Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On the Clergy (Book I)
Chapter 30: The Contrary Arguments Answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. II, De Clericis (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book I), On the Clergy (On the Members of the Church, Book I). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
But it will be worth the effort to answer briefly the objections which Diego de Covarrubias (in the cited place) and John of Medina (in the Code, On Restitution, question 15) — who spoke more freely than the other authors — brought forward. They object, first, that no divine law exists by which clerics are exempted from the jurisdiction of lay princes. But we have already shown that not a few testimonies of the Old Testament Scripture exist, from which by a probable consequence an argument is drawn to prove that by divine right clerics are free from the jurisdiction of secular princes. Nor does it stand in the way that the Old Testament has now been abrogated by the New. For although the ceremonial and judicial precepts have been abrogated, yet the moral ones have not been abrogated — that is, those which contain or declare natural right. And besides, since the ceremonies of the Jews were figures of our things, as the Apostle teaches (1 Corinthians 10, Galatians 4, Hebrews 7), we do not ill draw arguments by likeness from the Jewish rites. Finally, not only testimonies of the Old Testament Scripture, but also reasons drawn from natural right, we adduced; and natural right is not human but divine, since it flowed from the very Author of nature.
Secondly, they object many laws of Justinian from the Code and the Authentics, from which it can be known that of old clerics were subject to the jurisdiction of the Emperor. But the answer is easy. For if this argument had any force, it would prove also that in ecclesiastical and spiritual matters clerics are not free by divine right from the power of lay princes; for it is established, not only from the Code and the Authentics, but much more from the Nomocanon of Photius, that not a few laws of Justinian dispose of matters plainly ecclesiastical and spiritual. But Covarrubias and Medina, like all the theologians and canonists, teach with the highest agreement that in ecclesiastical and spiritual matters clerics are free from the power of the princes of the world by divine right. They are compelled, therefore, to say with us that those laws proceed in fact, not by right, and were sometimes tolerated by the supreme Pontiffs, but never approved. Yet I would not deny that there are also many civil laws of the emperors which clerics, no less than laymen, ought to follow. For the Church, for the course of temporal things only (as Pope Nicholas I speaks in the letter to Michael), uses the imperial laws. Which same we have in many canons of distinction 10 in Gratian, and in chapter 4, On the Denunciation of a New Work, and elsewhere. Which all, however, must be understood of those laws which are not contrary to ecclesiastical liberty, and as to direction, not as to coercion, and finally when the other conditions are present which the Doctors note, and especially Felinus (on the chapter Ecclesia S. Mariae, on constitutions, question 1).
Thirdly, they object the example of the Apostle Paul, who, though he was an ecclesiastical prelate, did not fear to appeal to Caesar, and freely to confess that he ought to be judged by him, as Saint Luke relates (Acts 25). But this objection Covarrubias ought altogether to have omitted; for Blessed Paul, as is established from the last chapters of Acts, was compelled to appeal to Caesar, being oppressed, namely, by the calumnies of the Jews and the injustice of the Roman governor, who acknowledged only Caesar as supreme judge. And so he too, at least in fact, if not by right, had to acknowledge Caesar as judge; nor would he have been received without laughter if he had wished to make mention, before Gentiles or Jews, of Blessed Peter, his supreme prince and judge.
Fourthly, they object the testimonies of the holy Apostles Peter and Paul. For Blessed Peter writes (in the first epistle, chapter 2): “Be subject to every human creature for God’s sake, whether to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him”; and Blessed Paul (in the epistle to the Romans, chapter 13): “Let every soul be subject to the higher powers.” On which passage Saint John Chrysostom writes that these things are said not only to laymen, but also to clerics, and monks, and even to the Apostles and Evangelists themselves. I answer that the sentences of the Apostles are general. For although in them mention is made by name of kings — because at that time it was very necessary diligently to admonish Christians to obey kings, lest the preaching of the faith be hindered — yet absolutely those words, both of Blessed Peter and of Blessed Paul, signify nothing else than that all men ought to be subject to their lawful superiors and render them due obedience. Wherefore it cannot be proved from these apostolic testimonies that clerics ought to obey the princes of the world or their laws, unless it be first proved that the kings of the world are the lawful superiors and judges of clerics. Which certainly cannot be proved unless it be proved that sheep are pre-eminent over shepherds, sons over parents, and temporal things over spiritual. Nor yet do we contradict Chrysostom. For although we say that the proper judge of clerics and monks is the Pontiff alone, yet we confess that kings are kings not only of laymen but also of clerics and monks. Whence too not without cause in the public prayers we pray for the king, or for our emperor. For since kings wage wars not only for laymen but also for clerics and monks, and watch for the peace and tranquillity of all, honor is owed them by all, according to that of Blessed Peter (first epistle, chapter 2): “Honor the king.” Obedience too is owed, when their laws are not contrary to the sacred canons, and when of the same matters there exists no canonical disposition; and at last as to direction, as we said above, not as to coercion.
