Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacrament of the Eucharist · Book III: On the Truth of the Body of the Lord, from Reason
Chapter 2: What Is the Rule for Knowing What God Can Do
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. IV, De Sacramento Eucharistiae, Book III: On the Truth of the Body of the Lord in the Eucharist (from Reason). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The rule for knowing what God can do can be taken either from God Himself, of whose power it is a question, or from man, who ought to know it, or from the things themselves which are done by that power.
A certain rule is taken from God by John Calvin, in his Short Catechism, where he explains the first article of the Creed, and in the Institutes, chapter 6, section 27; and by Peter Boquin in his book On the Supper of the Lord near the end, where they dispute of omnipotence. These men say that the power of God is not to be separated from His will and operation; that God can do that which He really wills to do and does; but that there is in God no power by which He can do that which He has not decreed to do.
This rule is false and useless. It is false, because the Scriptures most plainly teach that God can do many things which He will never do. Matthew 3 and Luke 3: God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham. On which passage Chrysostom, Ambrose, and Jerome say that God can form men from true stones, which nevertheless He never did, and it is probable will never do. Likewise Matthew 26: I can ask my Father, and he will presently give me more than twelve legions of Angels. And Mark 14: All things are possible to thee; remove this chalice from me. Where the Lord indicates plainly enough that the world could have been repaired without His death, and that His passion could have been hindered by the divine power, and yet we know that this was not done. Which Gregory Nazianzen too noted, in epistle 1 to Chelidonius; who again, Book 4 On Theology, says that God can make a camel pass through the eye of a needle, and that an old man return again into his mother’s womb and be reborn, which nevertheless He never did. Wherefore Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 95, rightly writes that God can do many things which He does not will, but wills nothing which He cannot do; and in his book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 1, teaches that many things are possible to God which will never be done, and sets the example of the camel passing through the eye of a needle. But although this rule were true, it is yet useless, because it is no more known to us what God wills to do than what He can do.
But if someone should say that the rule for knowing the divine power is His will or intellect, in this sense: that God can do all that which He wills, or which He understands to be doable—he would give a most true rule, but a useless one. Most true indeed, because in this God differs from creatures, that creatures can conceive in mind many things as doable, and even will to do them, which nevertheless they cannot really do; but God can do whatever He can will or understand as doable, and can do nothing which He cannot will, or which He does not understand to be doable. But the rule is useless, because it is no less obscure to us what God can will, or understand to make as doable, than what He can do.
On the part of man this rule could be taken: that God can do all that which man can conceive. For since the object of our mind is being itself, and the true in general, that which can be conceived or understood will be able really to exist; but that which cannot be conceived will be nothing; consequently he will be able to do all things who is able to do all that which man can conceive.
But this rule is partly true, partly false. It is true indeed inasmuch as it affirms that God can do whatever man can understand to be doable; but inasmuch as it denies that God can do what man cannot understand, it is fallacious and contrary to the divine writings. For although all being is of itself intelligible, and that alone which is not cannot be understood, yet our mind, on account of its weakness, unless it be divinely aided, is often deceived in understanding things, and thinks that many things cannot exist, and consequently are neither intelligible nor doable, which nevertheless can be understood, made, and exist. Hence John says: God is greater than our heart, 1 John 3. And the Apostle, Ephesians 3, says that God works above what we ask or understand. And Saint Augustine, Book 21 On the City of God, chapters 3, 6, and 7, shows that many things are true which nevertheless men cannot understand. And likewise Hilary, Book 3 On the Trinity, and other Fathers. And truly the heathen philosophers judged many mysteries of our faith to be utterly impossible, which nevertheless the faithful believe to be most true, no less than those men were skilled in the natural sciences. And if one man can sometimes do things which other men do not grasp, and, unless they saw them done, would believe could in no way be done—such as those things which are related of Archimedes by Plutarch in the life of Marcellus—how much more will God be able to do many things above the grasp of all men? And this very thing even the adversaries confess in words, as Calvin, Book 4 of the Institutes, chapter 17, sections 10 and 24, and Peter Boquin in his book On the Supper of the Lord, where they say that the mystery of the Eucharist is more sublime than that it can be fully understood by us; yet in reality they indicate plainly enough that they will believe nothing but what they grasp, since they everywhere assert that that cannot be done which the whole world believes not only could be done, but even was done; and the mystery which they say surpasses human grasp has no difficulty, as we showed above.
It remains, therefore, that the rule be taken from the things themselves. Now the rule could be taken from things in two ways. In one way, if we should say that God has as much active power as there is passive power in all things, or in the whole of nature. And in this manner the heathen philosophers perhaps would make God omnipotent; but Christians ought to attribute some greater power to God, since they confess that God created the world from nothing; for he who makes something from nothing does not depend on the passive power of a subject.
