Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 13: Response is made to the places which are produced from Augustine
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Let us come now to the places which are cited from Augustine. First Luther, in the assertion of the second article, cites two places: one from book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 25, where he says that sin is remitted in baptism “not that it be not, but that it be not imputed”; the other from the same book, chapter 37 [al. 26], where he says that the same sin “passes in guilt, remains in act.” I answer: Luther (as we said above) committed the crime of forgery. For nowhere did St. Augustine say that sin is in someone but is not imputed, or remains in act, passes in guilt. Nor was he so stupid as not to understand that the guilt cannot be separated from the sin, since in the same book, chapter 26, he wrote: “This it is not to have sin — not to be guilty of sin.” St. Augustine, then, speaks in the two places cited of concupiscence, and says that in the reborn it is not sin, is not imputed, and does not make guilty, though it remains as to act, because it does not cease to stir up depraved desires.
But against this solution is the argument of Melanchthon and Calvin and others: St. Augustine, not only in book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 25, but also in book 2 against Julian, and everywhere else, says that concupiscence is remitted in baptism: “This law of sin,” says he, “is both remitted in the spiritual regeneration, and remains in the mortal flesh.” But nothing is remitted except sin; therefore it in itself was truly sin before it was remitted. But it remains in the reborn the same as it was before, as to substance; therefore it is still truly sin, and is said to be remitted only because it is not imputed. I answer: St. Augustine signifies indeed that concupiscence in the unreborn is sin, and therefore is remitted through baptism; but he understands it to be sin not by reason of itself, but by reason of the guilt of original sin, which remains annexed with it until baptism. For thus speaks the same Augustine, book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 32: “So long, then, as this remission of sins is not made in the offspring, this law of sin is so there that it is even imputed as sin — that is, that its guilt too is with it, holding him a debtor of eternal punishment.” Thus he, who speaks likewise in many places. But in this place it must diligently be attended that the guilt of concupiscence can be understood in three ways. First, the guilt of concupiscence can mean the guilt which arises from it and is founded in it, so that he is guilty who has it, because he has it — as the guilt of theft means that by which he is properly called guilty who committed the theft. Second, the guilt of concupiscence can mean that by which it was made, not that which it makes — as if someone cut off his own hand, he would be said to be guilty of the cut-off hand, not because to have a cut-off hand is sin or makes guilty, but because to cut off one's own hand is against reason and makes guilt. So, then, it is called the guilt of concupiscence, not because to have it makes a man guilty, but because it was born from the guilt of the sin of Adam, who, made a rebel to God, deserved to experience in himself the rebellion of his own flesh. Third, the guilt of concupiscence can also mean that which it makes if it drag through to consent — so that the man is properly guilty not because he has concupiscence, but because he yields to concupiscence. Of these three ways the adversaries choose the first, and therefore will have concupiscence to be properly sin; but we take the second and the third, and therefore contend that concupiscence is not so much sin as the effect and cause of sin. Further, that the second and third ways are according to the mind of St. Augustine we prove from the words of the same, in book 2 against Julian, about the middle of the epilogue: “Although now it is not called sin in that manner in which it makes guilty, but because it was made by the guilt of the first man, and because by rebelling it strives to drag us to guilt.” Again, in the same book a little above, explaining the testimony of Ambrose on the good and evil horses, he indicates the third way in these words: “Or wilt thou not yet confess that their guilt has perished, their weakness has remained — not the guilt by which they themselves had been guilty, but by which they had made us guilty in the evil works to which they had dragged us?” For by these words Augustine shows that the vices with which we are born are remitted in Baptism, because their guilt is remitted, though the weakness remains; and by the guilt he says he understands the guilt of the evil works which we did by assenting to concupiscence. In the same book 2 against Julian, a little before the middle of the book, he mentions the second way. For when he had said that the guilt of concupiscence, like all other sins, is loosed in Baptism, and that thereafter it remains for the contest, he objects to himself that Julian will say that that evil against which we fight after baptism is not something drawn from the parents, but evil habits acquired before baptism by one's own acts; then he answers in these words: “If thou sayest this, thou now beyond doubt discernest and concedest that there is in man something of evil such that not it itself, but the guilt which had been contracted from it, is taken away in baptism.” By which words St. Augustine teaches that the concupiscence inborn in us is like an evil habit procured by many evil acts; and that, as in the baptism of adults all the sins are remitted by which the habit was procured, yet the habit itself is not taken away, so also in the baptism of little ones the sin of origin is remitted, whence concupiscence was born, yet concupiscence itself is not utterly rooted out. Now it is certain that he who has contracted evil habits is not properly guilty because he has those evil habits, but because he did the evil acts whence the evil habits proceeded. So, then, he who has concupiscence is not properly guilty by reason of the concupiscence, as though to have it were sin, but by reason of the sin by which the concupiscence itself was made. And by this reasoning concupiscence is said to be remitted in Baptism — not by reason of itself, but by reason of the annexed guilt, which is called its guilt because through it, as we said, it was made. The same St. Augustine, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 15, says that men are born entangled in the guilt of Adam, and on that account liable to punishment; and a little after he teaches that that punishment is concupiscence. The guilt, then, which is loosed in baptism is not properly the guilt which concupiscence makes, but the guilt whence that punishment proceeded. For the guilt of Adam, in which we too are born entangled, was not, as is known, the having of concupiscence, but the mind's being turned away from God — whence was born the turning away of the flesh from reason. Wherefore the same Augustine, book 14 On the Trinity, chapter 17, most openly wrote that in baptism all sins are remitted, yet concupiscence is not extinguished, because it is one thing to remove the cause of the languor, another to cure the languor itself; where, when he says that in Baptism, through the remission of the sin or guilt, the cause of concupiscence is removed, he evidently shows that the guilt of concupiscence which is remitted in baptism is not the guilt which concupiscence makes, but that through which concupiscence was made. Finally, the same St. Augustine, book 6 against Julian, chapter 5, says that in baptism is taken away the guilt of all evils, not all the evils; and he sets the example of the corruption of the body, and of ignorance, and understands the same of concupiscence — nay, of it chiefly he speaks. But it is certain that the guilt of the corruption of the body, which is taken away in Baptism, is the guilt by which that corruption was made, and not one which the corruption itself makes — as if it were sin to be mortal.
But against this our solution many testimonies of St. Augustine are adduced by the adversaries, by which they strive to demonstrate that the guilt of concupiscence which is loosed in Baptism is to be taken in the first way explained above — that is, that it is a guilt which accompanies concupiscence itself, so that whoever has concupiscence is guilty by this very fact that he has concupiscence, unless such guilt be remitted through Baptism. Book 2 against Julian, before the middle: “Yet not therefore would this evil have harmed nothing, even if the little one had departed from this life before it had begun to appear in him; because the guilt of the same evil — not that by which the evil is guilty, but that by which it makes guilty him in whom it is — as it is contracted by generation, so is not loosed except by regeneration.” Again in the same book, about the middle of the epilogue: “Although now it is not called sin in the same manner in which it makes guilty, but because it was made by the guilt of the first man.” Where that “now” demonstrates openly enough that concupiscence after Baptism has not a guilt by which it makes guilty, but before baptism had it. Likewise book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 23: “This concupiscence, which is expiated only by the Sacrament of regeneration, assuredly by generation carries over the bond of sin into posterity, unless they too be loosed from it by regeneration.” Likewise book 6 against Julian, chapter 5: “Now such and so great an evil — merely because it is present — how would it not hold one in death, and drag one down to the ultimate death, unless its bond too were loosed in that remission of all sins which is made in baptism?” And in the same book, chapter 6: “We say that it (concupiscence) is evil, and that it nevertheless remains in the baptized, although its guilt — not that by which it itself was guilty, for it is not some person, but that by which it made the man originally guilty — has been remitted and emptied.” Likewise book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 26 [al. 20], Augustine says that, as adultery passes in act and remains in guilt, so concupiscence passes in guilt and remains in act — where he compares the guilt of concupiscence with the guilt of adultery; but the guilt of adultery is the guilt by which adultery itself makes the man guilty. Finally, book 6 against Julian, chapter 8, Augustine says that guilt is the ordination of the divine law, that no iniquity remain unpunished unless it be expiated by the blood of Christ; and presently he subjoins that the concupiscence which is in the reborn is iniquity, and would have had to be punished, had it not been expiated through Baptism: “For neither is there no iniquity when, in one man, either the higher parts basely serve the lower, or the lower contumaciously struggle against the higher, even if they are not suffered to conquer,” etc.