Besides these arguments John of Medina (in the cited place) objects certain others, which Covarrubias perhaps thought should be passed over as lighter. But let us dissolve these too briefly. Medina says, then, that in the law of nature all the firstborn were priests, and yet not exempt from the power of their elders. Likewise that in the written law the Levites, whom clerics now succeed, were subject not only to Aaron the pontiff, but also to Moses, who was the civil prince of the whole people of the Jews. In the evangelical law too, that Christ Himself, who was the head of all priests, was subject to Pilate, according to that, “Thou wouldst have no power over me, unless it were given thee from above.” Finally Medina reasons thus: the evangelical law, Baptism, the clerical order do not free by divine right from debts previously contracted — as from the debt of servitude, the money-debt, the conjugal debt — therefore neither from the debt of subjection and civil obedience; but clerics before the clerical state were subject to the power and jurisdiction of secular princes and magistrates, therefore they are not free by divine right from the same power and jurisdiction after the clerical state.
But to all these the answer is easy and ready. For of the firstborn in the law of nature Medina did not prove that they were subject to civil magistrates. But we can prove that they were not; since the same firstborn were wont to be both priests and princes, Saint Jerome teaches (in the Hebrew Questions on Genesis 49), which is also the common opinion of the Hebrews, and is expressed by the Chaldee Paraphrase itself in the same place, in the blessing of Reuben. Moreover Moses, to whom the Levites were subject, was not only the civil prince of the whole people, but also the high priest, and greater than Aaron, though by an extraordinary power. Whence it is said (Psalm 98): “Moses and Aaron among His priests”; and we know that Aaron was consecrated by Moses; and finally Philo testifies (at the end of the book On the Life of Moses) that Moses was pontiff, king, and lawgiver of the Hebrews. What wonder, then, if the Levites were subject to Moses no less than to Aaron, since Moses no less than Aaron discharged the priesthood?
And that Christ was subject to Pilate only in fact, not by right, is most certain. And the power given from above, which Christ acknowledges in Pilate, is to be understood not as a judiciary power, but a permission, as the holy Fathers teach, Chrysostom and Cyril; of which the Lord says (Luke 22): “This is your hour, and the power of darkness.” And certainly it would not be bearable if Medina, with Marsilius of Padua, wished to say that Christ, the natural Son of God, was by right subject to earthly princes. Finally, the reasoning of the same Medina either proves nothing, or proves more than he himself would wish. For if it is equal to exempt from the debt of servitude, or the money-debt, or the marriage-debt, and to exempt from the debt of subjection and civil obedience — then, as the supreme Pontiff cannot exempt Christian men from the debt of servitude, or the money-debt, or the marriage-debt without the consent of the party (since otherwise he would seem to do injury), so the same supreme Pontiff could not exempt clerics from the jurisdiction of secular princes without their consent. And this is against all the theologians, from whom not even Medina himself dissents. Those things, then, are not equal, and by this Medina’s argument does not rightly conclude.
