Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Councils · On the Authority of Councils, Book II
Chapter 18: The Arguments of the Adversaries Answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. II, De Conciliis (De Conciliorum Auctoritate), On Councils, Book II (of the controversy On Councils and the Church). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It remains to answer the arguments. And first Hermann (Book III, chapter 12, of the Prolegomena) objects several examples of the ancients. Secondly, certain arguments from Gerson. Thirdly, another from the Council of Basel.
The first example is that of Marcellinus, who in the Council of Sinuessa was condemned and deposed by the bishops. I answer, first: Marcellinus was accused of an act of infidelity, in which case a Council can discuss the cause of the Pontiff, and if it finds that he is really an infidel, it can declare him to be outside the Church, and so condemn him. Secondly I say: the bishops indeed condemned Marcellinus, but after he had first condemned himself, that is, had abdicated the pontificate; for before that they had often cried: “The first see shall be judged by no one; thou art the accused, thou the judge; be not judged by us,” and so on. See Nicholas I in his letter to Michael.
The second example is that of Pope Melchiades, after whose sentence the bishop of Arles judged the same cause, as Augustine testifies (letter 162 to Glorius and Eleusius), where Augustine also adds: “Behold, let us suppose that those bishops who judged at Rome were not good judges. There still remained a plenary Council of the universal Church, where the cause could be discussed even with those judges themselves; so that if they were convicted of having judged badly, their sentences might be dissolved.”
I answer to that about the bishop of Arles, from the same Augustine in the same place, that the cause was judged again, not because it was necessary, but because the Emperor wished to gratify the Donatists, who asked for another judgment, in case perhaps, being condemned in two judgments, they might be healed. To that about a general Council I say that Augustine does not compare the Pope without a Council with a Council without the Pope, as we now compare them, but compares a particular Council over which the Pope presides with a general Council over which the Pope also presides. And a cause judged by the Pontiff in a particular Council can without doubt be judged again by the same in a general Council, especially in a question of fact, which depends on informations, and in which the Church can err — such as was the question then treated of. Nay, ordinarily too, when a general Council was indicted, particular Councils used first to be held in the several provinces and also at Rome, and then the matters defined in those particular Councils were treated again in the general Council, and then the final and definitive sentence was given by the Pontiff, the Council assenting.
The third example is that of Liberius, whom the Emperor deposed and afterward restored to his see, ordering that he should govern the Church at Rome together with Felix; which the same the Council of Sirmium ordered by letters given to Felix, as Sozomen relates (Book IV, chapter 14). I answer: the Emperor, being an Arian, did this unjustly and tyrannically, in the way that Nero too killed Peter and Paul. And the Council of Sirmium did not order it, but only sent hortatory letters to Felix, that he should suffer Liberius to sit together with him. Add that that Council was chiefly of the Arians, and of no weight.
The fourth example is that of Saint Leo, whose letter many bishops in the Council of Chalcedon examined, as Evagrius relates (Book II, chapter 18), and Leo himself (letter 63) glories that his letter was approved by the Council. I answer: it does not follow from this that a Council is above the Pope; for Leo had sent his letter to the Council, not as containing the final and definitive sentence, but only as an instruction, by which the bishops, being helped, might judge better. But after all had consented to Leo’s letter, then at last the final definition was issued in the name of the Pontiff and the Council. So much for the examples.
Secondly, he sets forth the arguments of Gerson; and the first is this. In Matthew 18 it is said: “If thy brother shall offend against thee,” and so on, “tell the Church.” But the Pope too is our brother, since he is a Christian and must say, “Our Father, who art in heaven”; therefore the Pope can be called to the judgment of the Church, and accordingly can be judged and punished by the Church. But the Church does nothing except through its prelates; therefore the Pope can be judged by a Council of prelates.
