Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 14: Objections from reason are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Besides the testimonies of the Scriptures and the Fathers, the adversaries bring forward also some reasons.
The first reason: The motions of concupiscence are unlawful, even if they happen with us unwilling, as is gathered from Augustine, book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 27; therefore they are forbidden by the divine law, and thereby it is a disobedience of the law, and a sin, to have them, though to the just and faithful they are not imputed. I answer: the motions of concupiscence are called unlawful because it is not lawful to give them consent, not because it is not lawful to suffer them with an unwilling mind — just as carnal union outside marriage is an unlawful thing, and yet if someone suffered the disgrace by force, or committed it altogether ignorantly, he would not sin. And so St. Augustine, in the place noted, does not say that those motions are unlawful because it is not lawful to suffer them, but because it is not lawful to obey them: “For,” says he, “if they were good and lawful desires, the Apostle would not forbid obeying them, saying: Let not sin reign in your mortal body, so as to obey the desires thereof.”
The second reason: That which of itself draws to evil is forbidden by the same law by which the evil itself is forbidden, as is plain of immodest embraces and kisses; but concupiscence, however involuntary, of itself draws to evil, James 1: Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured; therefore such concupiscence is forbidden by the divine law, and he violates the law who lusts, though unwilling. I answer: that which of itself draws to evil is forbidden by the same law by which the evil itself is forbidden; but as the evil itself is not properly forbidden, so as to make guilty, except when it is in our power not to commit it, so also — or rather with greater reason — that which of itself draws to evil is not judged to be properly forbidden except insofar as it is in our choice to take it up or reject it. For if he cannot by right be reprehended who suffers violation offered by force, how much less can he be reprehended who is compelled to suffer an immodest embrace or kiss, even if he feel himself goaded thence to wickedness? So, then, the motions of concupiscence which, the mind struggling against them, sometimes arise in the flesh, are not unlawful, nor forbidden, except materially; properly and formally, the consent alone is understood to be forbidden.
The third reason, against the preceding solution: He who cannot with a good will resist compelling cupidity, and therefore does against the precepts of justice, truly and properly sins, as St. Augustine teaches, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 15. But in the law of justice not only the work is forbidden, as adultery, but also the desire, as the concupiscence of adultery; therefore, as the work is truly sin, even if it cannot be resisted with a good will, so concupiscence itself will truly be sin, though it arise with the mind unwilling. I answer: there is much difference between the involuntary motions of carnal concupiscence, which have their seat in the flesh alone, and the desire of the will, whether it be completed in work or not completed. For that involuntary motion of the flesh is in no way in our power, and therefore is not properly sin, but only by metonymy, as in that very place the same St. Augustine teaches. But the voluntary desire of adultery, or the work of adultery, equally voluntary, is sometimes not in our power immediately — because, deserted by the divine judgment, we have not the strength with which to resist compelling cupidity; yet it is always in our power at least mediately, because we can ask help from God, and, his grace aiding, resist the temptation. “And therefore” (as Augustine there says) “then to do against the precepts of justice, whether by work or by consent, is so sin as to be also the punishment of sin.” Wherefore the whole argument is conceded, if in the consequent the discourse is of that concupiscence which arises in the will itself through consent; for it can be that that concupiscence be said to arise with the mind unwilling, if perchance one would not consent, and yet, conquered by the temptation, consents. But if it be treated of the concupiscence of the flesh, which in no way wrings out consent, the argument concludes nothing at all; for in the antecedent that is said to be sin which is done with the cupidity of the flesh compelling — which is not in our power immediately, but only mediately. From which it does not follow that the very cupidity of the flesh is sin, which is in our power neither mediately nor immediately.
The fourth reason: The concupiscence which remains in the baptized God hates, as St. Augustine teaches on Psalm 35, explaining that verse, “he would not understand malice”; the Apostle likewise held it in hatred, Romans 7: What I hate, I do; and we ought to hold it in hatred, according to that of Jude: hating also the spotted garment which is carnal. But God hates nothing except sin, Wisdom 14: To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike; and chapter 11: For thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made — and God made all things except sin. Wherefore the concupiscence remaining in the reborn is sin. I answer: we have already said above, in the explication of the testimonies of St. Augustine, that concupiscence is held in hatred by God, and is to be held in hatred by us, because, though it is not properly sin, yet it incites to sin, and we are compelled to wage with it an intestine and assiduous war. And what Scripture says — that God hates nothing of the things which he made — is most true; but that is false, that God made all things except sin. For God made, and loves, all things that are, because all are good: for he saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good, Genesis 1. Hence he made no evil, and hates all evil, insofar as evil is not some thing, but the privation of some thing. And so in the same book of Wisdom, chapter 1, we read: God made not death. And of concupiscence the Apostle John, in the first epistle, chapter 2, says that it is not of the Father, but of the world. God, then, hates in us concupiscence, not as sin, but as a languor left from sin; and by healing it he daily diminishes it, until it be utterly consumed. And how that is to be understood which the Council of Trent says — that God hates nothing in the reborn — was explained in the preceding chapter.
