Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book I: On Grace
Chapter 6: That the grace that makes pleasing is not really distinct from the habit of charity
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The second question remains: whether the habit of grace, of which we have discoursed hitherto, is the same as the habit of charity. Which controversy, since it does not pertain to the Catholic faith, is wont to be disputed among the Catholic Doctors themselves, the faith being safe; but I have had to treat it for this cause, that it may be understood, in the controversies that follow, what I wish to be understood by the habit of the grace that makes pleasing.
There are, then, among the theologians four opinions on this question. For some will have it that the grace that makes pleasing is a habit distinct from charity in reality and in notion; and that grace has its seat in the very substance of the soul, as in its subject, charity in the will. For they hold that grace stands to the infused virtues as the soul stands to its powers: and as the soul gives natural being to the body, while from it flow the powers, which are the instruments of actions, so also grace gives the soul a certain supernatural being, while from it in a certain manner flow the habits of the infused virtues, which are the proximate principles of supernatural operation. So teaches St. Thomas, 1-2, question 110, articles 3 and 4; question 27 On Truth, article 2 [al. 5]; on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 26, question 1, article 3; and book 3 against the Gentiles, chapter 150. The same is the opinion of Capreolus in the commentary on book 2 of the Sentences, Cajetan in the commentary on the 1-2, Ferrara in the explication of the books against the Gentiles, Dominic Soto, book 2 On Nature and Grace, chapters 17 and 18, and others. Others set up a distinction between grace and charity not real, but formal: as Alexander of Hales in the Theological Summa, part 3, question 61, member 2, article 4; Albert the Great on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 26, article 3; and perhaps St. Bonaventure on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 26, question 2, and on book 3, distinction 27, article 1, question 3 — for he does not sufficiently explain whether he means grace to be distinguished from charity in reality, or only formally; yet in this he openly differs from St. Thomas, that he places both grace and charity in the will. Others distinguish grace and charity neither in reality nor formally, but only in notion. For they teach that one and the same habit, on the side on which it regards the subject, and adorns the man himself in whom it is, and renders him pleasing and lovable to God, is named grace; on the side on which it regards the work, and makes the will prompt to love God above all things, is properly called charity. This is the opinion of Alexander of Hales — who perhaps changed his mind — in the Theological Summa, question 12 on penitence, member 3; of Richard, on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 26, question 4; likewise of Scotus, Mayronis, Gabriel, Major, and others on the same distinction; of Henry of Ghent, quodlibet 4, question 10; and of the more recent, of Andrew Vega, book 7 on the Council of Trent, chapter 25 and the two following. Others, finally, will have there to be no difference at all between grace and charity, and affirm that they are distinguished by name alone: so Durandus, on book 2, distinction 26, question 1, number 8.
Now although the two former opinions, and the fourth, are probable, and have notable and most learned authors, yet the third seems to me the more probable, and to agree more with the Scriptures and the Fathers, and with the Council of Trent itself. And indeed the fourth opinion, of Durandus, seems sufficiently refuted: both by the authority of all the other theologians, who have acknowledged some distinction between charity and grace; and also because, if grace makes a man beloved by God, and charity makes the same man a lover of God, as the common conception and the very names witness, assuredly there is some difference between charity and grace. Nor is that true which Durandus writes, that a man is made pleasing to God through grace, and dear through charity, and that therefore charity and grace are no more distinct than being dear and being pleasing. For, if we would speak properly, through the charity which each has in himself he is not dear to another, but holds the other dear; for charity is the virtue by which we love, not by which we are loved — though it can itself be the reason why we are loved by another, for love above all provokes love. Wherefore the grace by which we are dear, or pleasing, to God is distinguished, at least in notion, from the charity by which we hold God dear. But those former opinions, which set a real or formal distinction between grace and charity, are refuted by these arguments.
First: the Council of Trent, although it would not define this question, as one not pertaining to the faith, yet seems to have indicated plainly enough which opinion it more favored. For in session 6, chapter 7, where it properly treats of this matter, it simply affirms that there is a single formal cause of justification, and that it consists in charity: “Lastly,” says it, “the single formal cause is the justice of God — not that by which he himself is just, but that by which he makes us just,” etc. And a little after, explaining what that justice is: “Although no one can be just save he to whom the merits of the passion of our Lord Jesus Christ are communicated, yet this is done in this justification of the impious, when by the merit of that same most holy passion the charity of God is poured out, through the Holy Spirit, in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them. Whence in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, a man receives all these infused at once through Jesus Christ, into whom he is engrafted — faith, hope, and charity. For faith, unless hope come to it, and charity, neither unites perfectly with Christ, nor makes one a living member of his body.” And a little after it says that this living faith — that is, joined with hope and charity — is that which, from the Apostolic tradition, catechumens beg of the Church, when they beg for “the faith that bestows eternal life.” And presently it adjoins that this same living faith is the true and Christian justice, which, as the first robe, lost through Adam's sin and recovered through the obedience of Christ, the reborn are bidden to keep white and immaculate. But certainly, if justifying grace were distinguished from the habits of the theological virtues, the Council could rightly be reprehended for having made in this place no mention of grace of that kind. Would not the doctrine of so great a Council be imperfect and maimed, if in the explanation of justification it had omitted that which is the chief thing in justification? Add that in chapter 10 the same Council teaches that the increase of justice is asked by the Church, when she prays thus: “Give unto us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and charity.”
