Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On the Clergy (Book I)
Chapter 29: Whether the Exemption of Clerics Is of Natural Divine Right
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. II, De Clericis (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book I), On the Clergy (On the Members of the Church, Book I). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We have hitherto discoursed of positive divine right; now we must discourse of natural right, which cannot be called into doubt to be plainly divine, since natural right is that which is impressed on our minds by the Author of nature. But before I begin to explain whether the exemption of clerics pertains to this right, the degrees of natural right must be distinguished. For there are three degrees of natural precepts. The first is of those which are so clearly impressed on the hearts of men that by the light of reason alone, without any discipline or art — nay, without any new discourse of reason — they are judged just by all; such are certain first principles: that good is to be sought, evil to be fled; that life is to be preserved by food and drink; that offspring is to be propagated and educated to preserve the human race; that God is to be worshiped; that one ought not to do to another what one does not wish done to oneself. These are most properly precepts of natural right, of which Saint Ambrose speaks thus (in letter 71 to Irenaeus): “The law of nature, which God has poured into the breasts of individuals, is not written, but is born in us, nor is it received by any reading, but is expressed in each by a certain flowing fountain of nature, and drawn by human minds”; and Saint Jerome (in the letter to Algasia, question 8): “The law which is written in the heart contains all nations; and there is no man who is ignorant of this law. And therefore it is a just judgment of God, writing in the heart of the human race, that what thou wouldst not have done to thee, do not to another”; and Saint Augustine (in the tract on Psalm 57): “By the hand of our Fashioner, truth wrote in these very hearts of ours: what thou wouldst not have done to thee, do not to another. This, even before the law was given, no one was permitted to be ignorant of, that there might be whereby even those to whom the law was not given should be judged.” Nor do the Greeks dissent, as Chrysostom (homily 54 on Genesis), nor the Scholastics, as Saint Thomas (First Part of the Second Part, question 94, article 2); nor even the laws themselves, as is plain from the canon Jus naturale (distinction 1) and the first law of the Digest, On Justice and Right.
The second degree is of those precepts which are deduced from those first principles as proximate conclusions, and as it were naturally flowing by an easy, evident, and necessary consequence, so that there is no need of art or discipline, but of a simple discourse such as all men can have; such are all the precepts of the Decalogue. For from that principle, impressed on the heart of all, that God is to be worshiped, it follows at once that idols are not to be worshiped, nor is one to swear falsely. From that other principle, what thou wouldst not have done to thee do not to another, it follows that one ought not to kill, not to commit adultery, not to steal, and so on. And indeed some precepts of this kind have sometimes, through the excessive blinding of men, been deleted from the hearts of men, as is plain from Book VI of Caesar’s Gallic War, where we read that among the Germans theft was not a vice but a virtue; and from Saint Jerome (Book II against Jovinian), and Theodoret (Book IX to the Greeks), who relate many vices against nature which were approved by certain peoples, and even by their lawgivers, as lawful and just. But although such precepts were unknown to some, yet they truly and properly pertain to natural divine right, as Saint Thomas teaches (First Part of the Second Part, question 94, article 5, and question 100, article 8), where he writes that in the precepts of the Decalogue, because they are properly of natural right, no dispensation can fall. And certainly, as those things which are deduced by necessary consequence from the articles of faith pertain to faith, because they cannot be denied without the articles themselves being denied, so those things which are deduced by necessary consequence from the first principles of natural right pertain also to natural right, because they cannot be destroyed without nature being destroyed.
