Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 18: The opinion explained in the preceding chapter is proved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
That we may more conveniently prove, part by part, the opinion now explained, two propositions must be laid down.
The first proposition: the first transgression of Adam, which was the transgression of the whole human race, is original sin, if sin be taken for the action. It is proved, first, from the divine writings, Romans 5: In whom all have sinned. From which place we understand that we all not only are born sinners, but also at some time sinned — which the same Apostle teaches, Romans 3, when he says: All have sinned, and do need the glory of God. But because it is certain that none of us sinned by his own will before we were born, as that same blessed Paul testifies, Romans 9, it follows that we sinned by another's will — that is, Adam's; which will, nevertheless, had it not been in some manner the will of the whole nature, and thereby also ours, we should in no way truly be said to have sinned. We sinned, then, in the first man when he sinned, and that his transgression was also our transgression. The same is proved by those words of the same chapter 5 to the Romans: By the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners. And: By the offence of one, unto all men to condemnation. For we should not truly be made sinners by the disobedience of Adam, unless his disobedience were also our disobedience, and from it had flowed that stain and perversion which inheres in us; nor should we all justly be condemned by the offence of one, unless that offence had been common to all. And from these things the arguments of Catharinus and Pighius sought from the Scriptures remain solved. For they adduce the places of the Apostle already cited; which nevertheless do not prove that there is nothing in us which can be called sin besides the imputation of the sin of Adam, but only prove what we have said: that that disobedience of Adam pertains also to us, and that from it flowed the stain which truly cleaves to each as his own.
Secondly, the same proposition is proved by the testimonies of the holy Fathers. St. Augustine, book 1 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 10: “Certainly it is manifest that the sins proper to each are one thing — in which they only sin whose sins they are — and this one is another, in which all sinned, when all were that one man.” The same, in the same work, book 3, chapter 7: “Whence neither can that be clearly said — that the sin of Adam harmed even those not sinning — since Scripture says, In whom all have sinned. Nor are those sins so called others' as though they pertained not at all to the little ones. For in Adam all then sinned, when, in that nature implanted in him whereby he could beget them, they were all still that one man; but they are called others' because they were not yet living their own lives, but whatever was to be in the future offspring the life of the one man contained.” The same, book 16 of the City of God, chapter 27, explaining that of Genesis 17 — The male, whose flesh of his foreskin shall not be circumcised, that soul shall be destroyed out of his people: because he hath broken my covenant — says: “These divine words are to be understood as if it were said: He who shall not have been regenerated, that soul shall perish from his people, because he hath broken my covenant — when in Adam, with all, he too sinned.” The same, in epistle 23 to Boniface: “He drew, then, the guilt, because he was one with him and in him from whom he drew it, when that which he drew was committed.” The same, in epistle 89 to Hilary, question 3, and book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 13, says that little ones are born guilty of that sin which Adam committed; and on Psalm 118, discourse 25, and book 2 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 11, he says that even little ones are contained among the transgressors of whom David says, I have accounted all the sinners of the earth prevaricators — because they transgressed the law in paradise with the first parent. And so of the opinion of blessed Augustine there can be no doubt. Nor are dissimilar things found in the other Fathers. St. Basil, oration 1 on Fasting: “Adam received the first commandment: of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil ye shall not eat.” And presently: “Since we did not fast, we fell out of paradise.” Where he says that we did not fast, because with Adam we ate the forbidden fruit. St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the oration on the Birthday of the Lord: “But after that, by the envy of the devil and the transgression of the woman — alas for my weakness! for mine was that of the first parent — man forgot the commandment given, and succumbed to the bitter taste, and is driven at once both from the tree of life and from God, on account of his depravity.” St. Ambrose, on chapter 15 of Luke: “Adam was, and in him we all were. Adam perished, and in him all perished.” St. Bernard, sermon 1 on the first Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, speaking of the original fault: “It is another's, because in Adam we all sinned unknowing; it is ours, because, though in another, yet we sinned, and it was imputed to us by the just, though hidden, judgment of God.”