The second argument is taken from the doctrine of the ancient Fathers, who perpetually place the justice by which we are justified before God, and are pleasing and acceptable to him, in virtue, and above all in charity. Augustine, the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 42 [al. 70]: “Charity is the truest, fullest, and most perfect justice.” And on Psalm 118, discourse 26: “Justice is a great virtue of the soul, and praiseworthy above others.” And presently, expounding that verse, “I have done judgment and justice”: “By the name of justice in this place is signified not the virtue itself, but its work. For who wrought justice in man, save he who justifies the impious — that is, through grace makes the just man out of the impious? Whence the Apostle says, justified freely by his grace. He therefore does justice — that is, the work of justice — who has in himself justice, that is, the work of grace.” In which place St. Augustine most openly teaches that the justice by which we are justified by God is a virtue divinely infused, through which we work just works; hence he will not have it to be some habit in the essence of the soul, which works nothing, but a habit of virtue in the operative power. See besides the testimonies of the ancients which we cited in the book On the State of Innocence, chapter 2, for explaining the difference between the image and the likeness of God; for those testimonies teach that man was founded to the image and likeness of God, and that the image is seated in nature, the likeness in probity and justice; and that by justice must be understood the virtues, and above all charity, is not doubtful.
The third argument can be sought from the divine writings, in which we see all those things attributed to charity which by the authors of the contrary opinion are attributed to grace — not only absolutely, but even as they teach it to be distinguished from charity. Now assuredly, if according to the Scriptures all the things which are wont rightly to be attributed to grace alone belong to charity, one of two things is necessary: either false doctrine is contained in the Scriptures, which cannot be; or, what we contend, grace is distinguished from charity either in no way, or in notion only. They will have it proper to grace, as by their opinion it is distinguished from charity, to give the soul a certain supernatural being, from which a man is called a son of God by participation, and a partaker of the divine nature. But all this Scripture most openly attributes to charity. 1 John 3: Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God. And chapter 4: every one that loveth, is born of God. Besides, a man receives that supernatural being when he is regenerated and reborn, and is made a new creature; and that this is done through charity is proved from the Scriptures thus. The seed from which we are regenerated is the word of God: 1 Peter 1, being born again not of corruptible seed, but incorruptible, by the word of God who liveth. And James 1: of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth, that we might be some beginning of his creatures. But the word properly begets in us faith — and that living, which works through love: Romans 10, Faith then cometh by hearing; and hearing by the word of Christ. Living faith, then — that is, with charity — is that through which we are reborn; and hence it gives that divine and supernatural being whence we are called sons of God. And this very thing is confirmed from those words of the Apostle, Galatians 3: For you are all the children of God by faith. And that blessed Paul speaks of living faith is evident from chapter 5, where, having said, You are made void of Christ, you who are justified in the law: you are fallen from grace, he subjoins, explaining what that grace is, and what makes sons of God: “For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision: but faith that worketh by charity.” And in chapter 6 he calls this same living faith a new creature, when he says: For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature. Of which new creature the same Apostle says, Ephesians 2: For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works. And it is confirmed again on the side of those who regenerate us, who are the preachers of the Gospel: 1 Corinthians 4, by the gospel I have begotten you; Galatians 4, My little children, of whom I am in labour again, until Christ be formed in you. And Christ is formed in us, and dwells in us, through faith: Ephesians 3, that Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts. And that this faith must be living, and formed by charity, cannot be doubted. Wherefore St. John, first epistle, chapter 4, says that God abides in us through charity: God is charity: and he that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.