The third degree of natural precepts is of those which are indeed deduced from the principles of natural right, but by a consequence not absolutely necessary nor altogether evident, and therefore need human constitution. And these are what the theologians properly refer to the law of nations, and distinguish from civil right, because civil right is not deduced from natural right by the manner of a conclusion deduced from principles, but by the manner of a determination of those things which are generally commanded by natural right. Which doctrine is Saint Thomas’s (First Part of the Second Part, question 95, articles 2 and 4). And although the same Saint Thomas, in the aforesaid question 95, article 4, following Isidore, says that the law of nations is a species of positive right, yet on the contrary (Second Part of the Second Part, question 57, article 3, and more clearly in lecture 12 on Book V of the Ethics) he says it is a species of natural right, and alleges the ancient jurisconsults, who taught that natural right is one thing which is common to all animals, another which is common to all men; yet he does not fight with himself, nor does Isidore fight with the jurisconsults. For the same Saint Thomas (First Part of the Second Part, question 95, article 4, reply 1) writes that the law of nations is in some way natural and in some way positive, and by this is a mean between pure natural right and civil right. For pure natural right is that which in no way depends on human constitution; but civil right is that which depends on the constitution of men alone, and therefore can be called purely positive. But the law of nations is partly natural, partly positive, because it depends indeed on human constitution, that is, on the consent of all nations, but does not depend on the authority of a prince or a particular magistrate. From which it follows that those things which are of the law of nations, because they are in some way natural, are therefore forbidden because they are evil; but on the contrary those things which are of civil right, because they are purely positive, are therefore evil because they are forbidden. Again, it follows that those things which are of the law of nations, because they are in some way natural, cannot be abrogated or changed by princes or magistrates; but on the contrary those things which are of civil right, because they are purely positive, as they are established by a prince or magistrate, so can be abrogated by a magistrate or prince.
These things being thus explained, it seems it must be said that the exemption of ecclesiastics does not pertain to the first or second degree of natural precepts, nor yet is only of positive right, whether canon or civil, but is to be referred to the third degree of the precepts of natural right, or (what is the same) to the law of nations. This seems to me to be the opinion of almost all the theologians and canonists; and in substance I do not think that John Driedo dissents, who (in Book I On Christian Liberty, chapter 9), with the canonists, says the exemption of clerics is of natural divine right — from Vitoria (in the first relection On the Power of the Church, last question) and Soto (on the fourth book, distinction 25, question 2), who say it is of human and positive right. For John Driedo does not say it is of natural right because it is some first principle of natural right, or a proximate conclusion and as it were naturally deduced from the first principles, but says it is of natural right because it is altogether conformable and consonant to natural reason. But Vitoria and Soto deny that it is of natural divine right, because by natural right they understand pure natural right, in which way Soto too denies that the law of nations is natural; yet the same authors, and especially Soto, add that this exemption is altogether consonant to reason and to nature itself. Nor do they wish to say only that it is reasonable — that is, not contrary to reason — for so they would have said nothing, since every just law, even purely positive, ought not to be contrary to reason; but they wish to say that it is deduced as a conclusion from natural right, and has its force from natural right; and therefore they add that all nations consented to this exemption, and accordingly it cannot be changed or abrogated by kings and princes, even if all together conjoined tried to abrogate it. Nor does Saint Thomas dissent, though in the commentary on Romans 13 he wrote that clerics are free from tributes by the privilege of princes; for in the same place he adds that this was done on account of natural equity.
This opinion, then, we can prove by these arguments. First, from the custom of all nations; for what is done everywhere descends from nature itself, which is common to all. It is established that among the Hebrews the Levites were free from tributes (from Exodus 30 and Numbers 1). It is established that among the Egyptians under King Pharaoh the priests were exempt (from Genesis 47). The same is established of the priests of the Hebrews under King Artaxerxes (from 1 Esdras 7). The same can be known of the priests of the Gentiles from Aristotle (Book II Economics), from Caesar (Book VI Gallic War), from Plutarch (in Camillus), and from others. Among the Christians, the Emperor Constantine, who was the first openly Christian Emperor, at once, nature teaching, declared ecclesiastics immune from the common burdens of the commonwealth, as is plain from his letter to Ablavius in Eusebius (Book X of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 7); which same many other Emperors did. And the words of Justinian are to be noted (law Sancimus, 2, in the Code, On the Most Sacred Churches). For when he had exempted the Churches, he says: “For why do we not make a distinction between divine and human things? And why should not a fitting prerogative be preserved to the heavenly favor?” By which words he shows that that exemption was not arbitrary and free, but due and necessary.
The second argument is drawn from the likeness which the ecclesiastical and secular power have with the soul and body of man. For (as we showed in Book V On the Supreme Pontiff, from Saint Gregory Nazianzen, Hugh of Saint Victor, and other notable authors) it cannot be better understood how the ecclesiastical power stands to the secular than from the way in which in man the spirit stands to the flesh. And the spirit so stands to the flesh that, although it does not hinder its actions when they are well disposed, yet it rules and moderates it, and sometimes restrains, sometimes rouses it, as it judges expedient for its end; but on the contrary the flesh has no command over the spirit, nor can direct, or judge, or coerce it in anything. So then the ecclesiastical power, which is spiritual and by this naturally superior to the secular, can, when there is need, direct, judge, and coerce the secular power; but is by no reason permitted to be directed, or judged, or coerced by the secular.