I answer: in the last testimony (that we may proceed in reverse order) Augustine calls concupiscence iniquity because it is such either formally, if it be in the mind, as when the higher parts basely serve the lower; or certainly materially, if it be in the flesh alone, as when the lower parts struggle against the higher, even if they are not suffered to conquer. For that the concupiscence of the flesh alone, which remains in the reborn, is not properly and formally iniquity is plain from tractate 41 on John, where Augustine says that through Baptism the whole iniquity is blotted out, and only the weakness remains. Now this weakness, which is material iniquity, is rightly said to have been about to be punished, had it not been expiated, on account of the guilt by which it was made — which guilt is drawn with it from Adam, and remains with it until it be remitted; by which guilt concupiscence itself is said to make the man guilty — not that absolutely to have it is sin, but because it is sin to have it from one's own fault. In the second-last testimony Augustine does not compare the guilt of concupiscence with the guilt of adultery in all respects, but only in this: that, as the guilt of adultery is separated from the adultery, so the guilt of concupiscence is separated from the concupiscence. For otherwise the same Augustine, book 6 against Julian, chapter 7, says that concupiscence is like a habit, not an act; and chapter 8 he says that it is not like adultery or sacrilege, but like a remaining quality. To the other places it could be said that, by that guilt through which concupiscence was made, the man is made guilty by concupiscence itself, until it is remitted through Baptism. It can also be said that in these places Augustine speaks of concupiscence insofar as it makes up the total corrupt habit, as we said above; for truly that total habit, or that total corruption of the nature and of all the powers, makes the man guilty, even if it only be present and work nothing, as in infants. But in this total habit the one part — that is, the aversion of the mind from God — is formally sin, and properly makes the man guilty; the other — that is, the rebellion of the lower part against the higher — is not sin except materially, nor properly makes the man guilty, unless by alluring it drag through to consent. Since, then, before Baptism concupiscence is joined in the man with the aversion of the mind from God, therefore it is rightly said to have guilt — not only that through which it itself was made, if it be considered as a part of that corrupt habit, but also that by which it makes guilty, if it be considered as one thing with the other part of the same corrupt habit. But after Baptism, because that formal part — that is, the aversion of the mind from God — has been healed and taken away, there remains only the other part, that is, the concupiscence of the flesh, which has neither the guilt by which it makes guilty, nor that by which it was made, but only that to which it leads, if it be suffered to reign. And in this way all the places of St. Augustine cohere among themselves; and there is also excluded that wonder of Calvin, in the antidote to session 5 of the Council of Trent, where he wonders that the Fathers of the Council say that the same thing — that is, concupiscence — is not, after Baptism, what it was before. For the Fathers said most rightly that concupiscence remains after Baptism, and yet is not sin, as it was before — because, namely, separated from the aversion of the mind, it has not the annexed guilt which it had before. And so much for the first kind of testimonies of St. Augustine.
A second kind of testimonies is adduced by Chemnitz — of those, namely, which seem not to have great force, and therefore are briefly touched. “Augustine himself,” says Chemnitz, “calls the remaining concupiscence evil; and how he will have this understood he declares by antithesis: for he says that it is not good, not holy, but evil — against Julian, book 6, chapter 6. And book 5, chapter 4, he says: distinguish the evils which we sustain through patience from those evils which we bridle through continence — that is, he affirms that concupiscence is not only an evil of punishment, but also an evil of fault. Chapter 5, he calls it a vice, against which one must fight with virtue: it is, then, such a vice as is opposed to virtue. Book 2 against Julian: the law fighting against the law of the mind, which was even in the members of so great an Apostle, is remitted in Baptism, is not ended. Book 1 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 3 [al. 39]: through the Baptism of Christ this is done, that the flesh of sin be emptied; but it is not so emptied that the inborn concupiscence be not in the flesh, but that what was harmful to the living harm not the dead. Tractate 41 on John, Augustine calls the remaining concupiscence a languor struggling against our salvation; elsewhere he calls it a weakness succumbing to the law of God.” Thus he, page 482; and he adds two other places, page 502: one from book 2 On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 5; the other from book 4 to Boniface, chapter 7 — in which Augustine attributes to the Pelagians that opinion which now is the Catholics': namely, that through Baptism men are perfectly renewed, and have no sin at all. I answer, to the first, from book 6 against Julian, chapter 6: concupiscence is rightly called not good, not holy, but evil; yet it does not follow that it is properly sin. For the devil too, and his angels, are not good, nor holy, but evil; and yet they are not properly sins, except according to the doctrine of Illyricus. And so the same Augustine, in the same book 6 against Julian, chapter 5, says that the baptized lacks all sin, yet not all evil; and in that very chapter 6 he says that through Baptism all sins are remitted, but not all the languors healed — where he will have concupiscence to be an evil and a languor, yet not sin. To the second, from book 5, chapter 4 [al. 5]: Augustine rightly distinguishes the evils which are tolerated through patience — as fevers, want, persecutions, and the like, which do not of themselves incite to sinning — from those evils which are bridled through continence, as immoderate passions, which properly are the incitements of vices. But although these evils are to be bridled and, as far as may be, warred down, yet they cannot for that reason properly be called faults or sins. For the same St. Augustine, in book 2 against Julian, writes thus of these evils: “Such vices are not now to be called sins; they are passions, they are vices — to be bridled, restrained, healed.” And so that gloss of Chemnitz — “that is, Augustine affirms that concupiscence is not only an evil of punishment, but also an evil of fault” — destroys the text. It should rather have been said that Augustine affirms concupiscence to be not only a punishment, but also, in itself and absolutely, evil, because it is something immoderate and vicious — though it has not the proper notion of fault, since it has its seat not in the will, but in the flesh. To the third, from book 5 against Julian, chapter 5: St. Augustine rightly says that against