And the reason of the difference between those debts is this: that the bond between a creditor and debtor, a master and servant, a husband and wife is altogether greater than between a prince or magistrate and a citizen. And so the clerical state does not exempt from those debts of the former kind, and therefore he cannot become a cleric who is a servant, unless he be first freed by his master; nor he who is bound to a wife, unless the wife consent and she too make a vow of continence; nor he who owes so much money that he cannot restore it, if he become a cleric, unless the debt be remitted by the creditor. But the same clerical state exempts from civil subjection, and transfers into ecclesiastical subjection, even with the civil superior not consenting or opposing; since everyone is free concerning the state of his own person, and as he can leave father and mother and cleave to a wife, according to the word of the Lord (Matthew 19), so he can leave the prince of the world and pass into the lot of the Lord, and approach to the service of God, and commit himself wholly to the bishop in the clerical state, or to the abbot in monastic profession. But, says Medina, the evangelical law and Baptism do not exempt from civil jurisdiction, therefore neither does the clerical state. I answer that the reasoning of the evangelical law and Baptism, and of the clerical state itself, is not the same. For the evangelical law and Baptism do not exclude, nay, will have to be necessary, the civil principate, as we proved elsewhere against the Anabaptists. But the clerical state, like the monastic, could not rightly discharge its office unless it were free and immune from civil jurisdiction; and the very order of nature would be perverted if shepherds were to be subject to sheep, parents to sons, and spiritual things to corporeal. But, you will say, injury will be done to princes if against their will they are deprived of the right which they had over clerics before the clerical state. I answer that no injury is done to them, because he who uses his own right does no injury. And he uses his own right who chooses the state which he judges more suitable to himself, although by accident it follows that a prince is deprived of his subject. For even if anyone for a just cause transfers his domicile into another city or province, he will cease to be a subject to the former prince, and yet will not be seen to have done him injury.
The last objection of Medina is that it is not repugnant to reason that men devoted to the service of God and to spiritual functions should be subject, in temporal and civil matters, to a king or secular magistrate. From which it follows that if they are exempt, this was done by the concession of princes, not by divine right. There can be added a confirmation to this argument, that we may seem to escape no difficulty. For as a secular prince, as a Christian and in spiritual matters, is a sheep and son of the priests, so on the contrary priests, as citizens and in temporal matters, seem able to be called sheep and as it were sons of the secular princes. Likewise, because there is only one Church, containing clerics and laymen, and the head of the Church is the supreme Pontiff, therefore all are subject to the same supreme Pontiff, both clerics and laymen; therefore in the same way, since there is one city containing laymen and clerics, and the head of the city is the secular prince, therefore all, both laymen and clerics, ought to be subject to the secular prince in those things which pertain to the good government of the city.
I answer that by this argument it is proved that the exemption of clerics is not of primary natural right, which we distinguished above into two degrees, but is of secondary natural right, which we said is also called the law of nations. For, as Saint Thomas rightly teaches (Second Part of the Second Part, question 57, article 3), primary natural right regards a thing considered absolutely; secondary natural right, or the law of nations, regards a thing in relation to a certain end, and therefore depends on the discourse of reason. Although, therefore, it is not repugnant to reason absolutely that a cleric be subject, in civil matters, to a secular prince, yet it is repugnant in relation to the office of clerics being rightly administered. For, to omit other things, it would be most base (as Soto too noted) if a magistrate could correct or punish the bishop by whom he himself is to be corrected and punished. And who would bear it if today a priest summoned the magistrate to his tribunal, but tomorrow the magistrate summoned the priest to his? And would not all the reverence which laymen necessarily owe to priests perish, if they could coerce them by authority? Hence, then, before all the laws of princes, the human race, reason teaching, established that everywhere priests should be immune from the jurisdiction of lay princes.