Thirdly, it is proved from the names of Father and Shepherd, with which priests are adorned, both in the sacred writings and in the books of the holy Fathers, and by the common custom of Christians. For nature teaches that sons should obey their parents, and bear with an even mind to be corrected by them, but not that they should wish to command their parents, and correct or judge them. Much more, the same nature being leader and mistress, are sheep ruled and governed by shepherds, and, when they wander, brought back into the way by whistle or staff; and it would be plainly against nature if a sheep were seen to rule or govern the shepherd. The fourth argument can be sought from the name and office of clerics. For clerics are ministers of God, consecrated to the service of God alone, and for this very thing offered to God by the whole people; whence too they are called clerics, as pertaining to the lot of the Lord, as Saint Jerome teaches (in the letter to Nepotian). But certainly in those things which are offered and consecrated to God, and made as it were the property of God Himself, the princes of the world can have no right. Which both the light of reason shows, and God Himself not obscurely delivers in the holy Scriptures, when He says (Leviticus, last chapter): “Whatever is once consecrated to God shall be the holy of holies to the Lord.” And who would dare to say that a profane man has right in those things which have merited to be called the holy of holies, that is, most holy? For which reason the temporal goods too of clerics are properly called the goods of the Lord (in canon 4 of the Apostles), and therefore, as sacred to God, cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of laymen.
The fifth argument is drawn from the signs and prodigies which God not seldom shows against those who have presumed to violate the immunity of the Churches. On which matter many things can be read in Tilmann Bredenbach (Book V of the Sacred Collations). But there stands a notable testimony of Basil Porphyrogenitus, Emperor of the Greeks, in Balsamon, in the Nomocanon of Photius, in the commentary on the first canon of the first and second Synod of Constantinople, which we Latins call the eighth synod. For the same Basil refers the cause of all the calamities of his time to a certain law of Nicephorus Phocas, his predecessor, made against the liberty of the Church: “From the time,” he says, “that law had force, nothing good at all has befallen our life up to this present day, but rather, on the contrary, no kind of calamity at all has been lacking.” And so he deservedly willed that law to be void, and utterly abrogated it.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXIX. An exemptio Clericorum sit juris divini naturalis. Disseruimus hactenus de jure divino posi¬ tivo; nunc de jure naturali disserendum est, quod plane divinum esse in dubium revo¬ cari non potest, cum jus naturale sit illud, quod est ab auctore naturae in animis nos¬ tris impressum. Sed antequam explicare in¬ cipiam, an ad hoc jus pertineat exemptio Clericorum, distinguendi sunt gradus juris naturalis. Tres enim sunt gradus naturalium praeceptorum. Primus est eorum, quae ita perspicue sunt impressa t in cordibus homi¬ num, ut solo lumine rationis, 'sine ulla disci¬ plina vel arte, imo sine novo discursu ratio¬ nis judicentur ab omnibus justa; talia sunt prima quaedam principia, ut bonum esse ap¬ petendum, malum fugiendum, conservan¬ dam vitam cibo et potu, propagandam et educandam sobolem ad conservandum ge¬ nus humanum, Deum esse colendum, non esse faciendum alteri quod tibi non vis fieri. Haec maxime proprie sunt praecepta juris na¬ turae, de quibus ita loquitur Sanctus Ambro¬ sius in epist. 