I answer: by the name “Church” is understood either the bishop, as Chrysostom expounds this passage, and Innocent III (chapter Novit, on judgments), and the practice of the Church demonstrates — for daily those are denounced to the bishop of whom the Lord says, “Tell the Church” — or certainly the assembly of the faithful with its head. For as Cyprian says (in his letter to Florentius, which is the ninth of Book IV): “The Church is the people united to the priest, and the flock adhering to its shepherd.” Wherefore in any diocese sinners are to be brought to the Church and the bishop of that place; but if that bishop sin, he cannot be brought to that Church, unless he must be brought to himself, since he is the head of that same Church, but he must be brought to some higher Church, over which an archbishop or patriarch presides. But if a patriarch sin, he cannot be brought to his own Church, but to a greater, that is, to the Roman Church, or to a general Council over which the supreme Pontiff presides. But if the supreme Pontiff himself sin, he is to be reserved to the judgment of God; for there is no Church to which he can be brought, since without him no Church with a head is found.
But again they insist: these words, “tell the Church,” were said to Peter; therefore Peter too, and his successor, must sometimes bring sinners to the Church, and therefore must acknowledge some tribunal of the Church greater than himself. I answer: when these things were said to Peter, he was not yet Pontiff, but a private man; and therefore that was said to him which befits those who acknowledge some superior. I add, besides, that the Pontiff can in a certain manner of his own fulfill this precept; for first he ought to correct privately him who has sinned, then employ witnesses, and lastly tell the Church, that is, himself as president, and the Church over which he presides, that is, publicly excommunicate him. In which way Blessed Gregory understood this passage (Book IV, letter 38, to John, bishop of Constantinople).
The second argument: the Pope is a member of the Church, therefore he is less than his whole, which is the Church, and can and ought to be cut off if he infects the Church, because it is of the law of nature that members infecting the whole body be cut off.
I answer to the first consequence: either the Church is taken with the Pope or without the Pope when it is inferred, “therefore the Pope as a member is less than the Church, which is the whole.” If the Church is taken without the Pope, it is false that it is the whole; for it is not the whole, but a part — and indeed greater than the head in magnitude of mass, but less in magnitude of power or authority, as is plain in any body. And what the adversaries say, that the authority of the head remains in the Church by way of supplying, has already been refuted before. But if the Church is taken with the Pope, then, as we said elsewhere, the authority of the Church is greater extensively than that of the Pope alone, but intensively equal. Just as being, as it comprehends God and creatures, is not a greater good than God alone intensively, though extensively it is greater, because there are more goods; just as also Christ, as man, is a homogeneous head of the Church, and therefore a part of it, and yet the whole Church is not greater than Christ alone.
But they insist to the contrary: the power of acting is always more principally in the whole than in the parts, which are the instruments of the whole; for a man is said more principally to see than the eye. Wherefore since the Church, including even the Pope, is a certain whole, and the Pope is a certain part and instrument of this whole, it follows that the supreme ecclesiastical power belongs more principally to the Church itself than to the Pope.
I answer: the judgment about the body of the Church and about natural bodies is different. For in natural bodies the power proceeds from the essence to the faculties, and therefore the whole is said to act more principally than any part or faculty. But in the body of the Church the power does not proceed from the essence to the faculties or parts, but from without. For the Pope, who is (as it were) the eye and hand of the Church, has his power from God, and therefore the principal agent is not the Church but God. Secondly it can be said that the principal agent in any body is always the very supposit which sustains and moves all the members. Now the supposit of the body of the Church is Christ. For as when we say “this is the body of Peter or Paul,” that “of Peter” or “of Paul” sounds the supposit; so when we say “the Church is the body of Christ,” that “of Christ” sounds the supposit. Nor does it stand in the way that Christ is also the head of the Church; for Christ, as flowing into all the members, is called the head, but as He sustains and moves all, He can be called the supposit; and in this way we concede that the Pope is an instrument of the body of the Church, and something less than the whole itself — namely, insofar as in the whole we include Christ Himself as the supposit.
