheresoever at length it arise, whether from man or from the devil, it always makes guilty.
The fourth reason: Concupiscence, if it be taken for the involuntary act — that is, for the first motions of concupiscence which the mind resists — is no sin; therefore much less will it be sin if it be taken for the very proneness to the act. The consequence of this argument the adversaries concede; for they will have the proneness to be sin for this reason: that they judge that it fights with the law of God; but it is certain that it does not fight with the law of God, if its act does not fight with the same law. Let us prove, then, the antecedent, which they with common consent deny. Concupiscence in boys, madmen, and sleepers is not sin, because it is not in their power not to lust, as St. Augustine teaches, book 10 of the Confessions, chapter 30; St. Prosper, book 3 On the Contemplative Life, chapter 6; and St. Ambrose, book 1 On Offices, chapter 21. But neither is it in the power of wise and watchful men not to have those first motions of concupiscence, as experience teaches; therefore they are not sins. And truly said blessed Augustine, book 1 of the City of God, chapter 25: “How much more is the concupiscential disobedience without fault in the body of one not consenting, if it is without fault in the body of one sleeping?” Moreover, the law of the Lord is not only not impossible, but even easy and sweet to those who have his grace. Matthew 11: My yoke is sweet and my burden light. 1 Corinthians 10: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able. 1 John 5: And his commandments are not heavy. St. Basil, in the oration on that verse, “Attend to thyself,” not far from the beginning: “It is impious to say that the precepts of the Spirit are impossible.” St. Jerome, book 3 against the Pelagians, not far from the beginning: “God has commanded things possible — of this no one doubts.” St. Augustine, book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 3 [al. 6]: “They seem to themselves to speak acutely — as if any of us were ignorant of this — that if we will not, we do not sin, and that God would not command man what would be impossible to the human will.” St. Cyril, book 3 against Julian, about the middle, signifies that that precept seems impossible — “Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her,” etc. — but straightway corrects himself in these words: “But he does not suffer us to think so; for through the grace of God it is fulfilled by those who walk not according to the flesh.” But it is impossible, except by a singular privilege of God, even for the just and the holy not to have motions of concupiscence repugnant to the law of the mind, as is known from the Apostle himself, Romans 7 and 2 Corinthians 12; therefore those motions are not sins.
The fifth reason: This opinion of the adversaries does injury to Christ and to his merits. For if concupiscence is true sin, and always remains in a man, however justified, certainly it follows that Christ has redeemed and freed us from sins not truly, but only imputatively; and that the devil is more powerful than Christ, since the one could truly defile, the other could not truly cleanse. Whence also those testimonies of the Scriptures will be false: John 8, If therefore the son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed; and Romans 5, As by the disobedience of one many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one many shall be made just. For they who are still in sin cannot truly be said to be freed, nor are they truly made just through the obedience of Christ, as truly — and not only imputatively — they were made unjust through the disobedience of Adam. But of these things more in their place, in the disputation on justification.
The sixth reason could be that the opinion of the adversaries destroys itself, since it cannot be that they who are truly iniquitous and sinners — a perpetual disobedience of the divine law, namely, remaining in them — should not be guilty of the divine indignation and hatred. But this reason we have pursued fully enough above, in chapter 7. These things being omitted, then, let us come to diluting the arguments of the adversaries.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT IX. Refellitur idem error variis rationibus. Ultimo loco rationes varias ad eumdem er¬ rorem profligandum afferemus. Prima ratio. Baptismus non liberat ho¬ minem a concupiscentia, igitur vel concupi¬ scentia non est peccatum originis, vel Ba¬ ptismus non liberat hominem a peccato ori¬ ginis. Respondet Lutherus in assertione artic. 