The fifth reason: Concupiscence is not from God, as is had in 1 John 2; but every just punishment is from God, as is had in Amos 3; therefore concupiscence is not only punishment, but also fault. I answer: if this argument had force, it would also effect that corporal death is not only punishment, but also fault. For death is not from God, as is had in Wisdom 1; and every just punishment is from God, etc. I say, then, that concupiscence is not from God insofar as it is evil, and yet is from God insofar as it is good that by that evil the disobedience of man be punished. Likewise, that concupiscence is not from God, because he was not himself the author of the sin whence it flowed; yet it is from God, because in vengeance of the sin he took away the gift of original justice, which subjected the flesh to the spirit; which being removed, as a kind of bridle, straightway there arose in man that rebellion of the members. “Because I said” (says St. Augustine, book 5 against Julian, chapter 7 [al. 3]) “that the disobedience of the flesh, which appears in the flesh lusting against the spirit, came about by the devil's wound; and again, that this law of sin, fighting against the law of the mind, was brought in by God for vengeance, and therefore is the punishment of sin — thou asseveratest that these are contrary to each other. As though it could not be that the same evil be brought upon sinners both by the iniquity of the devil and by the equity of God. Nor herein do the divine utterances oppose themselves, because it is written: God made not death; and likewise it is written: Life and death are from the Lord God. Because the deceiver of man, the devil, is the cause of death; which God brought in, not as its first author, but as the avenger of sin.”
The sixth reason: There is no punishment of this life which cannot be sought after for a good end; but concupiscence can rightly be sought after for no end; therefore concupiscence is not only punishment, but also fault. I answer: the proposition is false. For ignorance of those things which are necessary to salvation is without doubt a punishment of sin, and yet it cannot be sought after except imprudently and ill. By like reasoning the temptations of Satan cannot be sought after, since we are commanded to pray: And lead us not into temptation, Matthew 6; and yet the internal temptations by which Satan moves the imagination, and sometimes compels us to think empty or unlawful things, are the punishment of sin. Finally, St. Augustine teaches that no punishments are to be sought after, but all to be tolerated, when he speaks thus, book 10 of the Confessions, chapter 28: “Who would wish to suffer troubles and difficulties? Thou commandest them to be tolerated, not to be loved. No one loves what he tolerates, even if he love to tolerate. For although he rejoice that he tolerates, yet he would rather there were nothing for him to tolerate.” Further, concupiscence, by the same reasoning, ought not to be sought after — not because it is sin, if it be not consented to, but because it leads to sinning, and because it is troublesome and heavy, and therefore is not to be loved, but to be tolerated, if it cannot be warred down. Nor ought the judgment of God to displease, who willed it to remain for the contest and the exercise of virtue, and said to his Apostle: My grace is sufficient for thee; for power is made perfect in infirmity, 2 Corinthians 12.
The seventh reason: Christ willed to be tempted in all things, but without sin, as the Apostle teaches, Hebrews 4; and therefore he took up all the common miseries of human life, that he might be made like his brethren in all things. But the concupiscence of the flesh he did not take up, nor would he suffer a temptation of the kind that arises from the rebellion of the flesh; therefore concupiscence is not only punishment and misery, but fault and iniquity. I answer: not only concupiscence, but also ignorance, Christ would not take up, though neither is sin if it be altogether involuntary. And why Christ would not have ignorance and concupiscence, St. Thomas teaches, in part 3, question 15, articles 2 and 3: both because these two miseries profited nothing toward the redemption of the human race, but rather hindered; and also because Christ had to be full of grace and truth — with which two gifts concupiscence and ignorance manifestly conflict. See St. Augustine, book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 29, and book 5 against Julian, chapter 9 [al. 15], where he teaches that Christ was always immune from ignorance and concupiscence.