To the other consequence it could be said, first, that it is of the law of nature that putrid members be cut off, but the head excepted. For it is better to have a putrid head than none. But this solution avails little; for in natural bodies the head must be excepted, because when it is cut off the whole body dies. But the body of the Church does not die when the Pope dies; whence also we see in temporal commonwealths that if a king degenerate into a tyrant, although he is the head of the kingdom, yet he can be deposed by the people and another elected. I say therefore, secondly, that in a natural body and in temporal commonwealths members infecting the whole body can be cut off, because they depend on the body itself and have their force from it; but the reasoning is not the same for the body of the Church, whose head received its authority not from the body but from God — just as neither is it lawful for a household to depose the supreme steward, though most wicked, because he was appointed not by the household but by the Lord.
But, they say, then the Church alone remains without remedy if it has a bad Pontiff, and the Pontiff will be able with impunity to vex and destroy all, and no one will be able to resist. I answer: it is no wonder if the Church remains without an efficacious human remedy, since its safety rests not chiefly on human industry but on divine protection, its King being God. And so even if the Church cannot depose the Pontiff, yet it can and ought to supplicate the Lord that He Himself apply a remedy; and it is certain that God will have a care for its safety, who will either convert such a Pontiff or take him out of the way, before he destroys the Church. Nor yet does it follow from this that it is not lawful to resist a Pontiff destroying the Church; for it is lawful, reverence being preserved, to admonish him and modestly correct him, and even to resist by force and arms, if he wish to destroy the Church. For to resist, and to repel force by force, no authority is required. See on this matter John of Torquemada (Book II, chapter [omitted]).
The third argument of Gerson, reported by Hermann, is taken from the Council of Constance. The Council of Constance (session 4) defined that a general Council has from Christ an immediate authority which all are bound to obey, even if he be of papal dignity. Either this Council is approved, or not: if it is approved, then what it defined is true and to be received; if not, then it wrongly deposed John XXIII, Gregory XII, and Benedict XIII, and elected Martin V, to whom afterward all the other Pontiffs succeeded. Add that Martin V, in the last session, confirmed all the decrees concerning faith of this Council of Constance; and this decree seems to pertain to faith.
I answer in two ways. First, the Council of Constance is lawful and approved, but does not conflict with what we have said. For it did not define absolutely that general Councils have from Christ a power over Pontiffs, but only in the case, that is, in time of schism, when it is not known who is the true Pope. For a doubtful Pope is held for no Pope, and therefore to have power over him is not to have power over a Pope. So Torquemada, Campegius, and Sander in the passages noted.
Secondly, it can be answered that it was not the Council of Constance, when it asserted this, of such a kind that it could define questions of faith. For, first, it was not then a general Council, since only a third part of the Church was present, that is, only those prelates who obeyed John; for those who obeyed Gregory and Benedict opposed what was done by the Synod. Next, there was not then a certain Pope in the Church, without whom doubts of faith cannot be defined; and in the Council there was no Pope. For John XXIII, who had begun the Council, had already withdrawn from it when the fourth session was held.
Nor is it true that Martin V confirmed this decree. For he expressly said that he confirmed only those decrees of faith which had been made conciliarly, that is, in the manner of other Councils, the matter being diligently examined; but it is established that this decree was made without any examination by the Council of Constance. And so when Martin confirmed the decrees of faith concluded conciliarly, he understood only the condemnation of the heresies of Wycliffe and Hus.
Nor does it follow, if the Council erred in this, that it also erred in deposing Gregory XII, John XXIII, and Benedict XIII. For although a Council without the Pope cannot define new dogmas of faith, yet it can judge in time of schism who is the true Pope, and provide the Church with a true shepherd when there is none or a doubtful one; and this is what the Council of Constance rightly did. Add that John and Gregory were not deposed against their will; for they themselves also spontaneously renounced the papacy, as is plain from the acts of the Council of Constance (sessions 12 and 14). And Benedict did not yield, but after his death Clement VIII, his successor, yielded to Martin V, whom the whole Church venerated as the true Pontiff — which suffices that Martin could be the true Pope.
