Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Councils · On the Authority of Councils, Book I
Chapter 16: The Adversaries’ Objections Are Answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. II, De Conciliis (De Conciliorum Auctoritate), On Councils, Book I (of the controversy On Councils and the Church). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
But it is objected, first, by the Protestants in the little book entitled The cause, etc., the testimony of Luke, Acts 15, where Saint Luke, speaking of the first Council of the Apostles, says: The apostles and ancients assembled to consider of this matter. And below: Then it pleased the apostles and ancients, with the whole church. Where we see that not only the Apostles, but also the Presbyters and Laymen, were present at the first Council.
I answer that in that Council the Apostles were present as judges, to define; the Presbyters to consult; but the people were not called, yet were present and consented — not indeed by defining or disputing, but only by hearing and not gainsaying. That this is so is proved in two ways. First, from the custom of the Church, which is the best interpreter of the Scriptures; for since in all the Councils celebrated after the Apostolic times it is established that this order was observed, that the Bishops alone were judges, though many others, whether Clerics or Laymen, were present, we ought to believe that altogether the same was kept in the Apostolic Council. For the whole Church, and especially in those first times, would not have departed from the example and tradition of the Apostles. Next, this same can be demonstrated from the context itself; for that the Apostles and Presbyters only were called is plain from what is there said: The apostles and ancients assembled to consider of this matter, where no mention is made of the people. Next, that both the Apostles and the Ancients spoke while it was discussed, so that a great disquisition was made; but that after the disputation, in which the Apostles and Presbyters had spoken, the Apostles alone spoke the definitive opinions, is plain from this, that only Peter, Paul, Barnabas, and James are introduced by Luke as speaking. And that no others spoke opinions is plain from the continuation of the text; for after Peter's opinion it is straightway added: And all the multitude held their peace, and they heard Paul and Barnabas. Then it is added: And after they had held their peace, namely Paul and Barnabas, James answered, saying; and soon, James's oration finished, is subjoined: Then it pleased the apostles, etc.
And so it is a lie which the Magdeburgians say, that all who were there spoke their opinion; but that which follows, It pleased the apostles and ancients, with the whole church, is understood of the tacit consent which ought to be given by all who are in the Council. See the Council of Carthage in the works of Cyprian; for even in that Council there were present with the Bishops also Presbyters, Deacons, and very many Laymen, and yet the Bishops alone spoke opinions.
Secondly, the same object in the same place: A general Council represents the whole Church; therefore there ought to be there men of every kind — that is, Bishops, Presbyters, Princes, private persons, Clerics, Laymen, etc. I answer that a thing can be represented in many ways, but the best way is that by which the peoples are represented by their Princes. For as in general assemblies of many estates the consuls or lords of the cities are wont to be gathered, so in the general assemblies of the Church all the Bishops are gathered; for each Bishop bears the person of his Church, as is plain from Cyprian, Book 4 letter 9, where he says that the Church is in the Bishop. Wherefore Eusebius, Book 3 on the life of Constantine, calls the Council of 318 Bishops an assembly of the whole world. And Augustine, Book 1 on Baptism chapter 18, calls the consent of the Bishops of that same Council the consent of the whole Church.
Thirdly, the same object in the same place: a common cause is to be helped by common votes and forces; but the cause of faith is common to all Christians, for the faith pertains no less to Laymen than to Clerics; therefore to Councils Laymen too are to be convoked. I answer: the cause of faith pertains to all, but in a diverse manner; for to the Prelates it pertains as to teachers, to the rest as to disciples — as in war the cause of victory pertains to the whole army, yet it is the leaders' to command and lead the army, the rest's to fight.
If anyone object those words of Nicholas I in his letter to Michael, which are had also distinction 96, canon Ubinam: “Where,” he says, “have you read that the Emperors your predecessors were present at synodal assemblies, unless perhaps at certain ones where the Faith was treated, which is universal, which is common to all, which pertains not only to Clerics but also to Laymen and to absolutely all Christians?” — it can be answered that Nicholas rightly gathered, from the fact that the faith is common to all, that the Emperor ought to be present, not indeed as a Judge, but as one to whom it belongs to defend the common faith by edicts and laws, and, if need be, even by the sword.
