Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book I: On Grace
Chapter 7: Objections are answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Against the things confirmed in the chapter above there are wont to be made arguments not light, which we shall now briefly and in order dissolve.
The first objection is taken from two general Councils. For in the Council of Vienne, under Clement V, as we have it in the first Clementine, on the Highest Trinity and the Catholic Faith, it was defined that in Baptism there is conferred, on little ones as well as on adults, informing grace and the virtues. And in the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 7, we read that justification is the renewal of the inner man through the voluntary reception of grace and of the gifts. And in canon 11 anathema is pronounced on those who teach that man is justified either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of grace and charity. In which places we see grace ever distinguished from the virtues and gifts, and so even from charity itself.
I answer: those Councils, and above all Trent, seem to have willed of set purpose so to speak as to leave undefined the scholastic question of the distinction of grace from charity, and to define only what was denied by the heretics — that we are justified through something really inhering in the soul; for that was the cause why the Council of Trent named now grace and charity, now charity alone. But though these things be so, yet the Fathers of the Council seem altogether to have inclined to that opinion which holds grace and charity for the same. For, as we showed above, in the explanation of the formal cause of justification, where above all it behooved to make mention of this distinction, they named charity alone, with her companions faith and hope.
Further, where those Councils name distinctly grace and the virtues, or grace and the gifts: either by grace they understand charity, and by the virtues and gifts the remaining virtues — as if they had said, grace and the other virtues, or grace and the other gifts; or surely those words signify the same thing, just as when we say that someone is holy and good, innocent and just, etc. — which we see done everywhere in the sacred Scriptures and in the books of the Fathers, for the greater explication of the matter in hand. And in this manner is to be understood canon 11 of the Council of Trent, where they are condemned with anathema who exclude from justification grace and charity: for that altogether the same thing is signified in that place by grace and charity we gather, both from the words that follow, where it is said in the singular number, “which is poured out in their hearts, and inheres in them”; and from chapter 7 of the same session, to which this eleventh canon answers (for in the canons no new dogmas are delivered, but the things defined in the chapters are reduced to the form of anathematisms); and the words of chapter 7, out of which the eleventh canon was framed, are these: “This is done in this justification of the impious, when the charity of God is poured out, through the Holy Spirit, in their hearts, and inheres in them.”
The second objection is drawn from the Fathers. They bring forward but one, yet most ancient and most celebrated: this is St. Dionysius the Areopagite, who in the book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 2, part 1, writes that man cannot work divine things unless he have first obtained a divine state, or being — even as we do not begin to work human works before we have begun to be men. I answer: Dionysius rightly teaches that man cannot work divine things unless he have first participated the divine being; but since the divine being cannot be participated by man save through some accident, therefore there are infused into man divine qualities — the habits, namely, of faith and hope and charity — and through them man is made a partaker of the divine nature, and works divine and supernatural things.
Someone will say: not only divine works, but divine habits too prerequire the divine being; for a habit, according to the Philosopher in book 7 of the Physics, text 17, is a disposition of the perfect toward the best; and he calls perfect that which is disposed according to nature. Wherefore, since human nature is not of itself disposed to supernatural works, nor has a natural proportion to them, there is necessarily required something to elevate and supernaturally perfect human nature, that supernatural habits may be able to be infused into it. Besides, as in natural things three are distinguished — being, power, working — of which the third depends on the second, and the second on the first, so also in supernatural things three must be distinguished: being, which is had through grace; power, which is had through the infused virtues; and working, which is the very actions of faith and hope and charity.
I answer: acquired habits, of which Aristotle speaks, prerequire the natural disposition of the subject to the work, because they do not give the power to work, but to work easily and promptly; hence, if nature could not work without the habit, the habit would profit it nothing. But habits divinely infused do not require a natural disposition in the subject, but only a natural capacity; and they themselves elevate nature, and confer on it the proportion to supernatural action. And that this capacity is in the soul that shares in reason St. Augustine teaches, book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 5, when he says: “To be able to have faith and charity belongs to the nature of men; but to have them, to the grace of the faithful.” To that which was added — that in all things are found being, power, and working — we answer: that is true in substances, not in accidents. For created substances cannot work of themselves without instruments, that is, without accidents; and therefore in them the substantial being itself is distinguished from the powers, and the powers from the actions. But in accidents these three are not distinguished, since the very being of an operative quality is a power or virtue. Hence, since the divine being which the soul has through grace is an accidental being, it is not necessary that it be distinguished from the virtue; but one and the same habit, as it regards the subject, can be called a supernatural being; as it regards the work, can be called a supernatural virtue.