Lastly, Hermann brings forward the Council of Basel, which (session 33) defined that it is to be believed with Catholic faith that a Council is above the Pope. Now this Council was indicted by Martin V, as is had in session 1, and afterward declared by Eugene (session 16) lawfully continued from its beginning; finally confirmed by Nicholas V with its acts.
I answer: the Council of Basel was lawfully begun, but unlawfully ended. And it is an express lie of Hermann that it was confirmed by Nicholas V with its acts. For Nicholas, as appears from his Bull annexed to that same Council, confirmed only what the Council had done concerning benefices and ecclesiastical censures. But what the Council of Basel defined about its own authority over the Pontiff, no Pontiff approved, but reproved professedly — first Pope Eugene, as is plain from the Council of Basel (session 38); then Leo X, in the last Lateran Council (session 11); likewise the whole Church, which always held Eugene, deposed by the men of Basel, for the true Pontiff; finally the men of Basel themselves, and Pope Felix, whom they created; for Pope Felix at last yielded to Nicholas, Eugene’s successor, and the men of Basel, who had transferred the Council to Lausanne, at last subjected themselves to Nicholas, as Nicholas testifies in the same Bull. Many other arguments could be set forth and solved, but they have been solved in the books On the Pontiff. See also what we shall say of the Council of Basel in the book next following, chapter 16.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPLlf XIX. Solvuntur argumenta adversariorum. Superest argumenta solvere. Ac primum Hermannus lib. III, cap. 12, Prolegomeno- rum objicit aliquot exempla veterum. Se¬ cundo argumenta quaedam ex Gersone. Tertio aliud quoddam ex Concilio Basi- leensi. Primam exemplum est Marcellini , qui in Concilio Sinuessano ab Episcopis damnatus, et depositus fuit. Respondeo Primo, Marcel- linum fuisse accusatum de actu infidelitatis, in quo casu potest Concilium discutere cau¬ sam Pontificis, et si inveniat, revera esse in¬ fidelem, potest declarare eum esse extra Ec¬ clesiam, et sic damnare. Secundo dico, Epis¬ copos quidem damnasse Marcellinuin , sed postea quam ipse primus se ipse damnave¬ rat; id est, abdicaverat se pontificatu , nam antea saepe clamaverant : « Prima sedes a nemine judicabitur, tu reus, tu judex, noli a Tom. II. nobis judicari etc. » Vide Nicolaum I, in ep. ad Michaelem. Secundum Exemplum est Melchiadis Pa¬ pie, post cujus sententiam judicavit eamdem causam Episcopus Arelaf ensis , ut testatur Augustinus in ep. 162. ad Glorium et Eleu- siiim , ubi etiam addit Augustinus : « Ecce, inquit, putemus illos Episcopos , qui Romae judicaverunt, non bonos judices fuisse. Res¬ tabat adhuc plenarium Ecclesiae universae Concilium, ubi etiam cum ipsis judicibus causa posset agitari. Ut si male judicasse convicti essent , eorum sententiae solveren¬ tur. » Respondeo ad illud de Episcopo Arelaten- si ex eodem Augustino ibidem, eam causam iterum judicatam fuisse, non quia oporteret sed quia voluit Imperator acquiescere Dona- tistis, petentibus aliud judicium , si forte in duobus judiciis condemnati sanarentur. Ad illud de generali Concilio dico, Augustinum non conferre Papam sine Concilio, cum Con¬ cilio sine Papa, ut nos