Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 19: The other part of the same opinion is proved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The second proposition: the privation of the gift of original justice, insofar as it is the aversion of the mind from God remaining by way of a habit, is original sin, if sin be taken for that which remains when the act has passed, and whence the man has it that he is properly and formally said to be a sinner. This proposition is proved, first, from the refutation of the other opinions which we numbered in the preceding chapter.
For that first opinion, which constituted the essence of original sin in the unworthiness, or guilt, does not seem probable. Both because that unworthiness is a certain relation, and a positive thing; but the sin whence a man is formally and properly called a sinner is not a relation, nor a positive thing, but a privation — since every sin is an evil, and every evil is the privation of a good. And because unworthiness is not the death of the soul, nor iniquity, nor malice, nor foulness, but a relation following all these; but the sin of origin, according to the Scriptures and the Councils, is the death of the soul, iniquity, malice, foulness; and therefore men have need, on account of this sin, to be born again, justified, purged, etc.
The second opinion, which set the sin of origin in the transgression of a precept about preserving the gift of justice, seems adverse to the Scriptures and to reason. For the Scriptures, according to the common explication of the ancient Fathers, hand down that the sin of the first man which is propagated to posterity through generation was nothing else than that disobedience by which the precept about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was violated. And reason shows the same: for Adam neither had a singular precept about preserving the gift of justice, nor by free will chose to lose that gift — as he in very truth had a singular precept about not eating of the tree of knowledge, and by free will chose to touch that tree and eat. Finally, because the gift of grace is lost through the transgression of any precept whatever, there was no need that any singular precept, distinct from the rest, should be given about preserving grace; but it was enough that it be implicitly contained in all. And so the guilt of the lost grace is not a sin distinct from the rest — otherwise everyone who sinned would always commit two sins — but is one and the same with the transgression of the other precepts.
The third opinion, which would have original sin to be the privation of original justice insofar as through it, as through its primary effect, the action of the first sin resides in the soul, can be both false and true. For if it will have the privation of original justice to be the effect of the sin in such wise that it is not also itself truly and properly sin, it manifestly conflicts with the Council of Trent, nor can it be distinguished from the opinion of Catharinus, which we rejected above. But if it say that the privation of justice is the effect of the first sin — not that it is not itself truly and properly sin, but because it would not be truly sin unless it proceeded from the action of sin — then the opinion is most true, and dissents in no way from ours.
The fourth opinion, which said that the privation of original justice is sin as justice is taken for the rectitude of the will, not for the gift infused by God into the will, can likewise be false and true. For if it altogether exclude the privation of the gift infused by God from the formal notion of original sin, it will conflict with the Council of Trent, in which, as the formal cause of the justification of the impious is defined to be the grace infused by God, as will be demonstrated in its place, so also the formal element of sin is signified to be the privation of the same grace. Wherefore the same Council, session 5, says that the sin is the death of the soul. But what is the death of the soul but the privation of grace — since the life of the soul, by the consent of all, is grace itself? But if the authors of this fourth opinion do not exclude from the notion of original sin the privation of the gift divinely infused, but wish to warn that the privation of the justice infused by God, precisely taken, is not sin, since it can happen even without any sin, but is then at last sin when it proceeds from an actual aversion — they hold altogether the same as St. Thomas holds, and as we set down in the conclusion. The privation, then, of the gift of original justice is called original sin insofar as it is the same with the habitual aversion from God. For as the soul, or the will, endowed with that gift, is said to be turned toward God, and habitually just; so also, deprived of that gift, it is called not turned, and not just; and if it has itself turned itself away from God, and shut out that gift, it will with the best right be called averse and unjust.