concupiscence one fights with virtue; but not everything that is opposed to virtue is sin properly so called — unless perchance Chemnitz has invented a new dialectic. For to virtue is repugnant the evil act, as adultery to chastity — and this is sin properly so called; repugnant also is the evil habit, which is wont to be called not sin, but vice; repugnant, finally, is the passion, in moderating and coercing which virtue is occupied. Now concupiscence (Augustine himself being witness, as we were saying a little before, in book 2 against Julian) is repugnant to virtue as a passion and a vice, not as a sin. To the fourth, from book 2 against Julian: who denies that the law of the flesh fighting against the law of the mind is remitted in baptism, not ended? But as we confess that concupiscence, by reason of the annexed guilt, is remitted in baptism, and yet remains for the contest, so Chemnitz must confess (will he, nill he) that after baptism concupiscence is not sin, but a vice. To the fifth, from book 1 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 39: we do not deny that concupiscence after baptism is not so emptied that it be not, but that what was harmful to the living harm not the dead — by reason of the annexed guilt. To the sixth, from tractate 41 on John: we concede that the remaining concupiscence struggles against eternal salvation, because it strives to allure to sin — not because it in itself is properly sin. For the same Augustine, in that same tractate, says in express words that in baptism the whole iniquity is blotted out, and only the weakness remains. To the seventh, from the other place, I say that it cannot be denied that our weakness succumbs to the law of God, if it be not helped by grace; but that also is true which St. Augustine says in book 5 against Julian, chapter 4 [al. 5]: namely, that concupiscence is under the power of the mind, by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord; to be chastised in the body of death; to be dissolved in the death of the body; to be healed in the resurrection of the body and the death of death. To the eighth, from book 2 On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 5, the impudence of Chemnitz is manifest. For St. Augustine attributes to the Pelagians that error, that a just man in this life has no venial sin; but Chemnitz so cites Augustine as if the Pelagians had held that the involuntary concupiscence which remains after baptism is truly and properly sin. But that Augustine speaks of actual, but venial sins, not of involuntary concupiscence, is plain from this, that he alleges the words of the Lord: Forgive us our debts — which prayer, the same Augustine very often repeats, epistle 200 and elsewhere, is not to be said for involuntary concupiscence. For these are the words of Augustine recited by Chemnitz: “Do the Pelagians even dare this — dare to say that a just man in this life has no sin at all? and that in such men the Church is even now, in the present time, not having spot or wrinkle? As if she were not the bride of Christ, who through the whole earth says what she has learned from him: Forgive us our debts.” To the ninth, from book 4 to Boniface, chapter 7: with no dissimilar impudence does Chemnitz abuse the testimony of St. Augustine. For he does not reprehend the Pelagians for saying that through baptism a man is perfectly renewed, but for depraving this truth with an evil sense, when they will have a man so perfectly renewed that thereafter he commits no venial sin. But Chemnitz so cites Augustine as if he had held that after baptism something remains which is truly and properly sin, and thereby that a man is not perfectly renewed through baptism. Now these are the entire words of St. Augustine — not maimed, as they are craftily alleged by Chemnitz: “What does it profit them (the Pelagians) that against the Manichaeans, who destroy baptism, they say that men are perfectly renewed by baptism, and apply to this the testimony of the Apostle, who testifies that the Church of the gentiles is made holy and immaculate through the laver of water — when with a proud and perverse sense they put forth their own disputations against the very prayers of the Church? For they say this to the end that the Church may be believed, after holy baptism, in which is the remission of all sins, to have thereafter no sin — when against them she, from the rising of the sun to its setting, cries in all her members: Forgive us our debts.” And that St. Augustine, against the Lutherans, teaches that through baptism a man is perfectly renewed is plain from those words of his, book 6 against Julian, chapter 5: “Thou affirmest that I said that grace does not perfectly make the man new. I do not say this; attend to what I say: Grace perfectly makes the man new — seeing that it also leads him through to the immortality of the body and to full felicity. Even now it perfectly renews the man, so far as concerns the deliverance from all sins — not so far as concerns the deliverance from all evils.”
A third kind of testimonies is produced by Calvin and Chemnitz: which kind contains those places which seem to teach that concupiscence is properly sin, or a disobedience of the law, even if it be resisted by reason and spirit. Book 1 against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 13, Augustine says that concupiscence is called sin “not only because it was made from sin, and because it makes sin if it conquer, but also because it is moved with the delectation of sinning, even if, the delectation of justice conquering, consent be not given to it.” Likewise book 5 against Julian, chapter 3: “The concupiscence of the flesh, against which the good spirit lusts, both is sin, because there is in it disobedience against the dominion of the mind; and is the punishment of sin, because it was paid back to the deserts of the disobedient one; and is the cause of sin, by the defection of him who consents, or by the contagion of him who is born.” And on account of these places — but chiefly on account of the latter — Chemnitz and Calvin triumph. They add also another testimony, Chemnitz and Calvin, from tractate 41 on John, where they contend that Augustine speaks from his own mind. For Augustine, speaking of the reborn: “They have been freed from sin,” says he, “because they lack crimes and complaint. But that is an inchoate, not a perfected liberty; it is not yet the whole, not yet pure liberty — because I see another law in my members,” etc. For hence it appears that the reborn are still impure on account of concupiscence. In the same place: “Is it that, because the whole iniquity is blotted out, no weakness has remained? Certainly, if none had remained, we should live here without sin.” Where Augustine calls the remaining weakness itself sin. In the same place: “As long as thou livest, it is necessary that sin be in thy members; at least let its kingdom be taken from it; let not what it commands be done.” And in the same place, treating the difference between reigning and non-reigning sin, he says: “God, therefore, does not condemn certain sins, and justify and praise certain others; he praises none, but hates all.” Here we see concupiscence called a sin which “God