There are besides many other things which are wont to be attributed to grace, all of which in the Scriptures are attributed to charity; nor can anything be brought forward so proper to grace as not to belong also to charity; wherefore there is no cause why distinct habits of grace and of charity should be posited. Let us run through the particulars briefly. First, they say it is proper to grace to make a man beloved by God; but in Proverbs 8 we read, I love them that love me; and John 14, If any one love me… my Father will love him. Second, grace is said to be the life of the soul, as sin its death; but in 1 John 3 we read: he that loveth not, abideth in death; and, We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. Third, grace is said to be that gift through which the Holy Spirit dwells in us; but in Romans 5 we read: the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us. Fourth, through grace we are justified from sin; but in Luke 7 we read: Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much; and we have already shown before, from the Apostle, Galatians 6, that the new creature is faith working through love, and demonstrated from the Council of Trent that the formal cause of justification is charity infused into our minds; nor is there any theologian or philosopher who by the name of justice understands anything other than a virtue. Fifth, grace is the fountain and root of all virtues; but the Apostle, Romans 13: Love therefore is the fulfilling of the law; and 1 Corinthians 13: Charity is patient, is kind, etc.; believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things, etc.; and St. Gregory, homily 27 on the Gospels, says that charity is the root of all good works; and St. Prosper, book 3 On the Contemplative Life, chapter 13, says that charity is the life of the virtues, the death of the vices. Sixth, grace separates the sons of the kingdom from the sons of damnation — for none with grace perishes, none without grace is saved; but in James 1 we read that the crown of life has been promised to them that love God; and St. Augustine, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 18: “Charity alone divides between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of eternal damnation.” Seventh, grace is the greatest of all the gifts of God; but the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13, sets charity before all other gifts; and Colossians 3: But above all these things have charity, which is the bond of perfection; and St. Augustine, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 18: “Nothing is more excellent than this gift of God; other gifts also are given through the Holy Spirit, but without charity they profit nothing.” And sermon 50 on the words of the Lord: “Add charity, all things profit; take away charity, the rest profit nothing. What a good is charity, brethren! What is more precious, what more luminous, what firmer, what more useful, what more secure?” Eighth, grace can do nothing greater than to join man to God; but in 1 Corinthians 6 we read that he who cleaves to God (namely, through charity) is one spirit with him; and 1 John 4: he that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him — which St. Bernard excellently explains, sermon 83 on the Canticles, where he shows that nothing joins man to God more than charity, “by which,” as he himself speaks, “the soul is as it were wedded to God.” Ninth, grace makes men friends to God; but in John 15 we read: You are my friends, if you do the things that I command you. Tenth, grace makes the shapely and the gracious; but charity is that wedding garment they who lack are cast into the exterior darkness, as St. Gregory expounds, homily 38. And let these suffice from the divine writings in this place.
Let there come, lastly, arguments drawn from reason. The first reason: if that grace were distinguished from charity and the other infused virtues as the soul is distinguished from its powers, or the light of reason from the virtues, as St. Thomas teaches, it would follow that, grace being lost through sin, all the infused virtues are lost together with it — as, the soul perishing, its powers necessarily perish, and without the light of reason no virtues at all are preserved in the soul. But infused faith does not perish when grace departs, as all Catholics confess; therefore faith is not distinguished from, nor does it depend on, the grace that makes pleasing as the powers are distinguished from and depend on the soul, and the virtues on the light of reason. Nor will one satisfy the argument by saying that, grace being lost, faith indeed remains, but not perfect and formed, and that only in this way does it flow from and depend on the habit of grace. For although without grace faith is imperfect and unformed, yet it is a supernatural habit, and has a supernatural operation; and St. Thomas taught that there cannot be in the soul supernatural habits and supernatural operations unless the same soul were first raised to a certain supernatural being through the habit of grace — since operation prerequires being. The second reason: if grace were a habit distinct from charity, that would without doubt be on account of three things which seem to be proper to grace and not to belong to charity: of which the first is, to give the soul a divine and supernatural being; the second, to be the proper effect of God's love toward man; the third, to be that by which properly he is pleasing to God, whoever is pleasing to him. But these very three most openly fit charity; there is no need, then, to seek another habit. The assumption of the argument is proved: for as regards the divine being, it is certain that man cannot participate the divine being save accidentally; and there is no accident by which we more participate the divine being than charity. Not even grace itself, if it were as it is posited by St. Thomas, would so raise us to the divine being as charity in very truth raises us: for that grace would be an accident of the supernatural order, and would give the soul a certain accidental supernatural being; but charity, besides being an accident of the supernatural order and giving the soul an accidental supernatural being, joins the soul with God as inwardly and closely as can be done in this life — which grace would not do. For God is reached by intelligence and will; but the intelligence in this life reaches God only through faith, and in a riddle; while the will, even in this life, is joined to God immediately and properly through love. Add that, since the highest perfection in God is knowledge and love, in the future life we shall participate through glory the divine perfection of the vision of God, of which John writes in the first epistle, chapter 3: we shall be like to him: because we shall see him as he is; but now we participate through grace the perfection of the love of God and neighbor, of which the Lord says, Matthew 5: Love your enemies… that you may be the children of your Father, etc. As regards the proper effect of God's love: that assuredly is charity; for what does God will for us when he loves us, save that which is best for us? And the best for us is charity, as we taught above from the Apostle and Augustine. And as to the third, concerning that by which properly we are pleasing to God: that is nothing else than charity, seeing that in it consists the highest likeness to God which we can have in this life. For God loves those like himself, and loves us the more, the more like to him we are. And this is the true foundation of the friendship between us and God: for friendship arises from likeness, since everything like loves its like; and the likeness which is the foundation of friendship is not so much a likeness of nature as of morals and virtues — otherwise there would be friendship among all men, and none between angels and men. Now charity is the queen of the virtues, and far excels all the others; wherefore likeness in charity is the first and highest cause of the friendship between us and God. The third reason: grace is properly opposed to fault; but fault is an actual and habitual deformity in the will; therefore grace also will be a habit and act in the will. The fourth reason: grace answers to glory; but glory will not be some habit in the essence of the soul, as the theologians commonly teach against Henry, but a union with God through vision and love; therefore grace also is not some habit in the essence of the soul, but faith, hope, and charity, divinely infused into the powers of the soul itself and inhering in them. The fifth reason: through grace we are formally justified; but justice, by the common consent of theologians and philosophers, is a virtue of the soul, and has its seat in the will, not in the essence of the soul.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
ab habitu charitatis.