The third objection is from the divine writings. The Scriptures witness that man is reborn through grace, and thereby obtains a divine being: John 3, unless a man be born again, etc.; and, That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit, is spirit. Besides, according to the Scriptures the grace of the Holy Spirit is prior to charity, and hence charity and grace cannot be the same: Romans 5, the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us — where thou seest the Spirit given first, and then charity poured out in hearts; Galatians 5, the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, etc.; 1 John 4, Not as though we had loved God, but because he hath first loved us. But if we are loved before we love, surely the charity by which we love God is later than the grace by which we are pleasing and lovable to God.
I answer: we have already shown in the chapter above that we are reborn through charity, and receive the divine being, when we are made like to God in the virtues, and above all in charity. For we cannot participate the divine being according to anything substantial: since substance is the very nature of a thing, if we participated the divine being substantially, we should naturally be gods — which can in no way come to pass. And so St. Augustine, in the book against Adimantus, chapter 5, writes that just men are sons of God “because they are like to God in love and in holiness.” And on Psalm 99, explaining the very title: “In the measure that charity grows in thee, it effects and recalls thee to the likeness of God.” And St. Thomas himself also, 2-2, question 23, article 2, reply to the second, says that charity is the life of the soul.
But as touching those Scriptures which make charity later than grace, we say those Scriptures are to be understood of grace as it signifies the benevolence of God toward us, not some quality which is in us. For God loves us in two manners: in one manner, that we may be just and holy; in the other, because we are just and holy. Of the former manner the Apostle speaks, Romans 5: when as yet we were sinners… Christ died for us; Ephesians 1: he chose us… that we should be holy; and chapter 5: Christ also loved the church, and delivered himself up for it: that he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life. Of the latter manner speaks Wisdom, Proverbs 8: I love them that love me; and the Lord, John 14: he that loveth me… shall be loved of my Father; and chapter 16: the Father himself loveth you, because you have loved me. Now therefore the charity which is in us, since it is both the effect and the object of the benevolence of God: as effect, it is later than that benevolence; as object, it is prior. Wherefore, when charity is said to be poured out in hearts through the Holy Spirit, or when charity is said to be the fruit of the Holy Spirit, it is not signified that there is given us some gift of the Holy Spirit from which charity should proceed and emanate; but that there is given us the Holy Spirit, who is the uncreated gift, and that his first and primary effect in us is charity. And when God is said to love us before he is loved by us, it is not signified that there is in us something whereby we merit to be loved before we love; but that we are loved by God, that from unjust we may be made just, and from deformed, shapely — so that afterward, being made just and holy through the gift of charity, friendship may be established between us and him, and we may love, and be loved.
The fourth objection is taken from reasons. The first reason: the formal effects of grace and of charity are diverse, nor does one include the other, or necessarily accompany it; for the effect of grace is to make one beloved, the effect of charity is to make one loving; and it can come to pass that one be loved and not love, and contrariwise; therefore the habits of grace and of charity are not one and the same. The second reason: the effect of grace is always in act while grace itself perseveres in the man, for it always makes him pleasing; but the effect of charity is not always in act while charity perseveres, since we do not always actually love; therefore charity and grace are not the same. The third reason: in natural things, besides the acquired virtues, there is in the mind a natural light, from which in some manner all the virtues flow; there will therefore also be among the supernatural gifts, besides the infused habits of the virtues, a light of grace, from which those habits should flow forth. The fourth reason: grace is a certain universal gift, which renders the whole man pleasing to God, and makes all his works accepted with him, and is repugnant to every sin; but the virtues are particular gifts, which perfect particular powers in their own works, and are opposed to certain vices; therefore grace and the virtues are not the same. The fifth reason: through grace the image of God, which through sin had been obscured, is reformed; but the image is not only in the powers, but also in the very substance of the soul; therefore grace is not charity alone, inhering in the will, but also some habit constituted in the substance of the soul.