To the first confirmation I answer that the prince is indeed a sheep and spiritual son of the priest, but the priest can in no way be called son or sheep of the prince; since priests and all clerics have their own spiritual prince, by whom they are ruled not only in spiritual but also in temporal things. Nor can it be that they acknowledge two princes in temporal things, since, according to the Gospel, no one can serve two masters. To the other confirmation I answer that the Church is truly one only, and in no way two; but the city is one materially, and two formally. For the Church contains all Catholic Christians, whether clerics or laymen. But if anyone consider the assembly of laymen, not as they are Christians, but as they are citizens, or in any other way, that assembly cannot be called the Church. Two Churches, then, cannot be feigned, and much less be. But the assembly of laymen and the assembly of clerics can formally be called two cities, since even in temporal things themselves they have diverse laws, a diverse prince, diverse tribunals; and yet materially they make one city too, because they inhabit one city and live under the protection of the same prince, who, as for the labor and solicitude which he undertakes for the common good he receives tributes from the laity, so he receives from the clerics far greater aids of public prayers and sacrifices to God.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
capot xx. Solvuntur argumenta contraria. Sed operae pretium erit ad eas objectiones breviter respondere, quas Didacus Govarru- vias loco citato, et Joannes Medina in Co¬ dice de Restitution. q. 15. (qui liberius aliis auctoribus locuti sunt) in medium protule¬ runt. Objiciunt ergo primo, nullam exstare legem divinam qua Clerici eximdntur a ju¬ risdictione Principum Laicorum. Sed jam ostendimus exstare non pauca testimonia scripturae veteris, ex quibus per probabilem consequentiam ducatur argumentum ad pro¬ bandum jure divino Clericos liberos esse a jurisdictione Principum saccularium. Neque obstat quod testamentum vetus abrogatum jam sit per testamentum novum. Nam tam¬ etsi abrogata sint caeremonialia, judicialia- que praecepta : non tamen sunt abrogata moralia, id est, qui continent vel declarant jus naturae. Et praeterea, cum caeremoniae Judaeorum figurae fuerint rerum nostrarum, ut Apostolus docet I Qor.N, Gal.IV etHebr. VII, non male ducimus argumenta per simi¬ litudinem a ritibus Judaicis. Denique non sola testimonia Scripturae veteris, sed etiam rationes ex jure naturae depromptas adduxi¬ mus, jus autem naturae non humanum, sed divinum est, cum ab ipsius naturae auctore manaverit. Secundo objiciunt leges multas Justiniani ex Codice, et Authenticis, ex qui¬ bus cognosci potest, olim Clericos Impera¬ toris jurisdictioni fuisse subjectos. Sed faci¬ lis est responsio. Nam si hoc argumentum vim ullam haberet, probaret etiam in rebus ecclesiasticis et spiritualibus non esse libe¬ ros Clericos jure divino a potestate Prin¬ cipum Laicorum : constat enim non solum ex Codice et Authenticis, sed multo magis ex Nomocanone Photii, non paucas leges Justiniani de rebus plane ecclesiasticis, et spiritualibus disponere. Covarruvias autem, et Medina, ut etiam omnes Theologi et Ca- nonistae, summo consensu docent in rebus Ecclesiasticis , et spiritualibus liberos esse Clericos a potestate Principum [saeculi jure divino. Coguntur igitur ipsi etiam nobiscum dicere leges illas procedere de facto non de jure, et toleratas aliquando a summis Pon¬ tificibus, nunquam autem approbatas. Non tamen negaverim, multas quoque esse civi¬ les leges Imperatorum, quas non minus Cle¬ rici, quam Laici sequi debeant. Ecclesia enim pro cursu temporalium tantummodo rerum, ut loquitur Nicolaus I Papa in epis¬ tola ad Michaelem, Imperialibus utitur legi¬ bus. Quod idem habemus in multis Canoni¬ bus distinctionis decimse apud Gratianum, et capite 4 . de novi oper. nuntiat, et alibi. Quae tamen omnia intelligi debent de iis le¬ gibus, quae non sunt contrariae Ecclesiasticae libertati, et quoad directionem, non quoad coactionem, ac denique cum adsunt aliae conditiones, quas notant Doctores, ac prae¬ sertim Felinus in cap. Ecclesia S. Mariae, de constit. quaest. 