Altera quaestio superest, utrum habitus
gratiae, de quo hactenus disseruimus, sit
idem cum habitu charitatis. Quae controver¬
sia, cum ad fidem Catholicam non pertineat,
inter ipsos Catholicos Doctores, salva fide,
disputari solet : sed mihi ea de causa tra¬
ctanda fuit, ut intelligatur in controversiis
consequentibus quid per habitum gratiae
gratum facientis intelligi velim.
Igitur quatuor sunt apud Theologos de hac
quaestione sententi®. Quidem enim volunt,
gratiam gratum facientem esse habitum, re
et ratione a charitate distinctum, et gratiam
quidem in ipsa animae substantia, tamquam
in subjecto sedem habere, charitatem in vo¬
luntate. Existimant enim ita se habere gra¬
tiam ad virtutes infusas, quemadmodum se
habet anima ad suas potentias, et sicut anima
dat esse naturale corpori, ex ipsa autem po¬
tentiae fluunt, quae sunt actionum instrumen¬
ta. Sic etiam gratiam dare animae esse quod¬
dam supernaturale, ex ipsa vero quodam¬
modo fluere habitus virtutum infusarum, qui
sint principia proxima operationis supernatu-
ralis. Ita docet S. Thomas in I. 2. quaest. 110.
art. 3. et 4. et q. 27. de verit. art. 2. in 2.
Sentent. dist. 26. quaest. 1. artic. 3. et lib.
in. contra Gentes cap. 150. Eadem est sen¬
tentia Capreoli in comment. lib. n. Sentent.
Cajet, in comment. ad 1. 2. Ferrar. in explic.
librorum contra Gentes, Dominici a Soto lib.
ii. de nat. et grat. «ap. 17. et 18. et aliorum.
Alii distinctionem inter gratiam et chari-
tatem, non realem, sed formalem constituunt,
ut Alexander Alensis in Summa Theologica
pari. 3. quaest. 69. mem. 2. art. 4. Albertus
Magnus in 2. Sentent. dist. 26. art. 3. et for¬
tasse S. Bonaventura in 2. Sentent. dist. 26.
quaest. 5. et in 3. dist. 27. art. 1. quaest. 3.
is enim non satis explicat, an velit re ipsa,
an solum formaliter distingui gratiam a cha¬
ritate ; in eo tamen aperte dissidet a S.
Thoma, quod tum gratiam, tum charitatem
in voluntate constituit.
Alii gratiam et charitatem neque re ipsa,
neque formaliter, sed tantum ratione distin¬
guunt. Docent enim unum atque eumdem ha¬
bitum, qua parte subjectum respicit, atque
hominem ipsum, in quo inest, exornat, Deo¬
que gratum et amabilem reddit, gratiam
nominari ; qua parte respicit opus, et volun¬
tatem promptam efficit ad Deum super om¬
nia diligendum, dici proprie charitatem. Haec
sententia est Alexandri Alensis, qui forte mu¬
tavit opinionem in Summa Theologica ,
quaestio. 12. de pienitentia, memb. 3. Ri-
chardi in 2. Sentent. distinet. 26. quaest. 4.
item Scoti, Mayroms, Gabrielis, Majoris, et
aliorum in eamdem distinctionem, Henrici a
Gandavo quod lib. 4. quaest. 10. et exrecen-
tioribus Andreae Vegae lib. vn. in Concil.
Tridentin. cap. 25. et duobus sequentibus.
Alii denique nihil omnino interesse volunt
inter gratiam et charitatem, soloque nomine
distingui affirmant, ita Durand. in 2. dist.
26. quaest. 1. num. 8.
Quamvis autem duae priores sententiae, et
quarta probabiles sint, et auctores insignes
ac doctissimos habeant ; tertia tamen proba¬
bilior mihi esse videtur, et cum Scripturis,
et Patribus, et cum ipso Tridentino Concilio
magis congruere.