The eighth reason is thus proposed by Chemnitz, page 506, in the Examination of the Council: Concupiscence, even in the reborn, is anomia, because it disagrees with the norm of the law, and fights with it; and because the law is the norm of justice, whatever disagrees with it and fights with it has the notion of sin. But Peter Martyr, in the commentary on the epistle to the Romans, weaves the argument more artfully thus: Everything that is not conformed to the divine law is sin, as is plain from that of 1 John 3: And sin is iniquity — or anomia, as is had in the Greek. But the depravation of human nature is not conformed to the divine law — and that threefold: for it is repugnant, first, to the law of the first institution, because it is not such as God founded it; second, to the law of nature, because it cannot live agreeably to reason; third, to the written law: Thou shalt not covet. Therefore that depravation is sin. This argument is the Achilles (as they commonly say) of Philip, Bucer, Peter Martyr, Calvin, Chemnitz. “By the weight of this argument” (says Chemnitz, page 506) “all the Pontificals feel themselves pressed; therefore they seek various crevices, that they may slip out.” I answer: this argument can easily be solved from what has been said; and it so little presses the Catholics with its weight that by many it is eluded in jest, seeing it needs no serious response. For that concupiscence in the reborn is anomia in the broad way and materially, we conceded above, with Augustine; and by the same reasoning we concede that it is sin in the broad way, materially, or improperly — just as every vice, and every departure from a rule or order, not only in morals, but also in nature and art, can be said to be sin. But if they contend that the concupiscence of the reborn is properly anomia, in the way St. John takes this word when he says, And sin is anomia, or iniquity, 1 John 3 — we deny that the concupiscence of the reborn is anomia. Nor is that proof of Chemnitz good: Concupiscence, even in the reborn, is anomia because it disagrees with the norm of the law and fights with it. For not what disagrees with the norm of the law, or fights with it, is anomia; but the discord itself, or repugnance, or departure and deviation, is properly anomia and formally sin. For the devil, tempting to sin, disagrees with the law, but he is not himself iniquity, but the persuader of iniquity. The man too who sins disagrees, but he is not himself, nor is said to be, iniquity and sin, but the author of sin. Likewise the human will disagrees with the law, by whose consent sin is perfected; but neither is it called iniquity or sin, but the principle or cause of sin. Finally, a human action disagrees with the law, when it is not congruent with the law; and not even it is iniquity, but iniquitous. Iniquity, then (as we said), is the very departure from the norm of the law, which is better expressed by the Greek word anomia; and that departure, or deviation from the norm of the law, is immediately in the action itself, which ought to have been done according to the norm of the law. Now concupiscence is indeed repugnant to the law of the mind, as the Apostle says, Romans 7; but it neither is the formal repugnance itself; nor is it repugnant as an action receding from the norm of the law; nor as a power or person which is bound to follow the norm; but it is repugnant as inciting and impelling to transgressing the law, as we said of the devil. For every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, as we have in James 1. And it is to be noted in this place that in 1 John 3 it is had that sin is anomia, which our interpreter renders iniquity; but in 1 John 5 it is not had that every anomia is sin, but that all adikia — that is, all injustice — is sin; and that our interpreter in each place rendered iniquity, because he had not a word by which properly to express anomia, which is the departure from the law. But whatever be of the equivocation of the Latin word, it is certain that it is not the same thing that every anomia is sin, and that every adikia is sin, as Chemnitz contends. For adikia is a species; anomia is the genus. For all injustice is a departure from the law, but not every departure from the law is injustice. And what St. John