modo conferimus, sed conferre Concilium particulare , cui praesit Papa, cum Concilio generali, cui etiam prae¬ sit Papa. Potest autem sine dubio causa ju¬ dicata a Pontifice in Concilio particulari, iterum ab eodem judicari in Concilio gene¬ rali , praesertim in quaestionem facti , quae pendet ex informationibus, et in qua errare potest Ecclesia , qualis erat quaestio, de qua tunc agebatur. Imo etiam ordinarie, indicto Concilio generali, olim fiebant Concilia par¬ ticularia prius in singulis provinciis, et etiam Romae, et deinde res definitae in illis Conci¬ liis particularibus iterum tractabantur in Concilio generali, et tunc dabatur ultima, et definitiva sententia a Pontifice, Concilio as- sentiente. Tertium est Liberii , quem Imperator de¬ posuit , et postea restituit in suam sedem, jubens, ut simul cum Felice Romae Eccle¬ siam regeret , quod idem jussit Concilium Syrmiense litteris datis ad Felicem, ut refert Sozomenus lib. IV, c. 14. Respondeo, Impe¬ ratorem, Arianum id fecisse injuste et tyran¬ nice , quomodo etiam Nero Petrum et Pau¬ lum interfecit. Concilium autem Syrmiense non jussit, sed tantum litteras exhortatorias misit ad Felicem, ut pateretur secum simul sedere Liberium. Adde, quod Concilium il¬ lud praecipue Arianorum fuit, et nullius mo¬ menti. Quartum est S. Leonis, cujus epistolam in Concilio Chalcedonensi multi Episcopi exa- minarunt, ut refert Evagrius lib. II, cap.18. et ipse etiam Leo epistol. 63. gloriatur epis¬ tolam suam a Concilia approbatam fuisse. Respondeo , hinc non sequi Concilium esse supra Papam ; nam Leo epistolam suam mi¬ serat ad Concilium, non ut continentem ul¬ timam, et definitivam sententiam, sed ut in¬ structionem tantum, qua adjuti Episcopi me¬ lius judicarent. Posteaquam autem omnes consenserunt epistolae Leonis , tum demum edita est definitio ultima nomine Pontificis, et Concilii. Haec de exemplis. Secundo, proponit argumenta Gersonis, ac primum est illud, Mattii. XVIII. dicitur : Si peccaverit in te frater tuus etc. dic E cclesiae (1). Sed Papa est etiam frater noster , cum sit Christianus, et dicere debeat , Pater noster qui es in coelis; potest igitur Papa ad judi¬ cium Ecclesiae vocari , proinde ab Ecclesia judicari, ac puniri potest. Non autem quid¬ quam agit Ecclesia , nisi per praelatos suos, igitur a praelatorum Concilio, Papa judicari potest. Respondeo, nomine Ecclesiae, vel intelligi Episcopum, ut exponit hoc loco Chrysosto- mus, et Innocentius III. cap. Novit, extra, de judiciis, et praxis Ecclesiae demonstrat; quo¬ tidie enim Episcopo denuntiantur ii, de qui¬ bus Dominus ait : Dic Ecclesiae^ vel certe fi¬ delium coetum cum suo capite. Nam ut Cy¬ prianus ait in epistola ad Florentium , quae est nona lib. IV : <■ Ecclesia est plebs sacer¬ doti adunata, et pastori suo grex adhaerens. » Quare in quocumque Episcopatu deferendi sunt peccatores ad Ecclesiam, et Episcopum ejus loci, sed si is Episcopus peccet, non po¬ test deferri ad eam Ecclesiam, nisi debeat de¬ ferri ad seipsum, cum ipse sit caput ejusdem Ecclesiae, sed deferendus est ad Ecclesiam aliquam altiorem , cui praeest Archiepisco- pus, vel Patriarcha : Si vero peccet Patriar¬ cha, deferri non potest ad Ecclesiam suam, sed ad majorem, id est, ad Romanam Eccle¬ siam, vel generale Concilium , cui summus Pontifex praesidet : Quod si ipse