It is proved, second, because of all the things that remain in the soul of the sinner, the act of sin passing, there is nothing which can have the proper notion of sin except the privation of justice, or the aversion and stain, which are one and the same. There remains in the soul of the sinner, first, a certain order to the preceding act, or the privation of innocence, which is set in this: that one has never sinned. Second, the guilt of fault, which is the worthiness of hatred, unworthiness of grace, and desert of punishment. Third, the guilt of punishment — that is, the ordination, or obligation, to paying the punishment. Fourth, the offense, or enmity, of him who through the sin was injured. Fifth, the disposition, or acquired habit. Sixth, the aversion, or crookedness of the will, remaining by way of a habit: for as he who turns his face from the sun remains turned away until he turn his face again to the same sun; and a finger bent of its own accord retains its bentness until it be straightened again through a contrary act: so also the will, which through the act of sin withdrew from God, remains in that withdrawal until through penance it again draw near to God. Seventh, the privation of grace, or of the justice infused by God. Eighth, the stain and foulness, which arises from the privation of the divine brightness and light. Of all these, the order to the preceding act is not properly sin; for it does not make the man have sin, but have had it, and be unable not to have had it. Wherefore that order remains even after the sin is remitted, nor can it by any means be blotted out; for innocence once lost can be repaired by no power. The guilt of fault — that is, the worthiness of hatred, unworthiness of grace, and desert of punishment — is not properly sin, but an effect necessarily following, and something remaining after the act of sin. For a man is not worthy of hatred precisely because he sinned; otherwise such worthiness could never be taken away, and sin would be irremissible, since it cannot be that he who has sinned should not have sinned. That worthiness of hatred, then, follows either the deformity, or the remaining crookedness, or the damage done and not yet repaired; and thus it is not sin, but an affect of sin. Moreover, such worthiness or unworthiness is not something receding from the law, is not voluntary, does not deform or spiritually slay the soul, is not the privation of a good, nor has anything else of the things that properly belong to sin. The guilt of punishment — whether it be called the desert, or the obligation, or even the ordination to punishment — is much less sin than the guilt of fault. For the obligation and ordination to punishment arise from the desert and worthiness of punishment, and are from God obligating and ordaining him who sinned to pay the punishment. Wherefore the guilt of punishment is so far from being sin that it is rather something good, instituted by God for reforming and restoring the order of justice which the fault had disturbed. The offense too seems not properly to be sin, since it is in him who through the sin was injured, not in him who injured. The disposition, or acquired habit, is a vice, not a sin; for it is both a positive quality, and oftentimes remains after the fault is remitted. There remains, then, the habitual aversion, to be properly the sin. For as actual sin is an actual aversion from God and his law, so habitual sin is a habitual aversion from God and his law; and as actual sin is the privation of actual rectitude, so habitual sin is the privation of habitual rectitude, which is the habit of grace; and as actual sin is voluntary by an actual will, so habitual sin is voluntary by a habitual will. From which we understand that there is much difference between a vicious habit acquired through repeated acts, and habitual sin. For the acquired habit is a positive quality; habitual sin is a privation. Likewise, the acquired habit cannot be taken away through one act of the will, however most efficacious; habitual sin, as it is made by one act, so by one act is taken away. Again, the acquired habit can be even very intense together with a contrary act, and with the grace of God; habitual sin cannot, at least by the ordinary power. Finally, the acquired habit cannot properly be called voluntary, since it remains in us for some time with us unwilling and resisting; habitual sin is voluntary, because we voluntarily remain in the sin, and if we efficaciously will not to remain, we do not remain. And so habitual sin differs from the acquired habit as he who remains bent because he wills so to remain differs from him who from habituation is so bent that he cannot be straightened except with great difficulty. Yet because habitual sin is not voluntary except habitually, therefore it can remain even in one sleeping, in a madman, in an infant. Further, the privation of grace, and the stain — which were the two last of the things we said are left in the soul of the sinner from the act of sin — do not differ in reality from the habitual aversion. For since the grace of God, inhering in the will by way of a habit, makes it formally turned toward God, just, upright, and beautiful, its privation makes the same will habitually averse, unjust, crooked, and deformed. See St. Thomas and Cajetan, in 1-2, question 86 [al. 80], article 2.
