Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 15: The opinion of those Catholics is refuted who place the sin of origin in a certain positive quality
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We have hitherto refuted three errors of the heretics of this time; now must be refuted two inconvenient opinions of Catholics, which seem also capable of being named errors.
The first opinion is of those who teach that there are in man two evil qualities, one in the flesh, the other in the soul, of which the latter arises from the former (for they judge that the soul is polluted from the contact of the flesh); and they judge that each can be called concupiscence, but they lay down that the latter alone is original sin. And so they will have the sin of origin to be nothing else than concupiscence — that is, a morbid quality in the soul, perpetually stirring up depraved desires. So teaches Peter Lombard, in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 30 [al. 31], letters 2 and 3, whom Henry followed, Quodlibet 2, question 11, and Gregory of Rimini, on 2, distinction 30, question 1, and of the more recent, John Driedo, in book 1 On Grace and Free Choice. Yet there is this difference between Henry and Gregory: that Henry supposes that evil quality of the soul to be a propensity to all evils, but Gregory restricts it to the inclination toward the good delightful according to the flesh. This opinion, though it agrees in part with the error of the Lutherans, yet differs in this: that the Lutherans acknowledge no superadded quality — rather Philip laughs at it, in the Apology of the Confession, not far from the beginning: “Of the tinder,” says he, “they dispute that it is a quality of the body; and, to be inept after their manner, they ask whether that quality was contracted by the contagion of the apple, or from the breath of the serpent.” Thus he. Moreover it differs also in this: that the Lutherans will have concupiscence after baptism to be, from its nature, sin properly so called; but those Catholic authors by no means concede this. Now to us this opinion seems in no way capable of defense. Which, that it may be made manifest, a few things must be premised, from which the state of the controversy will be altogether laid open.
It is to be known, then, first, that concupiscence is not always taken in the same way in the Scriptures. For sometimes it signifies the appetite of good universally; in which notion many good concupiscences are found, as St. Augustine warns, discourse 8 on Psalm 118. For the concupiscence of wisdom is good and praiseworthy, seeing that, as is said in Wisdom 6, it leads to the kingdom. Good likewise is the concupiscence by which the spirit lusts against the flesh, of which the Apostle speaks, Galatians 5; rightly too did he lust who said, in Psalm 118: I have longed to desire thy justifications. Again, concupiscence sometimes signifies the act, sometimes the power. For we call concupiscence both the very motion of desire, as is plain from Augustine, book 6 against Julian, chapter 8; and the very power or force of desiring sensible goods, as is plain from the same Augustine, book 4 against Julian, chapter 14, and book 6, chapter 7 — and in this way concupiscence is not evil, but good, or indifferent. For we can through the same power of desiring lust both well and ill; and without doubt the power of desiring sensible goods was in Christ, and in the first man before sin, and again will be in us after the resurrection. And so St. Augustine, in the places cited, confesses that concupiscence is not so to be taken when the sin of origin is treated of. There is, then, another notion of concupiscence, by which we call concupiscence the vice by which men are prone to desiring sensible goods against the order of reason. And in this way concupiscence is taken everywhere by Augustine in the books against the Pelagians. Book 2 against Julian, before the middle, he writes that concupiscence is not a substance, but the vice of a substance; and more openly book 6, chapter 7 [al. 18]: “I say that there is inborn in man, as an ill health from the vitiated origin, a vice by which the flesh lusts against the spirit.” And book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 25: “For concupiscence does not remain substantially, like some body or spirit; but it is an affection of a certain evil quality, like a languor.” And in chapter 31 [al. 26]: “He now called it flesh, where there is a certain morbid affection of the flesh, not the very conformation of the body.” It is to be known, second, that that vice resides chiefly in the flesh — that is, in the lower part of man, which is called sensuality — as we taught above from the Apostle, Romans 7, where he says that concupiscence is an evil dwelling in the flesh, and repugnant to the law of the mind, etc. Wherefore St. Augustine, in all the books which he wrote against the Pelagians, always, speaking of concupiscence, recurs to the vice of the lower part. Book 1 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 29 [al. 39]: “That, therefore,” says he, “which is moved in the members of this body, and strives to draw the whole mind down into itself, and neither rises when the mind wills, nor is quiet when the mind wills — this is the evil of