summus Pontifex peccet, judicio Dei reservandus est, non enim est ulla Ecclesia, ad quam deferri possit, cum sine ipso non inveniatur Ecclesia cum capite. Sed iterum instant. Haec verba, dic Eccle¬ siae , dicta sunt Petro, ergo etiam Petrus, et ejus successor debet deferre peccatores ali¬ quando ad Ecclesiam, debet igitur agnosce¬ re tribunal Ecclesiae quoddam suo majus. Respondeo, quando haec dicta sunt Petro, non fuisse eum adhuc Pontificem, sed homi¬ nem privatum, proinde illud ei dictum, quod iis convenit, qui superiorem aliquem agnos¬ cunt. Addo praeterea , suo quodam modo posse Pontificem hoc praeceptum implere ; Primum enim debet eum, qui peccavit, cor¬ ripere privatim ; deinde adhibere testes ; po¬ stremo dicere Ecclesiae, id est, sibi ipsi, ut praesidi, et Ecclesiae, cui ipse praeest, id est, publice eum excommunicare. Quomodo in¬ tellexit hunc locum B. Gregorius lib. IV, epist. 38. ad Joannem Constantinopolitanum Episcopum. Argumentum Secundum : Papa est mem¬ brum Ecclesiae , ergo est minor suo toto, quod est Ecclesia, et potest, et debet ampu¬ tari, si inficiat Ecclesiam, quia de jure natu¬ rae est ut membra inficientia totum corpus abscindantur. Respondeo ad primam consequentiam, vel accipere Ecclesia cum Papa, vel sine Papa, quando colligitur , ergo Papa ut membrum est minor Ecclesia, quae est totum. Si acci¬ piatur Ecclesia sine Papa , falsum est illam esse totum, non enim est totum, sed pars, et quidem major, quam caput , magnitudine molis , minor autem magnitudine virtutis, sive auctoritatis, ut patet in quolibet corpo¬ re. Quod autem adversarii dicunt, auctori¬ tatem capitis manere in Ecclesia suppletive, jam est refutatum antea. Si autem accipia¬ tur Ecclesia cum Papa , tunc , ut alias di¬ ximus, major est auctoritas Ecclesiae exten¬ sive , quam Papae solius : intensive autem aequalis. Sicut ens ut comprehendit Deum et creaturas, non est majus bonum, quam sit solus Deus intensive , tametsi extensive est majus, quia sunt plura bona : Sicut etiam Christus, ut homo , est caput homogeneum Ecclesiae , et proinde pars ejus , et tamen non est major Ecclesia tota, quam Christus solus. At contra instant : Semper potentia agen¬ di principalius est in toto, quam in partibus, quae sunt instrumenta totius ; principalius enim dicitur homo videre , quam oculus. Quare cum Ecclesia incluso etiam Papa, sit quoddam totum , et Papa sit pars quaedam, et instrumentum hujus totius , sequitur, principalius convenire ipsi Ecclesiae sum¬ mam potestatem Ecclesiasticam, quam Papae. (1) Mattii. XVIII, 17. 2"/5 Respondeo, aliud esse judicium de corpo¬ re Ecclesise et de corporibus naturalibus; Nam in corporibus naturalibus virtus proce¬ dit ab essentia ad potentias , ideo principa¬ lius dicitur totum agere, quam ulla pars, seu potentia. At in corpore Ecclesise virtus non procedit ab essentia ad potentias , seu par¬ tes, sed ab extrinseco. Papa enim , qui est a Deo auctoritatem, et ideo principale agens non est Ecclesia, sed Deus. Secundo dici po¬ test , principale agens in quolibet corpore semper esse ipsum suppositum, quod susten¬ tat et movet omnia membra. Porro supposi¬ tum corporis Ecclesise est Christus. Ut enim cum dicimus, hoc est corpus Petri velPauli, illud Petri vel Pauli, sonat suppositum ; ita cum dicimus Ecclesia est corpus Christi, il¬ lud Christi