Fourthly, the same object, and Charles Molinaeus in the places noted, and Brentius in the Confession of Wittenberg chapter on Councils, and Hermann Hamelmann Book 3 of the Prolegomena chapter 6: that often the opinion of one man, even a Layman, has been preferred to the opinion of the whole Council, because it was more fortified by the authority of Scripture, and without doubt is also thereafter to be preferred; therefore to a Council Laymen too, and any others, ought to be called. The antecedent they prove, first, from Gratian, question 36, question 2, last canon, where we read that the authority of Jerome, fortified by sacred Scripture, prejudged the whole general Council. Secondly, from Panormitanus on the chapter Significasti, on election, and from John Gerson, part 1 on the examination of doctrines; of whom the former says that the opinion of one private man is to be preferred to the opinion of the Pope, if that private man be moved by better authorities of the Old and New Testament; and the latter teaches that any learned man can and ought to resist the whole Council, if he see it erring out of malice or ignorance. This argument is confirmed, because the reason why the Bishops are chiefly called is that they are thought to be more learned than the rest; if, then, many Laymen be found more learned than the Bishops, or equally learned, why will they not be called to the Council?
I answer to the first: the opinion of one private man can be preferred to the opinion of a general Council before the definition, while the cause is discussed — for in discussion erudition, not the authority of the person, holds the first place; moreover also after the definition, when it is established that the Council was illegitimate; but in no way after the definition of a legitimate Council.
To that from Gratian, I say, first, that Hermann lies when he says that according to Gratian Jerome is preferred to a general Council; for Gratian speaks not of a general, but of a particular one. Secondly I say that those words which Gratian attributes to Jerome are nowhere found in the works of Jerome, nor seem to be his. Thirdly I say that Gratian slipped in that place. For Jerome and the Council do not fight, as Gratian thought. For Jerome only said that according to the old law it was lawful for a ravisher to take to wife the woman ravished by him, if her father consent; but the Council decreed that, notwithstanding that old law, which is judicial and does not bind Christians, it is not lawful for a ravisher to take to wife her whom he ravished.
To that from Panormitanus and Gerson, I say, first, that they speak conditionally, like the Apostle when he says, Galatians 1: Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach a gospel, etc. As, therefore, from the conditional sentence of the Apostle it is not lawful to gather “therefore Apostles and Angels could preach something contrary to the Gospel of Christ,” so also from the fact that Panormitanus and Gerson say it is lawful for anyone to resist a Council or the Pope if he see them erring, it is not lawful to gather “therefore absolutely Councils and Pontiffs can err, and therefore private men are to be called to Councils.” I say, secondly, that they speak of the resistance which can be made to a Council or Pope at the time of discussion before the decision, or also afterward, when the Council is illegitimate.
To the confirmation I say that the Bishops ought indeed to be chosen the most learned and the best, yet they have the authority of judging not because they are learned, but because they are public persons — that is, Princes having Ecclesiastical jurisdiction; just as in secular Princes and Judges too, jurisprudence and probity are indeed required, yet it will not therefore be lawful for a private man, better and more learned, to thrust the Prince or Judge from his seat and occupy it.
Fourthly, Hermann Hamelmann objects, Book 3 of the Prolegomena chapter 10, many testimonies of the ancients, that causes of faith were disputed before the people as judge. For so disputed the Apostle Peter and Simon Magus, in Clement, Books 1 and 2 of the Recognitions; Archelaus the Bishop and Manichaeus, in Epiphanius heresy 66; Pope Sylvester and the Jews, in Zonaras in the life of Constantine; Athanasius and Arius, in Vigilius Bishop of Trent; Augustine and Maximinus, in Augustine Book 1 chapter 1 against Maximinus. And that in the Council of Nicaea too there were many learned and eloquent Laymen is plain from Nicephorus, Book 8 chapter 14. Finally, that the people is judge, Ambrose expressly has, in letter 32, where he speaks thus: “Who would refuse that the cause of faith be handled in the Church? If anyone is confident, let him come hither.” And a little after: “This people judges, in whose heart is the divine law, not the human — a law written not with ink, but by the Spirit of the living God.” And below: “But Auxentius, certain that you are not ignorant of the faith, refuses your examination.”
