Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 17: The true opinion of the nature of the sin of origin is explained
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It remains that, the errors being refuted, we come to explaining the true opinion.
It is to be known, then, that the name of sin is wont to be taken in two ways: in one way, for the free transgression of a precept; in another way, for that which remains in the soul of the sinner after that action of the transgression of the precept. For that the action itself, by which we transgress the precept, both is and is called properly sin, there is no one who denies; and it is plain from the definition of sin, which is: something said, or done, or desired, etc. And that after the action of the sin something remains which is, and is called, properly sin, can be understood from this: that they who have committed sin are called by all, after the action of the sin, properly and formally sinners; likewise they are said to be in sin, to have sin, to be cleansed from sin, etc. Now although that which remains after the action is in some manner the effect of the same action, yet it is also in some manner the same with the action itself; and therefore it is called sin not by the figure of metonymy, but properly; and that twofold signification of sin is not the signification of two things, or of two sins, but of one and the same, standing now in one way, now in another. For as heating, and the heat acquired through the heating, are not two heats, but one — which is called heating while it is being acquired and made, but heat while, made and acquired, it remains — so also the perversion or crookedness of sin, as it is in motion, is called sin in the former signification; but as it remains in the soul of the one sinning, it is called sin in the latter signification. For as he who is turned away from the sun remains turned away, in darkness, until he turn back again to the sun; and he who withdraws from someone remains at that distance until he again draw near: so also he who through sin is turned away from God and withdraws, not only while he sins, but also after he has sinned, remains turned away from God and set far off, until through penance he be converted and return to God.
It is to be known, second, that these various significations of sin are acknowledged by all in actual and personal sin, but not likewise in the original. But since original sin is no less properly and truly sin than the personal, there is no reason why we should fear to extend them also to the original. Since, then, we see that in a newly born boy there is nothing which can be called sin in the former signification — seeing that in him the will is empty of all action — certainly sin in the former signification is to be sought not in us, but only in the first origin, that is, in the first parent. Nor is it, beyond doubt, anything else than that disobedience voluntarily committed by him, through which he despoiled himself and his posterity of original justice, made them guilty of death, and rendered them base and hateful to God. And so sin in the former signification is one only, of all men; but in Adam it is called actual and personal, in us original. For he alone committed it with an actual will; to us it is truly communicated through generation, in that manner in which what has passed can be communicated — namely, by imputation. For it is imputed to all who are born of Adam, since all of us, existing in the loins of Adam, sinned in him and through him when he sinned. And to this sin Catharinus and Pighius looked, nor on this account are they worthy of reprehension; for this they were right to say — but the other thing they should not have kept silent, which they did keep silent. For we say moreover that, as in Adam, besides the act of that sin, there was also a perversion of the will and a crookedness left from the action, through which he was properly and formally called, and was, a sinner, until it was remitted to him through penance; so also in all of us, when first we begin to be men, besides the imputation of the disobedience of Adam, there is also a like perversion and crookedness inhering in each, through which we are properly and formally called sinners, until through baptism such iniquity be remitted; but that this crookedness in Adam was personal sin in the latter signification, in us original sin, likewise in the latter signification. And to this looked St. Anselm, in the book On the Virginal Conception, chapter 3 [al. 27]; St. Thomas, in 1-2, question 82, article 3; St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel, and others on 2 Sentences, distinction 30, who would have the sin of origin to be the lack of original justice owed to its being present.
It is to be known, third, that the authors cited agree in this: that original sin is the lack of original justice owed to its being present; yet in the manner of explaining they do not altogether agree among themselves. For the privation of that gift seems to be rather punishment than fault; and therefore they all labor to show how it is sin, and some say one thing, some another. Certain judge that original sin is the lack of original justice together with the unworthiness of having it — yet so that formally the sin consists in that unworthiness, which they are also wont to call guilt. For they say that Adam, through the act of sin, was made unworthy of the gift of justice, and therefore was justly deprived of it; and likewise that all the posterity of Adam, because they sinned in Adam, are unworthy of the grace of God, and worthy of hatred and punishment; and because they are unworthy of grace, and worthy of hatred and punishment, therefore original justice is not infused into them by God, which otherwise would have been infused. Others hold that the lack of original justice is sin because Adam ought to have preserved that most excellent gift for himself and for us; which because he did not do, he was made guilty, and made us all guilty of that lost gift. Others seem to be of this opinion: that the lack of original justice is called sin because through it, as through its primary effect, the action itself of the first sin remains in us, and makes us sinners. Others teach that by original justice can be understood both the gift itself infused by God, and the rectitude of the will and subjection to God which was effected through that gift; and that original sin is the lack of original justice as by that name is signified not the gift infused by God, but the rectitude and subjection of the will. Others, finally, define original sin as the very lack of the divine gift effected through the act of sin, or flowing from that action. Which last opinion seems to us most true, and has as its author, above the rest, St. Thomas, in 1-2, question 82, article 3, where he teaches that the formal element in the sin of origin is the privation of the original justice which subjected the will to God.
