Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Councils · On the Authority of Councils, Book II
Chapter 17: That the Pontiff Cannot Subject Himself to the Coercive Sentence of Councils
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. II, De Conciliis (De Conciliorum Auctoritate), On Councils, Book II (of the controversy On Councils and the Church). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The fourth proposition: “The supreme Pontiff cannot commit to a Council, nor to any man, a coercive judgment over himself, but only a discretive one.” Note that in a perfect judgment two things are found. First, the power of discussing the cause, and of discerning and judging what is to be done. Secondly, the power of compelling him who has lost the case to obey the sentence passed against him. Both are found in a judge properly so called, such as is a prince, or a praetor appointed by the prince. But the first alone is found in arbiters, whose sentences, even if men are bound to abide by them by the law of nature (because we are bound to keep our promises), yet not by the force of the sentence, because arbiters cannot compel.
Now then the supreme Pontiff cannot set up over himself a judge properly so called, but only, in a manner, arbiters, whose sentence if he does not obey, he will do what he ought not, but not what he cannot.
The first part is proved. First, because the Pope’s power over all is of divine right, as is plain; but the Pope cannot dispense in divine right. Secondly, because an inferior cannot commit to anyone a judgment reserved to a superior. For a bishop cannot commit to his penitentiary to absolve in cases reserved to the Pope; but the judgment in the cause of the Pontiff is reserved to God, as we taught above. Thirdly, because it would follow that the Pope is superior and not superior in respect of the same, which is a contradiction. And that this follows is shown by this reason: the supreme Pontiff, when he commits himself and his cause to someone’s judgment, does not cease to be Pope, therefore neither does he cease to be superior to any Christian whatsoever. But nonetheless he is not superior but inferior, if he can be compelled; therefore he will be at once superior and not superior.
The second part is plain from Sixtus, Leo III, Symmachus, Leo IV, and others, who, when they were accused, willed their causes to be discussed in a Council of bishops, as is plain from the canons Mandastis and Auditum (cause 2, question 5) and from the Fourth Council under Symmachus; whom nevertheless the bishops did not dare to judge. Whence in the Fourth Council under Symmachus all the bishops, when they subscribe, affirm that they leave the whole judgment to God.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
caput xviu. Pontificem non posse subjicere seipsum senten¬ tiae coactivce Conciliorum. Quarta propositio : « Summus Pontifex non potest committere, neque Concilio, ne¬ que ulli homini supra se judicium coactivum, sed tantum discretivum. » Nota, in judicio perfecto duo quaedam reperiri. Primo, po¬ testatem discutiendi causam, et discernendi ac judicandi quid agendum sit. Secundo, po¬ testatem cogendi eum, qui cecidit causa, ad obtemperandum sententiae contra se latae. Utrumque invenitur in judice proprie dicto, qualis est princeps , vel praetor a principe constitutus. Primum autem solum reperitur in arbitris , quorum sententiae etiam si te¬ neantur homines stare ex jure naturae, quia tenemur servare promissa ; non tamen ex vi sententiae , quia non possunt arbitri co¬ gere. Jam ergo summus Pontifex non potest ju¬ dicem proprie dictum supra se constituere, sed tantum quodammodo arbitros, quorum sententiae si non obtemperaverit , faciet quod non debet , non autem quod non po¬ test. Prima pars probatur. Primo, quia potes¬ tas Papae super omnes , est de jure divino, f ut patet. At non potest Papa dispensare in jure divino. Secundo, quia non potest infe¬ rior committere alicui judicium reservatum superiori. Non enim potest Episcopus com¬ mittere suo pcenitentiario, ut absolvat in ca¬ sibus reservatis Papa3. At judicium in causa Pontificis est reservatum Deo, ut supra do¬ cuimus. Tertio, quia sequeretur Papam esse superiorem , et non superiorem , respectu ejusdem , quas est implicatio contraditionis. Id autem sequi, hac ratione ostenditur. Sum¬ mus Pontifex, cum se ac suam causam judi¬ cio alicujus committit, non desinit esse Pa¬ pa, ergo nec desinit esse superior quocum¬ que Christiano. At nihilominus non est su¬ perior, sed inferior, si cogi potest : erit igi¬ tur simul superior, et non superior. Secunda pars patet ex Sixto VIII, Leone III, Symmacho, Leone IV et aliis, qui cum ac¬ cusarentur, causas suas in Concilio Episco¬ porum discuti voluerunt , ut patet ex can. Mandastis, et can. Auditum, II. quaest. 5. et ex Concilio IV, sub Symmacho ; quos tamen Episcopi judicare ausi non sunt. Unde in Concilio IV sub Symmacho, omnes Episcopi cum subscribunt, affirmant, se totum judi¬ cium Deo relinquere.