For the solution two things are to be noted. First, that there is a twofold judgment, public and private. Public is that which is pronounced by a public judge with authority, so that the rest are bound to acquiesce in that judgment. Private is that opinion which each one chooses as true, but which binds no one — in the way that in the disputations of Theologians and Philosophers the hearers are judges; for, both parts heard, they choose what they will, but can compel no one to think likewise. Note, secondly, that a public judgment in a cause of faith was never granted to the people, but a private judgment was sometimes granted even by pious and holy men; but only then, when it could not be otherwise. For the peoples are bound to follow the judgment of their pastors; yet when heretics dwell with impunity among Catholics and seduce many, it is sometimes expedient to enter public disputations with them before the people, and to leave the judgment to the people, that it may follow those whom it sees to rest on better reasons — as Elijah did, 3 Kings chapter 18, who, when he could not otherwise recall the people from the worship of Baal, set up a contest with the Prophets of Baal, the people being present, and said: He that shall answer by fire, let him be God. If the Lord be God, follow him; but if Baal, follow him.
These things noted, I say to all those places that in those disputations a private judgment was given to the people, not a public one, and this because it could not be otherwise done. Which can be understood from that letter 32 of Ambrose. For thus he says: “Let them plainly come, if there are any, to the Church; let them hear with the people — not that anyone sit as judge, but let each one have the examination of his own affection, and choose whom he will follow.” Where you see a public judgment denied to the people, a private granted. But why a private was granted, the cause was that then at Milan the Emperor favored the Arians, nor could anything else be obtained. This in general can be said to all those places. But in particular, to that of the Council of Nicaea, it must be known that the Laymen were not called, nor were present at the acts of the Council, but came of themselves, to dispute outside the Council with the Bishops, whom they had heard had come together thither from the whole world. See Rufinus, Book 10 chapter 3.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVI. Solvuntur objectiones adversariorum. At objicitur primo a Protestantibus in li¬ bello, qui inscribitur, Causa etc. testimo¬ nium Lucae, Act. XV, ubi S. Lucas loquens de primo Concilio Apostolorum, ait : Conve¬ nerunt Apostoli et Seniores videre de verbo hoc. Et infra : Tunc placuit Apostolis , et Senioribus cum omni Ecclesia (1) ; ubi videmus , non so¬ lum Apostolos, sed etiam Presbyteros et Lai- cos in primo Concilio adfuisse. Respondeo, in isto Concilio interfuisse Apostolos, tanquam judices, ad definiendum, Presbyteros autem ad consultandum ; ple¬ bem autem non esse vocatam, sed tamen adfuisse, et consensisse, non quidem defi¬ niendo, vel disputando, sed tantum audien¬ do, et non reclamando ; quod ita esse pro¬ batur dupliciter. Primum, ex consuetudine Ecclesiae, quae est optima Scripturarum in¬ terpres ; nam cum in omnibus Conciliis, quae post Apostolica tempora sunt celebrata, hunc ordinem observatum esse constet, ut soli Episcopi fuerint judices , licet praesentes ad¬ fuerint multi alii, vel