Et quidem sententia quarta Durandi satis
refelli videtur; tum auctoritate omnium ali¬
orum Theologorum, qui distinctionem ali¬
quam inter charitatem et gratiam agnove¬
runt ; tum etiam quia si gratia facit hominem
Deo dilectum, et charitas facit eumdem dilec¬
torem Dei, ut communis conceptio, et no¬
mina ipsa testantur; profecto aliquid interest
inter charitatem et gratiam ; neque verum
est quod scribit Durandus, fieri hominem
Deo per gratiam gratum, per charitatem ca¬
rum et ideo non magis esse distincta charita¬
tem et gratiam, quam esse carum et gratum.
Nam si proprie loqui velimus, per charitatem
quam quisque in se habet, non est alteri ca-
312
UPEJl l.
rus, sed habet alteram carum ; est enim cha-
ritas virtus, qua diligimus, non qua diligi¬
mur ; quamvis possit ipsa esse ratio, cur ab
altero diligamur ; amor enim amorem ma¬
xime provocat. Quare gratia, qua sumus Deo
cari, sive grati, distinguitur saltem ratione a
charitate, qua Deum habemus carum. Prio¬
res autem ilke sententia;, quae distinctionem
realem aut formalem inter gratiam etehari-
tatem ponebant, his argumentis refellun¬
tur.
Primo, Concilium Tridentinum, tametsi
non voluit, quaestionem istam, ut qme ad fi¬
dem non pertineat, definire ; tamen satis
aperte indicasse videtur, cui sententia; ma¬
gis faveret. Namsess. 6. cap. 7. ubi proprie
de hac re agit, simpliciter affirmat unicam
esse formalem causam justificationis, eam-
que in charitate cons*stere : « Demum, in¬
quit, unica formalis causa est justitia Dei, non
qua ipse justus est, sed qua nos justos facit
etc. » Et paulo post explicans quid sit illa
justitia : « Quamquam, inquit, nemo possit
esse justus, nisi cui merita passionis Domini
nostri Jesu Christi communicantur ; id tamen
in hac impii justificatione fit, dum ejusdem
sanctissima; passionis merito per Spiritum
sanctum charitas Dei diffunditur in cordibus
eorum qui justificantur, atque ipsis inhaeret.
Unde in ipsa justificatione, cum remissione
peccatorum, haec omnia simul infusa accipit
homo,?pcr Jesum Christum, cui inseritur, fi¬
dem, spem et charitatem ; nam fides nisi ad
eam spes accedat ei charitas, neque unit
perfecte cum Christo, neque corporis ejus vi¬
vum membrum efficit. » Et paulo post, hanc
fidem vivam, id est, cum spe et charitate
conjunctam, esse dicit id, quod ex traditione
Apostolica petunt catechumeni ab Ecclesia,
cum petunt fidem vitam aeternam praestan¬
tem. Et mox adjungit hanc ipsam fidem vi¬
vam esse veram et Christianam justitiam,
quam ceu primam stolam per Adami pecca¬
tum amissam, ct per Christi obedientiam re¬
cuperatam, candidam et immaculatam ju¬
bentur renati conservare.
At certe si gratia justificans a virtutum
Theologicarum habitibus distingueretur, jure
Concilium reprehendi posset, quod hoc loco
nullam de istiusmodi gratia mentionem fe¬
cisset. An non esset imperfecta et manca
tanti Concilii doctrina, si in explicatione ju¬
stificationis illud emisisset, quod est in justi¬
ficatione prrecipnum? Adde quod cap. 10.
idem Concilium docet, justitia; incrementum
ab Ecclesia postulari, cum ita orat : « Da no¬
bis Domine fidei, spei et charitatis aug¬
mentum ».
• Alterum argumentum sumitur a doctrina
veterum Patrum , qui perpetuo justitiam,
qua coram Deo justificamur, eique grati, at¬
que accepti sumus, in virtute, ac praesertim
in charitate constituunt. Augustinus libro de
natura et gratia cap. 42 : « Charitas, inquit,
est verissima, plenissima, perfectissimaque
justitia. » Et in Psalm. 118. concione 2G :
« Justitia, inquit, virtus est magna animi»
prrecipueque laudabilis. » Et mox exponens
illud: « Feci judicium ct justitiam. Justitiae,
inquit, nomine, hoc loco non ipsa virtus, sed
opus ejus significatum est, quis enim fecit in
homine justitiam, nisi qui justificat impium,
hoc est, per gratiam ex impio facit justum ?
Unde ait Apostolus, justificati gratis per gra¬
tiam ipsius. Facit ergo justitiam, id est, opus
justitia;, qui habet in se justitiam, id est, o-
pus gratia;. »
Quo loco S. Augustinus apertissime docet,
justitiam, qua justificamur a Deo, esse vir¬
tutem divinitus infusam, per quam operamur
opera justa ; proinde non vult esse habitum
aliquem in essentia anima;, qui nihil opere¬
tur, sed habitum virtutis in potentia opera¬
trice. Vide praterca testimonia veterum,
qme citavimus in libro dc statu innocentia:,
cap. 2. ad explicandum discrimen inter ima¬
ginem et similitudinem Dei. Docent enim ea
testimonia concitum fuisse hominem ad ima¬
ginem et similitudinem Dei, et imaginem in
natura, similitudinem in probitate et justitia
sitam esse : per justitiam autem virtutes, ac
potissimum charitatem intolligi oportere, nori
dubium est.
