Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 10: The arguments of the adversaries are solved, drawn from chapters 6, 7, and 8 to the Romans
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Many are the arguments which the adversaries are wont to object to the Catholics. To begin, then, from the testimonies of sacred Scripture: the first and chief argument Luther, Calvin, Philip, Chemnitz, and others take from chapters 6, 7, and 8 of the epistle to the Romans. But because there are in these chapters many sentences to be explained, we shall propose separately the objections which are gathered from these testimonies.
The first objection: Let not sin reign in your mortal body, Romans 6. The Apostle does not say, “Let not sin be in your mortal body,” but “let it not reign,” as St. Augustine also noted, tractate 41 on John. Therefore sin is always in us, though it does not always reign. Now the Apostle speaks of concupiscence, as is plain from what follows: “so as to obey the lusts thereof”; concupiscence, then, is always in us, and is always sin. I answer that both in this place, and rather often in the following chapter, concupiscence is called sin improperly, by the figure of metonymy, because it is the cause of sin, if it be obeyed. But against this Luther cries out, in the assertion of the second article, that it is not lawful for the Angels themselves, much less for men, to interpret the words of God at their pleasure — so that what they call sin, we should say is a defect, and not properly sin. For if it be thus lawful to expound the words of God at pleasure, we shall everywhere be able to interpret the name of sin as defect, and to say that adultery is not adultery, theft is not theft, and of the rest in the same way. But Luther vociferates thus in vain. For there is no one who perverts the Scriptures with greater license than he himself does. For the Scriptures everywhere affirm that sins are taken away through Christ. Isaias 53: He hath borne the sins of many. John 1: Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who taketh away the sins of the world. Romans 11: When I shall take away their sins. And yet Luther, in the assertion of the same second article, says in express words that no sin is taken away, but only remitted — that is, not imputed. He himself, then, truly does what is not lawful even for the Angels. But we do not deny that concupiscence is called sin, as the Apostle calls it; we deny that it is called sin properly — which neither did the Apostle say. And moreover we gather our explication evidently from the Scriptures. For the Scriptures testify that the word sin is ambiguous, and is taken now for the fault, now for the punishment, which is the effect of the fault, now also for the cause of sin, now finally for the sacrifice, which is the expiation of sin. Deuteronomy 9: And your sin that you had committed, that is, the calf… I burnt it with fire, and breaking it into pieces… reduced it… to dust — where most manifestly the calf is called the sin, because it was the effect and cause of the sin. Zacharias, last chapter, God speaking of the plagues of Egypt: This, says he, shall be the sin of Egypt — that is, the punishment of the sin. Lamentations 4: Thy iniquity is accomplished, O daughter of Sion, he will no more carry thee away into captivity — where also iniquity is taken for the punishment of iniquity. Romans 7: Is the law sin? God forbid — here, by the consent of all, sin is taken for the cause of sin; just as a little below the same law is called death, that is, the cause of death. 2 Corinthians 5, Christ is called sin, because he was a sacrifice for sin; as also in Osee 4 the priests are said to eat the sins of the people, because they eat the offerings for the expiation of sin. And so it is certain from the Scriptures that the word sin is not always taken for the fault — that is, for sin properly so called. Again, it is agreed from the Scriptures that sins properly so called are truly taken away in justification, as is plain from the places adduced a little before; nor is it less agreed from the Scriptures that concupiscence is not taken away in justification, since the Apostle, justified, says of himself, Romans 7: I perceive another law in my members, etc. Therefore it is agreed from the Scriptures that the Scriptures which call concupiscence sin are to be expounded of sin improperly — that is, of the cause or effect of sin. This same thing can be confirmed from the same place of the Apostle. For the Apostle testifies that this sin is in the body, not in the mind. For he says: Let not sin reign in your mortal body; and chapter 7: There dwelleth not in me, that is, in my flesh, that which is good. But sin properly so called cannot be in the body, but in the mind. For sin is injustice; and there only can true injustice have place, where true justice is wont to have place. But who ever set true and properly-so-called justice in the members of the flesh? Therefore the Apostle, when he says that concupiscence is sin, but dwells in the flesh, not in the mind, openly signified that it is sin not properly, but figuratively. Let the authority of St. Augustine come to this, who (as we cited in chapter 8) wrote in many places that concupiscence is called sin by the Apostle because it is the effect or cause of sin. Which is also the opinion of the Council of Trent, session 5 — whose authority alone would suffice for Catholics. Further, that argumentation of Luther — if in this place sin is not taken properly, it can everywhere be taken improperly — is most inept; for from a particular proposition a universal proposition is not gathered, though contrariwise from a universal a particular is rightly gathered, since the particular is contained in the universal, not contrariwise. And so, if one showed that sin is everywhere in the Scriptures taken properly, he would most rightly gather that in this place too it is taken properly; but from this — that in this particular place, for definite causes, sin is taken improperly — he will not effect that it is everywhere taken improperly. But opportunely Chemnitz, in the Examination of the Council of Trent, session 5, page 476, bringing help to Luther, says that there is no better interpreter of the words of Paul than Paul himself; then from Paul himself he proves that the word sin ought to be taken properly in this place. First, because Paul calls concupiscence “not good”; second, because he calls it evil; third, because he describes that evil privatively, by that phrase, “to accomplish that which is good, I find not”; fourth, because he describes the same evil positively, by that phrase, “the evil which I hate, that I do”; fifth, because he says that concupiscence fights with the precept, Thou shalt not covet; sixth, because he says that that evil is to be crucified, mortified, destroyed; seventh, because on account of this evil he cries out, Unhappy man that I am, etc. I answer: concupiscence, although it is not properly sin, yet is a certain corruption inciting to evil, and therefore is rightly called not good, and evil — both privative and positive evil — and to be crucified and destroyed. But how it fights with the law, and makes wretched, will be explained a little after.