hates, and by curing brings it about that it be consumed,” as Augustine there subjoins. From which Chemnitz gathers that the Council of Trent spoke falsely in saying that God hates nothing in the reborn. And these three testimonies are the chief of all among those which are produced by the adversaries. I answer: in the first two places St. Augustine uses the name of sin in the broad way, as it signifies every corruption and vice — just as also in book 2 against Julian he called it iniquity. That this is so is proved, first, from this: that St. Augustine in the first place warns that concupiscence is not sin. For thus he says: “And therefore it is now not sin, but is so called, whether because it was made by sin, or because it is moved by the delectation of sinning,” etc. Where he openly shows that to be moved by the delectation of sinning is not properly sin, unless consent come to it; for otherwise he would wrongly have set down that adversative particle “but.” And what in this place he called being moved by the delectation of sinning, in the following he called the disobedience present in it against the dominion of the mind. Neither, then, is sin properly and formally, but only in the broad way, or materially. Second, the same is proved from this: that (as we said above) the disobedience of the flesh against the dominion of the mind cannot properly be sin so long as the mind resists, because the flesh is not capable of sin properly so called. Wherefore St. Augustine, when he renders that reason why concupiscence is sin — namely, because there is in it disobedience against the dominion of the mind — by that very reason signified that concupiscence is not properly sin. Third, because St. Augustine, in the same work against Julian, book 2, says that those motions of concupiscence are passions and vices, yet not sins; and book 6, chapter 5, says that it is an evil, yet not a sin: “The baptized,” says he, “lack all sin, not all evil.” And so, lest we make St. Augustine inconstant, we are compelled to say that concupiscence is by him sometimes called sin, sometimes denied to be sin, because he takes the word sin now in the broad way and improperly, now properly and formally. Nor does that have place here which Chemnitz says — that Augustine, in book 5 against Julian, chapter 3, retracted what he had said before. For what he had said before, he afterwards repeated again in book 6, as we have already warned; and if what is had in book 5 were a retractation, certainly what is had in book 6 would be a retractation of the retractation. But who would believe that a most grave man in book 5 revoked what he had written in book 2, and again in book 6 revoked what he had written in book 5? But why, I pray (someone will say), was St. Augustine not content, in that fifth book, to say that concupiscence is called sin because it is the punishment and cause of sin? why did he add and say that it is not only the punishment and cause of sin, but also sin? The response is at hand: because Julian, from this that Augustine, in the book On Marriage and Concupiscence, had said that concupiscence is the punishment of sin, had gathered that it is good and praiseworthy. The holy doctor, then, wished to show that concupiscence is not a good or indifferent thing, but evil; and because punishment (as it is from God) is good and praiseworthy, and the cause of sin can also be a good or indifferent thing, if it be a cause by accident, as are all the delightful objects of the senses — therefore St. Augustine was compelled to say that concupiscence is not only the punishment and cause of sin, but also sin — that is, a thing in itself evil and vicious; such as are not only the sins of morals, which are properly called sins, but also the sins of nature, as blindness and deafness, or any natural monstrosity, and such as are also evil habits, which are wont to be called vices, and the immoderate passions themselves, which in the state of entire nature would have had no place in man. Nor does it much matter that the same St. Augustine compares concupiscence with the blindness of heart, which he says is a sin, by which God is not believed, and at the same time the punishment and cause of sin. For St. Augustine's purpose was to show that that which is the punishment of sin can also be sin, whether properly or in the broad way; and therefore he brings forward various examples, not laboring much whether they be like in all respects, provided they be like in that of which he treats. Now as to the testimony from tractate 41 on John: were obstinacy absent, it would in no way be brought forward by the adversaries. For in that tractate St. Augustine says in express words that through baptism all sin is taken away, and the whole iniquity blotted out, and that nothing remains but languor and weakness. And when he afterwards says that the reborn are not without sin, sometimes he speaks of the venial sins which are done after baptism; sometimes he calls concupiscence itself, with the Apostle, sin by metonymy — and therefore says: this sin is in the members, not in the mind. And so, when he says that in the reborn there is not pure liberty, he says it because they are not pure from venial sins; and because the cause of venial sins is concupiscence, therefore he adds: Because I see another law in my members, etc. By like reasoning, when he says: if no weakness had remained, we should live here without sin — he speaks of venial sins, whose cause (as we said) is for the most part the weakness. Finally, we do not deny that concupiscence is called the sin dwelling in the members, and is condemned and held in hatred by God — not as sin properly so called, but as a disease and languor. For physicians too hate not only the fever, but also the remaining weakness, and endeavor to drive it out by their art. Further, in the Council of Trent it was also rightly said that God hates nothing in the reborn; because the Council speaks of the hatred which overflows upon the person. For in this way God hates nothing but sin; whence it is said, Wisdom 14: To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike. But the hatred of concupiscence which Augustine sets in God does not overflow upon the person. For God does not, on account of the concupiscence which is in the reborn, will to damn the reborn; but rather wills to consume concupiscence little by little, that the reborn may be perfectly healed and freed. Calvin, in the antidote of the Council, admits that God hates nothing in the reborn; but he errs no less himself while he admits this, than Chemnitz while he reprehends it. For if concupiscence were from its nature sin, as he says, it would not be true that it is not held in hatred by God, even in the reborn. For as St. Augustine rightly says in this very tractate 41 on John: “God hates all sins.” God, then, hates nothing in the reborn, because nothing remains after baptism which has the true notion of sin.