If, then, anyone ask of us what original sin properly is, we shall answer with a distinction, in this manner. If sin be taken for the action fighting with the law, original sin is the first disobedience of Adam, committed by Adam himself — not as he was a singular person, but as he bore the person of the whole human race. But if sin be taken for that which resides in the man after the action, and whence the same man is named not sinning, but a sinner, original sin is the lack of the gift of original justice — or the habitual aversion and crookedness of the will — which can also be called the stain rendering the mind hateful to God.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVII. Explicatur vera sententia de natura peccati originis. Restat, ut erroribus refutatis ad explican¬ dam veram sententiam accedamus. Sciendum igitur est 'peccati nomen bifa¬ riam accipi solere. Uno modo pro libera transgressione praecepti; alio modo pro eo quod remanet in anima peccatoris post ac¬ tionem illam transgressionis praecepti. Nam quod actio ipsa, qua praeceptum transgredi¬ mur, et sit, et dicatur proprie peccatum, nemo est, qui neget, et perspicuum est ex definitione peccati quae est, dictum, vel factum, vel concupitura, etc. Quod autem post actionem peccati aliquid maneat, quod sit, et dicatur proprie peccatum, ex eo po¬ test intelligi, quod qui peccatum commise¬ runt, dicuntur ab omnibus post actionem peccati, proprie, et formaliter peccatores ; item dicuntur esse in peccato, habere pec¬ catum, mundari a peccato etc. Quamvis autem id quod remanet post ac¬ tionem, sit aliquo modo effectus ejusdem actionis, tamen est etiam aliquo modo idem cum ipsa actione, et ideo non per figuram metonymise, sed proprie dicitur peccatum ; et duplex illa significatio peccati non est sig¬ nificatio duarum rerum, sive duorum pecca¬ torum, sed unius et ejusdem alio atque alio modo se habentis. Quemadmodum enim ca¬ lefactio, et calor per calefactionem acquisi¬ tus, non sunt duo calores, sed unus, qui calefactio dicitur dum acquiritur, et fit; ca¬ lor autem dum factus et acquisitus perma¬ net : sic etiam peccati perversio, sive obli¬ quitas, ut est in motu, dicitur peccatum in priore significatione; ut autem permanet in anima peccantis, dicitur peccatum in signi¬ ficatione posteriore. Nam sicut qui a sole avertitur, manet aversus in tenebris, ^lonec ad solem iterum revertatur ; et qui ab aliquo recedit, manet in ea distantia, donec itenim accedat ; sic etiam qui per peccatum a Deo avertitur et recedit, non solum dum peccat, sed etiam postquam peccavit, manet a Deo aversus, et longe dissitus, donec per poe¬ nitentiam convertatur et revertatur ad Deum. Sciendum est secundo, has varias peccati significationes in peccato actuali, et perso¬ nali ab omnibus agnosci ; non item in origi¬ nali. Sed cum originale peccatum non minus proprie, et vere sit peccatum, quam perso¬ nale : nihil est cur timeamus etiam ad origi¬ nale illas extendere. Igitur cum videamus in puero recens nato nihil esse, quod pecca¬ tum in priore significatione dici possit, quippe in quo voluntas ab omni actione va¬ cat ; certe peccatum in priore significatione non in nobis, sed in prima tantum origine, id est, in primo parente quaerendum est. Nec est aliud haud dubio , quam inobedientia illa voluntarie ab eo commissa, perquam se, et suos posteros justitia originali spoliavit, reos mortis effecit, turpes et invisos Deo reddidit. Itaque peccatum in priore significatione unum est duntaxat omnium hominum , sed in Adamo actuale et personale , in nobis originale dicitur. Solus enim ipse actuali voluntate illud commisit : nobis vere com¬ municatur per generationem eo modo, quo communicari potest id quod transiit, nimi¬ rum per imputationem. Omnibus enim im¬ putatur, qui ex Adamo nascuntur, quoniam omnes in lumbis Adami existentes in eo, et per eum peccavimus, cum