The second objection, Romans 7: I do not know sin, but by the law; for I had not known concupiscence, if the law did not say: Thou shalt not covet. Here the Apostle openly testifies that concupiscence is sin. For first he says that he knew sin through the law; and afterwards he declares that that sin is concupiscence, and says that the law through which he knew it is the precept, Thou shalt not covet. Nor can the distinction of sin properly or improperly so called be accommodated to this place; for concupiscence is said to be sin because it is a transgression of the divine law, Thou shalt not covet. I answer that sin in this place is taken properly — that is, for a true transgression of the law; but that concupiscence is taken not for the tinder, but for the voluntary act of coveting, which is forbidden by the law, Thou shalt not covet. That this is so is plain both from the context of the Apostle, who, when he had said that the law is not sin — that is, the cause of sin — but is the cause of the knowledge of sin, proved it from this: that men did not know that interior acts, as the desire of another's wife or of another's goods, are sins, until the law said, Thou shalt not covet. And also from that place of the Gospel, Matthew 5: It was said to them of old: Thou shalt not commit adultery. But I say to you, that whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart. For the Lord said these things against the perverse opinions of the Pharisees, who were still teaching that internal wickednesses are not sins. Which is also plain from Josephus, book 12 of the Antiquities, chapter 9 [al. 13], who writes that an internal motion is not sin, unless it betray itself outwardly; likewise from David Kimhi on Psalm 65, verse 18, where he thus expounds that verse — If I have looked at iniquity in my heart, God shall not hear — that is, God will not impute unto sin an unjust desire, if it be only in the heart. And so the Lord willed to destroy that ignorance which had reigned before the law, and again had been brought in through the Pharisees, when he says: Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, etc.; and not without cause he added, “in his heart,” because not the concupiscence of the flesh, but of the heart — that is, the voluntary — is forbidden by the law, Thou shalt not covet. Of the same ignorance the Apostle speaks when he says: I had not known concupiscence, if the law did not say, Thou shalt not covet. And so this testimony of blessed Paul, since it is understood of actual sin, helps the cause of the adversaries nothing. One thing could be objected against this our solution: namely, that we admit in the same chapter frequent equivocations in the word sin. But this is not a fault, but an ornament, when the equivocation does not obscure the sense; and certainly the evidence of the matter compels us so to expound. For when the Apostle says: What shall we say, then? Is the law sin? God forbid. But I do not know sin, but by the law — and presently: Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence — it cannot be doubted that in the first place sin is taken for the cause of sin (otherwise it would be inept to ask whether the law were sin); in the second place, for sin properly so called, which is repugnant to the law; in the third place, for the tinder, which works all concupiscence — where the Apostle seems to explain why he called the tinder sin: because, namely, it effects sin, since it works concupiscence in us, and makes it voluntary by drawing away and alluring, as blessed James writes in his epistle.
The third objection: For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin, Romans 7. In this place blessed Paul confesses that he does not keep the law, because it is spiritual, but he carnal; and he speaks not of the law forbidding voluntary actions — for this law the Apostle says he keeps, when he says, What I hate, I do [not], and, With the mind I serve the law of God. Therefore he speaks of the law forbidding concupiscence itself, implanted in us from the sin of Adam; and thereby that concupiscence is repugnant to the law, and truly and properly is sin. I answer that there are two expositions of this place, and according to either the argument can rightly be solved. The former exposition is of Chrysostom, Theophylact, Ambrose, and others on this place, and of Augustine, book 1 to Simplician, question 1, who judge that the Apostle speaks not of himself and the just like him, but has put on the person of impious men, who not only have the tinder, but are also conquered by the tinder itself, and dragged through into various wickednesses; who are rightly said to be sold under sin, because they are not yet redeemed through the application of the blood of Christ, which is made through faith and the Sacraments. And according to this exposition the argument of the adversaries has no force. And what the Apostle says — What I hate, I do, and, With the mind I serve the law of God — which seem not to suit men not yet justified — are to be understood of the light of reason, and a certain appetite of good, which at least in general is wanting to no man. For even the most abandoned know that theft, homicide, adultery are evil, and detest these same crimes in others: “I see the better things and approve them,” says that man; “I follow the worse.” The latter exposition is of St. Augustine in almost all the books against the Pelagians — who also prefers it to the former, book 2 [al. 1] of the Retractations, chapter 1 [al. 23], and On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 4 — likewise of Primasius, Anselm, Thomas, and others on this place. Which latter exposition approves itself more to us also, especially because blessed Paul, from what he had said in chapter 7 — I am delighted with the law of God according to the inward man; and, It is not I that work it; and, With the mind I serve the law of God, and the like — deduces that conclusion at the beginning of chapter 8: There is now therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh, etc. Which conclusion manifestly indicates that the Apostle in chapter 7 spoke of himself and the others reborn through Christ. According to this exposition it must be said that blessed Paul does not wish to signify that the spiritual law is not kept by the justified so far as is needed for avoiding sin, but that it is not kept as to a certain perfection which is the end of the precept, and therefore is not properly in the precept. For it is to be known that in precepts sometimes only the means to some end are signified — as when it is said, Fight against the enemies; apply medicine to the sick man: for these are means, the one to victory, the other to health. But sometimes end and means are signified together — as if one say, Conquer the enemies; heal the sick man: for here not only are the fight and the treatment commanded, which are means, but the end also is indicated — victory and health. But the obligation of the precept consists properly in the means which are commanded, not in the end; and he is a transgressor who neglects the means, not he who does not attain the end. For he does not sin to whom it is said, Conquer the enemies, if he conquer not, provided he fight manfully; nor does he sin to whom it was said, Heal the sick man, even if he cannot heal, provided he treat aptly for healing. For the end can be indicated in a precept; properly commanded it cannot be. The precept, then, Thou shalt not covet, is of that kind which comprehends together means and end. The means are: to resist the concupiscences, and never to assent to them, never to yield; and these so bind that he who shall not have done them straightway stands guilty. The end is: to root out the concupiscences from the foundation, and to bring it about that no motion arise in the flesh against reason. But this end the law sets forth that we may understand whither, God helping, we must tend — not that we be guilty if we do not that which to do is not in our power, and which pertains to the felicity of the future life, not to the obligation of the present. For so St. Augustine teaches, in epistle 200 to Asellicus: “This the law set down in saying, Thou shalt not covet — not what we can do here, but that toward which, by advancing, we should tend.” And book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 29 [al. 25]: “He does much good who does what is written, Go not after thy lusts; but he does not perfect it, because he does not fulfill what is written, Thou shalt not covet. To this end, therefore, the law said, Thou shalt not covet: that, understanding ourselves to lie in this disease, we might seek the medicine of grace, and might know, by that precept, both whither we ought to strive in this mortality, and whither it can be arrived, from us, at that most blessed immortality.” Blessed Paul, then, says: “We know that the law is spiritual” — because, namely, it makes men spiritual, and requires men altogether spiritual, that it be observed perfectly, even as to the end. “But I am carnal” — because I have not yet a spiritual body (says Augustine, book 1 against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 10); for the Apostle does not call himself carnal as walking according to the flesh — for that he openly denies a little below — but as not being wholly spiritual, such as he will be after the resurrection. Nor is it absurd that in that life even the flesh should be spiritual, if in this life, in those who still relish carnal things, even the spirit itself could be carnal. “Sold under sin” — not because I have not been redeemed by the blood of Christ, but because (as the same Apostle says in Romans 8) even we ourselves, having the firstfruits of the Spirit… groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption of the sons of God, the redemption of our body. And so the Apostle had been sold, with the rest, in the transgression of the first sin; and since he had been redeemed as to the soul, having the firstfruits of the Spirit, but was awaiting the redemption of his body, therefore he felt the concupiscences, but did not consent; and therefore he adjoins: For that which I work, I understand not — that is, I know not, I approve not; or, it happens before reason is called into counsel, and therefore it happens with me not knowing and not consenting: For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I hate, that I do. Where he said that he does it (says Augustine, in the place cited) not by the affection of consenting and fulfilling, but by the very motion of coveting. Wherefore the blessed Apostle did not altogether perfect the spiritual law, Thou shalt not covet, in that part in which he was still carnal; nor yet did he sin, because the law does not bind to not feeling the motions of the flesh, but to not consenting to them, as we said above — since this is the means, that the end. And these things have been said according to the mind of St. Augustine, who understands that by the precept, Thou shalt not covet, all motions of concupiscence, even involuntary, are in some manner forbidden; but he teaches that assent to these motions is forbidden by that other precept: Go not after thy lusts, Ecclesiasticus 18. But that also is probable which others teach: that by the precept, Thou shalt not covet, involuntary motions are in no way forbidden, but the assent only; and that in this precept are contained only the means, and not the end. Which is proved first, because by the Apostle this is called the law of the mind, Romans 7, since it was given not to the flesh, but to the mind. Second, because this precept is had in Exodus, chapter 20, in Deuteronomy, chapter 5, and Matthew 5 [al. 19], with the other precepts of the Decalogue — Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, and the rest — which are all understood of free and plainly voluntary actions. Further, that saying — Go not after thy lusts — can conveniently be understood of the external work by which the concupiscences are sated; whence it presently follows: For if thou give to thy soul her desires, she will make thee a joy to thy enemies. According to this exposition of the precept, Thou shalt not covet, it must be said that the Apostle, when he says, The law is spiritual, but I am carnal, signifies not that the law is not perfected by him, but that the cause of sin is not the law, which is spiritual, but the corruption of our flesh, which sprouts depraved desires even with reason resisting. For he had said a little before: “Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good. Was that then which is good, made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it may appear sin, by that which is good, wrought death in me; that sin, by the commandment, might become sinful above measure.” And straightway, to prove this, he adjoined: “For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal,” etc. That is: the law could not work death in me, because it is spiritual; but the root of sin is in me, who am still carnal, sold under sin as to the body; whence, even with me not knowing, or unwilling, there arise in my flesh motions of concupiscence, which endeavor to allure to assent. From these things the remaining objections will be diluted with easy labor.