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CAPUT XIII. Respondetur ad loca , qux producuntur ex Augustino. Veniamus nunc ad loca, qute citantur cx Augustino. Primum citat Lutherus in assert. 2. art. duo loca unum ex lib. r. de nuptiis et concupiscentia c. 25. ubi dimitti dicit pecca¬ tum in baptismo, « non ut non sit, sed ut non imputetur. » Alterum ex eodem lib. cap. 37. ubi dicit, idem peccatum « reatu transi¬ re, actu manere. » Respondeo : Lutherus (ut supra diximus) crimen falsi commisit. Nusquam enim S. August. dixit, peccatum in aliquo esse, sed non imputari, vel actu manere, reatu transire. Neque enim tam stupidus erat, ut non intelligeret, reatum a peccato separari non posse, cum in eodem lib. cap. 26, scripserit : <> Hoc est non habe¬ re peccatum, reum non esse peccati. » Lo¬ quitur igitur S. Augustin. in duobus locis citatis de concupiscentia, camque dicit in re¬ natis non esse peccatum, non imputari, nec reos facere, licet maneat, quoad actum, quia non cessat prava desideria excitare. Sed contra solutionem est argumentum Melanchthonis et Calvini, et aliorum, S. Au¬ gust. non solum in lib. i. de nuptiis et con¬ cupiscentia cap. 25, sed etiam lib. ii. in Ju- lian. et alibi passim dicit concupiscentiam in baptismo remitti : « Lex, inquit, ista pec¬ cati et remissa est in regeneratione spiritali, et manet in carne mortali. » At nihil remit¬ titur, nisi peccatum ; igitur ipsa in se vere peccatum erat, antequam remitteretur. Sed manet in renatis eadem, qua} antea erat, quoad substantiam, ergo adhuc vere pecca¬ tum est, et solum remitti dicitur, quia non imputatur. Respondeo, S. Aug. significat quidem concupiscentiam in non renatis esse peccatum, et propterea remitti per. bapti¬ smum; sed intelligit eam peccatum esse, non ratione sui, sed ratione reatus peccati origi¬ nalis, qui cum ea annexus manet usque ad baptismum. Sic enim loquitur idem August. lib. i. de nupt. et concupiscentia cap. 32 : <( llajc itaque remissio peccatorum quamdiu non fit in prole, sic ibi est lex ista peccati, ut etiam in peccatum imputetur, id est, ut etiam reatus ejus cum illo sit, qui eum teneat aeterni supplicii debitorem. » llaec ille, qui similiter loquitur in multis locis. Sed hoc loco diligenter attendendum est reatum concupiscentiae tribus modis intelli- gi posse. Primo dici potest reatus concupi¬ scentiae, reatus qui ab ipsa oritur, et in ipsa fundatur, ita ut reus sit qui ipsam habet, quia ipsam habet. Sicut dicitur reatus furti is, quo proprie reus dicitur, qui furtum fecit. Secundo, dici potest reatus concupiscentiae is, quo ipsa facta est, non quem ipsa facit, quomodo si quis sibi ipse manum abscinde¬ ret, diceretur esse reus manus abscissae, non quod habere manum abscissam sit peccatum, vel reum faciat, sed quod abscindere sibi ma¬ num sit contra rationem, et reatum faciat. Sic igitur dicitur reatns concupiscentiae, non quod ipsam habere, facit hominem reum, sed quod ipsa nata sit ex reatu peccati Ada- mi, qui factus Deo rebellis, meruit in se ex¬ periri carnis suae rebellionem. Tertio, dici potest etiam reatus concupiscentiae is, quem ipsa faciat si ad consensum pertrahat, ut non sit proprie homo reus, quia concupiscentiam habet, sed quia concupiscentiae cedit. Ex his tribus modis adversarii primum eli¬ gunt, et ideo concupiscentiam proprie pec¬ catum esse volunt. Nos autem secundum et tertium accipimus ; et ideo concupiscentiam non tam peccatum, quam effectum et causam peccati esse contendimus. Porro secundum illum et tertium modum esse ex mente S. August. probamus ex verbis ejusdem in ii. lib. adversus Julianum, circa medium epi- logi : « Quamvis, inquit, jam in eodem mo¬ do appelletur peccatum, quo facit reum, sed quod sit reatu primi hominis factum, et quod rebellando nos trahere nititur ad reatum. » Rursus in eodem libro paulo superius expli¬ cans testimonium Ambrosii de bonis et ma¬ lis equis, indicat modum tertium his verbis : « An nondum fateberis, quod reatus eorum perierit, infirmitas manserit, non reatus, quo ipsa rea fuerant sed quo nos reos fecerant in malis operibus, quo nos traxerant. » Hisenim verbis ostendit Augustinus vitia cum quibus nascimur remitti in Baptismo, quia reatus eorum remittitur, licet infirmitas remaneat. Per reatum autem dicit se intelligere reatum malorum operum, qua; fecimus concupiscen¬ tia} assentiendo. In eodem lib. ii. in Julianum paulo ante medium libri, meminit secundi modi. Nam cum dixisset, concupiscentia; reatum, ut ca;- tera peccata omnia solvi in Baptismate, et deinceps eam manere adagonem ; objicit si¬ bi dicturum Julianum id malum, contra CAPUT XIII. 431 quod post baptismum dimicamus, non esse aliquid a parentibus tractum, sed malos ha¬ bitus ante baptismum propriis actibusacqui- sitos. Deinde respondet his verbis : « Si hoc dicis, jam procul dubio cernis, atque conce¬ dis esse in homine aliquid mali, quod non ipsum, sed reatus, qui ex illo contractus fue¬ rat, auferatur in baptismo. » Quibus verbis similem esse docet S. Augustinus concupi¬ scentiam nobis innatam, malo habitui multis malis actibus comparato : et quemadmodum in baptismo adultorum remittuntur omnia peccata, quibus comparatus est habitus, non tamen ipse habitus tollitur : ita quoque in baptismo parvulorum remitti peccatum ori¬ ginis, unde concupiscentia nata est, non ta¬ men ipsam concupiscentiam penitus extirpa- ri. Jam vero certum est, eum, qui malos habitus contraxit, non esse reum proprie, quia malos illos habitus habet, sed quia malos actus fecit, unde mali habitus proces¬ serunt. Sic igitur qui concupiscentiam habet, non est reus proprie ratione concupiscentiee, quasi peccatum sit illam habere, sed ratione peccati, quo ipsa concupiscentia facta, est, Atque hac ratione remitti dicitur concu¬ piscentia in Baptismo, non ratione sui, sed ratione annexi reatus, qui ejus reatus dici¬ tur, quia per eum, ut diximus, facta est. Idem S. August. lib r. Retractat, cap. 15. dicit, homines nasci implicatos reatu Ada?, et ob id poena? obnoxios; et paulo post eam poenam, concupiscentiam esse docet : reatus igitur, qui solvitur in baptismo, non est pro¬ prie reatus, quem concupiscentia facit, sed reatus unde poena ista processit. Reatus enim Ada?, quo et nos nascimur implicati, non fuit habere concupiscentiam, ut notum est, sed mente averti a Deo, unde nata est aversio carnis aratione. Quocirca idem Au¬ gustinus lib. xiv de Trinit. cap. 17. apertis¬ sime scripsit, in baptismo remitti omnia pec¬ cata, non tamen extingui concupiscentiam, quia aliud est causam removere languoris, aliud ipsum curare languorem : ubi cum di¬ cit in' Baptismo per remissionem peccati si¬ ve reatus, causam concupiscentia? removeri, evidenter ostendit, reatum concupiscentia?, qui remittitur in baptismo, non esse reatum quem concupiscentia facit, sed per quem concupiscentia facta est. Denique idemS. Augustinus lib. vi. in Ju- lian. cap, 5. dicit, in baptismo tolli reatum omnium malorum, non omnia mala, ot po¬ nit exemplum de corruptione corporis, et de ignorantia, et idem intelligit de concupi¬ scentia, imo de ipsa praecipue loquitur. At certum est reatum corruptionis corporis, qui tollitur in Baptismo, esse reatum, quo ipsa corruptio facta est, non autem quem ipsa corruptio faciat, quasi peccatum sit esso mortalem. Sed contra hanc nostram solutionem mul¬ ta sancti Augustini testimonia ab adversariis adducuntur, quibus ipsi demonstrare nitun¬ tur, reatum concupiscentia? qui solvitur in Baptismo, accipiendum esse primo modo superius explicato, id est, esse reatum, qui concupiscentiam ipsam comitatur, ita ut sit reus