1. Tertio objiciunt exem¬ plum Apostoli Pauli, qui cum esset Praesul ecclesiasticus, non timuit appellare Caesa¬ rem, atque ab eo judicari se debere libere confiteri, ut S. Lucas refert Act. XXV. Sed hanc objectionem Covarruvias omnino de¬ buisset omittere; nam B. Paulus, ut constat ex cap. ult. Actorum, coactus est appellare Caesarem, oppressus videlicet calumniis Ju¬ daeorum, et injustitia Praesidis Romani, qui solum Caesarem supremum Judicem agnos¬ cebant. Itaque ipse quoque de facto saltem, si non de jure, Caesarem Judicem agnoscere debuit, nec sine risu exceptus fuisset, si B. Petri supremi Principis ac Judicis sui coram Gentilibus, vel Judaeis mentionem facere vo¬ luisset. Quarto objiciunt testimonia Sanctorum Apostolorum Petri et Pauli. Scribit enim B. Petrus in epist. priore, cap. II : Subjecti es¬ tote omni humance creaturie propter Deum, sive Regi tanquam praecellenti, sive Ducibus tan- quam ab eo missis ; et B . Paulus in epist. ad Rom. cap. XIII : Omnis , inquit, anima potes* tatibus sublimioribus subdita sit (1). In quem (1) I. Petr. II, 13; Rom. XIII, 1. CAPUT XXX. 495 locum scribit S. JoannesChrysostomus, hsec dici non tantum Laicis, sed etiam Clericis, et Monachis , et ipsis etiam Apostolis et Evahgelistis. Respondeo, sententias Aposto¬ lorum generales esse. Quamvis enim nomi- natim in eis fiat mentio Regum, quoniam eo tempore valde necessarium erat diligenter monere Christianos, ut Regibus obedirent, ne Fidei praedicatio impediretur, tamen ab¬ solute verba illa tam B. Petri, quam B. Pauli nihil aliud significant, nisi debere om¬ nes homines suis legitimis superioribus sub¬ ditos esse, eisque debitam obedientiam ex¬ hibere. Quare non potest ex his testimoniis Apostolicis probari Clericos Principibus sae¬ culi, vel ipsorum legibus obtemperare de¬ bere, nisi prius probetur, Reges saeculi esse legitimos superiores et Judices Clericorum. Quod certe probari non poterit nisi probe¬ tur, oves Pastoribus, filios parentibus, et temporalia spiritualibus praeeminere. Nec tamen Chrysostomo contradicimus. Quam¬ vis enim judicem proprium Clericorum, et Monachorum solum Pontificem esse dica¬ mus, tamen fatemur, Reges, non solum Lai- corum, sed etiam Clericorum, et Monacho¬ rum Reges esse. Unde etiam non sine causa in publicis precibus oramus pro Rege, vel pro Imperatore nostro. Nam cum Reges bella gerant non solum pro Laicis, sed etiam pro Clericis et Monachis, proque omnium pace, et tranquillitate invigilent, debetur eis ab omnibus honor, juxta illud B. Petri, I. epist. cap. II : Regem honorificate (I). Debe¬ tur etiam obedientia, cum eorum leges non sunt contrariae sacris Canonibus, et cum de rebus iisdem nulla exstet canonica disposi¬ tio. Ac demum quoad directionem ut supra diximus, non ad coactionem. Praeter haec argumenta objicit Joannes Medina loc. cit. quaedam alia, quae Covarruvias fortasse, ut leviora praetermittenda putavit. Sed nos ea quoque breviter diluamus. Ait igitur Medina in lege naturae primogenitos omnes fuisse sacerdotes, nec tamen exemptos a majorum suorum potestate. Item in lege scripta Levi¬ tas, quibus nunc succedunt Clerici, non so¬ lum Aaroni Pontifici subjectos fuisse, sed etiam Mosi, qui Princeps erat civilis totius populi Judaeorum. In lege quoque evange- lica Christum ipsum, qui caput erat omnium sacerdotum, Pilato subjectum fuisse, juxta illud : Non haberes potestatem in me ullam , nisi tibi datum esset desuper (2). Denique ita ratiocinatur Medina : Lex evangelica, Bap¬ tismus, ordo clericalis, non liberant jure di¬ vino a debitis antea contractis, ut a debito servitutis, a debito pecuniario, a debito con¬ jugali, ergo neca debito subjectionis et obe- dientiae civilis, sed clerici ante clericatum subjecti erant potestati et jurisdictioni Prin- cipum, et Magistratuum saecularium , non igitur liberi sunt jure divino ab eadem po¬ testate et jurisdictione post Clericatum. Sed ad haec omnia facilis est et