The fourth objection, Romans 7: If then I do that which I will not, I consent to the law, that it is good. If the mind of Paul consented to the law, certainly the law of the Lord and the mind of Paul willed the same thing; but the mind of Paul willed not to feel the motions of concupiscence (as is plain), because he felt them unwilling; therefore by the law of the Lord he willed that those motions should not exist; therefore those motions, although involuntary, were repugnant to the law, and hence were sin. Whence St. Augustine, sermon 5 on the words of the Apostle: “What sayest thou, O law? Thou shalt not covet. And I will not to covet. My weakness does not fulfill the law, but my will praises the law.” I answer: if we extend the precept, Thou shalt not covet, with Augustine, to the involuntary motions, we confess that those motions are repugnant to the law; but we deny that they are sins, because they are repugnant to the law as indicating the end, not as commanding the means, as was explained above. But if we restrict that precept to voluntary motions only, we answer to the argument that the consent of Paul with the law does not consist in this, that Paul and the law will or nill the same thing, but that Paul wills or nills that which the law commands him to will or nill. And so the consent of Paul with the law is set in this: that the law commands him to resist concupiscence, and Paul wills to resist concupiscence, and resists. Wherefore the sense of Paul's words will be this: if I do what I will not, I consent to the law, that it is good — that is: if I covet unwilling, I am not repugnant to the law, but consent to it; for it wills that I should not will to covet, and I will not to covet; when I covet, that happens beside and against my will. It could also more easily be said that the law nills concupiscence as its object, and likewise the mind of Paul nills the same, likewise as its object. Just as if someone killed a man by chance, and altogether beside his intention, he could truly say: What I willed not, I did; and therefore I consent to the law which says, Thou shalt not kill, that it is good. Nor yet from these words ought it to be gathered that the precept, Thou shalt not kill, is extended to altogether involuntary homicide, and that he is guilty who has killed beside his intention; for involuntary slaughter is not against the law, except materially.
The fifth objection, Romans 7: I find then a law, that when I have a will to do good, evil is present with me. From this place Calvin draws an argument. For the Apostle seems to say that he wills to keep the law, and so to do good, but cannot, on account of the evil lying beside him — that is, concupiscence repugnant to the law. I answer: this place is without doubt so obscure that many interpreters judge that something is wanting, and one strives to repair the defect in one way, another in another. But blessed Augustine, book 1 against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 10, indicated a sense convenient enough, and in which nothing need be supplied. For he will have that word “good” joined with “the law,” not with the verb “to do” — so that the sense is: I find, then, that the law is a certain good to me willing to do — that is, to me willing to work well and live according to the law; and I find the law to be a certain good for this reason: that the evil of concupiscence lies beside me. For while on the one side the evil lying beside incites to sin, on the other the good law of the Lord draws back from sin. And so it cannot be effected from this place that the law cannot be kept, or that involuntary concupiscence is sin.
The sixth objection: But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, Romans 7. In this place we see that concupiscence is repugnant to the law, and captivates — that is, makes one the slave of sin — and thereby without doubt is sin. I answer: not everything that is repugnant to the law is sin, although every sin is repugnant to the law. For sin is repugnant to the law privatively, because it is an action receding from its rule, when it could and ought to agree with its rule. But that many things are repugnant to laws which are not sins is beyond controversy. For the man who sins is repugnant to the law; and yet man is not properly sin, unless we would rave with Illyricus. Likewise an unjust law is repugnant to a just law; sometimes even the law of one Prince is contrary to the law of another, though neither seem unjust; an unjust law also can be repugnant to a law likewise unjust; nor yet can a law properly be called sin, as neither can a virtue. Now, then, concupiscence is repugnant to the law of the mind, not as an action receding from the rule when it could and ought to agree with the rule, but it is repugnant as a contrary law impelling to evil — in which way also the devil is repugnant to the law, and whatever incites to the transgression of the law. And so, by this very thing, that the Apostle calls concupiscence the law of the members, he signifies that it is not properly sin. And aptly was concupiscence called by the name of law, because law is nothing else than the rule of actions; and as the law of the mind is the rule of good action, which if thou follow, thou wilt do well, so concupiscence is a rule of sinning, which if thou follow, thou wilt altogether sin. And that phrase, “captivating me in the law of sin,” St. Augustine rightly expounds, book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 30, where he teaches that concupiscence is called captivating — that is, endeavoring to captivate; or captivating according to the flesh, not according to the mind, as was said above of those words: But I am carnal, sold under sin.
The seventh objection, Romans 7: Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? This too is Calvin's argument: he gathers that concupiscence is sin because it makes men wretched. I answer: unhappiness and misery in the Scriptures are for the most part attributed rather to the punishment than to the fault, as Proverbs 14: Sin maketh nations miserable. And Psalm 11: By reason of the misery of the needy, and the groans of the poor, now will I arise, saith the Lord. Chemnitz (as we said in the first objection) from this place proved that concupiscence is sin properly so called, and renders the reason: because Paul, saying this, acknowledges that that evil is of itself worthy of eternal death. But the reason is most inept, since the Apostle desires to be freed from a body mortal and liable to passions, but of eternal death says not even a word. For as to what is added in the following chapter — There is now therefore no condemnation, etc. — it is there explained why it was said: namely, because the reborn walk not according to the flesh; not because concupiscence, though sin, is not imputed.