sonat suppositum. Neque obstat quod Christus sit etiam caput Ecclesise; nam Christus, ut influens in omnia membra, di¬ citur caput , ut autem sustentat et movet omnia, dici potest suppositum, et hoc modo concedimus, Papam esse instrumentum cor¬ poris Ecclesise, et quoddam minus ipso toto, ut nimirum in toto Christum ipsum, ut sup¬ positum, includimus. Ad alteram consequentiam posset dici. Primo, de jure naturae esse, ut abscindantur membra putrida, sed excepto capite. Melius enim est habere caput putridum, quam nul¬ lum. Sed haec solutio parum valet; nam in corporibus naturalibus debet excipi caput, quia eo amputato , totum corpus moritur. At corpus Ecclesiae non moritur moriente Papa; unde etiam videmus in Rebuspublicis temporalibus, si Rex degeneret in tyrannum, licet sit caput Regni, tamen a populo depo¬ ni, et eligi alium. Dico ergo Secundo , in corpore naturali et Rebuspublicis tempora¬ libus posse abscindi membra inficientia to¬ tum corpus , quia ab ipso corpore pendent, et vim habent : At non eadem ratio est cor¬ poris Ecclesiae , cujus caput non a corpore, sed a Deo auctoritatem accepit, sicut etiam non licet familiae deponere summum oeco¬ nomum, licet pessimum, quia non a familia, sed a Domino institutus est. At, inquiunt, ergo sola Ecclesia sine re¬ medio manet, si habet malum Pontificem, et poterit Pontifex impune omnes vexare, et perdere, et nemo resistere poterit. Respondeo, non mirum, si manet Ecclesia sine remedio humano efficaci , quandoqui¬ dem non nititur salus ejus praecipue huma¬ na industria , sed divina protectione , cum ejus Rex Deus sit. Itaque etiamsi Ecclesia non possit deponere Pontificem, tamen po¬ test ac debet Domino supplicare, ut ipse re¬ medium adhibeat : et certum est Deo fore curae ejus salutem, qui talem Pontificem vel convertet, vel de medio tollet, antequam Ec¬ clesiam destruat. Nec tamen hinc sequitur, non lieere resistere Pontifici Ecclesiam des¬ truenti ; licet enim eum servata reverentia admonere, et modeste corripere, repugnare etiam vi et armis, si Ecclesiam destruere ve¬ lit. Ad resistendum enim, et vim vi repellen¬ dam, non requiritur ulla auctoritas. Vide de hac re Joannem de Turrecremata, lib. II, c. Tertium argumentum Gersonis abHerman- no relatum, sumitur ex Concilio Constantien- si. Concilium Constantiense sess. IV. definivit Concilium generale habere a Christo imme¬ diatam auctoritatem, cui omnes obedire te¬ nentur , etiamsi Papalis dignitatis existat. Vel hoc Concilium est approbatum, vel non: si est approbatum, ergo verum est, et reci¬ piendum, quod definivit : si non, ergo per¬ peram deposuit Joannem XXIII, Gregorium XII, et Benedictum XIII, et elegit Martinum V, cui postea omnes alii Pontifices succes¬ serunt. Adde, quod Martinus V, Papa in ult. sess. confirmavit omnia decreta circa fidem hujus Concilii Constantiensis : hoc autem decretum ad fidem pertinere videtur. Respondeo dupliciter. Primo, Concilium Constantiense esse legitimum et approba¬ tum , sed non pugnare cum iis , quae dixi¬ mus. Non enim definivit absolute , Concilia generalia habere a Christo potestatem supra Pontifices, sed tantum in casu, id est, tem¬ pore schismatis, quando nescitur, quis sit ve¬ rus Papa. Nam dubius Papa habetur pro non Papa, et proinde habere super illum potes¬ tatem, non est habere potestatem in Papam. Ita