Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 20: Objections are refuted which can be made against the doctrine of the preceding chapter
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Against the things which we have said, certain objections are wont to be made, which we shall briefly dissolve in this chapter.
The first objection: The sin of origin is sin properly so called; but sin properly so called is defined by St. Augustine, book 22 against Faustus, chapter 27, as “something said, or done, or desired against the law of God.” Therefore the sin of origin is something said, or done, or desired against the law of God; but there can be feigned in the sin of origin no other deed, or word, or desire than the deed of the first parent in eating the forbidden food; therefore that alone, and not the privation of original justice, or the habitual aversion, or the stain, is the sin of origin. I answer: this argument is that which led Pighius and Catharinus to believe that the sin of origin is nothing in very deed remaining in us, but only the disobedience of the first parent imputed to us. But it can easily be solved; for sin properly so called is said not only of the passing act itself, but also of that which after it remains in the soul of the sinner, as we showed above — since it is the same malice and perversity which is in the evil act by way of something passing, and in the will by way of something remaining as a habit. Now the definition of St. Augustine belongs to sin as sin signifies the passing act, not as it signifies the remaining stain; for it is in that signification which is better known that sin is wont to be defined.
The second objection: St. Augustine in very many places teaches that what remains after the act of sin is nothing else than the guilt; therefore the sin of origin — as also any other sin whatever — is not the privation of justice, or the habitual aversion, but only the guilt. Book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 26: “This it is not to have sin — not to be guilty of sin. For if anyone, for example's sake, has committed adultery, even if thereafter he never do it, he is guilty of adultery, until his guilt be remitted by pardon. He has, then, the sin, although that which he committed now is not, because it passed away with the time at which it was done. For if to desist from sinning were not to have sin, it would suffice that Scripture admonished us of this: My son, hast thou sinned? do so no more. But it does not suffice; it added: and for thy former sins pray that they may be forgiven thee. They remain, then, unless they be remitted; but how do they remain if they are past, unless because they have passed in act, they remain in guilt?” The same, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 15: “As though, forsooth, the sin which we say they draw originally from Adam — that is, that they are entangled in his guilt, and on that account held liable to punishment,” etc. The same, book 6 against Julian, chapter 8, treats fully of this matter, and at length concludes in these words: “Where, then, does the guilt remain, but in the hidden laws of God, which are written in a certain manner in the minds of the Angels, that no iniquity be unpunished save that which the blood of the Mediator has expiated — by whose sign of the cross the water of Baptism is consecrated, that by it the guilt be washed away, written as it were in a handwriting, in the knowledge of the spiritual powers through whom the punishment of sins is exacted? To this handwriting are born liable all who are born carnally, in the flesh, of the flesh,” etc. I answer: St. Augustine was not solicitous in these places to explain what that is which formally makes a man a sinner, nor how many and what are the things which, the act of sin passing, remain in the sinner; but he wished only to demonstrate that, the act passing, something remains by reason of which remission is necessary. And he took for demonstrating this the guilt itself — both because it is the best-known effect of sin, and also because, until the guilt has been remitted, the sin is never said to be fully and perfectly remitted; and contrariwise, the sin is then judged altogether perfectly remitted when not only the fault, but also all the punishment, has been remitted. But that blessed Augustine did not hold that, the act passing, only the guilt remains, but also the habitual aversion, or the iniquity and stain — that is, the guilt with its foundation — is plain from the tractate on Psalm 50, where he speaks thus: “What is it that he says he was conceived in iniquity, unless that iniquity is drawn from Adam? even that very bond of death was compacted together with that iniquity.” Likewise from book 2 [al. 1] On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 34 [al. 19], where he says of the little one to be baptized: “How can he be converted to God, from whom he is not turned away?” He speaks against the Pelagians, who supposed that little ones are not born iniquitous nor turned away from God. He, then, acknowledges in little ones an iniquity and aversion, on account of which they are guilty, and children of wrath. The same Augustine also everywhere alleges that of Job: No one is clean from filth, not even an infant whose life is of one day upon the earth — as on Psalm 50, book 5 of the Hypognosticon, and elsewhere. From which we understand that not only the guilt, but also the stain of sin, is acknowledged by Augustine.