The eighth objection, Romans 7: To will, is present with me; but to accomplish that which is good, I find not. But he who does not accomplish the good without doubt sins. And this is Calvin's argument. I answer: that one may sin by not doing something, it is required that he ought, and can, do it. For if one ought and cannot, he is wretched, not a sinner; if he can and ought not, he is less good, yet not evil. But that of which we treat — that the flesh should not lust — is not in our power; and therefore to will is present with us, but to accomplish the good of never lusting we find not. And therefore the Apostle concludes: Unhappy man that I am, etc. Hence St. Augustine, book 1 against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 10: “This it is to accomplish the good: that a man not even covet.”
The ninth objection, Romans 8: The wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God — or, as the Greek texts have it more clearly, the mind of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God. This place the adversaries everywhere bring, to prove that concupiscence is an evil of the whole man, and an enmity against God, and a repugnance against his law, and hence properly and most truly sin. I answer: the prudence, or wisdom, or sense of the flesh (for Paul uses all these words to signify the same thing) is truly and properly sin — but actual, not original. For the Apostle does not call the prudence of the flesh that evil which in chapter 7 he said is in the flesh, or in the members; for that evil the Apostle acknowledges in himself too, and in other holy men; but the prudence of the flesh he places only in sinners, who relish earthly things and walk according to the flesh. For thus he speaks: We walk not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit. For they that are according to the flesh, mind the things that are of the flesh; but they that are according to the spirit, mind the things that are of the spirit. For the wisdom of the flesh is death; but the wisdom of the spirit is life and peace. Because the wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be. And they who are in the flesh, cannot please God. But you are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. The prudence of the flesh, then, is a certain excessive care and solicitude of providing the things that are convenient, useful, and sweet to the flesh, the care and solicitude of the things that pertain to the spirit being neglected. And such a sense, or affection (for the verb from which the Greek word comes seems with the Apostle to pertain more to affection than to knowledge), is an enemy to God, because it does not agree with his law, nor can agree while it is such. For it cannot be that iniquity should concord with equity — though it can be that a man, the grace of God helping, lay down that prudence of the flesh, and begin to taste and to procure the things that are of the spirit. Hence appears the temerity of the adversaries, who confound and mix all things, and seek arguments from those places which make nothing to the matter.
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CAPUT X. Solvuntur argumenta adversariorum, deprom¬ pta ex cap. 6. 7. et 8. ad Roman. Multa sunt argumenta, qua; adversarii Ca¬ tholicis objicere solent. Ut igitur a Scriptu¬ ra} sacra} testimoniis ordiamur, primum, ac praecipuum argumentum sumunt Lutherus, Calvinus, Philippus, Kemnitius et alii ex cap. 6. 7. et 8. epist. ad Roman. Sed quia sunt in his capitibus multa; sententiae expli¬ candae, proponemus scorsim objectiones, quae ex his testimoniis colliguntur. Prima objectio. Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore , Rom. vi. (3). Non ait Apostolus, Non sit peccatum in vestro mor¬ tali corpore, sed non regnet, ut notavitetiam S. August. tract. 41. in Joan. Igitur semper est in nobis peccatum, licet non semper reg¬ net. Loquitur autem Apostolus de concupi¬ scentia, ut patet ex sequentibus : Ad obe- diendum concupiscentiis ejus; concupiscentia igitur semper in nobis est, et semper pecca¬ tum est. Respondeo, tum hoc loco, tum in sequenti capite saepius, concupiscentiam appellari peccatum improprie, per figuram metony- miae, quod sit causa peccaiti, si ei obediatur. Sed contra, exclamat Lutherus in assertione articuli secundi, non licere ipsis Angelis, nedum hominibus verba Dei pro arbitrio in¬ terpretari, ut quod illa peccatum appellant, nos defectum, et non proprie peccatum esse dicamus. Nam si ita liceat pro arbitrio verba Dei exponere, ubique poterimus nomen pec¬ cati per defectum interpretari, et dicere adul¬ terium non esse adulterium, furtum non esse furtum, et de eseteris eodem modo. At frustra Lutherus ita vociferatur. Nullus enim est, qui majori licentia Scripturas per¬ vertat, quam ipse faciat. Scriptura; siquidem passim affirmant, peccata per Christum tolli. Isai. Lin : Ipse peccata multorum tulit; Joan.i: Ecce agnus Dei, ccce qui tollit peccata mundi ; (2) Joan. VIII, 3Gj Rom. V, t!).— (3)Rom. VI, 12. % CAPIT X. 41’ ad Roman. xi : Cum abstulero peccata eo¬ rum (1), et Lutherus tamen in assertione ejusdem secundi articuli disertis verbis dicit: nullum peccatum tolli, sed tantum remitti, id est, non imputari. Ipse igitur vere facit, quodne Angelis quidem licet. Xos autem non negamus, conc.upiscentiam dici peccatum, ut Apostolus eam vocat, sed negamus dici peccatum proprie; quod nec Apostolus dixit. Et praiterea colligimus ex¬ plicationem nostram evidenter ex Scripturis. Nam Scriptura} testantur vocem peccati esse ambiguam, et nunc accipi pro culpa, nunc pro poena, quae est culpae effectus, nunc etiam pro causa peccati, nunc denique pro sacrificio, quod est peccati expiatio. Deute- ronom. ix : Peccatum vestrum, quod fecera¬ tis, id est vitulum, igne combussi , et in frusta comminuens, in pulverem redegi (2). Ubi mani¬ festissime vitulus dicitur peccatum, quia ef¬ fectus et causa peccati fuit. Zacharia} ulti¬ mo, loquens Deus de plagis ^Egypti : Hoc erit, inquit, peccatum SEgypti, id est, poena peccati. Thren. iv. Completa est iniquitas tua filia Sion, non addet ultra Dominus, ut trans¬ migret te (3). Ubi etiam iniquitas pro poena iniquitatis accipitur. Ad Romanos vn, Lex peccatum est? absit (4). Hic omnium consensu peccatum accipitur pro causa