71. ad Irenaeum : « Lex natu¬ rae, quam Deus singulorum infudit pectori¬ bus, non scribitur, sed innascitur, nec ali¬ qua percipitur lectione, sed profluo quodam naturae fonte in singulis exprimitur, et hu¬ manis ingeniis hauritur;» et Sanctus Hiero¬ nymus in epist. ad Algasiam quaest. 8. : «Lex, quae in corde scribitur, omnes continet na¬ tiones ; et nullus hominum est, qui hanc le¬ gem nesciat. Et idcirco, justum judicium Dei est scribentis in corde humani generis, quod tibi fieri nolueris, alteri ne feceris; » et Sanctus Augustinus in tract. Psal. LVII: « Manu formatoris nostri in ipsis cordibus nostris veritas scripsit, quod tibi non vis fie¬ ri, ne facias alteri. Hoc et antequam lex da¬ retur, nemo ignorare permissus est, ut es¬ set unde judicarentur et quibus lex non es¬ set data. » Nec dissentiunt Graeci, ut Chry- sostomus hom. 54. in Genesim, nec Scholas¬ tici, ut S. Thomas in 1.2. quaest. XGIY, art. 2. Neque etiam ipsa jura, ut patet ex can. Jus naturale, dist.l. et 1.1. ff.de just. et jure. Secundus gradus est eorum praecepto¬ rum, quae deducuntur ex illis primis princi¬ piis, tamquam conclusiones proximae , et quasi naturaliter fluentes per facilem, evi¬ dentem et necessariam consequentiam, ut non sit opus arte vel disciplina, sed simplici discursu, qualem omnes homines habere possunt : talia sunt omnia praecepta Deca¬ logi. Nam ex illo principio, in corde omnium impresso, Deum esse colendum, sequitur continuo non esse colenda idola, neque esse pejerandum. Ex illo altero principio, quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris, sequitur non esse occidendum, non esse moechan¬ dum, non esse furandum etc. Et sane aliqua hujus generis praecepta aliquando ob ni¬ miam hominum excavationem deleta sunt 492 LIBER I. de cordibus hominum, ut patet ex lib. VI Csesaris de bello Gallico, ubi legimus, apud Germanos furtum non fuisse vitium, sed vir¬ tutem; et ex Sancto Hieronymo lib. II in Jovinianum, et ex Theodoreto lib. IX ad Grsecos, qui referunt multa vitia contra na¬ turam, quoe a populis quibusdam et etiam a Legislatoribus eorum tanquam licita et justa approbabantur. Sed quamvis ejusmodi prae¬ cepta a nonnullis ignorarentur, vere tamen et proprie ad jus divinum naturale pertinent, ut docet S. Thomas in 1.2. qusest. XCIV, art. 5. et q. G, art. 8. ubi scribit, in praecep¬ tis Decalogi, quia sunt proprie juris natura¬ lis, nullam cadere posse dispensationem. Et certe sicut ea, quae deducuntur per necessa¬ riam consequentiam ex articulis fidei, perti¬ nent ad fidem, quia non possunt negari, quin articuli ipsi negentur : ita quae deducuntur per necessariam consequentiam ex primis principiis juris naturalis, pertinent etiam ad jus naturale, quia non possunt destrui, quin destruatur natura. Tertius gradus praecepto¬ rum naturalium est eorum, quae deducuntur quidem ex principiis juris naturae, sed per consequentiam non absolute necessariam, nec omnino evidentem, et ideo egent hu¬ mana constitutione. Et haec sunt quae Theo¬ logi proprie referunt ad jus gentium, et ea distinguunt a jure civili, quod jus civile non deducatur ex jure naturae per modum con¬ clusionis, deductae ex principiis, sed per modum determinationis eorum, quae gene- ratim praecipiuntur a jure naturae. Quae doc¬ trina est Sancti Thomae in 1.2. quaest. X.CV, art. 2. et 4. et quamvis idem S. Thomas in praedicta q. XCV, art. 4. Isidorum secutus dicat, jus gentium esse speciem juris posi¬ tivi; contra vero in 2. 2. q, LVII, art. 3. et clarius lect. 12. in lib. V Ethic. dicat esse speciem juris naturalis, et alleget Juriscon¬ sultos veteres, qui jus naturale aliud esse docebant, quod est commune omnibus ani¬ malibus, aliud quod est commune omnibus hominibus ; tamen non pugnat ipse secum, neclsidorus cum Jurisconsultis pugnat. Nam et idem S. Thomas in 1. 