Tertium argumentum peti potest ex divinis
litteris, in quibus videmus ea omnia tribui
charitati, qu;e ab auctoribus contraria; sen¬
tentia1 tribuuntur gralise, non solum absolute
sed etiam eam distingui, ut ipsi docent, a
charitate. Profecto autem si in charitatem,
secundum Scriptunfs, conveniunt ea omnia,
qua: soli gratia; jure tribui solent, alterum
necesse est, vel in Scripturis falsam doctri¬
nam, quod fieri non potest, contineri, vel,
quod nos contendimus, gratiam a charitate
aut nullo modo, aut sola ratione distingui.
Gratiae, proprium esse volunt, ut a chari¬
tate ipsorum opinione distinguitur, dare ani¬
ma; quoddam esse supernaturale, ex quo
dicatur homo filius Dei per participationem
ot divinae consors natuhe. Id vero totum
CAPUT VI.
Scriptura apertissime tribuit charitati, I
Joan. iii : Videte qualem charitatem dedit no¬
bis Pater , ut filii Dei nominemur , et simus.
Et cap. iv : Omnis qui diligit , ex Deo natus
est (1).
Prieterea tunc accipit homo illud esse su-
pernaturale cum regeneratur ac renascitur,
novaque efficitur creatura. Id autem fieri
per charitatem ex Scripturis, ita probatur:
Semen ex quo regeneramur, est verbum Dei,
I. Petri I : Renati non ex semine corruptibili ,
sed ex incorruptibili per verbum Dei vici (2). Et
Jacobi i : Genuit nos verbo veritatis , ut simus
initium aliquod creaturae ejus (3). Verbum
autem proprie fidem in nobis gignit camque
vivam, quae per dilectionem operatur, ad
Ilom. x : Fides ex auditu, auditus autem per
verbum Christi { 4). Fides igitur viva, id est,
cum charitale, est id, per quod renascimur,
et proinde ipsa dat illud esse divinum et su-
pernaturale, unde dicimur filii Dei.
Et confirmatur hoc ipsum ex illis Apostoli
verbis ad Galat. iii : Omnes enim filii Dei
estis per fidem (5). Loqui autem 13. Paulum
de fide viva, perspicuum est ex cap. v. ubi
cum dixisset : Evacuati estis a Christo , qui in
lege justificamini, ex gratia excidistis (6), sub¬
jungit explicans quid sit ista gratia, et quid
faciat filios Dei : « Nam, inquit, in Christo
Jesu, neque circumcisio aliquid valet, neque
praeputium, sed fides qute per dilectionem
operatur. » Et cap. vi. hanc ipsayi fidem
vivam appellat novam creaturam, cum ait :
In Christo Jesu, neque circumcisio aliquid
valet , neque prxputiurn, sed nova, creatura.
De qua nova creatura dicit idem Apostolus
ad Ephes. n : Ipsius enim sumus factura ,
creati in Christo Jesu in operibus bonis (7).
Et confirmatur rursus ex parte eorum, qui
nos regenerant, qui sunt Evangelii praedica¬
tores, I ad Corinth. iv : Per E vangelium ego
vos genui; ad Gal. iv : Filioli mei, quos iterum
parturio, donec formetur Christus in vobis.
Christus autem in nobis per fidem formatur
et habitat, ad Ephes. iii : Christum habitare
per fidem in cordibus vestris (8). Fidem au¬
tem istam debere esse vivam et charitate
formatam dubium esse non potest. Quare S.
Joan. I. epist. cap. iv. dicit, Deum per cha¬
ritatem in nobis manere : Deus charilas est,
et qui manet in charitate, in Deo manet, et
Deus in eo (9).
Sunt praeterea mulla alia, quae tribui solent
gratia*, quae omnia in Sripturis tribuuntur
charitati. Neque aliquid afferri potest ita
gratiae proprium, ut non conveniat etiam
charitati; quare nulla est causa, cui\distincli
habitus ponantur gratiae et charitatis, percur¬
ramus breviter singula.
Primo, gratiae proprium esse dicunt, fa¬
cere hominem Deo dilectum, at Proverbio¬
rum vili, legimus : Ego diligentes mc diligo.
Et Joan. xiv. Si quis diligit me, diligetur a
Patre meo (10).
Secundo, gratia dicitur esse animae vita,
ut peccatum, mors; at I. Joannis m. legi¬
mus : Qui non diligit, manet in morte ; et nos
scimus, quia translati sumus de morte ad vi¬
tam, quia diligimus fratres (11).
Tertio, gratia donum illud esse dicitur, per
quod in nobis habitat Spiritus sanctus. At
Rom. v. legimus : Charitas Dei diffusa est in
cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui da¬
tus est nobis (12).