I answer. To the first reason it is easy to reply, since to make beloved and to make loving can proceed from one and the same quality, if it be considered in diverse manners, as we said above: for the same charity, as a form inhering in the soul, makes it shapely, and thereby pleasing in the eyes of God; as a principle of operation, makes it apt and prompt to love. Nor yet are these two formal effects, but one; for that propensity and promptness of the soul toward loving God is its beauty, which makes it pleasing to God. And although it can happen that someone be loved and not love, when the foundation of the one's love is not the other's love, but something else, as beauty of body or some such thing; yet if the foundation of the one's love is the other's love, as we lay down, it cannot come to pass that he who is loved should not love, since he is loved for this very reason, that he loves.
To the second reason we answer that the formal effect of grace is always in act, and likewise the formal effect of charity. For as grace always makes pleasing, so also charity always makes prone and prompt to love; but to love in act, which we do not always have, is not the effect of the form, but of the efficient — or, what is the same, is not the effect of charity as it gives formal being to the soul in which it inheres, but as it is a principle of action.
To the third we say that in supernatural things the light of faith stands in place of the natural light; for from faith in some manner hope and charity flow, as from faith formed through charity all the moral virtues are ordered to the supernatural end.
To the fourth I answer that charity can be called a universal gift, because she is the queen of the virtues, and the root of all merit, and by her the actions of all the virtues are commanded, and she suffers no mortal sin with her; wherefore the Apostle says, Romans 13: he that loveth… hath fulfilled the law; and 1 Corinthians 13: Charity is patient, is kind, etc. And St. Augustine, book On Nature and Grace, chapter 70: “Charity begun,” says he, “is justice begun; charity advanced is justice advanced; charity great is justice great; charity perfect is justice perfect.”
To the fifth I say that the image of God is both in the substance and in the powers, but that it is not wounded save insofar as it is in the powers: for sin obscured the light of the intelligence, weakened the liberty of the will, made the lower appetite a rebel against the higher, and plainly took away the likeness to God, which was seated in justice; but in the very substance of the soul it wrought nothing properly. Wherefore this last objection seems rather to confirm than to weaken our opinion.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
Adversus ea quae capite superiore confir¬ mata sunt, fieri solent non levia argumenta, quae nunc breviter et ordine diluemus. Prima objectio sumitur ex duobus Conci¬ liis generalibus, siquidem in Concilio Vien¬ nensi, sub Clemente V. ut habetur in Cle¬ menti na prima, de summa Trinitate et fide Catholica definitum est , in Baptismo tara parvulis, quam adultis conferri informantem gratiam, et virtutes. Et in Concilio Triden- tino sess. 6. cap. 7. legimus, justificationem esse renovationem interioris hominis per vo¬ luntariam susceptionem gratia» et donorum. Et canone undecimo dicitur anathema iis, qui docent, hominem justificari vel sola im¬ putatione justitia Christi, vel sola peccato¬ rum remissione, exclusa gratia et charitate. In quibus locis videmus semper distingui gratiam a virtutibus et donis, atque adeo ab ipsa etiam charitate. Respondeo, Concilia ista, ac praecipue Tri- dentinum, dedita opera ita loqui voluisse vi¬ dentur, ut indefinitam relinquerent quaestio¬ nem Scholasticam, de distinctione gratiae a charitate, et solum definirent, quod ab hae¬ reticis negabatur, nos justificari per aliquid re ipsa in anima inhaerens ; ea siquidem causa fuit, cur Tridentinum Concilium, nunc gratiam et charitatem, nunc solam charita- tem nominaret ; sed quamvis haec ita sint, tamen videntur omnino Concilii Patres in eam sententiam inclinasse, quae