In another manner, then, the rule will be taken from things, if we say that God can do all things which can in any way exist, according to that word of the Angel Gabriel, Luke 1: No word shall be impossible with God. And that of the Saviour, Mark 14: All things are possible to thee. Now all that can exist which in its own notion says not ‘not to be’, but only ‘to be’. And this is what Saint Thomas writes, part 1, question 25, article 3, and all the Theologians: that God is called omnipotent because He can do all that which does not imply a contradiction; for that which implies a contradiction is not possible in any way, because it posits being and not-being at once, and consequently, if it were done, something would be done whose being it would be not to be. But bare not-being cannot be made by God, because everything that is made ought to be in some manner like Him by whom it is made; but to God, who is being itself, everything that is, is like, and only not-being is in no way like Him. Besides, to make that which is not is not to make, but to fail; and consequently to it not power, but impotence is required. And hence we say that God cannot die, cannot sin, cannot fail, because death, sin, defect are formally not-beings, and to be able for these is not of power, but of impotence. Finally, there is a first principle in the light of nature: Everything either is or is not; which being taken away, all knowledge is taken away. And so the adversaries too agree in this, that that cannot be done which implies a contradiction. And if indeed it were evidently established in particular what is the essence of each single thing, it would at the same time be established what implies and what does not imply a contradiction, and every question would be finished; but because this is not sufficiently established, therefore we must labor to show what we wish.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT II. Quae sit regula cognoscendi quid Deus possit. Regula cognoscendi quid Deus possit, vel sumi potest ab ipso Deo, de cujus potentia agitur, vel ab homine, qui eum cognoscere debet, vel a rebus ipsis, quae per eam poten¬ tiam fiunt. A Deo regulam quamdam sumunt Joannes Calvinus in Catechismo brevi, ubi explicat primum articulum Symboli, et in Institut. cap. 6. § 27. et Petrus Boquinus in libro de Ccena Domini prope finem, ubi de omnipo¬ tentia disputant. Dicunt ii homines potentiam Dei non esse separandam a voluntate, et operatione : id enim Deum posse facere, quod reipsa vult facere, et facit; nullam autem esse in Deo potentiam, qua possit facere id, quod non decrevit facere. Ha?c regula falsa est. et inutilis. Falsa est quia Scriptura? apertissime docent, Deum posse facere multa, qua? nunquam faciet. Matth. iii. et Luca? ni. Potens est Deus de lapidibus istis suscitare filios Abrahse (1). In quem locum Chrysostomus, Ambrosius, et Hieronymus, dicunt, posse Deum ex veris la¬ pidibus homines formare : quod tamen nun¬ quam fecit, et probabile est nunquam fac¬ turum. Item Matth. xxvi. Possum rogare Pa¬ trem meum , et exhibebit mihi modo plusquam duodecim legiones Angelorum. Et Mare. xiv. Omnia tibi possibilia sunt; transfer calicem hunc a me (2). Ubi satis aperte indicat Domi¬ nus potuisse reparari mundum sine morte sua et potuisse impediri passionem suam per divinam potentiam, et tamen scimus hoc non esse factum. Quod etiam notavit Gregorius Nazianzenus in epist. i. ad Chelidonium : qui rursus lib. iv. de Theologia dicit, posse Deum facere, ut camelus transeat per fora¬ men acus ; et ut senex iterum redeat in ute¬ rum matris sua?, et renascatur; qua? tamen nunquam fecit. Quare Augustinus in Enchi¬ ridio cap. 93. recte scribit multa Deum posse qua? non velit, nihil autem velit, quod non possit; et lib. de spiritu et littera, cap. i. do¬ cet, multa esse possibilia Deo, qua? numquam fient, et ponit exemplum de camelo trans- eunte per foramen acus. Sed quanvis ista regula vera esset, est tamen inutilis, quia non magis notum est nobis, quid Deus velit facere, quam quid possit facere. Si quis autem diceret, regulam cognos¬ cenda? divina? potentia? esse ejus voluntatem, vel intellectum, in hoc sensu; quod id omne possit Deus facere, vel quod intelligit esse factibile ; regulam verissimam daret, sed inutilem. ^Verissimam quidem, quia in hoc differt Deus a creaturis, quod creaturae multa possunt animo concipere, ut factibilia, et etiam vellefacere, quaetamennon possuntrei- psa facere: ac Deus quidquid potest velle, vel intelligere ut factibile, id totum potest facere, et nihil potest facere, quod non potest velle, aut quod non intelligit esse factibile. Sed re¬ gula est inutilis, quia non minus obscurum est nobis, quid Deus