ipse peccavit. Et ad hoc peccatum Catharinus et Pighius respexerunt, neque propter hoc reprehen¬ sione digni sunt. Hoc enim oportuit dicere, sed aliud non tacere, quod ipsi tacuerunt : nos en’m praeterea dicimus, quemadmodum in Adamo praeter actum illius peccati fuit etiam peiversio voluntatis et obliquitas ex actione relicta, per quam peccator proprie, et formaliter dicebatur et erat, donec ei per poenitentiam i emitteretur : ita quoque in omnibus nobis, cum primum homines esse incipimus, praeter imputationem inobedien- tiae Adami, esse etiam similem perversionem et obliquitatem unicuique inhaerentem, per quam peccatores proprie et formaliter dici¬ mur, donec per baptismum talis iniquitas remittatur ; sed hanc obliquitatem in Adamo fuisse personale peccatum in posteriore sig¬ nificatione ; in nobis originale in posteriore etiam significatione. Atque huc respexerunt S. Anselmus in lib. de conceptu virginali cap. 3. S. Thoraas in i. 2. quaest. 82. art. 3. S. Bonaventura, Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel et alii in 2. sent. dist. 30. qui peccatum originis esse volue¬ runt carentiam justitiae originalis debitae in esse. Sciendum est tertio, auctores citatos con- CAPUT XVIII. 447 venire in eo, quod peccatum originale sit ca¬ rentia justitiae originalis debitae in esse; ta¬ men in modo explicandi non omnino inter se convenire. Videtur enim privatio doni illius esse potius poena quam culpa, et ideo labo¬ rant omnes ut ostendant quomodo sit pecca¬ tum, et alii alia dicunt. Quidam existimant, peccatum originale esse carendam justitiae originalis cum indig¬ nitate illam habendi, ita tamen, ut forma- liter , peccatum consistat in illa indignitate , quam etiam reatum appellare solent. Dicunt enim Adamum per actum peccati factum esse indignum dono justitiae, et ideo juste illo fuisse privatum : et similiter omnes po¬ steros Adae, quia peccaverunt in Adamo, indignos esse gratia Dei, et dignos odio et poena ; quia vero indigni sunt gratia et odio, ac poena digni, ideo non infundi illis justi¬ tiam originalem a Deo, quae alioqui infusa fuisset. Alii sentiunt, carentiam justitiae originalis esse peccatum, quia debuit Adam sibi, et nobis donum illud praestantissimum conser¬ vare, quod quia non fecit, reus factus est, et nos omnes reos fecit doni illius amissi. Alii in ea sententia esse videntur, ut ca¬ rentia justitiae originalis dicatur peccatum quia per eam tanquam per effectum suum primarium actio ipsa primi peccati in nobis manet, et peccatores nos efficit. Alii docent, per justitiam originalem in- telligi posse tum ipsum donum a Deo infu¬ sum, tum rectitudinem voluntatis, et subje¬ ctionem ad Deum, quae per donum illud efficiebatur ; et quidem peccatum originale esse carentiam justitiae originalis , ut eo no¬ mine significatur non donum a Deo infusum, sed rectitudo et subjectio voluntatis. Alii denique carentiam ipsam doni divini per actum peccati effectam, sive ex actione illa manante, peccatum originale esse defi¬ niunt. Quae sententia postrema nobis veris¬ sima esse videtur, et auctorem habet, praeter caeteros, S. Thomam in i. 2. quaest. 82. art. 3. ubi docet, formale in peccato originis esse privationem justitiae originalis, quae vo¬ luntatem subjiciebat Deo. Si quis igitur a nobis quaerat, quid pro¬ prie sit originale peccatum, respondebimus cum distinctione ad hunc modum. Si pecca¬ tum pro actione cum lege pugnante acci¬ piatur ; peccatum originale est prima Adami inodedientia ab ipso Adamo commissa, non ut erat singularis persona, sed ut personam totius generis humani gerebat. Si vero pecca¬ tum accipiatur pro eo quod residet in homi¬ ne post actionem, ef unde idem homo non peccans, sed peccator nominatur ; peccatum originale est carentia doni justitiae originalis, sive habitualis aversio, et obliquitas volun¬ tatis, quae et macula mentem Deo invisam reddens appellari potest.