pro eodem habet gratiam et charitatem. Nam, ut su¬ pra ostendimus, in explicatione causae for¬ malis justificationis, ubi maxime oportebat hujus distinctionis mentionem facere, solam nominaverunt charitatem, cum suis comiti¬ bus fide et spe. Porro ubi Concilia ista distincte nominant gratiam et virtutes, vel gratiam et dona; aut per gratiam, intelligunt charitatem, per virtutes et dona, reliquas virtutes, ac si di¬ xissent, gratiam et caeteras virtutes, sive gra¬ tiam et caitera dona ; aut certe idem signifi¬ cant illae voces, quedmadmodum cum dici¬ mus, aliquem esse sanctum et bonum, inno¬ centem et justum etc. id quod in Scripturis sacris, et in Patrum libris passim fieri vide¬ mus ad rem, de qua agitur, magis explican¬ dam. Et hoc modo intelligendus est canon 11. Concilii Tridentini, ubi damnantur anathe¬ mate, qui excludunt a justificatione gratiam et charitatem, nam idem omnino significari eo loco per gratiam et charitatem, colligimus tum ex verbis sequentibus, ubi numero sin- (1) Matth. V, 4 i. UDEll J. ;>io gulaii dicitur, qu<e in eorum cordibus dif¬ fundatur, atque illis inha?reat : tum ex c. 7. ejusdem sessionis, cui respondet canon iste undecimus (neque enim in canonibus nova dogmata traduntur, sed Rediguntur ad for¬ mam anathematismorum ea, qme in capiti¬ bus definita fuerant) verba autem cap. 7. ex quibus canon undecimus confectus est, ha?c sunt: <( Id in hac impii justificatione fit, dum charifas Dei per Spiritum sanctum in eorum cordibus diffunditur, atque illis inlneret. » Secunda objectio ducitur ex Patribus. Pro- ferunt autem unum tantum, sed antiquissi¬ mum et celeberrimum, is est* sanctus Diony- s us Areopagita, qui in libro de Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, cap. 2. part. 1. scribit, non posse hominem operari divina, nisi prius adeptus fuerit statum, sive esse divinum, quemadmodum etiam opera humana non ante operari incipimus, quam homines esso cceperimus. Respondeo : recte Dionysius docet, non posse hominem operari divina, nisi ante par¬ ticipaverit esse divinum, sed quoniam esse divinum non potest ab homine participari, nisi per aliquod accidens, ideo infunduntur homini divina? qualitates, habitus vidolieel fidei et spei et charitatis, ac per eas efficitor homo divina? consors natura?, et divina ac supernaturalia operatui-. Dicet aliquis: non solum opera divina, sed etiam habitus divini pneexigunt esse divi¬ num, est enim habitus juxta Philosophum in lib. vii. Physicorum, text. 17. dispositio per¬ fecti ad optimum, perfectum autem vocat id, quod est dispositum secundum naturam , quare cum natura humana non sit ex se dis¬ posita ad opera, supernaturalia, neque ad ea naturalem proportionem habeat, necessario exigitur aliquid quod elevet, t?t supernatu- raliter perficiat naturam humanam, ut in eam habitus supernaturales infundi queant. Pra?terea sicut, in rebus naturalibus distin¬ guuntur tria, esse, posse, operari, quorum tertium a secundo, et secundum a primo de¬ pendet : sic etiam in rebus supernaturalibus distinguenda sunt tria, esse, quod habetur per gratiam, posse, quod habetur per infu¬ sas virtutes, et operari, qua? sunt ipsa? actio¬ nes fidei et spei et charitatis. Respondeo : habitus acquisiti, dc quibus loquitur Aristoteles, pra?exigunt naturalem dispositionem subjecti ad opus, quia non dant operari, sed facile ac prompte operari; proinde si natura sine habitu operari non posset, nihil ei prodesset habitus. At habitus divinitus infusi non exigunt naturalem dis¬ positionem in subjecto, sed solum capacita¬ tem naturalem, ipsi autem elevant naturam, et proportionem illi conferunt ad actionem supernaturalem. Hanc autem capacitatem essi? in anima rationis participe, docet S. Au¬ gustinus lib. de, praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. v. cum ait y « Posse habere fidem et charitatem, natura? est hominum; habere autem, gratia? fidelium. » Ad illud autem, quod addebatur, in omni¬ bus rebus inveniri esse, posse et operari, respondemus : id esse verum in substantiis, non in accidentibus; substantiae enim crea¬ tae non possunt per se sine instrumentis, id est, sine accidentibus