says — that all adikia is sin — is most true; but what Chemnitz says, and very often repeats — that every anomia is sin — is not true, unless sin be taken in the broad way, as it comprehends even the sins of art and of nature. But of these things thus far; for to the lies and calumnies and various absurdities of Chemnitz, Andradius has answered enough, against whom properly Chemnitz babbled out all those things. Now to the argument as it is woven by Peter Martyr, I answer that that proposition — “Everything that is not conformed to the divine law is sin” — is true universally, if sin be taken in the broad way; but if the treatment be of sin in morals, it must also be restricted to conformity with the law commanding moral acts. Otherwise even monsters, which are the sins of nature, would be sins properly so called, and would have to be punished — which certainly is most absurd. And that assumption — “But the depravation of human nature is not conformed to the divine law” — I say is also true, if it be treated of law universally; but not if it be treated of the law whose transgression induces guilt, and is sin properly so called, of which we now dispute. For although the depravation which is in the will, if it be taken for the aversion from God, is truly sin, as we shall afterwards say; yet the depravation which is in the understanding, or in the flesh, and also a certain proneness of the will to comply with the desires of the flesh, and its difficulty in complying with God, is not against any law whose transgression is sin properly so called; and therefore is not of itself and from its nature sin. For as to the law of the first institution of nature, that is not a moral law whose transgression constitutes the transgressor guilty; for God did not command that man be born with original justice, or in this or that manner; but he instituted nature as he willed, and adorned it with those gifts with which it pleased him to adorn it, and attributed to it the principles from which it could be propagated. And if at any time it happen that a thing arise otherwise than God instituted, there is indeed in that thing some sin of nature, but not such a sin as is worthy of punishment. For God did not create men blind, or deaf, or lame; and yet, when some are born blind, or deaf, or lame, no one judges that they are to be reprehended or chastised, even if their nature does not agree with the law of the first institution. And as to the law of nature, which commands that we lead our life according to reason — which law we cannot keep by the strength of corrupted nature — I say that that law can be considered in two ways. First, as it signifies the moral law, which properly commands the will to follow the leading of reason, not to consent to the desires of the flesh, etc.; and in this way it is a true law, but its transgression is not original sin, but actual, and does not pertain to the present matter. Second, as it signifies the natural order and congruence, which requires that the higher part command, the lower be subject, and the will obey reason without difficulty, etc.; and in this way that natural law is the same as the institution of nature — against which institution fight the rebellion of the flesh and the difficulty of the will; but these are not sins properly so called, but punishments of sin, and defects following upon the matter, as rust stands in an iron knife. Further, of the written law, Thou shalt not covet, we said enough above, where we demonstrated that that law properly forbids only voluntary desires, which are actual sins, not original.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIV. Solvuntur objectiones ex ratione. Praeter testimonia Scripturarum et Pa¬ trum, proferunt- etiam adversarii aliquot ra¬ tiones. Prima ratio. Motus concupiscentia? sunt illiciti, etiamsi nobis nolentibus fiant, ut ex Augustino colligitur lib. i. de nuptiis eteon- cupis. cap. 27. igitur lege divina prohibiti sunt, ac per hoc inobedientia legis, et pec¬ catum est illos habere, quamvis justis et fide¬ libus non imputentur. Respondeo : motus concupiscentiae dicun¬ tur illiciti, quia non licet eis praebere con¬ sensum, non quia non liceat eos invito animo pati, quemadmodum carnalis copula extra conjugium res est illicita, et tamen si quis