peccati. Quem¬ admodum paulo infra eadem lex dicitur mors id est, causa mortis II ad Corinth. v. Christus vocatur peccatum, quia sacrificium fuit pro peccato. Ut etiam Osca} iv. dicuntur Sacerdotes comedere peccata populi, quia comedunt oblationes, pro expiatione peccati. Itaque certum est ex Scripturis, vocem pec¬ cati non semper accipi pro culpa, id est, pro peccato proprie dicto. Rursus ex Scriptulis constat, peccata pro¬ prie dicta vere tolli in justificatione, ut ex locis, paulo ante adductis, perspicuum est ; nec minus constat ex Scripturis, concupi¬ scentiam in justificatione non tolli, cum Apo¬ stolus justificatus, de se dicat ad Roman. vn:' Sentio aliam legem in membris meis etc. (o). Igitur ex Scripturis constat, Scripturas, qute concupiscentiam peccatum appellant, expo¬ nendas esse de peccato improprie, id est, de causa vel effectu peccati. Id ipsum confirmari potest ex eodem loco Apostoli. Siquidem testatur Apostolus hoc peccatum esse in corpore, non in mente. Ait enim : Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore. Et cap. vii. Non habitat in me, id est, in carne mea , bonum. At peccatum proprie dictum, non potest esse in corpore, sed in mente. Peccatum enim est injustitia, et ibi solum locum habere potest vera injustitia, ubi locum habere solet vera justitia. Quis autem justitiam veram, proprieque dictam in membris carnis unquam posuit? Igitur j Apostolus, cum dicit, concupiscentiam esse peccatum, sed habitare in •carne, non in mente, aperte significavit, eam non proprie, sed figurate esse peccatum. Accedat auctori¬ tas S. Augustini, qui (ut citavimus cap. 8.) multis in locis scripsit, concupiscentiam ab Apostolo appellari peccatum, quia est effe¬ ctus, vel causa peccati. Quce etiam sententia est Concilii Tridcntini sess. 3. cujus Concilii auctoritas vel sola catholicis sufficeret. Porro argumentatio illa Lutheri, si hoc loco peccatum non accipiatur proprie, posse ubique non accipi proprie ; ineptissima est, nam ex particulari propositione non colligi¬ tur propositio universalis, quamvis contra ex universali recte colligatur particularis. Quo¬ niam particularis in universali continetur, non contra. Itaque si quis ostenderet, pec¬ catum ubique in Scripturis, accipi proprie, rectissime colligeret, hoc etiam loco accipi proprie. Sed ex eo, quod in hoc particulari loco certis de causis peccatum accipiatur improprie, non efficiet, ut ubique accipiatur improprie. Sed opportune Kemnitius in Examine. Concilii Tridcntini sess. o. pag. 476. Luthe- ro suppetias ferens dicit, nullum esse melio¬ rem interpretem verborum Pauli, ipso Pau¬ lo. Deinde ex ipso Paulo probat vocem, pec¬ catum, accipi debere proprie hoc loco. Pri¬ mo, quia Paulus concupiscentiam vocat non bonum. Secundo^ quia vocat malum. Tertio, quia illud malum describit privative, per il¬ lud, perficere bonum non invenio. Quarto, quia idem malum describit positive per il¬ lud, quod odi malum, illud facio. Quinto, quia dicit, concupiscentiam pugnai'e cum piXBcepto, Non concupisces. Sexto, quia dicit, illud malum esse crucifigendum, mortifican¬ dum, destruendum. Septimo, quia propter hoc malum exclamat, miser ego homo etc. Respondeo, concupiscentia, quamvis non sit proprie peccatum, tamen est corruptio quse- (I) Isai LI1I, 12; Joan, I, 29; Rom. XI, 27. - (2) Deut. IX, 21. - (3) Thren. IV, 22. - (4) Rom. VII, 7. - (5) Rom. VII, 23. —(6) Rom. VII, 18. 418 LIBER V. dam incitans ad malum, et ideo recte dicitur non bonum et malum, et malum privativum, et positivum, et crucifigendum, ac destruen¬ dum. Quomodo autem pugnet cum lege, et miserum faciat, paulo post explicabitur. Secunda objectio, ad Iloman vn : Pecca¬ tum non cognovi nisi per legem. Nam concupi¬ scentiam nesciebam , nisi lex diceret , Non con¬ cupisces (1). Hic Apostolus aperte concupi¬ scentiam testatur esse peccatum. Nam pri¬ mum dicit se. cognovisse peccatum per le¬ gem, et postea declarat, peccatum illud esse concupiscentiam ; et legem, per quam illud cognovit, dicit esse prmceptum, Non concu¬ pisces. Neque potest hoc loco accommodari distinctio de peccato proprie, vel improprie dicto. Nam concupiscentia ideo dicitur esse peccatum, quia est praevaricatio divinae legis, Non concupisces. Respondeo, peccatum hoc loco proprie accipi, id est, pro vera legjs praevaricatione : sed concupiscentiam non accipi pro fomite, sed pro actu voluntario concupiscendi, qui prohibitus est lege, Non concupisces. Id ita esse perspicuum est, tum ex contextu Apo¬ stoli, qui cum dixisset, legem non esse pec¬ catum, id est, causam peccati, sed esse cau¬ sam cognitionis peccati, probavit ex eo, quod non cognoscebant homines actus inte¬ riores, ut desiderium uxoris, vel rei alienae es¬ se peccata, nisi lex dixisset, non concupisces. Tum etiam ex loco illo Evangelii Matth. v : Dictum est antiquis : Non moechaberis ; Ego autem dico vobis, quia omnis, qui viderit mu¬ lierem ad concupiscendum eam, jam moechatus est eam in corde suo (2). Dominus enim haec dixit contra perversas Pharisaeorum opinio¬ nes, qui adhuc docebant, flagitia interna non esse peccata. Quod etiam patet ex Jose- pho lib. xii. antiquitatum cap. 13. qui scri¬ bit motum internum non esse peccatum, nisi exterius se prodat. Item ex David Kimhi in Psalm. lxvi. vers. 17. ubi sic exponit illud : Iniquitatem si aspexi in corde meo, non audiet Dominus (3), id est, non imputabit ad pecca¬ tum desiderium injustum, si tantum sit in corde. Itaque Dominus ignorantiam illam, quse regnaverat ante legem, et rursus per Phari- saeos inducta fuerat, destruere voluit, cum ait : Omnis qui viderit mulierem ad concupi¬ scendum etc. et non sine causa addidit, in corde suo, quia non concupiscentia carnis, sed cordis, id est, voluntaria prohibita est lege, Non concupisces. De eadem ignorantia loquitur Apostolus, cum ait : Concupiscen¬ tiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret, Non concu¬ pisces. Itaque hoc B. Pauli testimonium, cum de peccato actuali intelligatur, nihil juvat causam adversariorum. Unum objici posset contra nostram hanc solutionem, quod videlicet admittamus in eodem capite frequentes aequivocationes in voce, peccati. Sed hoc non est vitium, sed ornamentum, cum aiquivocatio non obscurat sententiam. Et certe cogit nos evidentia rei, ut sic exponamus. Nam cum Apostolus dicit : Quid ergo dicemus, lex peccatum est ? absit. Sed peccatum non cognovi nisi per legem. Et mox : Peccatum per mandatum operatum estin me omnem concupiscentiam. Dubitari non po¬ test, quin primo loco peccatum accipiatur pro causa peccati, alioqui inepte quairere- tur, an lex peccatum esset. Secundo loco pro peccato proprie dicto, quod repugnat legi tertio loco pro fomite, qui operatur omnem concupiscentiam. Ubi videtur Apo¬ stolus explicare, cur fomitem appellaverit peccatum, quia videlicet efficit peccatum, cum operetur in nobis concupiscentiam , eamque voluntariam abstrahendo et illi¬ ciendo, ut B. Jacobus in epistola sua scri¬ bit. Tertia objectio : Scio enim quia lex spiri¬ tualis est, ego autem carnalis sum, venumdatus sub peccato , Roman. vn (4). Hoc loco B. Paulus fatetur se non servare legem, quia illa spiritualis est, ipse vero carnalis, et non loquitur de lege prohibente actiones volun¬ tarias ; hanc enim legem Apostolus servare se dicit, cum ait : Quod odi facio, et mente servio legi Dei. Igitur loquitur de lege prohi¬ bente concupiscentiam ipsam nobis insitam ex peccato Ada3 ; ac per hoc concupiscentia illa repugnat legi, et vere proprieque pecca¬ tum est. Respondeo. Duas esse hujus loci exposi¬ tiones, et secundum utramque recte argu¬ mentum solvi posse. Prior expositio est Chrysostomi, Theophylacti, Ambrosii, et aliorum in huuc locum, et Augustini, lib. I. ad Rimplicianum quaist. 1. qui existimant Apostolum non loqui de se, suique simili¬ bus, justis; sed induisse personam hominum impiorum, qui non solum fomitem habent, sed etiam ab ipso fomite vincuntur, et per- (l)Rom. VII, 7. - (2) Matth. V, 27. - (3) Ps. LXVI, 17. — (4)Rom. VII, 14. CA1‘UT X. 419 trahuntur in varia flagitia ; qui recto dicun¬ tur venumdati sub peccato, quia nondum redempti sunt per applicationem sanguinis Christi ; quae fit per fidem et Sacramenta. Et secundum hanc expositionem argumen¬ tum adversariorum nullas vires habet. Qnod vero dicit Apostolus : Quod odi facio, et, mente servio legi Dei, quae videntur non con¬ venire hominibus nondum justificatis ; intel- ligenda sunt de lumine rationis, et quodam appetitu boni, qui saltem in genere nulli ho¬ mini deest. Nam etiam perditissimi quique norunt, malum esse furtum, homicidium, adulterium, et in aliis haec ipsa scelera dete¬ stantur : Video, inquit ille, meliora, probo- que ; deteriora sequor. Posterior expositio est S. Augustini in om¬ nibus fere libris contra Pelagianos, qui etiam illam priori praefert lib. ii. Retractat, cap. 1. et de praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 4. Item Primasii, Anselmi, Thomae, et aliorum in hunc locum. Quae expositio posterior no¬ bis etiam magis probatur, praesertim quia B. Paulus ex iis, quae dixerat in 7. cap. : Condelector legi Dei interiorem hominem, et, non ego operor illud, 'et mente servio legi Dei, it similibus, deducit illam conclusionem ini¬ tio cap. 8 : Nihil ergo damnalonis est his, qui sunt in Christo Jesu, qui non secundum carnem ambulant, etc. (1). Quae conclusio manifeste indicat. Apostolum in cap. 7. de se, et caeteris per Christum renatis esse locu¬ tum. Secundum hanc expositionem dicen¬ dum est, beatum Paulum non velle signifi¬ care, legem spiritualem, non servari a justi¬ ficatis, quatenus opus est ad vitandum pec¬ catum, sed non servari quantum ad quam¬ dam perfectionem, quae est finis praecepti, ac propterea proprie non est in praecepto. Sciendum est enim in praeceptis interdum significari solum media ad aliquem finem, ut cum dicitur, pugna contra hostes, fac medi¬ cinam aegroto. Haec enim sunt media, illud ad victoriam, istud ad sanitatem. Interdum autem significari simul finem et media, ut si quis dicat, vince hostes, sana aegrotum. Ilie enim non solum imperantur pugna et cura¬ tio, quae sunt media, sed etiam indicatur fi¬ nis, victoria et sanitas. Caeterum obligatio praecepti proprie in mediis, quae imperantur consistit, non in fine : et praevaricator est, qui media negligit, non qui finem non asse¬ quitur. Neque enim peccat, cui dicitur, vin¬ ce hostes, si non vincat, modo viriliter pug¬ net ; neque is peccat, cui dictum est, sana aegrotum, etiamsi sanare non possit, modo curet apposite ad sanandum. Finis enim in praecepto indicari potest, proprie imperari non potest. Praeceptum igitur, Non concupisces , ejus generis est, ut simul media, et finem com¬ prehendat. Media sunt resistere concupi¬ scentiis, eisque nunquam assentiri, nun¬ quam cedere : atque haec ita obligant, ut qui non fecerit, continuo reus existat : finis est funditus concupiscentias extirpare, atque id efficere, ut nullus in carne motus oriatur contra rationem. Hunc autem finem lex pro¬ ponit, ut intelligamus, quo sit nobis Deo ju¬ vante tendendum, non ut rei simus, si id non faciamus, quod facere in nostra pote¬ state non est, et quod ad felicitatem futura; vita;, non ad obligationem praesentis perti¬ net. Sic enim S. Augustinus docet in epist. 200. ad Asellicum ; « Hoc, inquit, lex posuit dicendo, Non concupisces, non quod hic vo- leamus, sed ad quod proficiendo tendamus.» Et lib. i. de nuptiis et concupiscentia cap. 29. « Multum, inquit, boni facit, qui facit quod scriptum est, Post concupiscentias tuas non eas : sed non perficit, quia non implet quod scriptum est, Non concupisces. Ad hoc ergo dixit lex, Non concupisces, ut nos in hoc morbo jacere intelligentes, medicinam gratia; quaereremus, et in eo praecepto scire¬ mus, et quo debeamus in hac mortalitate co¬ nari, et quo possit a nobis illa beatissima immortalitate perveniri. » Ait igitur B. Paulus : « Scimus quia lex spiritualis est. » Quia videlicet spirituales homines facit, et spirituales omnino requirit, ut perfecte, etiam quoad finem observetur. Ego autem carnalis sum. Quia nondum spiri¬ tuale corpus habeo (inquit Augustinus lib. i. contra duais epistolas Pelagianorum cap. 10.) non enim carnalem se vocat Apostolus, quod secundum carnem ambulet ; nam id paulo infra aperte negat ; sed quod non sit totus spiritualis, qualis post resurrectionem erit. Neque enim absurdum est, ut sit in illa vita etiam caro spiritualis, si potuit esse in hac vita in his, qui adhuc carnalia sapiunt, etiam spiritus ipse carnalis. Venumdatus sub peccato, non quia Christi sanguine redemptus non sim, sed quia (ut ad Roman. vm. idem Apo- (i)Rom. VII, 