sin, in which every man is born.” And book 4 against Julian, chapter 4 [al. 14], he says that lust, or concupiscence, is a vice by which we immoderately desire the delectation of all the senses, but chiefly of tasting and touching. And book 6, chapter 8: “To this handwriting are born liable all who are born carnally, in the flesh, of the flesh. For neither is there no iniquity when, in one man, either the higher parts basely serve the lower, or the lower contumaciously struggle against the higher, even if they are not suffered to conquer.” Finally, in all the books written directly against the Pelagians, though in almost every chapter he names concupiscence rather often, he almost always takes the name of concupiscence for the vice of the lower part, which is rebellious to the higher. But it is not to be denied that even in the higher part a like vice is found. For that part of the mind also is prone to desiring honors, empty glory, and other vanities, and, even if we will not, sometimes brings forth desires of that kind. Wherefore blessed Paul, in the epistle to the Galatians, chapter 5, when he had said that the flesh lusts against the spirit, straightway, enumerating the works of the flesh, named not only fornication, drunkenness, and others of that kind, but also idolatry, heresies, enmities, etc. — which St. Augustine diligently noted, book 14 of the City of God, chapters 2, 3, and 4, where he demonstrates that flesh is sometimes taken for the whole man, such as he is, without the grace of God, after the fall of Adam; and that he is called carnal who lives according to himself, not according to God. Whence, in the explication of Psalm 79, he says that every sin arises either from cupidity ill inflaming, or from fear ill humbling. And so the vice of concupiscence, though chiefly in the sensuality, yet has its seat also in the mind. But St. Augustine, in the books against the Pelagians, speaks almost everywhere of the vice of the sensuality for this reason: that in the sensuality this vice betrays itself more — not that he was ignorant that it has place also in the mind. And in all these things, unless I am deceived, we agree with Peter Lombard, Henry, Gregory, and all the rest. The question remains only concerning this vice: whether it is a positive quality or not, and whether this very vice is properly and formally original sin. They affirm both; we deny both. For we say that the sensuality is prone to lusting even against the order of reason, not from some implanted quality inclining it, but from the lack of original justice, which subjected it perfectly to reason — just as if a horse be incited to running, not because spurs are applied to it, but because the bridle has been removed; and as if something lean toward falling, not because it is pressed by some heavy body superadded, but because something has been removed which hindered it from falling. And what we have said of the sensuality is to be understood also of the will.
These things being premised, we prove that concupiscence is not a positive quality. First, by the testimonies of St. Augustine, whom the adversaries think they have as patron — even as their only one — for their opinion. He, then, in book 2 On Original Sin, chapter 40 [al. 1], speaking of concupiscence, whose guilt he says is original sin, as is plain from the six preceding chapters, says thus: “Man is compared to the beasts through vice, not through nature — not by the vice of the beast, but of nature. For of such excellence is man, in comparison with the beast, that the vice of man is the nature of the beast.” Likewise book 4 against Julian, chapter 5 [al. 41]: “But this lust is therefore not an evil in the brutes, since it does not resist reason, which they lack.” And chapter 14: “Therefore in the beasts concupiscence is not an evil, because it does not lust against the spirit, but rather delights their spirit.” And on Psalm 103, discourse 4: “What to the horse is nature, to man is crime.” In these places St. Augustine teaches that that very thing is in man the vice of concupiscence which in living creatures devoid of reason is nature. But it is certain that in living creatures devoid of reason there is no corrupt quality by which they are prone to lusting, but only the sensitive appetite, which assuredly would resist reason, if reason were in the brutes. In man, therefore, there is no positive quality besides the sensuality itself; but the sensuality itself is called vicious, and is so in man, because it ought to obey reason — which it would also do, had not man, on account of sin, lost original justice. Moreover, the same St. Augustine, book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 25, says that concupiscence does not remain substantially, but like a languor. And book 2 against Julian, before the middle, he says that it is not a substance, but the vice of a substance. Now St. Augustine is wont to understand by substance all that which is in the nature of things — that is, everything positive. For thus he says on Psalm 68: “What is no substance is nothing at all.” The same author too, wherever he explains the cause of concupiscence, always recurs to the privation or absence of grace. Book 1 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 16 [al. 39]: “When, therefore,” says he, “Adam sinned by not obeying God, then his body lost the grace by which it obeyed his soul in every part; then arose that bestial motion shameful to men, of which he blushed in his nakedness. From this disobedience of the flesh, then, from this law of sin and death, whoever is generated carnally has need to be regenerated spiritually.” And book 4 against Julian, last chapter: “What is the nakedness disclosed when the forbidden food was tasted, but that laid bare by sin which grace was covering? For great indeed was the grace of God there, where the earthly and animal body had not bestial lust.” The same he repeats, book 11 [al. 2] On Genesis, chapter 31, and book 13 of the City of God, chapter 13. Thou seest in these places that not only is the vice of concupiscence traced back to the absence of grace, but it is also called bestial lust, because that very lust is in man a vice which in the beasts is nature; and again, that it was brought about by the great grace of God in paradise that the earthly and animal body had not lust — because of itself, and from its nature, it would have had lust, had not that great grace hindered it from having it. There came, then, no evil quality; but the sensuality itself, as, despoiled of original justice, it resists reason, is called concupiscence.
Next, this same thing is confirmed by reasons. For first, if concupiscence were a positive quality, it would have to have a positive cause. I ask, then, what that cause is. For it will be either God, or the devil, or the serpent, or man himself, or certainly the forbidden apple itself. It cannot be God — especially according to the adversaries, who will have concupiscence to be the sin of origin; for then God would be the author of sin. And moreover, if that quality were from God as from its proper efficient cause, it would follow at least that God is the cause of temptation to evil. For every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, as is had in James 1; and if concupiscence is infused by God, certainly it follows that God is the cause of temptation to evil — which nevertheless is against the same James, who in the same place says: God is not a tempter of evils, and he tempteth no man. But neither can the devil be the efficient cause of that quality; for the devil has no power of producing anything except through local motion, by applying actives to passives — and that in corporal things only; but this quality is said to be spiritual. Much less could the corporal serpent be the cause of the same quality: both because a corporal serpent cannot breathe forth a spiritual quality; and because that serpent did nothing upon Adam, but only conversed with Eve. Adam himself, indeed, through the act of sinning could effect in himself some disposition toward a like act, but not such a quality as would perpetually cleave, and incline to all evils, such as concupiscence is. For that act was of pride; and through it there could not straightway be begotten a habit of pride, but only a light disposition, which could most easily have been taken away — and much less could there be begotten a habit inclining to fornication, adulteries, homicides, thefts, etc. Finally, neither can the cause of that quality be thrown back upon the forbidden apple; for that apple was not evil, and therefore forbidden, but evil because forbidden, and otherwise from its nature good, like the other things which God had created, as St. Augustine rightly teaches, book 14 of the City of God, chapter 12; and even if the apple had been vitiated and corrupted, it could not be understood how it could have effected a spiritual quality in the soul. It remains, then, that evil concupiscence, which had no positive cause, is not a positive quality. Moreover, second: if the vice of concupiscence were a positive quality, arisen in the first man himself through the sin of the first man, it could not easily be shown how it would be transmitted to posterity; for acquired habits are not carried over into offspring, as is plain of all the habits of sciences, virtues, arts, gifts. And if sometimes a clever father begets a clever son, sometimes also the contrary happens, that a wise father generates a foolish son, as Scripture testifies of Solomon and his son Roboam. Third: either God is the author of that positive quality, or not. If he is, then he is the author of sin; for the adversaries contend that that concupiscence is sin. If he is not, then God is not the author of all things, nor will that be true which we read in the Gospel, John 1: All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing. Fourth: even if we conceded that a morbid quality came to the flesh from the sin of the first man, yet it could not be understood how the infected flesh would infect the soul; for a body cannot act immediately upon a spirit, and produce a spiritual quality. Fifth: since that quality, if it be posited, is adventitious and against nature, how can it be that in so long a time it has not been diminished, or utterly extinguished? Sixth: it seems altogether superfluous. For, in order that the flesh lust against the spirit, it is enough if it have a sentient appetite, such as the beasts have, and the bridle of original justice be not present. And in order that the mind follow