per vim turpitudinem pateretur, aut omnino ignoranter committeret, non peccaret. Ita¬ que S. Augustinus loco notato, non dicit eos motus esse illicitos, quia non liceat eos pati, sed quia non liceat eis obediic: « Non enim, inquit, si bona et licita desideria essent, cis obedirc prohiberet Apostolus, dicens : Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore ad obediendum desideriis ejus. » Secunda ratio. Id quod per se trahit ad malum, eadem lege prohibetur, qua prohi¬ betur ipsum malum, ut perspicuum est de amplexibus et osculis impudicis : concupi¬ scentia autem, quantumvis involuntaria per se trahit ad malum, Jacobi i : Unusquisque lentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et il¬ lectus; igitur ejusmodi concupiscentia lege divina prohibita est, et legem violat qui concupiscit, quamvis invitus. Respondeo : id quod Jier se trahit ad ma¬ lum, eadem lege prohibetur, qua prohibetur ipsum malum, sed sicut ipsum malum non prohibetur proprie, ita ut reum faciat, nisi cum est in potestate nostra illud non .com¬ mittere, sic etiam, vel potius majori ratione, id quod per se trahit ad malum, non cense¬ tur proprie prohiberi, nisi quatenus in arbi¬ trio nostro est illud assumere, vel rejicere. Nam si jure non potest reprehendi, qui stu¬ prum per vim oblatum patitur, quanto minus reprehendi poterit, qui complexum, vel oscu¬ lum impudicum pati cogitur, etiamsi inde se stimulari ad flagitium sentiat ? Sic igitur concupiscentia? motus, qui reluctante animo interdum exoriuntur in carne, non sunt illi¬ citi, nec prohibiti nisi materialiter : proprie vero, ac formaliter solus consensus intelligi- tur prohiberi. Tertia ratio contra solutionem superiorem. Qui cogenti cupiditati bona voluntate resi¬ stere non potest, et ideo facit contra pra?ce- pta justitia?, vere et proprie peccat, ut S. Augustinus docet lib. I. rctract. cap. 15. At in lege justitia? non solum prohibetur opus, ut adulterium , sed etiam desiderium , ut concupiscentia adulterii ; igitur sicut opus est vere peccatum, etiamsi resisti bona vo¬ luntate non possit; ita concupiscentia ipsa 0 (li Sap. XIV, 0. — (2) Jacob. t. CAPUT XIV. 431 vere peccatum erit, quamvis invito animo oriatur. Respondeo : multum mterest inter motus concupiscentiae carnalis involuntarios, qui in sola carne sedem habent ; et desiderium voluntatis, sive opere compleatur, sive non compleatur. Nam motus ille carnis involun¬ tarius nullo modo est in potestate nostra, et ideo nec peccatum proprie, sed tantum per melonvmiam, ut in illo ipso loco idem S. Au¬ gustinus docet. Desiderium autem adulterii voluntarium sive ipsum opus adulterii pari¬ ter voluntarium, aliquando non est in nostra potestate immediate, quia divino judicio de¬ serti non habemus vires, quibus cogenti cu¬ piditati resistere valeamus : tamen semper est in potestate saltem mediate, quia possu¬ mus a Deo auxilium petere et gratia ejus adjuvante tentationi resistere: « Et ideo (ut ibidem Augustinus dicit) tunc facere contra preeeepta justitia:, sive opere, sive consensu, sic est peccatum, ut sit etiam pcena peccati. » (Juarc totum argumentum conceditur, si in consequente de concupiscentia illa sit ser¬ mo, quse in ipsa voluntate per consensum oritur. Fieri enim potest ut ea concupiscen¬ tia invito animo oriri dicatur, si forte nollet aliquis consentire, et tamen victus tentatione consentiat. Sin autem de concupiscentia carnis agatur, qua: nullo modo consensum extorqueat, argumentum nihil omnino con¬ cludet; nam in antecedente dicitur esse pec¬ catum id, quod fit cogente carnis cupiditate, quod non est in nostra potestate immediate, sed tantum mediate. Ex quo non sequitur, ut peccatum sit ipsa cupiditas carnis, qua: non est in potestate nostra, neque mediate, neque immediate. Quarta ratio. Concupiscentium, qua: re¬ manet in baptizatis. Deus odit, ut S. Augu¬ stinus docet in Psalm. xxxv. explicans illud : malitiam autem non audivit (1), Apostolus item illam odio habebat, Uom. 7.