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CAPUT XIX. Probatur altera pars ejusdem sententiv , Secunda propositio. Privatio doni justitiae originalis quatenus est aversio mentis a Deo per modum habitus manens, peccatum est originale, si peccatum accipiatur pro eo quod remanet transeunte actu, et unde habet homo, ut proprie et formalitcr peccator esse dica¬ tur. Probatur haec propositio primo ex refu¬ tatione aliarum sententiarum, quas numera¬ vimus capite superiore. Nam prima illa sententia, quae peccati ori¬ ginalis essentiam in indignitate, seu reatu constituebat, non videtur probabilis. Tum quia indignitas illa relatio quaedam est, ac res positiva ; peccatum autem, unde homo formaliter et proprie peccator dicitur, non est relatio , nec res positiva, sed privatio. Siquidem omne peccatum est nudum, omne autem malum est privatio boni. Tum quia indignitas non est mors animae, nec iniquitas nec malitia, nec fceditas, sed relatio conse¬ quens ista omnia; at peccatum originis juxta Scripturas et Concilia, mors est anima), ini¬ quitas, malitia, foeditas : et ideo necesse ha- hent homines propter hoc peccatum renasci, justificari, purgari elc. Altera sententia, qua? peccatum originis poneb.at in praevaricatione praecepti de dono justitia) conservando, videtur adversari Scri¬ ptulis et rationi. Scriptura) siquidem juxta communem veterum Patrum explicationem peccatum primi hominis, quod per genera¬ tionem propagatur ad posteros, non aliud fuisse tradunt, quam inobcdienliam illam, qua praeceptum de ligno scientia) boni et mali violatum est. Et ratio idem ostendit ; nam neque habuit Adam singulare prteee- ptum de dono justitiae conservando, neque li¬ bera voluntate elegit donum illud amittere, sicut revera singulare praeceptum habuit de ligno scientia) non edendo, et libera volun¬ tate elegit lignum illud attinge.re , atque edere. Denique quia donum gratia) per trans¬ gressionem cujuslibet praecepti perditur, non fuit opus, ut ullum daretur pra)ceptum singulare et distinctum a caeteris de gratia 450 LIBER V. conservanda, sed satis fuit, si in omnibus implicite contineretur. Itaque reatus amissa; gratiae, non est peccatum distinctum a cae- teris, alioqui omnis qui peccaret, semperduo peccata committeret, sed est unus et idem cum transgressione aliorum praeceptorum. Tertia sententia, quae peccatum originale esse volebat privationem justitia; originalis, quatenus peream, ut per effectum suum pri¬ marium, actio primi peccati in anima re¬ sidet, et falsa esse potest, et vera. Nam si privationem justitiae originalis ita velit esse effectum peccati, ut non sit etiam ipsa vere, proprieque peccatum , Concilio Tridentino manifeste repugnat, neque distingui potest a sententia Catharini, quam supra rejecimus. Si vero privationem justitiae dicat esse ef¬ fectum primi peccati, non quod non sit ipsa vere proprieque peccatum, sed quia non es¬ set vere peccatum, nisi ab actione peccati procederet ; tum sententia verissima est, ne¬ que a nostra ulla ratione dissentit. Quarta sententia, quae privationem justi¬ tiae originalis peccatum esse dicebat, ut justi¬ tia pro rectitudine voluntatis, non pro dono a Deo voluntati infuso accipitur, similiter falsa esse potest et vera. Nam si omnino pri¬ vationem doni a Deo infusi a ratione formali peccati originalis excludat, repugnabit Cone. Trid. in quo sicut formalis causa justifica¬ tionis impii definitur, esse gratia a Deo in¬ fusa, ut suo loco demonstrabitur, ita etiam formale peccati significatur ejusdem gratire esse privatio. Quare idem Concilium sess. 5. peccatum esse dicit mortem animse. Quid autem est mors anima; nisi privatiogratiae, sic ut vita animae omnium consensu est ipsa gratia ? Sin autem auctores quartae hujus sententiae non excludunt a ratione peccati originalis privationem doni divinitus infusi ; sed ad¬ monere volunt, privationem justitiae a Deo infusae praecise sumptam non esse peccatum, cum possit etiam sine ullo peccato contingere sed tunc demum peccatum esse, cum ex aversione actuali procedit, idem omnino sen¬ tiunt, quod S. Thomas sentit, et nos in con¬ clusione posuimus. Igitur privatio doni justitiae originalis pec¬ catum originale dicitur, quatenus idem est cum aversione a Deo habituali. Nam quem¬ admodum anima , seu voluntas, dono illo praedita, conversa dicitur ad Deum, et justa habitualiter ; sic etiam dono illo privata, non conversa, et non justa dicitur ; et si ipsa se a Deo averterit, et donum illud excluserit, aversa et injusta optimo jure dicetur. Probatur secundo, quoniam ex omnibus quae remanent in anima peccatoris, trans- eunte actu peccati, nihil