The third objection: The privation of original justice is the effect and punishment of sin, as St. Thomas teaches, question 5 On Evil, article 4, and 1-2, question 87, article 7; moreover, that privation is from God, who despoils man of that gift, as the same God had clothed man with the same gift in creation; therefore the privation of original justice is not properly and formally the sin of origin — otherwise sin properly and formally would be from God. I answer: original justice had two parts. For it both subjected the mind to God, and the flesh to the spirit. By reason of the former part, the privation of justice is the formal element in the sin of origin; by reason of the latter, the same privation is the material, as the same St. Thomas affirms in 1-2, question 82, article 3; and thereby, by reason of the former part, it is not the effect of original sin, but the sin itself; by reason of the latter, it is the effect. Again, the privation of justice by reason of the former part is not involuntary, but voluntary — for voluntarily did the first man withdraw from God, and turn himself away from him; but by reason of the latter part the privation of justice is involuntary. For who does not bear it ill that the flesh will not obey the spirit? who does not suffer a contumacious servant unwillingly? Wherefore the privation of justice by reason of the latter part can properly be called punishment, but not by reason of the former. For this is the difference between fault and punishment: that every fault is voluntary, but every punishment involuntary. Finally, the gift of justice, by reason of the former part, is not said properly to be taken away by God, but in a certain manner to be cast off and shut out by the man himself. For as he who turns his face from the sun is not said to grow dark because the sun does not shine upon him, but because he himself hinders the light from reaching him, so also that God does not preserve in man the gift of justice is not because God will not, but because man sets the impediment. Wherefore St. Thomas, in question 4 On Evil, article 1, in the response to the eleventh argument, says that that original justice is not now infused into the soul is not on the part of God, but on the part of human nature, in which is found a contrary thing hindering — because, namely, the whole nature in Adam turned itself away from God, and set the impediment to grace. And in 2-2, question 24, article 10 [al. 12], he says that the habit of charity, which is infused and preserved by God alone, is expelled not only demeritoriously, but even effectively, by the act of mortal sin, because the habit of charity cannot stand with such an act. But the gift of original justice, by reason of the latter part, though mediately and consequently it is expelled by the man sinning, yet is said also properly to be taken away by God — both because it could stand together with sin, and because its privation is the just punishment of sin, and every just punishment is from God. Wherefore St. Augustine more than once repeats that, in punishment of the rebellion by which the mind of the first man would not be subjected to God, it was brought about that his flesh was not subjected to the very mind of the man. Book 13 of the City of God, chapter 13: “They felt a new motion of their disobedient flesh, as a reciprocal punishment of their own disobedience.” And book 14, chapter 15: “In the punishment of that sin, what was paid back to disobedience but disobedience?” And book 15, chapter 6: “For this languor is the punishment of the first disobedience.” See to the same sense book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 6, and book 5 against Julian, chapter 3.
The fourth objection: The privation of original justice is the cause of original sin, as St. Thomas teaches in 1-2, question 82, article 2 [al. 1]; therefore it is not the original sin itself. I answer: St. Thomas speaks of the formal cause; and if the formal cause of original sin is the privation of original justice, certainly original sin formally consists in the privation of original justice, as the same St. Thomas teaches in the same question, article 3.
The fifth objection: Original justice is not restored in Baptism, as is known; therefore either Baptism does not take away original sin, or original sin is not the privation of original justice. I answer: Baptism does not restore all the things that pertained to original justice; yet it can absolutely be said to restore original justice, because it restores that gift insofar as it turned the mind to God and made it subject to God. For that was properly called justice, and its privation is properly called injustice.