the temperament of the body, it is enough that the sentient appetite and the will, and sense and reason, have their root in the same essence of the soul. For hence, without the aid of any quality, from the mere complexion and constitution of the body, some are clever, some dull, some cheerful, some sad, some prone to one vice, others to another, some mild, some wrathful, etc. Seventh: that positive quality is not taken away through baptism, as is known; therefore, if the sin of origin is concupiscence, and concupiscence is a positive quality, certainly it follows that the sin of origin is not taken away through baptism — which in the Catholic Church is exploded as a manifest error. Nor do those two solutions satisfy — that the sin of origin is said to be remitted through baptism, both because concupiscence is not imputed to the baptized unto fault, and because, on account of the grace which is conferred in baptism, concupiscence no longer has dominion. For the former solution is most openly adverse to the Council of Trent (whose authority Catholics do not spurn); for the Council condemns the error of the Lutherans, who say that the sin of origin remains after baptism, but is not imputed; and the same Council affirms that through baptism is taken away whatever has the notion of sin. The latter solution manifestly conflicts with the decrees of the same Council. For when grace is infused through baptism, the dominion of concupiscence is not taken away, but is bound and hindered for a time; and when grace is lost through actual sin, it is loosed again, and the same dominion of concupiscence returns. Wherefore, if reigning concupiscence is the sin of origin, it manifestly follows that the sin of origin is not truly taken away through baptism, as the Council teaches. For if it is truly taken away, whence, I ask, does the same sin exist in a sinful man after baptism? Nor can it be answered that it is not the same, but another; for it is the same reigning concupiscence which was before baptism; and the sin of origin cannot exist except through the origin of carnal generation, which happens once. To these let this be added: that this solution seems not consonant with the doctrine of St. Augustine. For he, when he says that the guilt of concupiscence is the sin of origin, does not recur to reigning concupiscence, but says that this evil, merely because it is present, even if it does not reign, leads through to eternal death, unless its guilt be expiated through baptism — as is plain from book 2 On Original Sin, chapter 39, and book 6 against Julian, chapters 5 and 8, and elsewhere. And how the guilt of concupiscence which is loosed in baptism ought to be taken, we explained above.
Further, the arguments of the adversaries — besides those which have been refuted by us in the disputation against the Lutherans — are all taken from the testimonies of St. Augustine. First, then, they object that St. Augustine writes that concupiscence is a quality; for thus he speaks of it, book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 25: “It does not remain substantially, like some body or spirit; but it is an affection of a certain evil quality, like a languor.” And chapter 31: “He now called it flesh, where there is a certain morbid affection of the flesh, not the very conformation of the body.” Then they add that the same Augustine, book 5 against Julian, chapter 3, says that the soul is corrupted in the body as in a vitiated vessel — that is, that from the evil quality of the flesh an evil quality overflows into the soul. Lastly they add that in book 4 of the Hypognosticon the same author teaches that lust in man was born from the breath of the serpent. To the first I answer that what is called by Augustine a quality, or a morbid affection, is the natural inclination itself of the sensuality, vitiated not by some positive blemish, but from the lack of original justice. For in the same way St. Thomas, in 1-2, question 82, article 1, calls the sin of origin a corrupt habit, in which there is something positive — namely, the very powers of the soul, not well disposed — and something privative, namely the disorder following from the lack of original justice. Wherefore both St. Augustine and St. Thomas oftentimes call the vice of concupiscence a languor of nature; and languor signifies the humors of the body deprived of their due proportion and harmony. To the second I answer that the soul is rightly said to be corrupted in the body as in a vitiated vessel — not that there is in the flesh a positive quality from which again another quality arises in the soul; but that the soul does not begin to have sin except when it is infused into the body, for then first the man begins to be a son of Adam. For the soul, as it is understood, prior in nature, to be created by God, has nothing to do with Adam, and thereby does not share in his sin; but when it begins to dwell in the body generated from Adam, and to make one supposite with that body, then (as we explained more fully above) it contracts the sin of origin. And the body generated from Adam is called, even before animation, a corrupted vessel, because from the force of such generation it is owed to it to be liable to death and to various passions. To the last, from the book of the Hypognosticon — to omit that that book is not judged a work of Augustine — I answer that the words of that author are to be understood metaphorically. For by the breath of the serpent he signified the diabolical persuasion: namely, that, as he himself speaks, Adam followed rather the serpent persuading than God forewarning. For from Genesis it is agreed that the breath of the corporal serpent did not reach Adam, but only the persuasion of the devil — and that not through the serpent, but through the woman. The sentence of that author, then, is this: as the corporal serpent, by breathing forth venom, slays the bodies of men, so the spiritual serpent — that is, the devil — by persuading sin, brought to the first parent the slaughter of soul and body.