possit velle, aut intellige fa¬ cere, ut factibibile, quam quid possit facere. Ex parte hominis posset accipi haec regula : Id omne posse Deum facere, quod potest homo concipere. Nam cum objectum mentis nostrae, sit ipsum ens, et verum in universum, id quod potest concipi, sive intelligi, revera existere poterit; quod autem non potest con¬ cipi, nihil erit; proinde omnia poterit facere, qui poterit id totum, quod homo potest con¬ cipere. Sed haec regula partim est vera, partim falsa. Vera quidem est, quatenus affirmat posse Deum facere, quidquid potest homo intelligere esse factibile : at quatenus negat posse Deum facere quod homo non potest intelligere , fallax est, et contraria divinis litteris. Nam etiamsi totum ens est ex se in- telligibile, et id solum, quod non est, non potest intelligi : tamen mens nostra ob suam imbecillitatem, nisi divinitus adjuvetur, siepe fallitur in rebus intelligendis, et multa putat non posse existere, et proinde nec esse in- telligibilia, nec factibilia, quse tamen intel¬ ligi, fieri, et existere possunt. Hinc dicit Joannes : Major est Deus corde nostro , i. Joan. m. (3) Et Apostolus Ephes. m. dicit, Deum operari supra quam petimus, aut in- telligimus. Et S. Augustinus, lib. xxi. de civit. Dei, cap. 3, 6, et 7. ostendit multa esse vera, quae tamen homines intelligere non possunt. Et similiter Hilarius, lib. m. de Trinitate, et alii Patres. Et sane multa nostra? fidei mysteria ethnici philosophi prorsus impossibilia esse judicabant , qua? tamen fideles homines non minus, quam illi periti naturalium scientiarum, verissima esse cre¬ dunt. Et si potest unus homo interdum ea facere, quse alii homines non capiunt, et nisi facta viderent, crederent nullo modo fieri potuisse, qualia sunt , qua? de Archimede narrantur a Plutarcho in vita Marcelli : quanto magis poterit Deus multa facere supra captum omnium hominum ? Atque hoc ipsum verbis (1) Matth. III, 9; Luc. III, 8. —(2) Matth. XXVI, 53; Mare. XIV, Z$. — (3) 1 Joan. TU, 20. 134 LIBER III. fatentur etiam adversarii, ut Calvinus lib. iv. Instit. cap. 17. § 10. et 24. et Petrus Bo- quiniis in lib. de ccena Domini ubi mysterium Eucharistia? dicunt sublimius esse, quam ut a nobis plene intelligi possit : tamen reipsa satis indicant se nihil velle credere, nisi quod capiunt, cum passim assererent non posse fieri, id quod orbis terrarum credit non modo fieri potuisse, sed etiam factum esse; et mys¬ terium quod ipsi dicunt, superare humanum captum, nullam habeat difficultatem, ut supra ostendimus. Restat igitur, ut regula sumatur a rebus ipsis. Posset autem dupliciter sumi regula a rebus. Uno modo, si diceremus, Deum ha¬ bere tantum activa? potentise, quantum est passivse potentise in omnibus rebus, sive in tota natura. Et hoc modo Deum omnipoten¬ tem philosophi ethnici fortasse facerent ; at Christiani majorem aliquam potentiam Deo tribuere debent, cum fateantur Deum ex ni¬ hilo mundum procreasse : qui enim ex nihilo aliquid facit, non pendet a potentia passiva subjecti. Alio igitur modo regula sumetur a rebus, si dicamus Deum posse facere omnia, quse ullo modo existere possunt, juxta illud ver¬ bum Angeli Gabrietis ; Lucse i. Non erit im¬ possibile apud Deum omne verbum. Et illud Salvatoris Marci xiv. Omnia tibi possibilia sunt (i). Id autem omne existere potest, quod in sua ratione non dicit non esse, sed tantum esse. Et hoc est, quod scribit S. Thomas i. par. qua?st. xxiv. art. 3. et omnes Theologi, Deum dici omnipotentem , quia potest id omne, quod non implicat contradictionem ; quod enim implicat contradictionem, non est possibile ullo modo, quia ponit esse, et non esse simul, et proinde si illud fieret, fieret aliquid, cujus esset non esse. Solum au¬ tem non esse, non potest a Deo fieri, quia omne quod fit, debet esse aliquo modo simile ei, a quo fit : Deo autem, qui est ipsum esse, omne quod est, simile est, et solum non ens, non est ei ullo modo simile. Praeterea facere quod non est, non est facere, sed deficere, et proinde ad illud non potentia, sed impotentia requiritur. Et hinc dicimus, Deum non posse mori, non posse peccare, non posse deficere, quia mors, peccatum, defectus formaliter sunt non entia, et illa posse non est potentise, sed impotentiae. Denique est primum princi¬ pium in lumine naturae; Omne est, aut non est : quo sublato tollitur omnis cognitio. Itaque etiam adversarii in hoc conveniunt, id non posse fieri, quod implicat contradic¬ tionem. Et siquidem in particulari evidenter constaret, qua? sit essentia uniuscujusque rei, simul etiam constaret quid implicet, et quid non implicet contradictionem; et quaestio omnis finita esset : sed quia id non satis constat, ideo laborandum est nobis, ut osten¬ damus quod volumus.