Clerici, velLaici, idem omnino in Apostolico Concilio servatum esse credere debemus. Nec enim Ecclesia universa, ac praesertim primis illis tempori¬ bus, ab Apostolorum exemplo et traditione discessisset. Deinde , hoc idem ex ipso contextu de¬ monstrari potest : nam quod Apostoli et Presbyteri tantum vocati sint , patet ex eo, quod ibi dicitur : Convenerunt Apostoli et Se¬ niores videre de verbo hoc; ubi nulla mentio fit plebis. Deinde, quod tam Apostoli, quam Seniores locuti sint , donec discutiebatur cum magna disquisitio fieret; quod vero post disputationem, in qua Apostoli et Presbyteri locuti erant, soli Apostoli sententias defini¬ tivas dixerint, patet ex eo, quod soli Petrus, Paulus, Barnabas, et Jacobus introducuntur a Luca loquentes. Et quod nulli alii senten¬ tias dixerint, patet ex continuatione textus ; nam post Petri sententiam , mox subditur : Tacuit autem omnis multitudo , et audiebat Pau¬ lum et Barnabam. Deinde subditur : Et post- quam tacuerunt, nimirum Paulus et Barnabas, respondit Jacobus dicens, et mox finita Jacobi oratione subjungitur : Tunc placuit Aposto¬ lis etc. Itaque mendacium est, quod Magdebur- genses dicunt, omnes qui ibi erant, senten¬ tiam suam dixisse , quod autem sequitur : Placuit Apostolis et Senioribus cum omni Ec¬ clesia , intelligitur de consensu tacito, qui debet dari ab omnibus, qui sunt in Concilio. Vide Concilium Carthaginiense in operibus Cypriani; nam etiam in eo Concilio adfue¬ runt cum Episcopis etiam Presbyteri , Dia¬ coni, et Laici permulti, et tamen soli Epis¬ copi sententias dixerunt. Secundo, objiciunt iidem ibidem : Conci¬ lium generale universam Ecclesiam reprae¬ sentat, ergo debent esse ibi homines ex omni genere, id est, Episcopi, Presbyteri, Princi¬ pes, Privati, Clerici, Laici etc. Respondeo, multis modis posse aliquid re¬ praesentari , sed optimum modum esse, quo per Principes repraesantantur populi. Sicut enim in comitiis generalibus multorum sta¬ tuum congregari solent consules vel domini civitatum, sic in comitiis Ecclesiae generali¬ bus congregantur omnes Episcopi : nam qui¬ libet Episcopus personam gerit suae Eccle¬ siae, ut patet ex Cypriano lib. IV, ep. 9. ubi dicit, Ecclesiam esse in Episcopo. Quare Eusebius lib. III de vita Constantini, Conci¬ lium Episcoporum 318, vocat conventum orbis terrarum. Et Augustinus lib. I de Baptismo, cap. 18. ejusdem Concilii Episco¬ porum consensum, vocat totius Ecclesiae con¬ sensum. Tertio, objiciunt iidem ibidem : commu¬ nis causa communibus votis et viribus ju¬ vanda est, sed causa fidei est communis om¬ nibus Christianis; nec enim minus fides ad Laicos, quam ad Clericos pertinet; igitur ad Concilia etiam Laici convocandi sunt. Res¬ pondeo : causam fidei ad omnes pertinere, sed diverso modo ; nam ad Praelatos perti¬ net, ut doctores; ad caeteros, ut discipulos; sicut in bello causa victoriae ad totum exer¬ citum pertinet, tamen ducum est praeci¬ pere et ducere exercitum , caeterorum pug¬ nare. Si quis objiciat illa verba Nicolai I in epis¬ tola ad Michaelem, quae habentur etiam (1) Act. XV, 6, 7, 22 et possim. dist. 96. can. Ubinam : « Ubinam , inquit, legistis, Imperatores antecessores vestros sy- nodalibus conventibus interfuisse, nisi forte in quibusdam, ubi. de Fide tractatum est, quae universalis est, quse omnium* communis, quae non solum ad Clericos, verum etiam ad Laicos. et omnes omnino pertinet Christia¬ nos? » Responderi potest, Nicolaum ex eo, quod fides communis est omnibus, recte