expedita respon¬ sio. Nam de primogenitis in lege naturae non probavit Medina eos civilibus Magistratibus fuisse subjectos. Nos autem probare possu¬ mus, non fuisse ; quoniam iidem Primoge¬ niti Sacerdotes et Principes esse solebant, docet S. Hieronymus in quaestionibus He¬ braicis ad cap. XL1X Genesf quae est etiam communis Hebraeorum sententia, et expri¬ mitur ab ipsa Paraphrasi Chaldaica eodem loco in benedictione Ruben. Porro Moses, cui subjecti erant Levitae, non solum Prin¬ ceps civilis totius populi, sed etiam summus sacerdos erat, et Aarone major, quamvis ex¬ traordinaria potestate. Unde dicitur in Psal. XCV1II : Moyses , et Aaron in sarcer dotibus ejus ; et novimus Aaron a Mose consecra¬ tum ; et denique testatur Philo in extremo libro de vita Mosis fuisse Mosen Pontificem, Regem, et legislatorem Hebraeorum. Quid igitur mirum, si Levitae Moysi subjecti erant, non minus quam Aaroni, cum Moses non minus quam Aaron sacerdotio fungeretur. Christum autem Pilato subjectum fuisse de facto solum, non de jure certissimum est. Et potestas desuper data, quam in Pilato Christus agnoscit, non potestas judiciaria, sed permissio intelligenda est, ut sancti Pa¬ tres docent, Chrysostomus et Cyrillus ; de qua Dominus ait Luc. XXII : Haec est hora vestra , et potestas tenebrarum ; et certe fe¬ rendum non esset, si Medina cum Marsilio Paduano Christum, Dei filium naturalem, Principibus terrenis jure subjectum fuisse dicere vellet. Ratiocinatio denique ejusdem Medina: aut nihil probat, aut plus quam ipse velit probat. Nam si paria sunt eximere a debito servitutis, vel pecuniario, vel uxorio; et eximere a debito subjectionis, et obedien¬ tia; civilis ; sicut non potest summus Ponti¬ fex eximere homines Christianos a debito servitutis, vel pecuniario , vel uxorio sine » (1) I. Petr. II, 17. — (2) Joan. XIX, 11. 496 LIBER I. consensu partis, quoniam alioquin injuriam facere videretur; ita non potuisset idem summus Pontifex eximere Clericos a juris¬ dictione Principum saecularium, sine ipso¬ rum consensu. Atque hoc est contra omnes Theologos, a quibus nec ipse Medina dissen¬ tit. Non igitur sunt illa paria, ac per hoc Medinae argumentum non recte concludit. Ratio vero discriminis inter illa debita haec est, quod majus omnino sit vinculum inter creditorem et debitorem, Dominum et ser¬ vum, virum et uxorem ; quam inter Princi¬ pem, vel Magistratum et civem. Itaque cleri¬ catus non eximit a debitis illis prioris gene¬ ris, et ideo non poterit fieri Clericus is, qui servus est, nisi prius a Domino liberetur, ne¬ que is qui est alligatus uxori, nisi uxor con¬ sentiat, et ipsa quoque votum continentiae emittat, neque qui tantum pecuniae debet, ut restituere nequeat, si Clericus fiat, nisi a creditore debitum remittatur. At idem Cle¬ ricatus eximit a subjectione civili, et trans¬ fert in subjectionem ecclesiasticam etiam non consentiente, vel repugnante superiore civili ; quoniam unusquisque circa statum propriae personae liber est, sicut potest relin¬ quere patrem et matrem, et adhaerere uxori, juxta verbum Domini Matth. XIX, ita potest relinquere Principem saeculi, et in sortem Domini transire, atque ad Dei servitutem accedere, seque totum Episcopo in clerica¬ tu, vel Abbati in Monastica professione com¬ mittere. At, inquit Medina, lex evangelica, etBaptismus non eximunt a jurisdictione ci¬ vili, igitur neque eximit Clericatus. Respon¬ deo, non esse eamdem rationem legis Evan- gelicee et Baptismi, ac ipsius Clericatus. Nam lex Evangelica, et Baptismus non ex¬ cludunt, imo necessarium esse volunt Prin¬ cipatum civilem, ut adversus Anabaptistas nos alio loco probavimus. At Clericatus, ut etiam Monachatus, non posset suo munere recte fungi, nisi liber esset et immunis a ju¬ risdictione civili ; et ordo ipse naturae per¬ vertetur, si Pastores ovibus, Parentes filiis, et spiritualia corporalibus subjicienda sint. At, inquies, injuria fiet Principibus si inviti suo jure priventur, quod in clericos ante clericatum habebant. Respondeo, nullam ip¬ sis injuriam fieri, quia, qui jure suo utitur, nullam facit injuriam. Utitur