quicumque concupiscentiam habet, hoc ipso quod concupiscentiam habet, nisi per Baptismum reatus hujusmodi remittatur. Lib. ii. in Julianum ante medium : « Non tamen, inquit, ideo malum hoc nihil no¬ cuisset, etiamsi prius quam in illo apparere coepisset, parvulus ex hac vita exisset, quia reatus ejusdem mali, non quo reum malum est, sed quo reum facit, in quo est, sicut ge¬ neratione contrahitur, ita nisi regeneratione non solvitur. » Rursus in eodem lib. circa medium epilo- gi : « Quamvis jam non eodem modo appel¬ letur peccatum, quo facit reum, sed quod sit reatu primi hominis factum. » Ubi illud jam satis aperte demonstrat, concupiscentiam post Baptismum non habere reatum, quo ipsa faciat reum, sed ante baptismum ha¬ buisse. Item lib. I. de nuptiis et concupi¬ scentia cap. 23. « IIa?c, inquit, concupiscen¬ tia, qua? solo Sacramento regenerationis ex¬ piatur, profecto peccati vinculum generatio¬ ne trajicit in posteros, nisi ab illo et ipsi rege¬ neratione solvantur. » Item lib. vi in Julia¬ num cap. 5. <i Tale porro, ac tam magnum malum tantum quia inest, quomodo non teneret in morte, et pertraheret in ultimam mortem, nisi et ejus vinculum in illa, quae fit in baptismo, remissione peccatorum om¬ nium solveretur. » Et eodem lib. cap. 6. « Nos, inquit, eam (concupiscentiam) ma¬ lam dicimus, et manere tamen in baptizatis, quamvis reatus ejus, non quo ipsa rea erat, neque enim aliqua persona est, sed quo re¬ um hominem originaliter faciebat, fuerit remissus, jatque vacuatus. » Item lib. I. de nuptiis et concupiscentia, cap. 20. Augustinus dicit, quod, sicut adul¬ terium actu transit, remanet reatu; ita con¬ cupiscentia transit reatu, et remanet actu. » Ubi comparat reatum concupiscentia? cum LIBER V. 2 reatu adulterii. Reatus autem adulterii, est reatus quo ipsum adulterium reum facit hominem. Denique lib. vi. in Julian. cap. 8. Augustinus dicit, reatum esse ordinatio¬ nem divina) legis, ut nulla iniquitas maneat impunita, nisi Christi sanguine expietur. Et mox subjungit, concupiscentiam quee est in renatis, esse iniquitatem, et puniendam fuisse, nisi per Baptismum expiata fuisset : « Neque enim, inquit, nulla est iniquitas si in uno homine, vel superiora inferioribus turpiter serviant, vel inferiora superioribus contumaciter reluctentur, etiamsi vincere non sinantur, ctc. » Respondeo, in ultimo testimonio (ut ordine retrogrado procedamus) vocat Augustinus concupiscentiam iniquitatem, quia talis est, vel fonnalitcr, si in mente sit, ut cum supe¬ riora inferioribus turpiter serviunt; vel egr- te materialiter, si in sola carne sit, ut cum inferiora superioribus reluctantur, etiamsi vincere non sinantur. Nam non esse concu¬ piscentiam solius carnis, qua; remanet in renatis, proprie et fonnalitcr iniquitatem, patet ex tract. 41 . in Joan. ubi dicit Angusti- nus, per Baptismum totam deleri iniquita¬ tem, et solam remanere infirmitatem. Ha;c autem infirmitas, qiue est materialis iniqui¬ tas, recte dicitur punienda, nisi expiata es¬ set, propter reatum, quo facta est, qui cum ipsa trahitur ex Adam, et cum ipsa manet donec remittatur, quo reatu ipsa concupi¬ scentia dicitur hominem reum facere, non quod absolute illam habere sit peccatum, sed quia peccatum est, illam habere ex propria culpa In testimonio pcnullimo non comparat Augustinus concupiscentia; reatum cum rea¬ tu adulterii in omnibus, sed in eo tantum, quod, ut separatur reatus adulterii ab adul¬ terio, ita separatur reatus concupiscentia; a concupiscentia. Nam alioqui idem Augusti¬ nus lib. vi. in Julianum cap 7. dicit, concu¬ piscentiam similem esse habitui, non actui, et cap. 8, dicit, non esse similem adulterio, vel sacrilegio, sed manenti qualitati. Ad ca;tera loca dici posset, per eum rea¬ tum, quo concupiscentia facta est, ab ipsa concupiscentia fieri hominem reum, donec non remittitur per Baptismum. Potest etiam dici, in his locis loqui Augustinum de concu¬ piscentia, quatenus ea efficit habitum tota¬ lem corruptum, ut supra diximus, vere enim lile totalis habitus, sive totalis illa natura;, et omnium potentiarum corruptio, facit homi¬ nem reum, etiamsi tantum insit, et nihil operetur, ut in infantibus Cadorum in hoc totali habitu pars una, id est, aversio mentis a Deo, est fonnalitcr peccatum, et reum hominem proprie facit; altera, id est, rebellio partis inferioris a su¬ periore. non est peccatum nisi materialiter, nec facit proprie hominem reuiii, nisi illi¬ ciendo pertrahat ad consensum. Quoniam igitur ante Baptismum concupiscentia con¬ juncta est in homine cum aversione mentis a Deo, ideo recte dicitur habere reatum, non solum per quem ipsa facta est, si considere¬ tur, ut pars illius habitus corrupti, sed etiam quo facit reum, si consideretur ut unum quid cum altera parte ejusdem habitus corrupti. Post Baptismum vero, quia pars illa forma¬ lis, id est, aversio mentis a Deo, sanata et sublata est, ideo sola remanet pars altera, id est, concupiscentia carnis, qua; non habet reatum, quo facit reum, neque illum quo ip¬ sa facta est; sed cum solum, ad quem perdu¬ cit, si regnare sinitur. Et hoc modo cohasrent inter se loca omnia S. Augustini ; atque etiam excluditur admi¬ ratio illa Calvini in antidoto sess. 5. Concilii Tridentini, ubi miratur, Patres Concilii rem eamdem, id est, concupiscentiam, dicere non esse post Baptismum id, quod erat antea. Patres enim rectissime dixerunt, concupi¬ scentiam post Baptismum manere, et tamen non esse peccatum, ut erat antea, quia vi¬ delicet separata ab aversione mentis non habetannexum reatum, quem habebat antea. Atque haec de primo genere testimoniorum S. Augustini. Alterum genus testimoniorum adducitur a Kemnitio eorum videlicet, qua; non videntur habere magnas viros, et ideo breviter per¬ stringuntur ; « Ipse Augustinus, inquit , Kemnitius, reliquam concupiscentiam vocat malam; et quomodo hocintelligi velit, decla- ratperantithesim : nam dicit esse non bonam, non sanctam, sed malam, contra Julian. lib. vi. cap. G. et lib. v. cap. 4. inquit, discerne mala, qua; per patientiam sustinemus ab eis malis, quie per continentiam refrsenamus. Hoc est, affirmat concupiscentiam non tan¬ tum esse malum poenae, sed et malum culpre, cap. 5. vocat vitium, contra quod virtute pugnandum est. Est igitur vitium tale, quod virtuti opponitur. Lib. ii. contra Julianum, lex repugnans legi mentis, qua; in tanti quo¬ que Apostoli membris orat, remittitur in Ba¬ ptismate, non finitur. Lib. i, de peccatorum CAPUT MU. m meritis et remissione cap. 3. per Baptismum Christi hoc agitur, ut caro peccati evacue¬ tur. Non autem sic evacuatur, ut in carne concupiscentia innata non sit, sed non obsit mortuo, qua; inerat vivo. Tractat. 