est quod propriam peccati rationem habere possit, nisi privatio justitiae, sive aversio et macula, qua; unuin et idem sunt. Remanet in anima peccatoris primo, ordo quidam a:l actum prrecedentem, sive pri¬ vatio innocentia;, qua; in eo sita est, ut ali¬ quis nunquam peccaverit. Secundo, reatus culpce, qui est dignitas odii, indignitas gratia; et meritum poenae. Tertio, reatus poena;, id est, ordinatio, sive obligatio ad luendam poe¬ nam. Quarto, offensa, sive inimicitia ejus, qui per peccatum est lsesus. Quinto, dispo¬ sitio, vel habitus acquisitus. Sexto, aversio, sive obliquitas voluntatis, manens per modum habitus, ut enim qui faciem a sole avertit, manet aversus, donec iterum ad euindem so¬ lem faciem suam convertat; et digitus sponte curvatus curvitatem retinet, donec iterum per actum contrarium dirigatur : sic tiam voluntas, quae per actum peccati a Deo re¬ cessit, in eo recessu permanet, donec ite¬ rum per poenitentiam ad Deum accedat. Septimo, privatio gratiae, sive injustitiae a Deo infusae. Octavo, macula, atque foeditas, quae ex privatione divini nitoris, ac luminis oritur. Ex his omnibus ordo ad actum praeceden¬ tem non est proprie peccatum ; non enim facit ut homo peccatum habeat, sed ut habu¬ erit, nec possit non habuisse. Quocirca iste ordo manet etiam post peccatum remissum, nec potest ulla ratione deleri. Innocentia enim semel amissa per nullam potentiam re¬ parari potest. Reatus culpa;, id est, dignitas odii, indig¬ nitas gratiae et meritum poenae, non est pro¬ prie peccatum sed effectus necessario conse¬ quens et aliquid manens post actum peccati. Non enim homo est dignus odio praecise, quia peccavit ; alioqui nunquam talis dig¬ nitas auferri posset, et peccatum esset irre¬ missibile, sicut fieri non potest, ut, qui pec¬ cavit, non peccaverit. Consequitur igitur ea dignitas odii, vel deformitatem, vel obliqui¬ tatem manentem, vel damnum datum, et nondum resarcitum : atque ita non est pec¬ catum, sed affectus peccati. Prreterea, talis dignitas, vel indignitas non est aliquid rece¬ dens a lege, non est voluntaria, non deformat vel occidit spiritualiter animam, non est pri- * CAPUT XX. 451 vatio boni, neque habet aliquid aliud eorum, qua} proprie peccato conveniunt. Reatus poenae, sive meritum, sive obligatio sive etiam ordinatio dicatur ad poenam, multo minus peccatum est, quam reatus culpa}. Nam obligatio et ordinatio ad poenam, ori¬ untur ex merito et dignitate poenae, et sunt a Deo obligante et ordinante eum qui pec¬ cavit ad luendam poenam. Quare tantum ab¬ est, ut reatus poena} sit peccatum, ut potius sit aliquid boni a Deo institutum ad refor¬ mandum et restituendum ordinem justitia}, quem culpa turbaverat. Offensa quoque non videtur proprie esse peccatum, cum sit in eo, qui per peccatum est la}sus, non in eo, qui laesit. Dispositio, vel habitus acquisitus vitium est, non pec¬ catum. Nam et estqualiXas positiva, et manet saepenumero post culpam r missam. Restat igitur aversio habitualis, quae pro¬ prie peccatum sit. Nam ut peccatum actuale est aversio actualis a Deo, et ejus lege, ita peccatum habituale est aversio habitualis a Deo et ejus lege. Et sicut peccatum actuale est privatio rectitudinis actualis ; ita pecca¬ tum habituale est privatio rectitudinis habi¬ tualis, qua} est habitus gratiae ; et sicut pec¬ catum actuale est voluntarium actuali vo¬ luntate, ita peccatum habituale est volunta¬ rium habituali voluntate. Ex quo intelligimus, multum interessc in¬ ter habitum vitiosum acquisitum per actus frequentatos, et peccatum habituale. Nam habitus acquisitus est qualitas positiva : pec¬ catum habituale est privatio. Item habitus ac¬ quisitus non potest tolli per unum actum vo¬ luntatis, quamvis efficacissimum, peccatum habituale sicut uno actu fit, ita uno actu tol¬ litur. Rursus habitus acquisitus potest esse etiam valde intensus cum actu contrario, et cum gratia Dei; peccatum habituale non po¬ test, saltem de potentia ordinaria. Denique habitus acquisitus non potest dici proprie voluntarius, cum maneat in nobis per ali¬ quod tempus nobis invitis et repugnanti¬ bus : peccatum habituale voluntarium est, quia voluntarie in peccato manemus, et si efficaciter velimus non manere , non ma¬ nemus. Itaque differt habituale peccatum ab ha¬ bitu acquisito, quomodo qui curvus manet, quia ita vult manere, ab eo, qui ob assuetu¬ dinem ita curvus est, ut non possit nisi ad¬ modum difficulter erigi. Quia tamen pecca¬ tum habituale non est voluntarium, nisi ha- bitualiter, ideo potest manere etiam in dor¬ miente, in amente, in infante. Porro, privatio gratia} et macula, qua} erant duo postrema ex his, quae diximus ex actu peccati relinqui in anima peccatoris, re non differunt ab aversione habituali. Nam cum gratia Dei per modum habitus in volun¬ tate inhaerens, eam formaliter conversam ad Deum, justam, rectam, formosamque effi¬ ciat: ejus privatio voluntatem eamdem habi- tualiter aversam, injustam, obliquam et de¬ formem facit. Yide S. ThomametCajetanum ini. 2. quaest. 80. art. 2.