2. q. XCV, art. 4. ad primum, scribit jus gentium esse aliquo modo naturale, et aliquo modo positivum, ac per hoc est medium inter jus naturale pu¬ rum et jus civile. Jus enim naturale purum est illud, quod nullo modo pendet ex huma¬ na constitutione; jus civile autem, quod ex sola hominum constitutione pendet, et ideo pure positivum dici potest. Jus vero gentium partim est naturale, partim positivum, quia pendet quidem ab humana constitutione, id est, a consensu omnium gentium, sed non pendet ab auctoritate Principis, vel Magis¬ tratus particularis. Ex quo sequitur, ut ea quse sunt de jure gentium, quia sunt aliquo modo naturalia, ideo prohibeantur quia sunt mala : contra autem quse sunt de jure civili, quia sunt pure positiva, ideo sint mala, quia prohibentur. Rursus, sequitur, ut ea quse sunt de jure gentium, quia sunt aliquo mo¬ do naturalia, non possint a Principibus vel Magistratibus abrogari, vel immutari : con¬ tra autem, quse sunt de jure civili, quia sunt pure positiva, sicut a Principe, vel Magis¬ tratu constituuntur, ita posse a Magistratu, vel Principe abrogari. His ita explicatis, di¬ cendum videtur. Exemptionem Ecclesiasti¬ corum non pertinere ad primum, vel secun¬ dum naturalium preeceptorum gradum, nec tamen esse juris tantum positivi sive cano¬ nici, sive civilis, sed referendam esse ad ter¬ tium gradum praeceptorum juris naturae, sive, quod idem est, ad jus gentium. Haec mihi videtur esse sententia fere omnium Theologorum et Canonistarum, et in re non arbitror dissentire Joannem Driedonem, qui in lib. I de libert. Christiana, c. 9. cum Ca- nonistis dicit, exemptionem Clericorum esse juris divini naturalis, *a Victoria in Relectio- ne prima de potestate Ecclesiae qu. ult. et Soto in IV sent. dist. 23. qu. 2. qui dicunt, esse juris humani, ac positivi. Nam Joannes Driedo non dicit esse juris naturalis, quia sit primum aliquod principium juris naturae, aut conclusio proxima, et quasi naturaliter deducta ex primis principiis, sed dicit esse juris naturalis, quia est omnino conformis, et consentanea rationi naturali. Victoria ve¬ ro, et Sotus negant esse juris divini natura¬ lis, quia per jus naturale intelligunt jus pure naturale, quo modo etiam negat idem Sotus jus gentium esse naturale ; tamen iidem auc¬ tores, et maxime Sotus, addunt hanc exemp¬ tionem esse omnino consentaneam rationi, et ipsi naturse. Neque dicere volunt solum, esse rationabilem, id est, non contrariam rationi, sic enim nihil dixissent, cum omnis justa lex etiam pure positiva non debeat es¬ se contraria rationi, sed dicere volunt, esse deductam ut conclusionem ex jure naturse, et vim habere ex jure naturse, et ideo ad¬ dunt, in hanc exemptionem consensisse om¬ nes gentes, ac propterea non posse mutari, vel abrogari a Regibus et Principibus, etiam CAPUT XXIX. 493 si omnes simiil conjuncti eam abrogare co- nentur. Neque dissentit S. Thomas, licet in com. ad c. XIII ad Rom. scripserit, Clericos privilegio Principum liberos esse a tributis ; nam in eodem loco addit, id factum esse ob naturalem aequitatem. Hanc igitur sententiam probare possumus his argumentis. Primo ex consuetudine om¬ nium gentium, quod enim ubique fit, ex na¬ tura ipsa descendit, quae omnibus commu¬ nis est, constat apud Hebraeos, Levitas fuisse liberos a tributis ex cap. XXX Exod. et cap. I Numer. Constat apud iEgyptios sub Rege Pharaone sacerdotes fuisse exemptos, ex cap. XLYII Genes. Constat idem de sacer¬ dotibus Hebraeorum sub Rege Artaxerxe ex lib. I Esdrae cap. VII. Idem cognosci potest de sacerdotibus Gentilium ex Aristotele in lib. II QEconom. ex Caesare lib. VI de bello Gallico, ex Plutarcho in Camillo, et ex aliis. Apud Christianos, Imperator Constantinus, qui primus fuit Imperator aperte Christia¬ nus, continuo natura docente Ecclesiasticos immunes a communibus Reipublicae oneri¬ bus declaravit, ut patet ex epistola ejus ad Avilinum apud Eusebium lib. Xhist. eccles. cap. 7. quod idem multi alii Imperatores fe¬ cerunt. Et notanda sunt verba Justiniani 1. , sancimus. 