Lastly, the same proposition can be proved by a most evident reason. For unless we posit that we truly sinned in Adam and with Adam, it can by no reasoning be explained how in little ones newly born there is any true fault; and this Catholic dogma will seem not so much above reason as against reason. For whatever we say cleaves in little ones from the sin of Adam — whether guilt, or aversion, or privation of grace, or anything else — that can in no way be reckoned to the little ones as their fault, nay, cannot even be, unless it proceeded from a free action of which action they were in some manner partakers. And the guilt indeed, since it is a relation following an action, by what reasoning can it exist in one who is not a partaker of the action? And a habitual aversion, unless an actual one preceded, cannot even be understood. For if God, by his absolute power, despoiled a just man of grace, without any actual fault of his, by the mere good pleasure of his will, that man would indeed lack the habitual conversion to God which the habit of grace effected; but he would not for that reason be said to be turned away from God, but only not turned toward him — just as, if God now produced some man from nothing and did not infuse into him the habit of grace, that man would not have conversion to God, but neither aversion, but only non-conversion, which in no way deserves the name of fault. But let us feign that some little one has the aversion and the guilt, and yet did not sin with the first parent: who will be able to grasp that he ought deservedly to be reprehended and punished? What fault has he in this, that he was so generated? Could he hinder his being so begotten? And what certain men say — that whether sin ought to be voluntary or not is a question of its origin, not of its essence, and that therefore, from wheresoever true sin arise, provided it be present, it can be imputed to him in whom it is present — is altogether improbable. For every true sin has essentially an order to a free will — so that, if it be born from elsewhere than from a free will, it is not true sin. For why is blasphemy in a madman, or a parrot, judged not to be sin, except because it does not draw its origin from a free will? And so, whether sin ought to be voluntary is a question not only of the cause, but also of the essence; nor can that in any way be imputed unto fault which in no way proceeded from a free will. And what others say — that sin in newly born little ones is voluntary by the habitual will of the little ones, because they bear no contrary choice of will, and that thus it is true sin even without relation to the sin of Adam — is no less improbable. For that little ones bear no contrary choice of will is not their fault, nor is it voluntary to them, since it is not in their power. Wherefore it cannot rightly be said that sin is voluntary to little ones by a habitual will through this alone, that they bear no contrary choice of will. Finally, it is not enough for fault that something be voluntary by a habitual will; but it is required that it have proceeded from an act that was also voluntary; otherwise that voluntary-by-habitual-will thing would be natural, and worthy of mercy, not of reprehension. Certainly, if someone were created in pure natural endowments, he would both lack grace and the habitual conversion to God, and would have flesh lusting against reason, and would bear no contrary choice of will; and yet he would neither be called, nor be, truly and properly a sinner. Wherefore St. Augustine, when he asks whence original sin is voluntary, never recurs to the habitual will of the little one, but to the will of Adam, in whom all sinned — as in book 1 of the Retractations, chapters 13 and 15, and book 2 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapters 26 and 28. Let it stand, then, as we said above: that there cannot be in little ones anything which has the notion of fault, unless they too were partakers of the transgression of Adam.