Turrecremata , Campegius et Sanderus locis notatis. Secundo , responderi potest , non fuisse Concilium Constantiense , cum id asseruit hujusmodi , ut quaestiones de fide definire posset; nam in primis non erat tunc gene¬ rale Concilium , cum tantum adesset tertia pars Ecclesise, id est, ii tantum Prselati, qui obediebant Joanni; nam qui obediebant Gregorio et Benedicto, repugnabant iis, quae a Synodo fiebant. Deinde non aderat tunc certus Papa in Ecclesia, sine quo dubia de fide definiri non possunt ; in Concilio autem nullus erat Papa. Joannes enim XXIII , qui Concilium inchoaverat, jam inde recesserat, cum quarta sessio haberetur. Neque verum est , quod Martinus Y con¬ firmaverit hoc decretum. Ipse enim diserte dixit , se confirmare tantum ea decreta de fide , quae facta erant conciliariter, id est, more aliorum Conciliorum , re diligenter examinata : Constat autem hoc decretum sine ullo examine factum a Concilio Constan- tiensi. Itaque Martinus cum confirmavit de¬ creta de fide conciliariter conclusa, intellige- hat tantum de damnatione haeresum NViclefi et Huss. Neque sequitur, si Concilium in hoc erra¬ vit , errasse etiam in deponendo Gregorio XII, Joanne XXIII et Benedicto XIII. Nam etsi Concilium sine Papa non potest definire nova dogmata fidei , potest tamen judicare tempore schismatis, quis sit verus Papa, et providere Ecclesiae de vero Pastore, quando is nullus , aut dubius est , et hoc est quod recte fecit Concilium Constantiense. Adde, quod Joannes et Gregorius non inviti depo¬ siti sunt ; nam ipsi etiam sponte renuntiarunt Papatui, ut patet ex actis Concilii Constan- tiensissess. XII et-XIV. Benedictus autem non cessit, sed post ejus obitum Clemens YIII. successor ipsius cessit Martino Y. quem om¬ nis Ecclesia ut verum Pontificem, veneraba¬ tur, id quod sufficit, ut Martinus esse posset verus Papa. Ultimo, adfert Hermannus Concilium Basi- leense , quod sess. XXXIII definivit, fide Ca¬ tholica esse credendum, Concilium esse su¬ pra Papam. Fuit autem hoc Concilium in¬ dictum a Martino Y, ut habetur sess. I. et deinde ab Eugenio declaratum sess. XVI. legitime continuatum a sua inchoatione. De¬ nique a Nicolao Y confirmatum cum actibus suis. Respondeo, Concilium Basileense legitime inchoatum, sed illegitime terminatum. Est autem mendacium expressum Hermanni, quod sit confirmatum a Nicolao Y, cum ac¬ tibus suis. Nicolaus, enim ut apparet ex Bul¬ la ejus, eidem Concilio annexa, solum con¬ firmavit ea, quae egerat Concilium circa be¬ neficia, et censuras Ecclesiasticas. Quae au¬ tem definivit Concilium Basileense de sua auctoritate supra Pontificem, nullus Pontifex probavit, sed reprobavit ex professo in pri¬ mis Eugenius Papa, ut patet ex Concilio Ba- sileensi sess. XXXYIII. deinde Leo X , in Concilio Lateranensi ultimo sess. XI. item Ecclesia tota , quae Eugenium a Basileensi- bus depositum, semper habuit pro vero Pon¬ tifice ; denique Basileenses ipsi, et Papa Fe¬ lix, quem ipsi creaverunt ; Nam Papa Felix tandem cessit Nicolao Eugenii successori, et Basileenses qui Lausannam Concilium trans¬ tulerant, tandem sese Nicolao subjecerunt, ut in eadem Bulla Nicolaus testatur. Multa alia argumenta proponi , et solvi poterant, sed ea soluta sunt in libris de Pontifice. Yi- de etiam quai dicemus de Concilio Basileensi in libro proxime sequente cap. 16.