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CAPUT XX. Refelluntur objectiones quae fieri possunt contra doctrinam capitis superioris. Adversus ea, quae diximus, objectiones quaedam fieri solent, quas breviter in hoc ca¬ pite dissolvemus. Prima objectio. Peccatum originis est pec¬ catum proprie dictum, at peccatum proprie dictum definitur a S. Augustino lib. xxil. contra Faustum cap. 27 : « Dictum, vel fa¬ ctum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei. » Igitur peccatum originis est dictum, vel fa¬ ctum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei : non potest autem fingi in peccato originis aliud dictum, vel concupitum, nisi factum primi parentis in comedendo cibo prohibito; igitur illud solum, non autem privatio justitiae ori¬ ginalis, aut aversio habitualis, vel macula, est peccatum originis. Respondeo : hoc argumentum est id, quod Pighium, et Catharinum adduxit, ut crede¬ rent, peccatum originis nihil esse reipsa in nobis manens, sed tantum inobedientiam primi parentis nobis imputatam. Caeterum facile solvi potest, nam peccatum proprie dictum non solum dicitur de ipso actu tran- seunte, sed etiam de eo, quod post ipsum manet in anima peccatoris, ut supra osten¬ dimus. Siquidem eadem est malitia atque perversitas, qua} est inactu malo per modum transeuntis, et in voluntate per modum ha- ‘bitus permanentis. Definitio autem S. Au¬ gustini convenit peccato, ut peccatum signi¬ ficat actum transeuntem, non ut significat maculam permanentem. In ea enim signifi¬ catione, quae magis est nota, peccatum defi¬ niri solet. Litton v. 452 Secunda objectio. S. Augustinus in plu¬ rimis locis docet id, quod manet post actum peccati, nihil aliud esse, nisi reatum ; igitur peccatum originis, ut etiam aliud quodeum- que peccatum, non est privatio justitia?, vel a versio habitualis, sed tantum reatus. Lib. 1. de nuptiis et concupiscentia cap. 20 : « Hoc est, inquit, non habere peccatum, reum non esse peccati. Nam si quisquam, verbi gra¬ tia, fecerit adulterium, etiamsi nusquam deinceps faciat, reus est adulterii, donec re¬ atus ipsius indulgentia remittatur. Habet ergo peccatum, quamvis illud, quod admisit jam non sit, quia cum tempore, quo factum est, pra?teriit. Nam si a peccando desistere, hoc esset non habere peccatum, sufficeret, ut hoc nos moneret Scriptura, Fili peccasti, non adjicias iterum : non autem sufficit, sed addidit, et de pristinis deprecare, ut tibi di¬ mittantur. Manent ergo, nisi remittantur, sed quomodo manent si praeterita sunt, nisi quia praderierunt actu, manent reatu ? » Idem lib. I . Retractationum cap. 15 : (( Quasi vero, inquit peccatum quod eos ex Adam dicimus originaliter extrahere, id est, reatu ejus implicatos, et ab hoc poenae ob¬ noxios detineri etc. » Idem lib. vi. in Ju¬ lianum cap. 8. fuse de hac re tractat ; et tandem concludit his verbis : « Ubi ergo manet reatus, nisi in occultis legibus Dei, qua? sunt scripta? quodammodo in mentibus Angelorum, ut nulla sit iniquitas impunita, nisi quam sanguis Mediatoris expiaverit, cu¬ jus signo crucis consecratur unda Bapti¬ smatis, ut ea diluatur reatus tanquam in chi¬ rographo, scriptus in notitia spiritualium potestatum, per quas po?na exigitur pecca¬ torum, huic chirographo nascuntur obnoxii omnes in carne de carne carnali ter nati etc. » Respondeo : sanctus Augustinus non fuit sollicitus in his locis, explicare quid illud sit, quod hominem formaliter peccatorem efficit, neque etiam quot sint, et qua?, illa quaetrans- cunte actu peccati remanent in peccatore. Sed illud tantum demonstrare voluit ; trans¬ eunto actu aliquid remanere, ratione cujus remissio sit necessaria. Accepit autem ad hoc demonstrandum, ipsum reatum ; tum quia est effectus peccati notissimus ; tum etiam quia donec reatus non sit remissus, numquam dicitur plene, atque perfecte pec¬ catum remissum. Iit contra, tunc peccatum omnino perfecte censetur remissum, cum non solum culpa, sed etiam omnis poena fu¬ erit remissa. Non sensisse autem B. Augustinum, trans¬ eunto actu, manere solum reatum, sed etiam aversionem habitualem, sive iniquitatem et maculam, hoc est, reatum cum suo funda¬ mento, perspicuum est ex tract. in Psalm. l. ubi sic loquitur : « Quid est, quod se di¬ cit in iniquitate conceptum, nisi quia tra¬ hitur iniquitas ex Adam ? etiam ipsum vin¬ culum mortis cum ipsa iniquitate concretum est. » Item ex lib. ii. de peccatorum meritis et remissione cap. 34. ubi de parvulo bapti¬ zando ait : « Quomodo converti ad Deum potest, a quo non est aversus? » loquitur contra Pclagianos, qui existimabant, parvu¬ los non nasci iniquos neque a Deo aversos. Ipse igitur in parvulis iniquitatem et aversi¬ onem agnoscit, ob quam rei sunt, et ira? filii. Idem quoque Augustjnus passim allegat illud Job : Non est mundus a sorde, nec in fons cu¬ jus est unius diei vita super terram, ut in Psalm. i,, lib. v. Hypognostici, et alibi. Ex quo intclligimus non solum reatum, sed e- tiam maculam peccati, ab Augustino agnosci. Tertia objectio. Privatio justitia? originalis est effectus et poena peccati, ut S. Tliomas docet qufest. 