Quarto, per gratiam a peccato justifica¬
mur. At Lucae vii. Jegimus : Remittuntur ei
peccata mulla, quoniam d ilex it multum (33).
Et jam antea ex Apostolo ad Galat. 6. osten¬
dimus, novam creaturam esse fidem per di¬
lectionem operantem, et exTridentino Con¬
cilio demonstravimus, formalem causam ju¬
stificationis esse charitatem mentibus nostris
infusam. Neque ullus est Theologus aut Phi¬
losophus, qui justitiae nomine aliud, quam
virtutem, intelligat.
Quinto, gratia est fons et radix omnium
virtutum. At Apostolus aid Roman. xm :
Plenitudo, inquit, legis, est dilectio. Et I ad
Corinth. xm : Charitas, inquit, patiens est,
benigna est Mc. omnia credit, omnia sperat,
omnia sustinet, etc. (14). Et S. Gregorius ho-
mil. 27. in Evangelia dicit charitatem esse
radicem omnium operum bonorum ; et S.
Prosper lib. 3. de vita contemplativa, c. 13.
dicit, charitatem esse vitam virtutum, mor¬
tem vitiorum.
Sexto, gratia separat filios regni a filiis
damnationis : nullus enim cum gratia perit,
nullus sine gratia salvatur. At Jacobi 1. le¬
gimus, coronam vita/ repromissam esse dili-
(1) I Joan. III, 1 ; IV, 7. —(2) I Pct. I, 23. - (3' Jacob- I, '8. — (4) Rom *X, 17. - (5) Gal
III, 7. — 10) Ibid. V, 4. - (7) Gal VI, 15; Eph II, 10. - (8)1 Corint IV, 15; Gal. IV, 19; Eph. Ili'
17. - (9) 1 Joan IV, 8. - (10) Prov. VIII, 17; Joan. XIV, 23. — .(U ) Joan. III, 14. — (12) Rom. V, 5.'
— (13) Luc. VII, 47. —(14) Rom. XUI, K>; — I Corint. XIII, 4.
LIBER I.
314
gentibus Deum. Et sanctus Augustinus lib.
xv. de Trinit. cap. 18 : « Sola charitas, in¬
quit, dividit inter filios regni, et filios dam¬
nationis alternae. »
Septimo, gratia est donum Dei omnium
maximum. At Apostolus I. ad Corinth. xm :
anteponit charitatem omnibus aliis donis. Et
ad Coloss. iii : Super omnia , inquit, charita¬
tem habete , quod est vinculum perfectionis (1).
Et S. Augustinus lib. xv. de Trin. cap. 18.
« Nullum, inquit, est isto Dei dono excellen¬
tius : dantur et alia per Spiritum sanctum
munera, sed sine charitate nihil prosunt. »
Et serm. 50. de verbis Domini : « Adde, in¬
quit, charitatem, prosunt omnia ; detrahe
charitatem, nihil prosunt caetera : quale bo¬
num est charitas fratres ? quid pretiosius,
quid luminosius, quid firmius, quid utilius,
quid securius? »
Octavo, nihil majus gratia facere potest,
quam conjungere hominem Deo. At I. ad
Corinth. vi. legimus : Qui adhaeret Deo , vide¬
licet per charitatem, unus spiritus fit cum eo (2).
Et i. Joan. iv. Qui manet in charitate, in Deo
manet, et Deus in eo (3). Id quod praeclare ex¬
plicat S. Bernardus serm,. 83. super Cantica,
ubi ostendit, nihil esse quod magis hominem
Deo conjungat, quam charitatem, « qua >>, ut
ipse loquitur, « quasi maritatur anima Deo. »
Nono, gratia facit amicos Deo. At Joan.
xv. legimus : Vos amici mei estis, si feceritis
quae ego praecipio vobis (4).
Decimo, gratia formosos gratiosos facit.
At charitas est vestis illa nuptialis, qua qui
carent, mittuntur in tenebras exteriores, ut
exponit S. Gregor, homil. 38. atque hsec ex
divinis litteris hoc loco sufficiant.
Accedant postremo argumenta ducta ex
ratione. Prima ratio, si gratia ista distingue¬
retur a charitate, caeterisque infusis virtuti¬
bus, quemadmodum distinguitur anima a
potentiis, vel lumen rationis a virtutibus,. ut
S. Thom. docet, sequeretur amissa gratia
per peccatum, simul amitti virtutes omnes
infusas, sicut pereunte anima, pereunt neces¬
sario ejus potentiae, et sine lumine rationis
nullae omnino virtutes in anima conservan¬
tur; at fides infusa non perit gratia rece¬
dente, ut Catholici omnes fatentur ; non igi¬
tur distinguitur, neque pendet fides a gratia
gratum faciente, ut distinguuntur, ac pen¬
dent potentiae ab anima, et virtutes a lumine
rationis.