2. per Baptismum remitti peccatum originis quoad reatum, non quoad actum. Sed ha;c solutio explosa jam est supra cap. 7. Respon¬ dent alii, per Baptismum non tolli quidem concupiscentiam, sed tamen tolli ejus domi¬ nium. Id enim facit gratia, qucc per Bapti¬ smum confertur, ut concupiscentia non do- minetur. At haec solutio facile refutatur. Nam si con¬ cupiscentia esset peccatum originis, non esset propter dominium, sed propter repugnantiam ad rationem, vel pronitatem ad repugnan¬ dum. Siquidem peccatum originis est id, cum quo nascimur, et quod ab origine etiam in¬ fantes trahunt : nascimur autem cum proni- tate ad repugnandum rationi ; dominium au¬ tem in infantibus non invenitur, sed postea accedit ex consensu voluntatis, et ideo actu¬ ale, non originale peccatum est. Itaque Ba¬ ptismus etiamsi dominium tollat, non tamen peccatum originis tollit, si concupiscentia est peccatum originis. Porro quod diximus, concupiscentiam non propter dominium, sed propter repugnan¬ tiam, vel pronitatem esse peccatum originis, ex Augustino manifeste colligitur. Nam lib. vi. in Julianum cap. v. sic ait : « Tale porro, ac tam magnum malum, tantum quia inest, quomodo non teneret in morte, et pertraheret in ultimam mortem , nisi et ejus vincu¬ lum in illa, qua; fit in Baptismo, remissione peccatorum omnium solveretur ? » Ibidem cap. 8 : « Neque enim, inquit, nulla est ini¬ quitas, cum in uno homine vel superiora in¬ ferioribus turpiter serviunt, vel inferiora su¬ perioribus contumaciter reluctantur, etiamsi vivere non sinantur. » Vide etiam lib. n. de peccato originali cap. 39. Quemadmodum autem intelligi debeat quod S. Augustinus dicere videtur, concupiscentiam carnis esse peccatum originis, in solutione argumento¬ rum explicabimus. 'Nunc solum demonstrare volumus eorum sententiam non congruere cum doctrina S. Augustini, qui dicunt, in Baptismo remitti peccatum originis, quia tollitur concupiscentue dominatus. Secunda ratio. Concupiscentia est effectus, et pcena peccati originalis, ergo non est pec¬ catum ipsum originale. Nam tametsi possit unum et idem, et peccatum esse, et pcena (l)Rom. VI, 12|; tbid.YII 17. CAPUT IX. peccati, addo etiam, et causa peccati : ta¬ men hoc sine dubio intelligendum est per comparationem ad diversa. Neque enim in- telligi potest, ut res una sit peccatum, et poe¬ na, atque effectus ejusdem peccati, quia es¬ set pcena, et effectus sui ipsius, ac per hoc prior et posterior seipsa. Esse autem concupiscentiam poenam, et effectum peccati originalis, probatur primo ex verbis illis Apostoli ad Roman. v : Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum in¬ travit , et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit , in quo omnes pecca¬ verunt (1). Habemus enim ex hoc loco mor¬ tem esse poenam, et effectum peccati origi- ginalis; mors autem est pars corruptionis humana; naturae, altera vero pars ejusdem corruptionis est concupiscentia cum ignoran¬ tia, et aliis ejusdem generis naturae nostrae inflictis vulneribus. Igitur eadem ratio vide¬ tur esse mortis et concupiscentiae. Quare sic¬ ut mors est poena et effectus peccati origi¬ nalis, ita quoque et concupiscentia est pce¬ na et effectus ejusdem peccati. Quod idem S. Augustinus multis in locis non obscu¬ re significat lib. v. in Julianum c.- 3. : « Concupiscentia, inquit, pcena peccati est, quia reddita est meritis inobedientis »; lib. I retractationum cap. 13. dicit, hominem nasci implicatum reatu Adae, et ob id pcenae obnoxium, et per poenam intelligit concu¬ piscentiam, de qua statim subjungit, eam per tropum vocari peccatum, quia est effe¬ ctus peccati. Sed apertissime id habet S. Augustinus, lib. xiv de Trinitate cap. 17. et libro de con¬ tinentia cap. 7. quae sunt a nobis citata ca¬ pite superiore. Ubi comparat peccatum origi¬ nale febribus, concupiscentiam languori, qui remanet sanatis febribus : « Aliud est, in¬ quit, carere febribus aliud ab infirmitate, quae frebribus facta est, revalescere. » Et infra : « Prima curatio est causam remo- 'v» > i * ii 1 * • / •••-' vere lauguoris, quod per omnium fit indul¬ gentiam peccatorum; secunda ipsum sanare languorem, quod fit paulatim proficiendo etc. » Vides, quam aperte peccatum, quod remittitur in Baptismo, dicatur causa lan¬ guoris, jd est, concupiscentiae remanentis. Non igitur ipsa concupiscentia potest esse peccatum originale, nisi idem sit causa sui. Tertia ratio. Si homo non nasceretur ex Adamo, et tamen haberet concupiscentiam, -113 quam nunc habet, non posset in eo concupi¬ scentia proprie vocari peccatum, igitur con¬ cupiscentia non est ex se, et ex natura sua proprie peccatum. Hujus argumenti antece¬ dens est S. Augustini lib. m. in