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XV. Refellitur eorum Catholicorum sententia, qui peccatum originis in quadam positiva quali¬ tate constituunt. Refutavimus hactenus tres errores hujus temporis fucrcticorum : nunc refutanda? sunt dua? Catholicorum incommoda? sententia?, quae videntur etiam errores nominari posse. Prima sententia eorum est, qui duas esse doceiit in homine malas qualitates, unam in carne, alteram in anima, quarum posterior a priori oriatur, (animam enim ex contactu carnis pollui existimant) utramque autem concupiscentiam dici posse censent, sed so¬ lam posteriorem statuunt esse originale pec¬ catum. Itaque peccatum originis nihil aliud esse volunt, nisi concupiscentiam, hoc est, morbidam in anima qualitatem, prava desi¬ deria perpetuo excitantem. Ita docet Petrus Lombardus in n. lib. sentent. dist. 31. g. 2. et 3. quem secuti sunt Henricus Quodlib. 2. qua?sl. 11. et Grcgorius Arim. in 2. dist. 30. qua?st. 1. et ex reccntioribus JoaunesDriedo in 1. lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio. Hoc ta¬ men interest inter Hern icum et Grcgorium, quod Henricus arbitratur malam illam ani¬ ma? qualitatem esse propensionem ad omnia mala : Grcgorius autem restringit ad incli¬ nationem in bonum delectabile secundum carnem. Ha?c sententia tametsi convenit ex parte cum errore Lutheranorum ; tamen in eo dif- fert, quod Lutherani non agnoscunt ullam superadditam qualitatem, sed eam potius ri¬ det Philippus in Apologia Confessionis, non procul ab initio : « Dc fomite, inquit, dispu¬ tant, quod sit qualitas corporis, et, ut suo more sint inepti, qua?runt, utrum qualitas illa contagione pomi, an ex afflatu serpentis contracta sit. » Ha?c ille. Pra?lerea differt etiam in eo, quod Lutherani concupiscen¬ tiam post baptismum, ex natura sua pecca¬ tum proprie dictum esse volunt ; auctores autem illi Catholici minime id concedunt. Videtur autem nobis luee sententia nullo modo defendi posse. Quod ut manifestum fiat, pauca qua?dam pra?miltenda erunt, ex quibus controversia? status omniuo aperie¬ tur. Sciendum est igitur primo, concupiscen¬ tiam non semper eodem modo accipi in Scri¬ pturis. Interdum enim significat appetitum boni in universum, qua notione mulla? bona? concupiscentia? inveniuntur, ut S. Augusti¬ nus monet concion. 8. in Ps. cxvm. nam concupiscentia sapientia? bona et laudabilis est, quippe qua?, ut dicitur Sap. vi. deducit ad regnum. Bona est item concupiscentia, qua spiritus adversus carnem concupiscit, de qua loquitur Apostolus ad Galat. v. recte quoque .concupiscebat, qui dicebat in Ps. cxviii. concupivi desiderare justificationes luas. Rursus concupiscentia aliquando significat actum, aliquando potentiam. Nam et concu¬ piscentiam dicimus ipsum desiderii motum, ut patet ex Augustino lib. vi. in Julinuuwi eap. 8. et ipsam potentiam, seu vim appe¬ tendi bona sensibilia, ut patet ex eodem Au¬ gustino lib. iv. in Julian. cap. 14. et lib. vi. eap. 7. et hoc modo concupiscentia non est mala, sed bona, vel indifferens. Nam possu¬ mus per eamddm vim appetendi, et bene et male concupiscere, et sine dubio vis appe¬ tendi bona sensibilia fuit in Christo, et in primo homine ante peccatum, et rursus in nobis post resurrectionem erit. Itaque S. CAPCT xr. Augustinus locis citatis fatetur, non ita acci¬ piendam esse concupiscentiam cuin agitur de peccato originis. Est igitur alia notio concupiscentia;, qua concupiscentiam appellamus vitium, quo pro¬ ni sunt homines ad appetenda bona sensibilia contra ordinem rationis. Et hoc modo acci¬ pitur concupiscentia passiui ab Augustino in libris adversus Pelagianos ; lib. 2. in Julia¬ num ante medium, scribit concupiscentiam non esse substantiam, sed substantia; vitium ; et apertius lib. vr. cap. 7 ; « Ego, inquit, tanquam valetudinem malam ex origine vi¬ tiata ingenitum esse dico homini vitium, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. » Et lib. i. de nuptiis et coneupisc. cap. 25: « Non enim, inquit, concupiscentia substan¬ tialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus, aut spi¬ ritus, sed allectio est quasdam mala; qualita¬ tis, sicut languor. » Et.in cap. 31 : « Carnem, inquit, appellavit, ubi est quidam morbidus carnis affectus, non ipsam corporis confor¬ mationem. » Sciendum est secundo, istud vitium in carne potissimum residere, hoc est, in parte hominis inferiore, qua; sensualitas dicitur, bl (juod supra docuimus ex Apostolo Rom. vii. ubi concupiscentiam dicit esse malum inhabitans in carne, et repugnare legi men¬ tis, ctc. QuorcireaS. Augustinus in omnibus libris, quos