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVIII. Probatur sententia in superiori capite explicata. Ut sententiam jam explicatam per partes commodius probemus. Duae propositiones statuendae erunt. Prima propositio, prima Adami praevari¬ catio, quae totius humani generis praevari¬ catio fuit, peccatum est originale, si pecca¬ tum pro actione accipiatur. Probatur, primo ex divinis litteris, Rornan. v : In quo omnes peccaverunt (I). Ex quo loco intelligimus, nos omnes non solum nasci peccatores, sed etiam aliquando peccavisse , quod idem Apostolus docet ftoman, iii. cum ait : Omnes peccave¬ runt , et egent gloria Dei (2). Sed quia cer¬ tum est, neminem nostrum peccavisse pro¬ pria voluntate, antequam nati essemus, ut ipse idem B. Paulus testatur, Rom. ix, se¬ quitur ut peccaverimus aliena voluntate, id est, Adami : quae tamen voluntas nisi fuisset aliquo modo totius naturae, ac per hoc etiam nostra, nullo modo vere peccavis¬ se diceremur. Peccavimus igitur in primo homine, quando ille peccavit, et illa ejus praevaricatio nostra etiam praevaricatio fuit. Idem probant illa verba ejusdem cap. 5. ad Roman. : Per unius inobedientiam pecca¬ tores constituti sunt multi. Et : Unius delicto in omnes homines in condemnationem (3). Non enim vere per Adami inobedientiam consti¬ tueremur peccatores, nisi inobedientia illius ' nostra etiam inobedientia esset, et ex illa profluxisset ea macula et perversio, quae in nobis inhaeret Neque juste unius delicto condemnaremur omnes, nisi delictum illud commune fuisset omnibus. Atque ex his so- (1) Rom. V, 12. - (2) Rom. III, 23. - (3) Rom. V, 19. Iut;i manent argumenta Cutharini et Pighii ex Scripturis petita. Adducunt enim loca Apostoli jam citata ; qua; tamen non probant nihil in nobis esse, quod peccatum dici pos¬ sit, praiter imputationem peccati Adami , sed tantum probant quod nos diximus, illam Adami inobedientiam ad nos etiam pertinere, et ex illa fluxisse maculam, qua; unicuique propria vere adlueret. Secundo probatur eadem propositio testi¬ moniis sanctorum Patrum. S. Augustinus lib. i. de peccatorum meritis et remis. cap. 10 : « Certe, inquit, manifestum esi alia esse propria cuique peccata, in quibus hi tantum peccant, quorum peccata sunt ; aliud hoc unum, in quo omnes peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus homo fuerunt. » Idem in eodem opere lib. m. cap. 7. « Unde nec illud liquide dici potest, quod peccatum A da; etiam non peccantibus nocuit, cum Scriptura dicat, in quo omnes peccaverunt. Nec sic di¬ cuntur ista aliena peccata, tanquam omnino ad parvulos non pertineant. Siquidem in Adam omnes tunc peccaverunt, quando in ejus natura illa insita, in qua eos gignere poterat, adhuc omnes ille unus fuerunt ; sed dicuntur aliena, quia nondum ipsi agebant vitas proprias ; sed quidquid erat in futura propagine, vita unius hominis continebat. » Idem lib. xvi. de Civ. Dei cap. 27. explicans illud Gen. xvii ; Masculus , cujus caro praeputii circumcisa non fuerit, peribit anima illa de populo suo, quia testamentum meum dissipavit. Intelligenda, inquit, « sunt luce divina ver¬ ba, tanquam dictum sit : Qui non fuerit re¬ generatus, interibit anima illa de genere suo, quia testamentum meam dissipavit , quando in Adam cum omnibus, et ipse pec¬ cavit. » Idem in epistol. 23. ad Bonifacium : « Traxit ergo reatum, quia unus erat cum illo et in illo, a quo traxit, ‘quando quod traxit admissum est. » Idem in epistol. 89. ad Hilarium qurest. 3. et lib. i. Retract. c. 13. dicit, parvulos nasci reos illius peccati, quod Adam commisit, et in Ps. cxyiii con- cion. 23. et lib. 2. de nuptiis et concupisc. cap. 11. dicit, etiam parvulos contineri inter prajvaricantes, de quibus ait David : Praeva¬ ricantes reputavi omnes peccatores terrae, quia legem in paradiso cum primo parente trans¬ gressi sunt. Itaque de sententia B. Augustini dubitari non potest. Neque dissimila in aliis patribus inveniuntur, S, Basilius orat, i, de Jejunio ; « Primum, inquit, mandatum accepit Adam, de ligno scientia; boni et mali ne edatis. » Et mox*: « Quandoquidem non jejunavimus, excidimus e paradiso. » Ubi dicit, nos non jejunasse, quia cum Adamo comedimus fru¬ ctum prohibitum. S. Gregorius Nazjanzenus in oratione de natali Domini : « At postquam inquit, diaboli invidia, mulicrisquc trans¬ gressione , proh mea; imbecillitatis ( mea enim fuit primaevi parentis) traditi mandati oblitus homo esf, amaroque succubuit gu¬ stui, pariter et a vita; ligno, et a Deo propter pravitatem