- (2). Quod odi facio. Et nos illam odio habere de¬ bemus, juxta illud Judie :<Jdienlcs eam , qux carnalis est , maculatam tunicam (3). At nihil odit Deus nisi peccatum, Sap. xiv. Odio est Jteo impius, et impietas ejus (4) . Etcap. ii. Di¬ ligis omnia, qux sunt, et nihil odisti eorum, qux fecisti (o). Fecit autem omnia Deus, pne- ter peccatum. Quare concupiscentia rema¬ nens in renatis peccatum est. Respondeo: jam supra diximus in explica¬ tione testimoniorum S. Augustini, concupi¬ scentiam odio haberi a Deo, et a nobis odio esse habehdam; quia tametsi proprie pecca¬ tum non sit, tamen incitat ad peccatum ; et cum ea bellum intestinum et assiduum gere¬ re cogimur. Quod autem Scriptura dicit, Deum nihil odisse eorum, qua: fecit, verissimum est ; sed illud est falsum Deum omnia fecisse praeter peccatum. Deus enim fecit, ac diligit omnia quae sunt, quia omnia bona sunt. Vidit enim cuncta quae fecerat et erant valde bona, Gen. i. Proinde malum nullum fecit, et malum omne odit, quatenus malum non est res ali¬ qua, sed rei alicujus privatio. Itaque in eo¬ dem libro Sap. cap. i. legimus: Deus mortem non fecit (G). Et de concupiscentia Joan. Apo¬ stolus in 1 epistol. cap. 2. dicit Eam non esse ex patre, sed ex mundo (7). Odit igitur Deus in nobis concupiscentiam, non ut pec¬ catum, sed ut languorem ex peccato reli¬ ctum, cainquc sanando quotidie minuit, do¬ nec penitus consumatur. Quomodo autem in- telligendum sit, quod Consilium Tridentinum dicit, Deum in renatis nihil odisse, explica¬ tum est capite superiore. Quinta ratio. Concupiscentia non est a Deo, ut habetur, 1. Joan. 2. At omnis justa pcena est a Deo, ut habetur Amos 3. Igitur concu- piscentianon estsolum pcena, sed etiam culpa. Respondeo : si argumentum hoc vires ha¬ beret, efficeret etiam mortem corporalem non esse tantum poenam, sed etiam culpam. Nam mors non est a Deo, ut habetur Sap. t. Et omnis justa pcena est a Deo etc. Dico igitur concupiscentiam non esse a Deo, qua¬ tenus illa est mala, et tamen esse a Deo, qua¬ tenus bonum est, ut eo malo puniatur homi¬ nis iuobedientia. Item concupiscentiam non esse a Deo, quia non fuit ipse auctor peccati, unde illa manavit ; tamen esse a Deo, quia in ultionem peccati abstulit donum origina¬ lis justitia:, quod carnem spiritui subjicie¬ bat, quo tanquam framo quodam sublato, continuo extitit in homine rebellio ista mem¬ brorum : « Quia dixi (inquit S. Augustinus lib v. in Julian. cap. 7.) inobedientiain car¬ nis, qua: in carne concupiscente adversus spiritum apparet diabolico vulnere conti¬ gisse : et rursus hanc legem peccati repug¬ nantem legi mentis, a Deo esse illatam pro- (1) P.-al. XXXV, 5. - (2) Rom. VII, 15. - (3) Jud. 23. - (4) Sap. XIV, 9. - (5) ibid. XI, 25. - (G)Sap.I, 13. - (7) 1 Joan, II. 10. 438 LIBEIl V. pter ultionem, et ideo poenam esse peccati ; haec inter se asseveras esse contraria. Quasi fieri non possit, ut idem malum, et diaboli iniquitate, et Dei aequitate peccantibus inge¬ ratur. Neque hinc sibi ipsa divina adversantur eloquia quia scriptum est, Deus mortem non fecit. Item scriptum est, vita et mors a Do¬ mino Deo. Quia deceptor hominis causa mor¬ tis est diabolus, quam non ut primus auctor ejus, sed ut peccati ultor intulit Deus. » Sexta ratio. Nulla est poena hujus vitae, quae oh finem bonum expeti non possit, at concupiscentia ob nullum finem recte expeti potest: igitur concupiscentia non est solum poena, sed etiam culpa. Respondeo : falsa est propositio. Nam igno¬ rantia earum rerum, qua) ad salutem neces¬ sariae sunt, sine dubio poma peccati est et tamen expeti, nisi imprudenter et male non potest. Pari ratione tentationes Satanae ex¬ peti non possunt, cum orare jubeamur : Et ne nos inducas in tentationen, Math. vi (1), et tamen tentationes internae, quibus Satanas imaginationem movet, et inania, vel illicita interdum nos cogitare compellit, poena pec¬ cati sunt. Denique nullas poenas expetendas esse docet S. August. sed omnes tolerandas, cum sic loquitur lib. x. Confess. cap. 28. « Quis velit molestias et difficultates pati ? tolerare jubes eas, non amare. Nemo quod tolerat amat, et si tolerare amat. Quamvis enim gaudeat se tolerare, mavult tamen non esse quod toleret. Porro concupiscentia ea¬ dem ratione expeti non debet, non quod peccatum sit, si' non ei consentiatur, sed quod ad peccandum inducat, et quod mole¬ sta sit,etgravis, et ideo non amanda, sed to¬ leranda sit, si debellari nequeat. Neque dis¬ plicere debet judicium Dei, qui eam ad ago- nem, et exercitium virtutis remanere voluit, ct Apostolo suo dixit : Sufficit tibi gratia mea , nam virtus in infirmitate perficitur , II Corinth. xii (2). Septima ratio. Christus per omnia tenturi