41. in Joanncm, Augustinus vocat reliquam con¬ cupiscentiam languorem obluetanfem saluti nostrae, alibi vocat infirmitatem succumben¬ tem legi Dei. » Ha;c ille pagina 482. addit autem duo alia loca pag. 302. Unum ex lib. ir. de bono perse verant ise cap. 3. Alterum ex lib. iv. ad Bonifacium cap. 7. in quibus Augustinus tribuit Pelagianis eam senten¬ tiam, qua; nunc est Catholicorum, quod vi¬ delicet per Baptismum homines perfecte renoventur ; et nullum habeant omnino pec¬ catum. Respondeo ad primum, ex lib. vi. in Ju- lian. cap. 6. recte dicitur concupiscentia non bona, nec sancta, sed mala. Non tamen se¬ quitur, eam esse proprie peccatum. Nam diabolus quoque, et Angeli ejus non sunt boni, nec sancti, sed mali, et tamen non sunt proprie peccata, nisi juxta doctrinam Illyrici. Itaque idem Augustinus in eodem lib. vi. in Julianum cap. 3. dicit, Baptiza- tum carere, omni peccato, non tamen omni malo ; et in ipso cap. G. dicit, per Bapti¬ smum remitti omnia peccata, sed non sanari omnes languores. Ubi concupiscentiam vult esse malum et languorem, non tamen pec¬ catum. Ad secundum ex lib. v. eap. 4. recte dis¬ tinguit Augustinus mala, qua; per patientiam tolerantur, ut febres, inopiam, persecutio¬ nes, et similia, qua; non incitant per se ad peccandum ab iis malis, qua; per continen¬ tiam reframantur, ut passiones immodera¬ tas, qiuc proprie incentiva sunt vitiorum, quamvis autem htec mala framanda, et quoad ejus fieri potest, debellanda sint, tamen non propterea culpa;, aut peccata proprie dici possunt. Idem enim S. August. in ii. lib. cont. Julian. de his malis ita scribit : « Non talia sunt vitia, qua; jam peccata dicenda sint ; passiones sunt, vitia sunt, framanda, cohibenda, sananda sunt. Itaque glossa illa Kemnitii, hoc est, affirmat Augustinus con¬ cupiscentiam non tantum esse malum pre¬ nse, sed et malum culpa;, » destruit textum. Dicendum autem fuisset, affirmari ab Au¬ gustino, concupiscentiam non tantum esse poenam, sed esse etiam in se, et absolute malam, quia est quid immoderatum et v i- ljo«um. quamvis non habeat propriam cul- pse rationem, cum non in voluntate, sed in carne sedem habeat. Ad tertium, ex lib. v. in Julianum cap. v. Itecte dicit S. Augustinus, contra concupi¬ scentiam virtute pugnari ; sed non omne quod virtuti opponitur, peccatum est proprie tlic; tumnisi forte novam dialecticam Kemni- tius adinvenerit. Virtuti siquidem actus ma¬ lus repugnat, ut castitati adulterium, et hoc est peccatum proprie dictum : repugnat eti¬ am habitus malus, qui non peccatum, sed vitium dici solet. Repugnat denique' passio, in qua moderanda et coercenda virtus occu¬ patur. Porro concupiscentia (ipso Augustino teste) ut paulo ante dicebamus, in 2. lib. adversus Julianum, ut passio ac vitium, non ut peccatum, virtuti repugnat. Ad quartum, ex lib. 2. in Julianum, quis negat legem carnis repugnantem legi mentis remitti in baptismate, non finiri ? sed, ut nos fatemur, concupiscentiam ratione reatus annexi in baptismate remitti et tamen ad agonem remanere ; ita fateri (velit nolit) Kemnitius debet, post baptismum concupi¬ scentiam non peccatum esse, sed vitium. Ad quintum, ex lib. i. de peccatorum me¬ ritis et remissione, cap. 3. Non negamus concupiscentiam post baptismum non ila evacuari, ut non sit; sed, ut non obsit mortuo ratione reatus annexi, qua; inerat vivo. Ad sextum, ex tractat. -41. in Joan. conce¬ dimus, reliquam concupiscentiam obluctari saluti seterme, quia allicere nititur ad pecca¬ tum, non quia ipsa in se proprie sit pecca¬ tum. Idem enim Augustinus in illo eodem tractatu disertis verbis dicit, in baptismo deleri totam iniquitatem, et solam remanere infirmitatem. Ad septimum, ex alio loco, dico, negari non posse, quin infirmitas nostrasuccumbat legi Dei, si non adjuvetur a gratia. Sed ve¬ rum est tamen quod S. Augustinus ait in lib. v. adversus Julianum cap. 4. videlicet, esse concupiscentiam sub animi potestate, gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, in mortis corpore castigandam, in morte corporis resolvendam, in corporis resurre¬ ctione, et mortis morte sanandam. Ad octavum, ex lib. ii. de bono perseve¬ rantia;, cap 5. manifesta est Kemnitii impu¬ dentia. Siquidem S. Augustinus Pelagianis tribuit errorem illum, quod homo justus in hac vita nullum habeat veniale peccatum. Kemnitius. autem ita citat Augustinum, quasi Pelagiani senserint concupiscentiam invo- 434 LIBER V. luntariam, quae remanet post baptismum, vere ac proprie esse peccatum. Loqui autem Augustinum de peccatis actualibus, sed ve¬ nialibus, non de concupiscentia involuntai-ia, perspicuum est ex eo, quod allegat verba Domini : Dimitte nobis debita nostra , quam orationem non esso dicendam pro concu¬ piscentia involuntaria, idem Augustinus sae- pissime repetit epist. 200. et alibi. Haec enim sunt verba Augustini a Kemuitio recitata : « Etiam hoc Pelagiani audent, audent dicere hominem justum in hac vita nullum habere omnino peccatum ? ct in talibus hominibus esse jam in praesenti tempore Ecclesiam, non habentem maculam, neque rugam : tanquam sponsa Christi non sit, quae per universam terram quod ab eo didicit, dicit : Dimitte nobis debita nostra. » Ad nonum, ex lib. iv. adBonifacium cap.7. Non dissimili impudentia Kemnitius abutitur testimonio S. Augustini. Ille enim non repre¬ hendit Pelagianos, quod dicant, per bapti¬ smum perfecte hominem renovari; sed quod malo sensu hanc veritatem depravent, dum ita volunt perfecte hominem innovari ; ut deinceps nullum committatveniale peccatum. Kemnitius autem ita citat Augustinum, quasi ille senserit post baptismum rcmanerealiquid, quod vere et proprie sit peccatum, ct per hoc non perfecte per baptismum hominem renovari. Haec autem sunt verba S. Augustini integra, non truncata, ut a Kemnitio callide allegantur : « Quid eis (Pelagianis) prodest, quod adversus Manichaeos, qui baptisma destruunt, isti dicunt baptismo perfecte ho¬ mines innovari, atque ad hoc Apostoli adhi¬ bent testimonium, qui per lavacrum aquae Ecclesiam de gentibus sanctam fieri, imma- culatamque testatur; cum superbo sensu, atque perverso -contra orationes ipsius Eccle¬ siae suas exerant disputationes ? Hoc enim dicunt, ut credatur Ecclesia post sanctum baptismum, in quo sit omnium remissio pec¬ catorum, ulterius nonhabere peccatum, cum adversus eos illa a solis ortu usque ad occa¬ sum omnibus suis membris clamet : Dimitte nobis debita nostra. » Quod autem S. Augustinus contra Luthe- ranos doceat, per baptismum perfecte homi¬ nem renovari, perspicuum est ex illis ejus verbis lib. vi, in Julianum cap. 5 : « Dixisse me affirmas quod gratia non perfecte homi¬ nem novum faciat. Non hoc dico, attende quod dico : Gratia perfecte hominem novum facit ; quandoquidem et ad corporis immor¬ talitatem, plenamque felicitatem ipsa per¬ ducit. Nunc etiam perfecte innovat homi¬ nem, quantum attinet ad liberationem ab omnibus peccatis, non quantum ad libera¬ tionem ab omnibus malis. » Tertium genus testimoniorum producitur a Calvino et Kemnitio. Quod genus continet ea loca, qua; concupiscentiam proprie docent esse peccatum, sive inobedientiam legis, etiamsi illi a ratione et spiritu resistatur. Lib. i. contra duas epistolas Pelagianor. cap. 13. dicit Augustinus. « Concupiscentiam vocari peccatum, non tantum quia ex peccato facta est, et quia peccatum facit, si vincit, sed etiam quia peccandi delectatione mo¬ vetur, etsi ei vincente delectatione justitias non consentiatur. Item lib. v. in Julianum cap. 3. Concupiseentiacarnis, inquit, adversus quam bonus concupiscit spiritus, et peccatum est, quia inest illi inobedientia contra domi¬ natum mentis; et poena peccati est, quia reddita est meritis inobedientis, et causa peccati est, defectione consentientis, vel contagione nascentis. » Atque ob haec loca, maxime autem ob posteriorem triumphant Kemnitius et Calvinus. Addunt etiam aliud testimonium Kemnitius et Calvinus ex tract. 