extorris agitur. » S. Ambrosius in cap. 13. Luca; : « Fuit, inquit, Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes. Periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt. » S. Bernardus serm. i. de Dominica prima post octavam Epiphania;, loquens de culpa originali : «Aliena, inquit, est, quia in Adam omnes nescientes pecca¬ vimus : nostra, quia et si in alio, nos tamen peccavimus, et nobis justo Dei judicio impu¬ tabatur, licet occulto. » Postremo probari potest eadem propositio evidentissima ratione. Nisi enim ponamus, nos in Adamo, et cum Adamo vere peccasse, nulla ratione explicari poterit, quomodo in parvulis recens natis sit aliqua vera culpa : et hoc Catholicum dogma non tam supra ra¬ tionem, quam contra rationem esse videbitur. Nam quidquid dicamus in parvulis ex pecca¬ to Adami hmrere, sive reatum, sive aversio¬ nem, sive gratia; privationem , sive quid aliud ; illud nullo modo parvulis vitio dari, ac ne esse quidem poterit, nisi processerit ab actione libera, cujus actionis illi aliquo modo participes fuerint Ac reatus quidem cum sit relatio conse¬ quens actionem, qua ratione fieri potest, ut existat in eo qui non est particeps actionis, avei’sio habitualis, nisi preeeesserit actualis, ne intelligi quidem potest. Nam si Deus per absolutam suam potestatem spoliaret homi¬ nem justum gratia, sine ulla ejus culpa ac¬ tuali, solo beneplacito sute voluntatis , care¬ ret ille quidem conversione habituali ad Deum, quam habitus gratia; faciebat; sed non propterea diceretur a Deo aversus, sed tantum non conversus ; quemadmodum si Deus hominem aliquem ex nihilo nunc pro¬ duceret, et gratiae habitum illi non infunde- x*et, non haberet ille convcx-sionem ad Deum, sed neque aversionem, sed tantum non con¬ versionem, qua; nomen culpa; nullo modo meretur. Sed fingamus, parvulum aliquem habere aversionem, et reatum, et tamen non pec¬ casse cuin primo parente, quis capere pote¬ rit. eum merito reprehendi et puniri debere? guam culpam habet in eo, quod ita genera¬ tus est? Nuin impedire potuit, ne sic gigne¬ retur? Quod vero quidam dicunt, an pecca¬ tum debeat osse voluntarium, necne, q mu¬ stionem esse originis, non essentiae, et ideo undecumque verum peccatum oriatur, modo insit, posse imputari ei, in quo inest : om¬ nino improbabile est. Nam omne verum peccatum essentialiter habet ordinem ad voluntatem liberam, ita ut si aliunde quam a libera voluntate nascatur, verum peccatum non sit. Quare enim»blasphemia in furioso, vel psittaco non esse censetur, nisi quia non ducit originem a libera voluntate ? Itaque an peccatum voluntarium esse de¬ beat, non solum causae, sed etiam essentiae, quaestio est; nec ullo modo imputari potest ad culpam, quod nullo modo a libera volun¬ tate processit. Quod autem alii dicunt, pec¬ catum in parvulis recens natis esse volunta¬ rium habituali parvulorum voluntate, quia non gerunt contrarium voluntatis arbitrium, atque ita verum esse peccatum etiam sine relatione ad peccatum Adami, non minus est improbabile. Nam quod parvuli non ge¬ rant contrarium voluntatis arbitrium, non fit culpa ipsorum, neque ipsis est voluntarium, cum non sit in eorum potestate. Quare non potest recte diei parvulis, peccatum esse voluntarium habituali voluntate per hoc so¬ lum, quod non gerunt contrarium voluntatis arbitrium. Denique nor^ satis est ad culpam, ut ali,- quid sit voluntarium habituali voluntate, sed requiritur ut processerit ab actu etiam voluntario : alioquin voluntarium illud, ha¬ bituali volontate, naturale esset, et miseri¬ cordia, non reprehensione dignum. Certe si quis in puris naturalibus crearetur, is et gratia careret, et conversione ad Deum ha¬ bituali, et. carnem concupiscentem contra rationem haberet, nec gereret contrarium voluntatis arbitrium, et tamen vere ac pro¬ prie peccator nec diceretur, nec esset. Qua¬ re S. Augustinus cum quaerit, unde pecca¬ tum originale sit voluntarium , nunquam recurrit ad habitualem parvuli voluntatem, sed ad voluntatem Adami, in quo omnes peccaverunt, ut lib. i. Retractat, cap. 13. et 15. et lib. ii. de nuptiis et concupiscentia cap. 26. et 28. Maneat igitur quod supra diximus, non posse in parvulis aliquid esse, quod habeat culpae rationem, nisi participes fuerint etiam ipsi praevaricationis Adae.