autem jure suo, qui elegit statum quem sibi magis con¬ venientem esse censet, quamvis per acci¬ dens sequatur, ut Princeps subdito suo pri¬ vetur. Nam etsi quis justa de causa domi¬ cilium suum in aliam civitatem, vel provin¬ ciam transferat, desinet subditus esse priori Principi, nec tamen injuriam illi fecisse vi¬ debitur. Ultima objectio Medinae illa est, quod non repugnet rationi, ut homines ad¬ dicti obsequio Dei et spiritualibus functioni¬ bus subsint in rebus temporalibus et civili¬ bus Regi, vel Magistratui saeculari. Ex quo sequitur, ut si exempti sint, id factum sit con¬ cessione Principum, non jure divino. Addi potest confirmatio ad hoc argumentum, ut nihil difficultatis subterfugere videamur. Nam sicut Princeps saecularis, ut Christianus et in rebus spiritualibus est ovis, et filius sa¬ cerdotum : ita e contrario sacerdotes ut ci¬ ves, et in rebus temporalibus videntur posse dici oves, et quasi filii Principum saecula¬ rium. Item quia una tantum est Ecclesia, continens Clericos et Laicos, et Ecclesiae ca¬ put est summus Pontifex, ideo subsunt om¬ nes eidem summo Pontifici tum Clerici, tum Laici, igitur eodem modo quoniam una est civitas continens Laicos et Clericos, et civi¬ tatis caput est Princeps saecularis, ideo sub¬ jecti debent esse omnes tam Laici, quam Clerici Principi saeculari in iis, quae pertinent ad bonum regimen civitatis. Respondeo, hoc argumento probari, exemptionem Clerico¬ rum non esse de jure naturae primario, quod nos supra in duos gradus distinximus, sed esse de jure naturae secundario, quod etiam jus gentium appellari diximus. Nam ut S. Thomas recte docet in 2. 2. quaest. LVII, art. 3. jus naturae primarium respicit rem absolute consideratam, jus naturae secunda¬ rium, sive jus gentium respicit rem in or¬ dine ad certum finem, et ideo pendet ex dis¬ cursu rationis. Licet igitur non repugnat ra¬ tioni absolute, ut clericus subsit in rebus ci¬ vilibus Principi saeculari ; tamen repugnat in ordine ad officium Clericorum rite adminis¬ trandum. Nam ut alia omittam, turpissimum esset ut etiam Sotus annotavit, si Magistra¬ tus Episcopum corrigere, vel punire posset, a quo ipse corrigendus et puniendus est. Et quis ferret, si hodie sacerdos ad suum tri¬ bunal Magistratum vocaret, cras autem Ma¬ gistratus vocaret sacerdotem ad suum? Et nonne omnis reverentia, quam necessario debent Laici sacerdotibus, periret, si eos pro imperio coercere possent? Hinc igitur ante omnes Principum leges, humanum genus ratione docente constituit, ut ubique sacer¬ dotes immunes essent a jurisdictione Princi¬ pum Laicorum. Ad primam confirmationem CAPUT XXX. 497 respondeo : Principem quidem ovem, ac fi¬ lium spiritualem sacerdotis esse : sed sacer¬ dotem nulla modo filium vel ovem Principis dici posse : quoniam sacerdotes, et omnes clerici suum habent Principem spiritualem, a quo non in spiritualibus solum, sed etiam in temporalibus reguntur. Neque fieri po¬ test, ut duos agnoscant Principes in rebus temporalibus, cum, juxta Evangelium, nemo possit duobus Dominis servire. Ad alteram confirmationem respondeo : Ecclesiam vere unam tantum esse, et nullo modo duas, ci¬ vitatem autem unam esse materialiter, et duas formaliter. Nam Ecclesia continet om¬ nes Christianos Catholicos, sive sint Clerici, sive Laici. Si quis autem consideret coetum Laicorum, non ut Christiani sunt, sed ut ci¬ ves, vel quocumque alio modo, is coetus Ec¬ clesia dici non potest. Non igitur duse fingi possunt Ecclesiae, ac multo minus esse. At coetus Laicorum, et coetus Clericorum for¬ maliter duae civitates dici possunt, quoniam in ipsis etiam temporalibus rebus diversas leges habent, diversum Principem, diversa tribunalia, et tamen materialiter unam quo¬ que civitatem faciunt, quia unam Urbem in¬ habitant, et sub ejusdem Principis protec¬ tione vivunt, qui sicut pro labore ac sollici¬ tudine, quam pro communi bono suscipit, a Laicis tributa recipit, ita recipit a Clericis auxilia longe majora publicarum precum, et sacrificiorum ad Deum. Tom. II. 32 VT 'i ’ • '* ’ r " ’ . - , ■ • .J * . ' , ■ 'i ...... . ' V