adversus Pelagianos scripsit, semper de concupiscentia loquens, ad vitium partis inferioris recurrit lib. 1. de peccat, meritis et remiss. cap. 29. «Quod igitur, in¬ quit, in membris corporis hujus movetur, fotumque animum in se dejectum conatur attrahere, et neque cum mens voluerit, as¬ surgit, neque cum meus voluerit, conquie¬ scit, hoc est malum peccati, in quo nascitur omnis homo. » Et lib. iv. in Juliauum c. 4. dicit, libidinem, sive concupiscentiam esse vitium, quo appetimus immoderate delecta¬ tionem omnium sensuum, sed pnueipue gu¬ standi ct tangendi. Et lib. vi. cap. 8. « Huic chirographo, inquit, nascuntur obnoxii om¬ nes in carne de carne carnaliter nati. Neque enim nulla est iniquitas, cum in uno homine, vel superiora inferioribus turpiter serviunt, vel inferiora superioribus contumaciter relu¬ ctantur, etiamsi vincere non sinantur. » De¬ nique in omnibus libris contra Pelagianos di¬ recte scriptis, cum in singulis fere capitibus concupiscentiam saepius nominet , semper fere pro vitio partis inferioris, qua; rebellis est superiori, concupiscentia; nomen accipit. Tom. V. -i i i Caderum negandum non est, etiam in parte superiore simile vitium inveniri. Nam ea quoque animi pars prona est ad concupi¬ scendos honores, inanem gloriam, et alias vanitates, et, etiamsi nolimus, interdum pa- rit ejusmodi desideria. Quocirca B. Paulus in epist. ad Galat. cap. o. cum dixisset car¬ nem concupiscere adversus spiritum, statim enumerans opera carnis, non solum nomi¬ navit fornicationem, ebrietatem, et alia id genus; sed etiam idololatriam, haereses, ini¬ micitias ctc. quod diligenter notavit S. Au¬ gustinus lib. xiv. de civ. cap. 2. 3. et 4. ubi demonstrat, carnem interdum accipi pro toto homine, qualis est, sine gratia Dei, post la¬ psum Adami, et eum dici carnalem, qui se¬ cundum se ipsum, non secundum Deum vi¬ vit. Ex quo in explicatione Psal. t.xxix dicit, omne peccatum oriri ex cupiditate male in¬ flammante, vel ex timore male humiliante. Itaque concupiscentiae vitium licet pneci- pue in sensualitate, tamen etiam in mente sedem habet. S. autem Augustinus in libris contra Pelagianos ideo pene ubique loquitur dc vitio sensualitatis, quia in sensualitate magis hoc vitium se prodit, non quod igno¬ raret etiam in mente locum, habere. Atque in liis omnibus nisi lallor, cum Petro J.om- bardo, Hcnrico, Gregorio, et cieteris omni¬ bus convenimus. Solum qua;stio manet de hoc vitio, sitne positiva qualitas, an non, et utrum hoc ipsum vitium sit. proprie, ac for- iualiter originale peccatum. Illi affirmant utrumque, nos utrumque negamus. Dicimus enim sensualitatem esse pronam ad concu¬ piscendum etiam contra ordinem rationis, non ex aliqua insita qualitate eam incli¬ nante, sed ex carentia justitia; originalis, quae cam perfecte rationi subjiciebat. Quem¬ admodum si equus incitetur ad curren¬ dum, non quia admoventur ei calcaria, sed quia sublatum est frsonum : et voluti si ali¬ quid propendeat ad casum non quia premi¬ tur aliquo corpore gravi superaddito, sed quia sublatum est aliquid, quod prohibebat ne caderet. Quod autem diximus de sensua¬ litate, de voluntate quoque intclligendum est. Ilis praenotatis probamus, non esse concu¬ piscentiam positivam qualitatem. Primo, te¬ stimoniis sancti Augustini, quem adversarii vel solum pro sua opinione patronum habere sc putant. Is igitur iu lib. 2. de peccato ori¬ ginis cap. f . loquens de concupiscentia, cu¬ jus reatum dicit esse originale peccatum, ut 20 L1BEB V. 442 patet ex capitibus sex praecedentibus, sic ait: « Comparatur homo pecoribus per vitium, non per naturam, non pecoris vitio, sed na¬ tura;. Tanta; namque excellentia; est in com¬ paratione pecoris homo, ut vitium hominis natura sit pecoris. » Item lib. iv. adversus Julian. cap. 5 : « Ilsec autem libido, inquit, ideo malum non est in belluis, quoniam non repugnat rationi, qua carent. » Et cap. 14 : « Ideo, inquit, in pecoribus malum non est concupiscentia, quia non adversus spiritum concupiscit, sed eorum potius oblectat spiri¬ tum. » Et in Psalm. ciii. concio. 4 : « Quod equo, inquit, natura est, homini crimen est. » In his locis S. Augustinus docet illud ipsum esse in homine vitium concupiscentia;, quod est in animantibus rationis expertibus na¬ tura. Certum est autem in animantibus ra¬ tionis expertibus nullam esse corruptam qua¬ litatem, qua sint prona ad concupiscendum, sed solum appetitum sensitivum, qui rationi utique repugnaret, si ratio in belluis esset. In homine igitur nulla est qualitas positiva, praeter ipsam sensualitatem, sed ipsa sensua¬ litas ; ideo vitiosa dicitur, et est in homine, quia deberet rationi obtemperare , quod etiam faceret, nisi homo propter peccatum justitiam originalem amisisset. Praeterea idem S. Augustinus, lib. 1. de nuptiis et concupiscentia cap. 25. dicit, con¬ cupiscentiam non substantialiter manere, sed sicut kinguorem. Et lib. 2. in Julianum, ante medium, dicit, non esse substantiam, sed substantiae vitium. Solet autem S. Augusti¬ nus per substantiam intelligere id omne, quod est in rerum natura, id est, omne po¬ sitivum. Sic enim ait in Psalm. lxviii : (i Quod nulla substantia est, nihil omnino est. » Idem quoque auctor ubicumque con¬ cupiscentiae causam explicat, semper recur¬ rit ad privationem, sive absentiam gratiae. Lib. i. de peccat, meritis et remiss. cap. 16 : <( Quando ergo, inquit, peccavit Adam non obediens Deo, tunc ejus corpus gratiam per¬ didit, qua ejus animae omni ex parte obedic- bat ; tunc ille extitit bestialis motus puden¬ dus hominibus, quem in sua erubuit nudi¬ tate. Ex hac igitur inobedientia carnis, ex hac lege peccati et mortis, quisquis carnali- ter generatur, regenerari spiritualiter opus habet. » Et lib. iv. in Julian. cap. ult. : « Quid, inquit, est gustato cibo prohibito nuditas indicata, nisi peccato nudatum quod gratia contegebat? gratia quippe Dei magna ibi erat, ubi terrenum, et animale corpus bestialem libidinem non habebat. »*Idem . repetit lib. II. de Genesi cap. 31. et lib. xili. de Civ. Dei cap. 13. Vides in his locis, non solum ad gratia; absentiam revocari concupiscentia; vitium, sed etiam vocari libidinem bestialem, quia illa ipsa libido est in homine vitium, quae in bestiis est natura. Et rursus, ideo magna Dei gratia factum esse in paradiso, ut terrenum et animale corpus libidinem non haberet, quia ex se et ex natura sua libidinem habi¬ turum fuisset, nisi magna illa gratia, ne ha¬ beret, impedivisset. Non igitur accessit mala qualitas aliqua; sed ipsa sensualitas, ut spo¬ liata originali justitia rationi repugnat, con¬ cupiscentia dicitur. Deinde hoc ipsum rationibus confirmatur. Nam primo si concupiscentia qualitas esset positiva, positivam causam habere deberet. Qua;ro igitur, qua? sit ista causa. Nam vel erit Deus, vel diabolus, vel serpens, vel ipse homo, vel certe pomum ipsum vetitum. Deus non potest esse, prmsertim secundum adversarios, qui volunt concupiscentiam esse peccatum originis; nam tunc Deus esset au¬ ctor peccati. Et praeterea si ea qualitas esset a Deo, ut a propria causa efficiente, seque¬ retur saltem Deum esse causam tenlationis ad malum. Unusquisque enim tentatur a con¬ cupiscentia sua, ut habetur Jacobi I. quod si concupiscentia infunditur a Deo, certe se¬ quitur, ut Deus sit causa tentationis ad ma¬ lum; quod tamen est contra eumdem Jaco- bum, qui in eodem loco dicit, Deus intenta¬ tor malorum est, ipse autem neminem tentat. Sed nec diabolus esse potest causA effi¬ ciens ejus qualitatis. Neque enim potestatem habet diabolus aliquid producendi, nisi per motum localem applicando activa passivis, idque in rebus corporalibus tantum. Haec autem qualitas spiritualis esse dicitur. Multo minus serpens corporalis causa esse potuit ejusdem qualitatis, tum quia serpens corporalis non potest afflare spiritualem qualitatem, tum quia nihil egit ille serpens in Adamum, sed solum cum Eva collocu¬ tus est. / Ipse autem Adam per actum peccandi effi¬ cere potuit in se dispositionem aliquam ad similem actum, sed non talem qualitatem, qua; perpetuo haereret, et ad omnia mala in¬ clinaret, qualis est concupiscentia. Nam «ictus ille superbia; fuit, et per eum gigni non po¬ tuit continuo habitus superbia;, sed solum levis dispositio, quae facillime tolli potuisset; •CAPUT XV. M3 et multo minus gigni potuit habitus incli¬ nans ad fornicationem, adulteria, homicidia, furta, etc. Denique neque in pomum vetitum causa ejus qualitatis rejici potest, neque enim po¬ mum illud malum fuit, et ideo prohibitum, sed ideo malum, quia prohibitum, et alio- qui ex natura sua bonum, ut caetera quae Deus creaverat, ut S. Augustinus recte docet lib. xiv. de Civit. Dei cap. 12. et etiamsi pomum vitiatum et corruptum fuis¬ set, non tamen intelligi posset, quemadmo¬ dum in anima qualitatem spiritualem efficere potuisset. Restat igitur ut mala concupiscen¬ tia. quae causam positivam non habuit, non sit qualitas positiva. Praeterea secundo, si concupiscentiae vi¬ tium qualitas esset positiva, per peccatum primi hominis in ipso primo homine exorta; non facile posset ostendi, quemadmodum transmitteretur ad posteros ; neque enim ha¬ bitus acquisiti trajiciuntur in prolem, ut per¬ spicuum est de omnibus habitibus scientia¬ rum, virtutum, artium, donorum. Quod si aliquando pater ingeniosus filium ingenio¬ sum gignit, aliquando etiam contra accidit, ut pater sapiens filium insipientem generet, ut Scriptura testatur de Salomone et filio ejus Roboam. Tertio, vel Deus est auctor positivae illius qualitatis, vel non : si est, igitur est auctor peccati. Istam enim concupiscentiam adver¬ sarii peccatum esse contendunt : si nou est, igitur Deus non est auctor omnium rerum, neque verum erit quod in Evangelio legimus, Joan. i : Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil (1). Quarto, etiamsi concederemus, in carne qualitatem morbidam ex peccato primi ho¬ minis accessisse: tamen intelligi non posset, quomodo caro infecta animam inficeret. Ne¬ que enim corpus immediate in spiritum agere, et spiritualem qualitatem producere potest. Quinto, cum illa qualitas, si ponatur, ad¬ ventitia sit, et contra naturam, quomodo fieri potest, ut tam longo tempore non sit immi¬ nuta, vel penitus extincta? Sexto, videtur omnino supervacanea; nam ad hoc, ut caro concupiscat contra spiritum, satis est si habeat sentientem appetitum , qualem bestiae habent, et non adsit fraenum originalis justitiae. Ut autem animus sequa¬ tur corporis temperamentum, satis est quod in eadem animae essentia radicem habeant sentiens apetitus et voluntas, et sensus et ratio. Hinc enim absque ullius qualitatis ad¬ jumento, ob solam corporis complexionem et constitutionem aliqui sunt ingeniosi, ali¬ qui