41. in Joan. ubi conten¬ dunt Augustinum loqui ex propria mente. Loquens enim Augustinus de renatis : « Li¬ berati, inquit, sunt a peccato, quia carent criminibus et querela. Sed illa est inchoata non perfecta libertas ; nondum est tota, non¬ dum pura libertas ; quia video aliam legem in membris etc. » Hinc enim apparet, adhuc renatos esse impuros propter concupiscen¬ tiam. Ibidem : « Quia deleta est tota ini¬ quitas, nulla remansit infirmitas? certe si non remansisset, sine peccato hic viveremus.» Ubi ipsam infirmitatem remanentem appellat Augustinus peccatum. Ibidem : « Quamdiu vivis, peccatum necesse est esse in membris tuis : saltem illi regnum auferatur. Non fiat quod jubet. » Et ibidem tranetans discrimen peccati regnantis et non regnantis, inquit : « Non ergo Deus quaedam peccata damnat, quaedam justificat et laudat : nulla laudat, sed odit omnia. » Hic videmus concupiscen¬ tiam vocari peccatum, quod « Deus odit et curando agit, ut consumatur, » ut ibidem Augustinus subjungit. Ex quo colligit Kemni¬ tius falso dixisse Concilium Tridentinum , Deum in renatis nihil odisse. Atque haec tria testimonia sunt omnium praecipua in iis, quae ab adversariis producuntur. CAPUT XIII. 435 Respondeo : utitur in primis duobus locis 5. Augustinus nomine peccati largo modo, ut omnem corruptionem et vitium significat. Quemadmodum etiam lib. ir. in Julianum vocavit iniquitatem. Id ita esse probatur Primo ex eo, quod S. Augustinus in primo loco monet, concupiscentiam non esse pec¬ catum. Sic enim ait : « Et ideo jam non sit peccatum, sed sic vocetur, sive quod peccato facta sit, sive quod peccandi delectatione moveatur etc. » Ubi aperte ostendit, moveri delectatione peccandi non esse peccatum proprie, nisi consensus accedat. Nam alioqui perperam posuisset illam particulam adver¬ sativam sed. Quod autem in hoc loco dixit, moveri delectatione peccandi, in sequenti dixit, inesse inobedientiam contra dominatum mentis. Neutrum igitur est peccatum proprie et formalitcr, sed solum largo modo, vel materialiter. Secundo idem probatur ex eo, quod (ut supra diximus) inobedientia carnis contra dominatum mentis, non potest proprie esse peccatum, donec mens resistit, quia caro non est capax peccati proprie dicti. Quare S. Au¬ gustinus cum rationem illam reddit, cur con¬ cupiscentia sit peccatum, quia videlicet inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis ; illa ipsa ratione significavit, concupiscentiam proprie non esse peccatum. Tertio, quia S. Augustinus in eodem opere adversus Julianum lib. ii. dicit, motus istos concupiscentia, passiones, et vitia esse, non tamen peccata. Et lib. vi. cap 5. dicit, esse malum, non tamen peccatum : « Omni pec¬ cato, inquit, baptizati carent, non omni malo. » Itaque neS. Augustinum inconstantem fa¬ ciamus , cogimur dicere ab eo aliquando concupiscentiam appellari peccatum , ali¬ quando negari esse peccatum, quia nunc vocem (peccati) largo modo, et improprie, nunc proprie, fonnaliterque accipiat. Neque vero hic habet locum, quod dicit Kemnitius, Augustinum in lib. v. in Julian. cap. 3. retractasse quod antea dixerat. Nam quod antea dixerat, iterum postea repetivit in lib. 6. ut jam ante monuimus. Et si quod habetur in lib. 5. esset retractatio ; certe quod habetur in lib. G. esset retractatio retractationis. Sed quis credat, virum gravissimum lib. v. revo¬ casse quod scripserat lib. ii. et rursum lib. 6. revocasse quod scripserat lib. v. At cur qmeso (dicet aliquis) S. Augustinus non fuit contentus in lib. illo quinto dicere, concupiscentiam vocari peccatum, quia est poena, et causa peccati? cur addidit, ac dixit, « non solum eam poenam et causam peccati, sed etiam esse peccatum? » Responsio est in promptu, quia Julianus ex eo quod Augusf. in libro de nuptiis et concupiscentia dixerat, concupiscentiam esse poenam peccati, colle¬ gerat eam esse bonam et laudabilem. Voluit igitur sanctus doctor ostendere, non esse rem bonam aut indifferentem concupiscentiam, sed malam ; et quia poena (ut a Deo est) bona et laudabilis est ; et causa peccati, potest etiam esse res bona aut indifferens, si sit causa per accidens, ut sunt omnia objecta sensuum delectabilia ; propterea S. Augu¬ stinus coactus est dicere, concupiscentiam non solum esse poenam et causam peccati, sed etiam peccatum, id est, rem in se malam et vitiosam, qualia sunt non solum peccata morum, quse proprie peccata dicuntur, sed etiam peccata naturm, ut ccecitas et surditas, vel quaelibet monstrositas naturalis, quales sunt etiam habitus mali, qui vitia dici solent, et ipsae passiones immoderatae, quae in statu naturae integrae locum nullum in homine ha¬ buissent. Neque multum refert, quod idem S. Au¬ gustinus comparat concupiscentiam cum caecitate cordis, quam dicit esse peccatum, quo in Deum non creditur et simul pcenam et causam peccati. Nam propositum S. Au¬ gustino fuit, ostendere posse id, quod est poena peccati, esse etiam peccatum, sive pro¬ prie, sive largo modo ; et ideo varia profert exempla, non multum laborans, utrum sint in omnibus similia, modo similia sint in eo, de quo agitur. Jam vero testimonium ex tract. 41, in Joannem si abesset pervicacia, nullo modo ab adversariis proferretur. Nam in ea tra¬ ctatu S. Augustinus disertis verbis dicit, per baptismum tolli omne peccatum, ac totam deleri iniquitatem, nec remanere nisi lan¬ guorem et infirmitatem. Quod vero postea dicit, renatos non esse sine peccato, inter- • dum loquitur de peccatis venialibus, qua} post baptismum fiunt ; interdum ipsam con¬ cupiscentiam cum Apostolo vocat peccatum per metonymiam, et ideo dicit, peccatum hoc est in membris, non in animo. Itaque- cum dicit, non esse in renatis pu¬ ram libertatem, ideo dicit, quia non sunt puri a peccatis venialibus ; et quia peccato¬ rum venialium causa est concupiscentia, ideo addit: Quia video aliam leyem in membris , etc. UDER V. 43« pari ratione cum dicit, si nulla remansisset infirmitas, sine peccato hic viveremus; dc peccatis loquitur venialibus, quorum causa (ut diximus) ut plurimum est infirmitas. De¬ nique non negamus concupiscentiam dici peccatum habitans in membris, et, damnari, atque odio haberi a Deo; non ut peccatum proprie dictum, sed ut morbum et languo¬ rem. Nam etiam medici non solum febrem, sed etiam remanentem infirmitatem oderunt, et pellere sua arte conantur. Porro in Concilio Tridentino recte etiam dictym est, Deum in renatis nihil odisse; quia loquitur Concilium de odio, quod red¬ undet in personam. Sic enim nihil odit Deus, nisi peccatum. Unde dicitur Sap. xiv : Odio est Deo impius , et impietas ejus (1). Odium autem concupiscentia?, quod ponit Augustinus in Deo non redundat in perso¬ nam. Non enim Deus propter concupiscen¬ tiam, quae est in renatis, vult renatos dam¬ nare, sed potius vult concupiscentiam pau- latim consumere, ut renati perfecte sanentur ac liberentur. Calvinus in antidoto Concilii admittit , Deum nihil in renatis odisse ; sed non minus errat ipse, dum hoc admittit, quam Kemni- tius dum reprehendit. Nam si concupiscentia esset ex natura sua peccatum, ut ipse dicit, non esset verum, eam a Deo non haberi odio, etiam in renatis. Ut enim S. Augusti¬ nus recte ait in hoc ipso tract. 41 . in Joanncm : « Deus omnia peccata odit. » Nihil igitur Deus in renatis odit, quia nihil remanet post baptismum, quod habeat veram peccati ra¬ tionem.