voluit , sed absque peccato (3), ut Apostolus docet ad Hebr. iv. Et ideo communes hu¬ mana) vita) miserias omnes assumpsit, ut fra¬ tribus per omnia similis fieret. At concupi¬ scentiam carnis non assumpsit, neque tenta- tionem ejusmodi, qua) a rebellione carnis oriretur, pati voluit : igitur concupiscentia non solum poena, ac miseria, sed culpa, et iniquitas est. Respondeo : non solum concupiscentiam, sed etiam ignorantiam Christus assumere noluit, quamvis neutra sit peccatum si sit omnino involuntaria. Cur autem ignorantiam et concupiscentiam Christus habere noluerit, docet S. Thomas in 3. part. qua)st. Io. art. 2. et 3. Tum quia duae istae miseriae ni¬ hil proderant ad redemptionem generis hu¬ mani, sed potius oberant. Tum etiam quia plenum gratia et veritate Christum esse opor¬ tebat, quibus duobus donis concupiscentia et ignorantia manifeste repugnant. Vide S. Augustinum lib. ii. de peccatorum meritis et remissione cap 29. Et lib. v. in Julianum cap. 9. ubi docet Christum fuisse ab igno¬ rantia et concupiscentia semper immunem. Octava ratio sic proponitur a Kcmnitio pag. 506 in examine Concilii. Concupiscentia etiam in renatis est dvouda, propterea quod dissidet, a norma legis, et cum illa pugnat : et quia lex est norma justitiae, et quicquid ab ea dissidet et cum ea pugnat rationem peccati habet. Sed Petrus Martyr in com- ment. epist. ad Romanos magis artificiose sic argumentum texit: Omne quod non est con¬ forme legi divinae, peccatum est, ut patet ex illo i. Joan.3. Et peccatum est iniquitas (4), si¬ ve dvou.ia, ut habetur in Graeco : At depravatio naturae humanae non est conformis legi di¬ vina), eique triplici ; repugnat enim primo legi institutionis primae, quia non est qualis eam Deus condidit; secundo , legi naturae, quia non potest vivere convenienter rationi ; tertio, legi scriptae : Non concupisces. Igitur ea depravatio peccatum est. Hoc argu¬ mentum Achiles est (ut vulgo dicitur) Phi¬ lippi, Buceri, Petri Martyris, Calvini, Kem- nitii. « Argumenti hujus (inquit Kemnitius pag. 506.) mole premi se omnes Pontificii sentiunt, ideo varias quaerunt rimas, ut ela¬ bantur. » Respondeo : argumentum hoc ex iis, qua: dicta sunt facile solvi potest; et adeo non premit sua mole Catholicos, ut a multis per jocum eludatur, quippe quod seria respon¬ sione non egeat. Nam concupiscentiam esse avopiav, in renatis, largo modo et materialiter supra concessimus cum Augustino, et eadem l atione concedimus esse pcccatunrlargo mo¬ do, materialiter, vel improprie, quemad¬ modum omne vitium, omnisque recessus a regula, vel ordine, non solum in moribus, sed etiam in natura et arte, dici potest esse (l) Math. VI, 13. - (2) II forinth. XII, 9. — (3) Heb. IV. 45. —(4) I Joan. 3, IV. CAPUT XIV. 439 peccatum. Sin autem concupiscentiam re¬ natorum contendant proprie esse avoaiav, quomodo hanc vocem accipit S. Joannes, cum ait, Et peccatum est dvoufa, sive iniqui¬ tas i. Joan. iii. negamus, concupiscentiam renatorum esse avoiria. Neque bona est illa Kemnitii probatio : Con¬ cupiscentia etiam in renatis est dvogi' a pro- pterea quod dissidet a norma legis, et cum illa pugnjjt. Nam non quod dissidet a legis norma, vel cum illa pugnat, est dvouta, sed ipsadiscordia, sive repugnantia, vel recessus, ac deviatio proprie est dvojjua et formaliter peccatum. Dissidet enim a lege diabolus ten- tans ad peccandum, sed non est ipse iniqui¬ tas, sed iniquitatis suasor. Dissidet etiam homo qui peccat, sed non est ipse neque esse dicitur iniquitas et peccatum, sed auctor peccati. Dissidet item a lege voluntas hu¬ mana, cujus consensu peccatum perficitur ; sed nec ipsa dicitur iniquitas, vel peccatum, sed principium, vel causa peccati. Denique dissidet a lege actio humana, cum non est le¬ gi congruens, et ne ipsa quidem est iniquitas, sed iniqua. Iniquitas igitur (ut diximus) est ipsa recessio a norma legis, quae melius explicatur gneca voce dvogia. Illa autem re¬ cessio, vel deviatio a norma legis immediate inest in ipsa actione, quae secundum legis normam fieri debuisset. Jam vero concupiscentia repugnat quidem legi mentis, ut Apostolus dicit ad Rom. vn. sed neque est ipsa formalis repugnantia ; ne¬ que repugnat, ut actio recedens a norma le¬ gis; neque ut potentia, vel persona, qme normam sequi teneatur : sed repugnat, ut incitans et impellens ad praevaricandam