operari, et ideo in eis distinguitur ipsum esse substantiale a poten¬ tiis, et potentife ab actionibus ; at vero in accidentibus non distinguuntur ista tria, cum ipsum esse qualitatis operatricis sit potentia seu virtus ; proinde cum esse divinum, quod habet anima per gratiam, sit esse acciden- inrium, non est necessarium, ut distinguatur a virtute, sed unus atque idem habitus, ut respicit subjectum, dici potest esse superna- I urale ; ut respicit opus, dici potest virtus supernaturalis. Tertia objectio ex divinis litteris, Scriptu- ne testantur, hominem per gratiam renasci, ac per hoc adipisci esse divinum, Joan. m : Nisi quis renatus fuerit , etc. Et : Quod na¬ tum est cx carne, caro est ; quod natum est ex spiritu , spiritus est (1). Pra?terea secundum Scripturas gratia Spiritus sancti est prior charitate, ac per hoc non possunt esse idem charitas et gratia, ad Roni. v : Charitas I)ei diffusa esi in cordibus nostris per Spiritum salictum, qui datus est nobis (2). Ubi vides, prius dari Spiritum, ac deinde diffundi in cordibus charitatem, ad Galat. v : Fructus Spiritus est charitas, gaudium, etc. I. Joan. iv : Non quia nos dileximus Deum, sed ipse prior diicxit nos (3). Quod si prius diligimur, quam diligamus, certe sequitur charitatem, qua Deum diligimus, posteriorem esse gra¬ tia, qua Deo grati et amabiles sumus. Respondeo : jam ostendimus .capite supe¬ riore, nos renasci per charitatem, et. accipe¬ re esse divinum, dum efficimur Deo similes in virtutibus, ac pra?sertim in charitate. Xe- (1) Joan. III, 3. - (2) Rom. V, 5. - (3) Gal. V, 22; I Joan. IV, 10. «j no enim participare possumus esse divinum secundum aliquid substantiale , nam cum substantia sit ipsa rei natura, si substantia¬ liter .participaremus esse divinum, naturali¬ ter essemus Dii, quod nullo modo fieri pot¬ est. Itaque S. Augustinus in lib. contra Adi- mantum, cap. v, scribit, homines justos esse filios Dei : « Quia sunt Deo similes in dile¬ ctione et in sanctitate. » Et in Psalm. xcix. explicans ipsum titulum : « In quantum, in¬ fluit, in te crescit charitas, efficit et revocat te ad similitudinem Dei. » Et ipse etiam san¬ ctus Thomas in Secunda Secunda;, qumst. 2.'!. art. 2. ad 2. dicit, charitatem esse vitam anima;. Quod autem attinet ad eas Scripturas, qua; faciunt charitatem posteriorem gratia, dicimus, eas Scripturas intelligendas essede gratia, ut significat benevolentiam Dei erga nos, ndn autem qualitatem aliquam, qute sit in nobis : Deus enim duobus modis nos dili¬ git, uno modo, ut simus justi et sancti, alio modo quia sumus justi et sancti. Dc prio¬ re modo loquitur Apostolus ad Roman. v : Cum adhuc peccatores essemus , Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Ad Ephes. I : Ele¬ git nos ut essemus sancti. Et cap. v : Chri¬ stus dilexit Ecclesiam , et se ipsum tradidit pro ea , ut eam sanctificaret, mundans eam lavacro aqux in verbo vita;. De posteriore modo loquitur Sapientia, Provevb. vm : Ego dili¬ gentes me diligo. Et Dominus Joan. xiv : Qui diligit nic, diligetur a Patre meo. Et cap. xvi :• Pater amat vos, quia vos me ama¬ stis (1). Jam igitur charitas, qua in nobis est, cum effectus et objectum sit benevolentia; Dei, ut effectus, est illa posterior, ut. objectum, est prior. Quare cum dicitur charitas dif¬ fundi in cordibus per Spiritum sanctum, vol cum dicitur charitas fructus esse Spi¬ ritus sancti, non significatur, dari nobis aliquod donum Spiritus sancti, cx quo pro¬ cedat, atque emanet charitas, sed dari nobis Spiritum sanctum, qui est domfln incrcatum et ejus primum et primarium effectum in nobis esse charitatem; cum autem dicitur Deus nos prius diligere, quam diligatur a nobis, non significatur esse in nobis aliquid, unde mereamur diligi antequam diligamus ; sed a Deo nos diligi, ut ex injustis justi, et ex deformibus formosi efficiamur, ut postea justi, sanctiquc offecti per donum chari tatis, amicitia inter nos constituatur ct diligamus, ac diligamur. Quarta objectio sumitur cx rationibus. Pri¬ ma ratio, effectus formales gratia; et chari- tatis, diversi sunt, nec unus alium includit, aut necessario comitatur ; nam effectus gra¬ tia; est