col¬ legisse, Imperatorem debere interesse , non quidem ut Judicem, sed ut eum, cui incum¬ bit defendere communem fidem edictis ac legibus, et si oporteat, etiam gladio. Quarto, objiciunt iidem, et Carolus Moli- naeus locis notatis, necnon Brentius in Con¬ fessione Wirtembergica , c. de Conciliis , et Hermannus Hamelmannus lib. III Prolego- menorum cap. 6. saepe unius hominis etiam Laici sententia praeposita est sententiae totius Concilii, quia Scripturae auctoritate magis munita erat, et sine dubio etiam deinceps praeponenda est ; Ergo debent ad Concilium vocari etiam Laici, et quicumque alii. Antecedens probant , primo ex Gratiano 36, q. 2, can. ult. ubi legimus Hieronymi auctoritatem, Scriptura sacra munitam, toti Concilio generali praejudicasse. Secundo, ex Panormitano in cap. Significasti, de electio¬ ne, et ex Joanne Gersone par. I de exami¬ natione doctrinarum : quorum ille dicit, unius privati sententiam praeponendam esse sententiae Papae, si ille privatus moveatur melioribus auctoritatibus Testamenti veteris et novi ; iste autem docet, quemcumque ho¬ minem doctum posse et debere toti Concilio resistere, si videat illud ex malitia, vel igno¬ rantia errare. Confirmatur hoc argumentum, quia ratio, cur Episcopi praecipue vocentur, est, quia existimantur esse doctiores caeteris; si ergo multi Laici inveniantur doctiores Episcopis, vel aeque docti, cur non vocabuntur ad Con¬ cilium? Respondeo ad primum : sententiam unius privati posse anteponi sententiae Concilii ge¬ neralis ante definitionem, dum causa discu¬ titur, in discussione enim eruditio, non auc¬ toritas personae primas tenet ; praeterea etiam post definitionem, quando constat, Concilium fuisse illegitimum : at nullo modo post defi¬ nitionem Concilii legitimi. Ad illud ex Gratiano, dico primo, mentiri Hermannum, cum ait, secundum Gratianum anteponi Hieronymum Concilio generali; non enim de generali, sed de particulari lo¬ quitur Gratianus. Secundo dico , illa verba, quae Gratianus Hieronymo tribuit, nusquam inveniri in operibus Hieronymi, nec videri ejus verba. Tertio dico , Gratianum eo loco lapsum esse. Non enim pugnant Hierony¬ mus, et Concilium, ut Gratianus putavit. Hieronymus enim tantum dixit, secundum legem veterem licuisse raptori ducere in uxo¬ rem mulierem a se raptam , si pater ejus consentiat; Concilium autem statuit, ut non obstante lege illa veteri , quae judicialis est, et Christianos non obligat, non liceat raptori in uxorem ducere eam, quam rapuit. Ad illud ex Panormitano et Gersone, dico primo, eos loqui canditionaliter, sicut Apos¬ tolus, cum ait ad Galat. I : Si nos, aut Ange¬ lus de coelo evangelizet etc. (1). Sicut ergo ex conditionali sententia Apostoli non licet col¬ ligere, ergo Apostoli et Angeli poterant Evangelizare aliquid contrarium Evangelio Christi, ita quoque ex eo, quod Panormita¬ nus et Gerson dicunt, licere unicuique resis¬ tere Concilio, aut Papas, si eos errare videat ; non licere colligere , ergo absolute Concilia et Pontifices errare possunt , et ideo privati homines ad Concilia vocandi sunt. Dico se¬ cundo, eos loqui de resistentia , quas potest fieri Concilio vel Papae, tempore discussionis ante decisionem, vel etiam postea, quando Concilium est illegitimum. Ad confirmationem dico, Episcopos qui¬ dem debere eligi quam doctissimos et opti¬ mos, tamen eos auctoritatem judicandi ha¬ bere, non quia docti sunt, sed quia sunt per¬ sonae publicas, id est, Principes habentes Ec¬ clesiasticam