hebetes, aliqui hilares, aliqui tristes, ali¬ qui proni ad unum vitium, alii ad aliud, ali¬ qui mites, aliqui ipacundi etc. Septimo, qualitas ista positiva per bapti¬ smum non tollitur, ut notum est ; ergo si peccatum originis est concupiscentia , et concupiscentia est qualitas positiva; certe sequitur, peccatum originis per baptismum non tolli. Quod in Ecclesia Catholica, ut ex¬ ploratus error exploditur. Neque satisfaciunt duae illae solutiones quod peccatum originis per baptismum dicatur remitti, tum quia concupiscentia baptizatis non imputatur ad culpam, tum quia propter gratiam, quae in baptismo confertur, concu¬ piscentia non amplius dominatur. Nam prior solutio Concilio Tridentino (cujus auctorita¬ tem Catholici non spernunt) apertissime ad¬ versatur, damnat enim Concilium Lutherano- rum errorem, qui dicunt peccatum originis post baptismum manere, sed non imputari ; et affirmat idem Concilium, per baptismum tolli quicquid peccati rationem habet. Poste¬ rior solutio decretis ejusdem Concilii mani¬ feste repugnat. Nam cum per baptismum infunditur gratia, non tollitur dominium concupiscentiae, sed ligatur et impeditur ad tempus, et cum per actuale peccatum amit¬ titur gratia, iterum solvitur, ac redit idem concupiscentia! dominium. Quare si concu¬ piscentia dominans est peccatum originis, manifeste sequitur peccatum originis per baptismum non vere tolli, ut Concilium do¬ cet. Nam si vere tollitur, unde quaeso idem peccatum in homine peccatore post bapti¬ smum existit? neque enim responderi potest, non esse idem, sed aliud. Nam eadem con¬ cupiscentia dominans est, quae ante bapti¬ smum erat; et peccatum originis, nisi per originem carnalis generationis, quae semel fit, existere non potest. His accedat, quod haec solutio, non vide¬ tur consentanea doctrinae S. Augustini. Ipse enim cum dicit, reatum concupiscentiae esse peccatum originis, non recurrit ad concupis- contiam dominantem, sed dicit, hoc malum, tantum quia inest, etiamsi- non dominetur, perducere ad aeternam mortem, nisi reatus (1) Joan, 1. 3. ejus per baptismum expietur; ut perspicuum est ex lib. 2. de peccato originali cap. 39. et lib. vi. in Julian. c. 3. et 8. et alibi. Quemad¬ modum autem accipi debeat concupiscentia; reatus, qui solvitur in baptismo, supra ex¬ plicuimus. Porro argumenta adversariorum, prader ea, qua; sunt a nobis refutata in dis¬ putatione adversus Luthcranos . sumuntur omnia ex testimoniis S. Augustini. Primum igitur objiciunt, quod S. Augu¬ stinus scribit concupiscentiam esse qualita¬ tem : sic enim loquitur de ea lib. i. de nuptiis et concupiscentia cap. 25 : « Aon substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut spiritus, sed affectio est quiedam rnake qualitatis, sicut languor. s> Et cap. 31. «Car¬ nem, inquit, nunc appellavit, ubi est morbi¬ dus quidam carnis affectus, non ipsam cor- poris conformationem. » Deinde addunt, quod idem Augustinus lib. 5. in Julian. cap. 3. dicit, animam in corpore, lauquam in vase vitiato corrumpi, hoc est, ex mala qualitate carnis redundare malam qualitatem in ani¬ ma. Postremo adjiciunt, quod in lib iv. hv- pognostici idem auctor docet, libidinem iu homine ex aftlatu serpentis esse natam. Ad primum respondeo, vocari ab Augu¬ stino qualitatem, sive morbidum allectum, ipsam naturalem inclinationem sensualitatis vitiatam non aliqua positiva labe, sed ex carentia justitia; originalis. A'am eodem mo¬ do S. Thomas in I. 2. qua;st. 82. art. I. vocat peccatum originis habitum corruptum, iu quo sil aliquid positivum, ipsa; videlicet potentiae anima; non bene disposita ; et ali¬ quid privativum, nimirum deordinatio ex carentia justitia; originalis consequuta. Quo¬ circa tam S. Augustinus, quam S. Thomas concupiscentia; vitium siepenumcro natura; languorem appellant. Languor autem signifi¬ cat humores corporis debita proportione, et harmonia privatos. Ad alterum respondeo, recte dici animam iu corpore tanquam in vase vitiato corrum¬ pi, non quod sit in carne positiva qualitas ex qua rursus in anima qualitas alia oriatur; sed quod anima non incipiat habere pecca¬ tum, nisi cum infunditur corpori, tunc enim primum incipit esse homo lilius Adami. Siquidem anima; ut prius natura iutelligilur creari a Deo, niliil habet cum Adamo, ac per hoc non communicat ejus peccato, sed cum iu corpore generato ex Adamo incipit habitare ct cum ipso corporo unum supposi¬ tum facere, tuuc (ut sqpru fusius explicui¬ mus) peccatum originis contrahit. Dicitur autem corpus ex Adamo generatum, etiam ante animationem, vas corruptum, quia ex vi talis generationis debetur illi ut sit morti, et variis passionibus obnoxium. Ad postremum ex libro hypognostici, ut omittam librum illum non censeri opus Au¬ gustini, respondeo, verba illius auctoris in- tclligenda esse metaphorice. Per afllatum enim serpentis persuasionem diabolicam significavit. Quod videlicet, ut ipse loquitur magis secutus sit Adam serpentem suaden - tem, quam Deum praemonentem. Nam ex Genesi constat, flatum serpentis corporalis ad Adamum non pervenisse, sed solum dia¬ boli persuasionem, et eam non per serpen¬ tem , sed per mulierem. Sententia igitur illius auctoris est, quemadmodum serpens corporalis afflando venenum hominum cor¬ pora interimit, ita serpentem spiritualem, id est, diabolum, suadendo peccatum, primo parenti necem anima;, et corporis attulisse.