Neque vero satisfaciet argumento, si quis
dixerit, amissa gratia remanere quidem fi¬
dem, sed non perfectam et formatam, et hoc
modo solum manare eam, ac dependere ab
habitu gratiae. Nam quamvis sine gratia fides
imperfecta atque informis sit, est tamen ha¬
bitus supernaturalis, et operationem habet
supernaturalem ; docuit autem S. Thomas,
non posse esse in anima habitus supernatu-
rales. et operationes supernaturales, nisi an¬
tea evecta esset eadem anima ad esse quod¬
dam supernaturale per habitum gratia;, cum
operatio praerequirat esse.
Secunda ratio, si gratia esset habitus a
charitate distinctus, id sine dubio esset pro¬
pter tria quae videntur esse propria ipsi gra¬
tiae et charitati non convenire, quorum pri¬
mum est, dare animae esse divinum et su¬
pernaturale. Alterum esse proprium effe¬
ctum amoris, erga hominem. Tertium esse
id, quo proprie Deo gratius est, quicumque
illi gratus est. At haec ipsa tria apertissime
quadrant in charitatem, non igitur opus est,
alium habitum quaerere.
Probatur assumptio argumenti, nam quod
attinet ad esse divinum, certum est, non
posse hominem participare divinum esse,
nisi accidentaliter ; nullum est autem acci¬
dens, quo magis participemus esse divinum,
quam charitas, ac ne ipsa quidem gratia si
esset, ut ponitur a S. Thoma, ita nos evehe¬
ret ad esse divinum, ut ro vera charitas ve¬
hit; gratia enim illa esset accidens ordinis
supernaturalis, et daret animae esse quoddam
accidentarium supernaturale ; at charitas
praeterquam quod est accidens ordinis super¬
naturalis, et dat animae esse accidentarium
supernaturale, conjungit animam cum Deo,
quam intime atque arcte in hac vita fieri po¬
test; quod non faceret gratia, Deus enim
intelligentia et voluntate attingitur, sed in-
telligentia in hac vita nonnisi per fidem, et
in aenigmate Deum attingit ; voluntas autem
etiam in hac vita immediate, et proprie Deo
conjungitur per amorem.
Adde quod cum summa perfectio in Deo
sit cognitio et amor, in futura vita participa¬
bimus per gloriam, divinam perfectionem
visionis Dei, de qua scribit Joannes in i.
epist. cap. iii : Similes ei erimus, quia vide¬
bimus eum sicutiest (5) ; nunc autem participa¬
mus per gratiam, perfectionem amoris Dei
et proximi, de qua dicit Dominus Matth. v :
(1) Coi. III, 14. — (2) 1 Corinth. VI, 47.— (3) I Joan. IV, 16.— (4) Joan. XV, J4.-(5) 1 Joan. III, 2.
CAPUT VII.
51.1
Diligite inimicos vestros, ut sitis filii Patris
vestri , etc. (i).
Quod attinet ad effectura proprium amoris
Dei, ille profecto charitas est, quid enim
vult nobis Deus, cum nos amat, nisi id quod
nobis est optimum : optimum autem nobis
charitas est, ut supra ex Apostolo et Augu¬
stino docuimus.
Quod autem pertinet ad tertium, de eo
quo proprie Deo grati sumus ; id vero nihil
est aliud, nisi charitas, siquidem in ea con¬
sistit summa similitudo ad Deum, quam in
hac vita possimus habere. Deus enim diligit
sibi similes, et eo nos magis diligit quo su¬
mus ei similiores. Atque hoc est verum ami¬
citiae fundamentum inter nos et Deum, ami¬
citia siquidem oritur ex similitudine, cum
omne simile diligat suum simile ; Similitudo
autem, quae est fundamentum amicitiae, non
tam est similitudo naturae, quam morum et
virtutum; alioqui inter omnes homines esset
amicitia, et inter Angelos et homines nulla
esset. Porro charitas est regina virtutum, et
omnibus aliis virtutibus longe praestat. Quare
similitudo in charitate, est prima et summa
causa amicitiae inter nos et Deum.
Tertia ratio. Gratia proprie opponitur cul¬
pae, sed culpa est actualis et habitualis de¬
formitas in voluntate; igitur et gratia erit
habitus et actus in voluntate.
Quarta ratio. Gratia respondet gloriae, sed
gloria non erit habitus aliquis in essentia
animae, ut adversus Hern icum Theologi com¬
muniter docent, sed conjunctio cum Deo per
visionem et amorem, igitur et gratia non est
habitus aliquis in essentia animae, sed fides,
spes et charitas ipsius animae potentiis divi¬
nitus infusie atque in illis inhaerentes.
Quinta ratio. Per gratiam formalitcr justi¬
ficamur ; at justitia communi consensu Theo¬
logorum et Philosophorum, virtus animi est,
et in voluntate , non in essentia animae se¬
dem habet.
CAPUT VII.
Solvuntur objectiones .