jurisdictionem ; quemadmodum etiam in Principibus et Judicibus saeculari¬ bus, requiritur quidem jurisprudentia et probitas, tamen non propterea licebit pri¬ vato homini meliori , et doctiori deturbare Principem, aut Judicem de sua sede, et eam oecupare. Quarto, objicit Hermannus Hamelmannus lib. III Prolegomenor. c. 10. multa veterum testimonia, quod coram populo tanquam ju¬ dice causae fidei disputatae sint. Sic enim disputarunt Apostolus Petrus et Simon Ma¬ gus, apud Clementem lib. I et II Recognitio¬ num ; Archelaus Episcopus et Manichaeus, apud Epiphanium haeresi 56. Sylvaster Papa et Judaii, apud Zonaram in vita Constan- (1) Galat. I, 8. UBER I. tini; Athanasius et Arius, apud Vigilium Episcopum Tridcntinum ; Augustinus et Ma¬ ximinus, apud Augustinumlib. I, c. 1. cont. Maximin. Quod etiam in Nicaeno Concilio multi fuerint Laici docti et eloquentes, patet ex Nicephoro lib. VIII, c. 14. Denique, quod populus sit judex, diserte habet Ambrosius in epist. 32. ubi sic loquitur: «Causam fidei, inquit, in Ecclesia agendam quis abnuat? Si quis confidit, huc veniat. » Et paulo post : « Iste populus judicat, cujus in corde lex di¬ vina est, non humana : Lex non atramento scripta, sed Spiritu Dei vivi. » Et infra : « Sed Auxentius, inquit , certus non ignaros vos esse fidei, vestrum refugit examen. i> Pro solutione duo notanda sunt. Primo, duplex esse judicium, publicum et privatum. Publicum est, quod profertur a publico ju¬ dice cum auctoritate, ita ut teneantur cseteri illi judicio acquiescere. Privatum est, ea sententia, quam quisque eligit ut veram, sed neminem obligat; quomodo in disputa¬ tionibus Theologorum et Philosophorum, auditores sunt judices; audita enim utraque parte eligunt quod volunt, sed neminem co¬ gere possunt, ut similiter sentiat. Nota secundo, judicium publicum in causa fidei numquam esse tributum populo, judi¬ cium autem privatum aliquando esse tribu¬ tum etiam a piis et sanctis hominibus ; sed tunc solum, cum aliud fieri non potuit : te¬ nentur enim populi sequi judicium pastorum suorum ; tamen quando haeretici impune versantur cum Catholicis, et multos sedu¬ cunt, expedit quandoque publicas disputa¬ tiones coram populo cum iis inire, et relin¬ quere judicium populo, ut sequatur, quos vi¬ derit melioribus rationibus niti : quomodo fecit Elias lib. III. Reg. cap. XVIII qui cum non posset aliter revocare populum a cultu Baal, instituit certamen cum Prophetis Baal, praesente populo, et ait : Qui exaudierit per ignem , ille sit Deus. Si Dominus est Deus , se¬ quimini illum, si Baal est Deus , sequimini eum (1). His notatis, dico ad illa omnia loca , in il¬ lis disputationibus datum esse populo judi¬ cium privatum, non publicum , et hoc quia non poterat aliter fieri. Id quod ex illa epist. 32 Ambrosii intelligi potest. Sic enim ait : « Veniant plane si qui sunt, ad Ecclesiam, audiant cum populo, non ut quisquam judex resideat ; sed unusquisque de suo affectu habeat examen, et eligat quem sequatur. » Ubi vides negari populo judicium publicum, tribui privatum. Cur autem tribueretur pri¬ vatum, causa erat, quia tunc Mediolani Im¬ perator Arianis favebat, nec poterat aliud obtineri. Hoc in genere ad illa omnia loca dici potest. In particulari autem, ad illud de Nicaeno Concilio, sciendum est, Laicos non esse vocatos, nec interfuisse actis Concilii ; sed per se venisse , ut extra Concilium dis¬ putarent cum Episcopis, quos audierant ex toto orbe eo convenisse. Vide Ruffinum 1. X, c. 3.