facere dilectum, effectus charilalis est, facere diligentem, et potest fieri, ut unus di¬ ligatur, et non diligat, et contra ; non igi¬ tur sunt unum et idem habitus gratia; et charitatis. Secunda ratio, effectus gratia; semper est in actu, dum ipsa gratia in homine perseve¬ rat, semper enim facit gratum; at effectus charitatis non est semper in actu perseve¬ rante charitatc, cum non semper actu dili¬ gamus ; non igitur sunt idem charitas et gratia. Tertia ratio, in rebus naturalibus, praeter virtutes acquisitas, est in animo lumen na¬ turale, ex quo aliquo modo virtutes omnes manant; erit igitur etiam in supernatura- libus donis, praeter habitus virtutum infu¬ sos, lumen gratia;, cx quo habitus illi pro- fluant. Quarta ratio, gratia est donum quoddam universale, quod totum hominem Deo gra¬ tum reddit, et omnia opera accepta illi facit, et omni peccato repugnat ; at virtutes sunt dona particularia, qua; particulares poten¬ tias in operibus ipsarum perficiunt, ct certis vitiis opponuntur ; igitur non sunt idem gra¬ tia et virtutes. Quinta ratio, per gratiam reformatur ima¬ go Dei, qute per peccatum fuerat obscurata, at imago non est solum in potentiis, sed etiam in ipsa anima; substantia ; gratia igi¬ tur non est sola charitas in voluntate inhae- rens, sed etiam habitus aliquis in substantia anima; constitutas. Respondeo, ad primam rationem facile est respondere, siquidem facere dilectum et di¬ ligentem, ab una et eadem qualitate prove¬ nire possunt, si ea diverso modo, ut supra diximus, consideretur; eadem enim ohari- tas, ut forma inhaerens animae, facit eam formosam, ct per hoc gratam oculis Dei ; ut principium operationis, facit eam aptam ct promptam ad diligendum; nec tamen sunt isti duo effectus formales, sed unus, illa e- nim propensio ct promptitudo animae ad Deum diligendum, est ejus pulchritudo, qua; gratam eam facit Deo ; ct quamvis fieri pos¬ ti) Rom V, 9; Epii. I, i; ibid. V, 25; Prov. VIII, 17; Joan. XIV, ‘21; ibid, XVI, 27. 518 IJBEH 1. sit, ut aliquis diligatur, et non diligat, quan¬ do fundamentum dilectionis unius, non est dilectio alterius, sed aliquid aliud, ut forma corporis, aut aliquid ejusmodi; tamen si fundamentum dilectionis unius, sit dilectio alterius, ut nos ponimus, fieri non potest, ut qui diligitur non diligat, cum ideo diligatur, quia diligit. Ad secundam rationem respondemus, ef¬ fectum formalem gratiae semper esse in actu, et similiter effectum charitatis formalem. Ut enim gratia semper facit gratum, ita et cha- ritas semper facit propensum et promptum ad diligendum ; diligere autem actu quod non semper habemus, non est effectus formae sed efficientis, sive quod est idem, non est effectus charitatis, ut dat esse formale animae, in qua inhmret, sed ut est principium actio¬ nis. Ad tertiam dicimus, in rebus supernatu- ralibus lumen fidei esse loco luminis natura¬ lis, ex fide enim aliquo modo spes et chari- tas manant, ut ex fide per charitatem for¬ mata virtutes omnes, morales . ad finem supernaturalem ordinantur. Ad quartam respondeo, charitatem dici posse donum universale, quia regina est vir¬ tutum, et radix omnis meriti, et ab ipsa ac¬ tiones virtutum omnium imperantur, et nul¬ lum peccatum mortale secum patitur ; quare Apostolus ait : Qui diligit, legem implevit , ad Rom. xni. Et : Charitas patiens est, benigna est, etc. I ad Gorinth. xm (1). Et S. Augu¬ stinus lib. de natura et gratia cap. 70 : « Charitas, inquit, inchoata, inchoata justi¬ tia est ; charitas provecta, provecta justitia est; charitas magna, magna justitia est; charitas perfecta, perfecta justitia est. » Ad quintam dico, imaginenTDei esse tum in substantia, tum in potentiis, sed non esse lsesam, nisi quatenus in potentiis est, pecca¬ tum siquidem lumen intclligentiae obscuravit, voluntatis libertatem debilitavit, appetitum inferiorem superiori rebellem fecit, similitu¬ dinem ad Deum, qua; in justitia sita erat, plane sustulit : in ipsa vero substantia ani¬ ma; nihil proprie operatum est : quare ob¬ jectio ista postrema, videtur potius nostram confirmare, quam infirmare sententiam. CAPUT VIII. Charitatem esse virtutem creatam, non ipsum