5. de malo, art. 4. et 1. 2. qua?st. 87. art. 7. praeterea ista privatio est a Deo, qui hominem spoliat dono isto, sicut ipse idem Deus eodem dono hominem in creatione vestierat : non igitur privatio ju¬ stitia? originalis est proprie ac formaliter pec¬ catum originis : alioqui peccatum proprie et formaliter esset a Deo. Respondeo : Justitia originalis duas paries habebat. Nam et subjiciebat mentem Deo, et carnem spiritui. Ratione prioris partis pri¬ vatio justitia? est formale in peccato originis. Ratione posterioris eadem privatio est mate¬ riale, ut idem S. Tliomas affirmat in 1. 2. qua?st. 82. art. 3. ac per hoc ratione prioris partis non est, effectus peccati originalis, sed ipsum peccatum. Ratione posterioris est ef¬ fectus. Rursus privatio justitia? ratione prio¬ ris partis non est involuntaria, sed volunta¬ ria ; voluntarie siquidem primus homo a Deo recessit, atque ab eo se avertit : at ra¬ tione posterioris partis privatio justitiae invo¬ luntaria est. Quis enim non moleste fert, quod caro spiritui obtemperare nolit? Quis contumacem servum non invitus patitur? Quare privatio justitia? ratione posterioris partis proprie poena dici potest, non item ra¬ tione prioris. Hoc enim interest inter culpam et poenam, quod culpa omnis voluntaria, om¬ nis autem poena involuntaria est, CAPUT XX, Denique donum justitiae ratione prioris partis non dicitur proprie a Deo tolli, sed ab ipso homine projici quodammodo, et ex¬ cludi; ut enim is, qui a sole avertit faciem, non dicitur tenebrescere, quia sol non luceat super cum, sed quia ipse prohibet ne lumen ad se perveniat, sic etiam quod Deus non conservet in homine donum justitia}, non est quia Deus nolit, sed quia homo impedimen¬ tum ponif. Quocirca S. Thomas in quaest. 4. de malo art. t . in responsione ad 1 1 . argu¬ mentum, dicit, quod anima; non infundatur nunc originalis justitia, non esse ex parte Dei, sed ex parte naturae humante, in qua invenitur contrarium prohibens. Quia nimi¬ rum tota natura in Adamo avertit se a Deo, et impedimentum gratia} posuit. Et in 2. 2. qutest. 24. art. 10. dicit, habitum charitatis, qui a solo Deo infunditur et conservatur, ex¬ pelli non solum demeritorie, sed etiam ef¬ fective ab actu peccati mortalis, quia cum lali actu consistere non potest habitus chari¬ tatis. At donum justitia} originalis ratione partis posterioris, licet mediate et consequenter expellatur ab homine peccante, tamen dici¬ tur etiam proprie tolli a Deo, tum quia pos¬ set consistere cum peccato, tum quia ejus privatio justa est poma peccati, et omnis justa poena est a Deo. Quare S. Augustinus non semel repetit, in p cenam rebellionis, qua mens primi hominis Deo subjici noluit, factum esse ut ipsi menti hominis non subji¬ ceretur caro ejus. Lib. xm. de civit. Dei cap. 453 13 : « Senserunt, inquit, novum motum ino- beclientis carnis suce, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedienticc suce. » Et lib. xiv. cap. Io : « In illius peccati perna quid ino- bedientkc nisi inobedientia retributa est. » Et lib. xv. cap. 6 : « Languor est quippe iste inobedienticc primee supplicium. » Vide in eamdem sententiam lib. i. de nuptiis et concupiscentia cap. U. et lib. v. in Juliau. cap. 3. Quarta objectio. Justitia} originalis priva¬ tio est causa peccati originalis, ut S. Thomas docet in 1. 2. qucesl. 82. art. 2. non igitur est ipsum originale peccatum. Respondeo : loquitur S. Thomas de causa formali, et si causa formalis peccati origina¬ lis est privatio justitiae originalis, certe pec¬ catum originale formaliter in privatione ju¬ stitia} originalis consistit, ut -idem S. Thomas docet in ead m quaest. art. 3. Quinta objectio. Justitia originalis non re¬ stituitur in Baptismo, ut notum est ; igitur aut Baptismus non tollit originale peccatum, aut peccatum originale non est privatio ju¬ stitia} originalis. Respondeo : Non restituit Baptismus om¬ nia quae ad originalem justitiam pertine¬ bant : tamen absolute dici potest, originalem justitiam restituere ; quia restituit illud do¬ num, quatenus mentem convertebat ad Deum, et subjectam faciebat Deo. Id enim proprie dicebatur justitia, et ejus privatio proprie dicitur injustitia. CONTROVERSIARUM I)E AMISSIONE GRATliE SIVE DE STATU PECCATI