le¬ gem, quemadmodum de diabolo diximus. Tentatur enim unusquisque a concupiscentia sua, ut habemus Jacobi i. Est autem hoc loco notandum, haberi i. Joannis 3. peccatum esse , dvogta, quod noster interpres vertit iniquitatem. Sed i. Joan v. non haberi omnem dvopiav, esse peccatum, sed ir3<av dSlxiav, id est, om¬ nem injustitiam esse peccatum; nostrum au¬ tem interpretem in utroque loco vertisse ini¬ quitatem, quia non habebat vocabulum, quo proprie exprimeret dvoaiav, quse est recessio a lege. Caiterum quicquid sit de aequivo- catione Latinai vocis, certum est non esse idem, omnem dvogtav esse peccatum, et omnem doixtav, esse peccatum, ut Kemnitius contendit. Nam, dS.xi* species est, dvouta, est genus. Omnis enim injustitia est recessus a lege, non autem omnis recessus a lege est injustitia. Et quod dicit S. Joannes, omnem doixtav esse peccatum, verissimum est: quod auterh dicit, et saepissime repetit Kem¬ nitius, omnem dvouiav esse peccatum, non est verum, nisi peccatum largo mundo acci¬ piatur, ut etiam peccata artis et naturae com¬ prehendit. Sed de his hactenus. Nam ad mendacia et calumnias et varia Kemnitii ab¬ surda, satis respondit Andradius, in quem proprie illa omnia Kemnitius effutiit. Jam vero ad argumentum, ut texitur a Petro Martyre, respondeo, propositionem illam a Omne, quod non est conforme legi divinae, peccatum est », veram esse in uni¬ versum, si peccatum accipiatur largo modo ; sin autem agatur de peccato in moribus, debere etiam restringi ad conformitatem le¬ gis praecipientis actus morales. Alioqui etiam monstra, quae sunt peccata naturae, essent peccata proprie dicta, et puniri debe¬ rent; quod certe est absurdissimum. Assum¬ ptionem vero illam : « At depravatio naturae humanae non est conformis legi divinae, » dico etiam esse veram, si agatur de lege in universum, non autem si agatur de lege, cujus praevaricatio inducat reatum, sitque peccatum proprie dictum, de quo nos in praesenti disputamus. Nam etsi depravatio, quae est in volun¬ tate, si accipiatur pro aversione a Deo, sit vere peccatum, ut postea dicemus ; tamen depravatio quae est in intelligentia, vel in carne, necjion pronitas quaedam voluntatis ad obsequendum desideriis carnis, et diffi¬ cultas ejusdem ad obsequendum Deo, non est contra legem ullam, cujus praevaricatio sit peccatum proprie dictum. Et ideo non est per se, et ex natura sua peccatum. Quod enim attinet ad legem primic institutionis naturae, non est ea lex moralis, cujus prae¬ varicatio reum constituat transgressorem, non enim jussit Deus, ut homo nasceretur cum justitia originali, vel hoc, aut illo mo- , do ; sed instituit naturam, sicut voluit, et ornavit iis donis, quibus ei placuit illam or¬ nare ; et eidem attribuit principia, ex quibus propagari posset. Si quando autem contin¬ git, ut aliter res oriatur, quam Deus insti¬ tuerit, est quidem in ea re peccatum aliquod naturae, sed non tale peccatum quod suppli¬ cio dignum sit. Nam non creavit Deus homi¬ nes caecos, vel surdos, aut claudos, et tamen cum nascuntur aliqui caeci, vel surdi, aut claudi, nemo eos reprehendendos, aut casti- LIBEM V. •i 50 gandos censcot, etiamsi non congruat eorum natura cum lege primae institutionis. Quod vero attinet ad legem naturae, qiue jubet ut vitam agamus secundum rationem, quam legem viribus natura? corrupta? ser¬ vare non possumus; dico, posse legem illam bifariam considerari. Primo, ut signitieat legem moralem, quae proprie imperat volun¬ tati, ut sequatur ductum rationis, non con¬ sentiat desideriis carnis etc. et hoc modo vera lex est, sed ejus praevaricatio non est peccatum originale, sed actuale, et ad rem pra?sentem non perlinet. Secundo, ut signi¬ ficat ordinem et congruentiam naturalem, quae requirit, ut pars superior imperet, infe¬ rior subjiciatur, et voluntas sine difficultate rationi obediat etc. Et hoc modo lex ista naturalis eadem est cum institutione naturae, contra quam institutionem pugnant rebellio carnis, ct difficultas voluntatis, sed ea non sunt peccata proprie dicta ; sed poena? pec¬ cati, et defectus consequentes materiam, quemadmodum se habet rubigo in cultro fer¬ reo. Porro dc lege scripta, Non concupisces, satis multa supra diximus, ubi demonstravi¬ mus. eam legem proprie non prohibere nisi desideria voluntaria, qua? sunt peccata actu¬ alia, non originalia.