22; ibid. VIII, 1. >520 LIBER V. stolus dicit) et nos primitias spiritus haben¬ tes intra nos ingemiscimus adoptionem expe- ctantes , redemptionem corporis nostri (1). Itaque venumdatus erat Apostolus cum caetc- ris in praevaricatione primi peccati, et quo¬ niam redemptus erat quoad animam, primi¬ tias spiritus habens, expectabat autem red¬ emptionem corporis sui, ideo concupiscen¬ tias sentiebat, sed non consentiebat, et pro- pterea adjungit : Quod enim operor non intel- ligo, id est, non scio, non approbo, vel prius id fit, quam ratio in consilium avocetur, et ideo me ignorante, et non consentiente fit : Non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago ; sed quod odi malum, illud facio. Ubi facere se dixit (in¬ quit Augustinus loco citato) non affectu con¬ sentiendi et implendi , sed ipso motu concupi¬ scendi. Quare B. Apostolus legem spiritualem, Non concupisces, non omnino perficiebat, qua parte adhuc carnalis erat : nec tamen peccabat, quia lex non obligat ad'non sen¬ tiendum carnis motus, sed ad non consen¬ tiendum eis, ut supra diximus, cum hoc sit medium, illud finis. Atque haec dicta sunt ad mentem S. Augustini, qui praecepto, Non concupisces, intelligit prohiberi aliquo modo motus omnes concupiscentiae, etiam invo¬ luntarios : assensum vero his motibus prohi¬ beri docet illo alio praecepto : Post concupi¬ scentias tuas non eas (2), Eceles. xvm. Caeterum probabile etiam est, quod alii docent, praecepto, Non concupisces , non pro¬ hiberi ullo modo motus involuntarios : sed assensum tantum, et hoc praecepto contineri solum media, non autem finem. Quod proba¬ tur primo, quoniam ab Apostolo haec voca¬ tur lex mentis Roman. vii. Quia non carni, sed menti data est. Secundo, quia hoc praece¬ ptum habetur in Exodo cap. 20. in Deutero- nom. cap. 5. et Matth. v. cum aliis praeceptis Decalogi. Non occides , Non moechaberis , et caeteris, quae intelliguntur omnia de actioni¬ bus liberis, planeque voluntariis. Porro illud, Post concupiscentias tuas non eas, intelligi commode potest de opere externo, quo con¬ cupiscentiae satiantur. Unde mox sequitur : Si enim praestiteris animae tuae concupiscentias suas, faciet te in gaudium inimicis tuis. Juxta hanc expositionem praecepti, Non concupi¬ sces, dicendum est, Apostolum, cum ait : Lex spiritualis est , ego autem carnalis sum , non significare, non perfici legem a se, sed causam peccati non esse legem, quae spiri¬ tualis est ; sed carnis nostrae corruptionem, quae pullulat prava desideria, etiam relu¬ ctante ratione. Dixerat enim paulo ante : c Itaque lex quidem sancta, et mandatum sanctum, et justum, et bonum; quod ergo bonum est, mihi factum est mors? absit, sed peccatum, ut appareat peccatum, per bo¬ num operatum est mihi mortem, ut fiat su¬ pra modum peccans peccatum per manda¬ tum. )) Et continuo, ut hoc probaret, adjun¬ xit : « Scimus enim quod lex spiritualis est, ego autem carnalis sum, etc. » Hoc est, lex non potuit mihi mortem operari, quia spiri¬ tualis est : sed radix peccati in me est, qui adhuc carnalis sum, venumdatus sub pecca¬ to, quoad corpus. Unde etiam me ignorante, vel invito oriuntur in carne mea motus con¬ cupiscentia;, qui allicere conantur ad assen¬ sum. Ex his objectiones reliqua; facili nego¬ tio diluentur. Quarta objectio Roman. vii : Si quod nolo, facio, consentio legi, quia bona est (3). Si mens Pauli consentiebat legi, certe idem vo¬ lebant lex Domini, et mens Pauli, sed mens Pauli nolebant sentire motus concupiscentiae (ut patet) quia invitus eos sentiebat ; igitur ex lege Domini nolebat eos motus existere, igitur motus illi, quamvis involuntarii, repug¬ nabant legi, ac proinde peccatum erant. Unde S. Augustinus sermon. o. de verbis Apostoli : « Quid, inquit, dicis o lex? Non concupisces, et ego nolo concupiscere, non implet legem infirmitas mea, sed legem lau¬ dat voluntas mea. » Respondeo : si praeceptum, Non concupi¬ sces, extendamus cum Augustino ad motus involuntarios, fatemur eos motus repugnare legi, sed negamus esse peccata ; quia repug¬ nant legi ut indicanti finem, non ut impe¬ ranti media, ut supra explicatum est. Sin autem praeceptum illud restringamus ad motus tantum voluntarios, r espondemus ad argumentum, consensum Pauli cum lege, non consistere in eo quod rem eamdem ve¬ lint, aut nolint Paulus et lex ; sed quod Pau¬ lus velit, aut nolit id quod lex jubet eum velle, aut nolle. Itaque consensum Pauli cum lege in eo positum esse, quod lex jubeat eum resistere concupiscenthe , et Paulus velit concupiscentia; resistere, ac resistat. Quare sensus verborum Pauli hic erit, si quod nolo, facio ; consentio legi, quia bona (1) Roni. VIII, 23. - (2) Eccl XVIII, 30. - (3)Rom VII, 10. CAPUT X. 4-21 est ; hoc est, si invitus concupisco, non re¬ pugno legi, sed ei consentio ; ipsa enim vult, ut ego nolim concupiscere, et ego nolo concupiscere ; cum concupisco, id fit prte- ter, et contra voluntatem meam. Posset etiam facilius dici, legem nolle concupiscen¬ tiam, ut objectum ; et similiter mentem Pauli nolle eamdem, similiter, ut objectum. Quemadmodum si quis hominem c?su, atque omnino praeter intentionem occideret, is vere dicere posset, Quod nolui, feci: et ideo con¬ sentio legi, quai ait, Non occides, quia bona est. Nec tamen ex his verbis colligi deberet praeceptum, Non occides , extendi ad homi¬ cidium omnino involuntarium, et reum esse, qui praeter intentionem occiderit. Caedes enim involuntaria non est contra legem, nisi materialiter. Quinta objectio, Hom. vii : Invenio igitur legem, volenti mihi facere bonum, quoniam malum mihi adjacet (1). Ex hoc loco ducit argumentum Calvinus. Videtur enim Apo¬ stolus dicere, velle se legem servare/ et ita bonum facere, sed non posse, propter ma¬ lum adjacens, id est, concupiscentiam repug¬ nantem legi. Respondeo : locus hic sine dubio ita ob¬ scurus est, ut multi interpretes existiment aliquid deesse, et alius alio modo defectum resarcire studeat. Sed B. Augustinus lib. i. contra duas epistolas Pclagianorum c. 10. salis commodum sensum indicavit, et in quo nihil subintelligi debeat. Vult enim illud, bonum , conjungi cum, lege , non cum verbo, facere; ut hic sit sensus, Invenio igitur le¬ gem bonum quoddam esse mihi volenti fa¬ cere, id est, volenti bene operari, et secun¬ dum legem vivere : ideo autem legem inve¬ nio