Julianum cap. 12. ubi 'concedit S. August. Juliano ho¬ minem non posse juste reprehendi, neque esse reum, vel peccatorem propter concu¬ piscentiam, si cum ea concupiscentia, quam habet, non propagetur ex Adamo, sed cree¬ tur a diabolo, et praeter Augustini auctori¬ tatem, res est omnino explorata ac certa. Nam tunc concupiscentia res esset omnino naturalis ; propter naturalia autem nemo juste reprehendi potest, ut si quis caecus na¬ scatur, aut fatuus. Quod si concupiscentia non esset peccatum, si naturalis esset, pro¬ fecto non esset peccatum per se et ex natura sua. Quod enim ex natura sua peccatum est, semper peccatum est, et undecumque tandem oriatur, sive ab homine, sive a diabolo, sem¬ per facit reum. Quarta ratio. Concupiscentia si sumatur pro actu involuntario, id est, pro primis con¬ cupiscentiae motibus quibus mens resistit, nullum peccatum est ; igitur multo minus peccatum erit, si sumatur pro ipsa pronitate ad actum. Consequentiam hujus argumenti adversarii concedunt, quia pronitatem ideo peccatum esse volunt, quoniam existimant eam pugnare cum lege Dei : Certum autem est, eam non pugnare cum lege Dei, si actus ejus cum eadem lege non pugnat. Probemus igitur antecedens, quod ipsi communi con¬ sensu negant. Concupiscentia in pueris, a- mentibus et dormientibus peccatum non est, quia non est in potestate eorum non concu¬ piscere, ut docent S. Augustinus lib. x. Con- fession. cap. 30. S. Prosper lib. m. de vita contemplativa cap. 6. et sanctus Ambrosius lib. i. de officiis cap. 21. At non est etiam in potestate virorum sapientium et vigilantium, non habere primos illos concupiscentiae mo¬ tus, ut experientia docet ; igitur illi peccata non sunt, et vere dixit beatus Augustinus lib. i. de civit. Dei cap. 23. « Quanto magis concupiscentialis inobedientia absque culpa est in corpore non consentientis, si absque culpa est in corpore dormientis? » Praeterea lex Domini non solum non im¬ possibilis, sed etiam facilis, ac suavis est ha¬ bentibus gratiam ipsius, Matth. xi : Jugum meum suave est, et onus meum leve ; I. ad (1) Rom. V, 12. LIRER V. 'i 1 Ii Corinth. x : Fidelia Deus , qui non patietur vos tentari supra id , quod potestis; I Joan.m : Et mandata ejus gravia non sunt (1). Sanctus Rasilius oratione in illud: «Attende tibi, » non procul ab initio : « Impium, inquit, est dicere, impossibilia esse spiritus praecepta. » Sanctus Hieronymus lib. m. adversus Pela- gianos, non longe a principio : «Deus, in¬ quit, possibilia mandavit, hoc nulli dubium est. » Sanctus Augustinus lib. ii. de peccat, merit. et remiss, cap. 3 : « Acute, inquit, sibi videntur dicere, quasi nostrum hoc ullus ignoret, quod si nolumus non peccamus, nec praeciperet Deus homini, quod esset huma¬ na} impossibile voluntati. » S.Cyrillus lib.m. in Julianum, circa medium, significat im¬ possibile videri praeceptum illud : « Si quis viderit mulierem ad concupiscendum etc. » sed continuo corrigit se his verbis : «Sed non ita, inquit, sapere nos sinit; nam per gra¬ tiam Dei adimpletur ab iis, qui non secun¬ dum carnem ambulant. » At impossibile est, nisi privilegio singulari Dei, etiam justis, et sanctis non habere motus concupiscentiae, repugnantes legi mentis, ut notum est ex ipso Apostolo Roman. vir. et 11 ad Corinth. xii. igitur motus illi peccata non sunt. Quinta ratio. Haec adversariorum senten¬ tia injuriam facit Christo, et ejus meritis. Nam si concupiscentia est verum peccatum, etsemper manet in homine, quantumvis ju¬ stificato, certe sequitur, ut Christus nos non vere, sed imputative tantum a peccatis red¬ emerit, ac liberaverit, et sit diabolus Chri¬ sto potentior, cum ille vere potuerit inqui¬ nare, iste non potuerit vere mundare. Unde etiam falsa erunt testimonia illa Scriptura¬ rum, Joan. vnr. Si vos filius liberaverit, vere liberi eritis. Et ad Roman. vin. Sicut per unius inobedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita per unius obedientiam justi constituentur mulli (2). Nam qui adhuc sunt in peccato, vere liberati dici possunt, nec vere sunt justi constituti per Christi obedientiam, sicut ve¬ re, et non imputative tantum injusti sunt constituti per Adami inobedientiam. Sed de his plura suo loco in disputatione de justifi¬ catione. Sexta ratio esse posset, quia sententia ad¬ versariorum se ipsa destruit, cum fieri ne¬ queat, ut qui vere sunt iniqui et peccatores, manente in illis videlicet perpetua legis di¬ vina; inobedientia, non sint rei divina} (•!) Mattii. XI, 30: 1 Corin. X, 13; I Joan. V, 3.- indignationis et odii. Sed hanc rationem supra cap. 7. satis fuse persecuti snmus. Ilis igitur omissis, ad argumenta adversa¬ riorum diluenda «accedamus.