2. C. de saciosanct. eccles. Nam ubi exemisset Ecclesias, ait : « Cur enim non facimus discrimen inter res divinas et humanas ; et cur non competens praeroga¬ tiva coelesti favori conservetur? » Quibus verbis ostendit, exemptionem illam non fuisse arbitrariam et liberam, sed debitam et ne¬ cessariam. Alterum argumentum ducitur a similitu¬ dine, quam potestas ecclesiastica et saecula¬ ris habent cum anima et corpore humano. Nam (ut ostendimus in lib. V de summo Pontifice, ex S. Gregorio Nazianzeno, Hu- gone de S. Victore, aliisque insignibus auc¬ toribus) non potest melius intelligi quo mo¬ do, se habeat potestas ecclesiastica ad saecu¬ larem, quam ex modo, quo se habet in ho¬ mine spiritus ad carnem; Spiritus autem ita se habet ad carnem, ut quamvis non impe¬ diat actiones ejus, cum bene se habent, eam tamen regat, et moderetur, et aliquando co¬ hibeat, aliquando excitet, prout ad finem suum expedire judicat. Contra vero, caro nullum habet imperium in spiritum, neque eum ulla in re dirigere, vel judicare, vel coercere potest. Sic igitur potestas ecclesias¬ tica, quse spiritualis est, ac per hoc natura- raliter saeculari superior, saecularem potes¬ tatem, cum opus est, dirigere, judicare, et coercere potest ; ipsam vero a saeculari di¬ rigi, vel judicari, vel coerceri nulla ratione permittitur. Tertio probatur ex nominibus Patris, et Pastoris, quibus tum in sacris lit¬ teris, et in libris sanctorum Patrum, tum ex communi Christianorum consuetudine sacer¬ dotes ornantur. Natura enim docet, ut filii parentibus obediant, atque ab iis se corrigi aequo animo ferant, non autem ipsi parenti¬ bus imperare, eosque corrigere vel judicare velint. Multo etiam magis eadem duce et magistra natura oves a Pastoribus reguntur et gubernantur, et quando aberrant, vel si¬ bilo, vel baculo reducuntur inviam; et plane contra naturam esset, si ovis Pastorem re¬ gere, vel gubernare videretur. Quartum ar¬ gumentum peti potest a nomine et officio Clericorum, Clerici enim sunt ministri Dei, consecrati ad obsequium solius Dei, atque ad hoc ipsum ab universo populo Deo oblati, unde et Clerici dicuntur tanquam ad sortem Domini pertinentes, ut S. Hieronymus docet in epist. ad Nepotianum. Certe autem in ea, quse sunt oblata et consecrata Deo, et quasi propria ipsius Dei facta sunt, nullum jus ha¬ bere possunt Principes saeculi. Id quod et lumen rationis ostendit, et Deus ipse in Scripturis sanctis non obscure tradit, cum ait Levitici ult. : Quidquid semel Deo fuerit consecratum , sanctum sanctorum erit Domi¬ no (1). Quis autem dicere audeat, jus esse profano homini in ea, quae sancta sancto¬ rum, id est, sanctissima dici meruerunt? Qua ratione bona etiam temporalia Clerico¬ rum bona dominica proprie dicuntur in cap. 4. Apostolico, et ideo tanquam Deo sacra ju¬ risdictioni Laicorum subjecta esse non pos¬ sunt. Quintum argumentum ducitur a signis et prodigiis, quae non raro Deus ostendit in eos, qui Ecclesiarum immunitatem violare praesumpserunt. De qua re multa legi pos¬ sunt apud Tilmannum Bredembachium in lib. V sacrarum collationum. Sed exstat in¬ signe testimonium Basilii Porphyrogeniti Graecorum Imperatoris apudBalsamonem, in Nomocanone Photii, in commentario cano¬ nis primi synodi Constantinopolitanee pri¬ mae, et secundae, quam nos Latini octavam synodum appellamus. Refert enim idem Ba- (1) Levit. XXIII, 28. 494 LIBER I. silius causam omnium calamitatum ejus tem¬ poris in legem quamdam Nicephori Phocee praedecessoris sui contraEcclesiae libertatem latam : « Ex quo, inquit, Lex ista robur ha¬ buit, nihil boni penitas in hodiernum usque diem vitae nostrae contigit, sed potius e con¬ trario nullum omnino genus calamitatis de¬ fuit. » Itaque legem illam merito irritam esse voluit, ac penitus abrogavit.