esse quoddam bonum, quoniam malum concupiscenti® adjacet mihi. Dum enim ab una parte malum adjacens incitat ad pecca¬ tum ; ab altera lex Domini bona retrahit a peccato. Itaque non potest ex hoc loco effici, non posse legem servari, aut concupiscen¬ tiam involuntariam esse peccatum. Sexta objectio : Video aliam legem in mem¬ bris meis repugnantem legi mentis meat, et ca¬ ptivantem me in lege peccati (2), Itoman. vii. Hoc loco videmus concupiscentiam repug¬ nare legi, et captivare, id est, servum pec¬ cati facere, ac per hoc sine dubio esse pec¬ catum. Respondeo : non omne quod repugnat legi peccatum est, quamvis omne peccatum legi repugnet. Peccatum enim repugnat legi privative, quia est actio recedens a sua re¬ gula, cum posset, et deberet cum sua regula, congruere. Multa vero legibus repugnare, quic peccata non sunt, extra controversiam est. Repugnat enim legi homo, qui peccat, et ta¬ men homo non est peccatum proprie, nisi cum Illyrico delirare velimus. Item repugnat legi justae lex injusta, interdum etiam lex unius Principis legi alterius contraria est, cum tamen neutra videatur injusta. Potest quoque lex injusta legi item injust® repug¬ nare. Nec tamen lex peccatum proprie dici potest, sicut nec virtus. Jam igitur concupiscentia repugnat legi mentis, non ut actio recedens a regula, cum posset, et deberet regulae congruere ; sed repugnat ut lex contraria impellens ad ma¬ lum; quomodo etiam legi repugnat diabolus et quidquid incitat ad legis transgressionem. Itaque hoc ipso, quod Apostolus concupi¬ scentiam vocat legem membrorum, signifi¬ cat eam non esse proprie peccatum. Apposite autem legis nomine concupi¬ scentia appellata est, quia lex nihil est aliud,* nisi regula actionum. Et quemadmodum lex mentis est regula bona: actionis, quam si se¬ quaris, bene ages : ita concupiscentia regu¬ la est peccandi, quam si sequaris, omnino peccabis. Illud autem, captivantem me in lege peccati , recte exponit S. Augustinus lib. i. de nuptiis et concupiscentia cap. 30. ubi do¬ cet, concupiscentiam dici captivantem, id est, captivare conantem ; vel captivantem secundum carnem, non secundum mentem ; ut supra dictum est de illis vocibus, Ego au¬ tem carnalis, venumdatus sub peccato. Septima objectio, Roman. vii. Infelix ego homo , quis me liberabit de corpore mortis hu¬ jus (3)? Hoc etiam est Calvini argumentum : colligit, concupiscentiam esse peccatum, quia miseros facit homines. Respondeo : Infelicitas et miseria in Scri¬ pturis ut plurimum poenae potius tribuitur, quam culpae, ut Proverb. xiv : Miseros facit populos peccatum (4). Et Psal. xi : Propter miseriam inopum, et gemitum pauperum, nunc exurgam dicit Dominus (5). Kemnitius (ut in I. objectione diximus) ex hoc loco probabat, concupiscentiam esse peccatum proprie di¬ ctum; et rationem reddit, quia Paulus hoc dicens agnoscit, malum illud esse persedig- (I) Rom. VII, 21. - (2) Rom. VII, 23. - (3)Rotn. VI, 24.— (4) Prov. XIV, 34. - (5) Psal. XI, 0, ElfeER V. i22 nura morte feterna. Sed ineptissima ratio est, cum Apostolus de corpore mortali, et passionibus obnoxio liberari cupiat, de mor¬ te vero aeterna ne verbum quidem dicat. Nam quod in sequenti capite additur : Nihil ergo damnationis etc. ibidem explicatur, cur dictum sit; nimirum, quia renati non secun¬ dum carnem ambulant, non autem quia con¬ cupiscentia quamvis peccatum, non imputetur. Octava objectio, Rom. vii : Velle adjacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio (1). At qui non perficit bonum, sine dubio pec¬ cat. Et hoc argumentum Calvini est, Respondeo : ut quis peccet non faciendo aliquid, requiritur, ut debeat, et possit illud facere. Nam si quis debeat, et non possit, miser est, non peccator : si possit et non de¬ beat, minus bonus est, non tamen malus. Id autem de quo agimus, id est, carne non concupiscere, non est in nostra potestate, et ideo velle adjacet nobis , perficere bonum nunquam concupiscendi non invenimus. Et ideo concludit Apostolus, Infelix ego homo etc. Hinc S. Augustinus lib. i. contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum cap. 10 : « lloc est, inquit, perficere bonum, ut nec concupiscat homo. » Nona objectio, Roman. vm : Sapientia carnis inimica est Deo. Vel, ut clarius habent Graeci textus, cppbvr,u.a ty); aapxb; eyOpa ei? Oeov, « inimicitia est in Deum, legi enifn Dei non est subjecta. » Hunc locum passim adferunt adversarii, ut probent concupiscentiam esse malum totius hominis, et inimicitiam adversus Deum, et repugnantiam contra legem ejus; ac proinde proprie, verissimeque peccatum. Respondeo : Prudentia, sive sapientia, sive sensus carnis (nam his omnibus vocibus ad rem eamdem significandam utitur Paulus) vere proprieque peccatum est, sed actuale, non originale. Non enim vocat Apostolus prudentiam carnis illud malum, quod cap. 7. dixit esse in carne, sive in membris. Nam illud malum in se quoque, et in aliis sanctis hominibus agnoscit Apostolus; prudentiam vero carnis non ponit nisi in peccatoribus, qui terrena sapiunt, et secundum carnem ambulant. Sic enim loquitur : Non secundum carnem ambulamus, sed secundum spiritum. Qui enim secundum carnem sunt, quae carnis sunt sapiunt ; (pii vero secundum spiritum sunt sentiunt. Nam prudentia carnis mors est,' pru¬ dentia autem spiritus vita et pax; quoniam sa¬ pientia carnis inimica est Deo. Legi enim Dei non est subjecta ; nec enim potest. Qui autem in carne sunt , Deo placere non possunt. Vos autem in carne non estis, sed in spiritu, si ta¬ men spiritus Dei habitat in vobis (2). Prudentia igitur carnis est cura, et sollici¬ tudo quaedam nimia providendi, quae carni sunt commoda, utilia, suavia, neglecta cura, et sollicitudine eorum, qua; ad spiritum per¬ tinent. Talis autem sensus, sive affectus (vi¬ detur enim verbum ©povEtv, unde est vocabu¬ lum cppdvTjfx.se, apud Apostolum magis ad affe¬ ctum, quam ad cognitionem pertinere) ini¬ micus est Deo, quia non congruit cum ejus lege neque congruere potest dum talis est. Neque enim fieri potest, ut iniquitas cum aequitate concordet, quamvis fieri possit, ut homo gratia Dei adjuvante, deponat prudentiam illam carnis, et ea, qua; spiritus sunt, gustare, et procurare incipiat. Hinc ap¬ paret adversariorum temeritas, qui omnia confundunt, et miscent, et argumenta pe¬ tunt ex his locis, qui nihil ad rem faciunt.