Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book I: On Grace
Chapter 12: In what the efficacy of grace consists
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follows the second question: whence the efficacy of grace is taken. On which matter I find three opinions — two extreme, and one middle.
The first opinion is that of those who place efficacious grace in human assent and cooperation, so that grace is called efficacious from the event — because, namely, it obtains its effect, and it obtains its effect because the human will cooperates. And so these authors judge it to be in man's power to make grace efficacious which otherwise, of itself, would be but sufficient.
This opinion is altogether foreign to the judgment of blessed Augustine, and, so far as I judge, to the judgment also of the divine Scriptures. For St. Augustine, book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8, says that grace — the efficacious, namely — is refused by no hard heart, because it itself softens the heart; where thou seest efficacy attributed to grace, not to the human will. And in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 34, asking why God so counsels one that he persuades him, and another not so, he does not answer, “because the one consents, the other does not consent,” but exclaims: O the depth of the riches! Thus he refers to the secret of the divine will the question why to one efficacious grace is given, and to another it is not given. And in epistle 107 to Vitalis he reprehends those who say that all men would have received the grace of God, had not they to whom it is not given refused it by their own will — where without doubt he speaks of efficacious grace, for we shall prove a little below, from the judgment of St. Augustine, that sufficient grace is given to all men. St. Augustine, then, will not have efficacious grace depend on the human will, but on the divine. Finally, this is so frequent and so ready to hand in the works of St. Augustine that it is superfluous to confirm it by more.
As touching the sacred Scriptures: those words of the Lord, John 6, Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to me, teach perspicuously enough wherein the efficacity of grace is seated. For they come infallibly to the faith of Christ, or through faith to Christ, who have the heavenly Father for teacher — so that the infallibility of the effect has for its cause not the diligence of the disciple, but the excellence of the master; for the Lord alleges in the same place the prophecy of Isaias, chapter 54: It is written in the prophets: And they shall all be taught of God — or, as it is more clearly in the Greek text, didaktoi tou Theou, taught by God; according to that of Psalm 93: Blessed is the man whom thou shalt instruct, O Lord. See Augustine treating this place, book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8. Another place is 1 Corinthians 4: For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? etc. For if the opinion of these men were true, free choice would plainly distinguish the believer from the unbeliever: for if there be two who hear the same preacher and have the same inward inspiration, and the one believes, the other believes not, will not he who believed be able to say that he is distinguished from the unbeliever by free choice, because he himself received the inspiration which the other rejects? Will he not be able to glory against the unbeliever, that he himself cooperated with the grace of God which the other contemned? And yet the Apostle altogether forbids this; and therefore he says that not only the being able to believe, but the very believing, is the gift of God, Philippians 1; and that God works in us not only that we may be able to will, but that we will, Philippians 2. Finally, this opinion altogether overturns the foundation of divine predestination, which St. Augustine most solidly established from the divine writings: for on this depends the certainty and infallibility of predestination, that God has prepared efficacious grace for the elect. For whom he predestinated, them he called — with that calling, as Augustine admonishes in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7, which is according to purpose, of which it is said: all things work together unto good, to such as, according to his purpose, are called to be saints; and whom he called according to purpose, them he justified — with a justification, namely, according to purpose, which has perseverance even to the end adjoined; and whom he so justified, them he glorified. But if the efficacious calling depended not on the purpose of God, but on the human will, no place would be left for predestination, but only for foreknowledge; nor would the Apostle have said, that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand… not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger, as it is written: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated, Romans 9. I omit that it would be to abuse words to call a grace efficacious, and to distinguish it from the sufficient, if there were no distinction at all in the grace itself, and the whole difference depended on the human will.
There is, then, another opinion at the other extreme, of others, who teach that efficacious grace is a physical action of God which determines the will to willing and choosing the good which had been inspired into it through stirring grace; and because it cannot come to pass that God physically determine the will without the will itself being determined, therefore it cannot come to pass that this grace should not have an infallible effect. This opinion seems to me either to be altogether the same with the error of Calvin and the Lutherans, or to differ little from it. And as the worse opinion destroyed efficacious grace and with it predestination, so this opinion destroys sufficient grace, and at the same time takes free choice out of the way. For that determination of the will which grace is said to effect is necessary in order that the will be moved — since without the concourse of God nothing at all can be done, and by the judgment of these authors the concourse of God is nothing else than the determination which God effects in the will. But if that grace is necessary, then without it no good action can be done; and thereby there remains no grace truly sufficient which is not also efficacious: this opinion therefore destroys sufficient grace. And that it takes free choice out of the way can be proved thus: for, a determining grace being posited, it is not in the power of free choice to act or not to act, nor is it in its power that that grace be applied or not applied; therefore the will acts necessarily and not freely. But because we are to dispute of this matter more fully in the fifth book, in this place I shall undertake only to prove that this opinion is not conformable to the doctrine of St. Augustine. For they who follow that opinion follow it chiefly for this reason, that they have persuaded themselves it is St. Augustine's.
By four arguments, then, it can be demonstrated that the mind of St. Augustine was far other than theirs is — and at the same time it will be explained what the true judgment is concerning the efficacy of grace. The first argument is taken from those testimonies in which St. Augustine teaches that efficacious grace consists in a calling, or inward persuasion and illumination, and hence pertains to stirring grace rather than to aiding — if by aiding we understand the physical cooperation of God. For the authors of the opinion we set about to refute place efficacious grace in that physical action of God which produces the very act of willing. Thus, then, speaks St. Augustine in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 34: “Let him attend and see that this will is to be attributed to the divine gift, not only because it is from free choice, which was created in us naturally, but also because by the persuasions of things seen God brings it about that we will and that we believe.” And in the same place: “In these ways, when God deals with the rational soul that it may believe him — for it cannot believe by any free choice whatever, if there be no persuasion or calling for it to believe — assuredly God works in man the very willing to believe, and in all things his mercy prevents us; but to consent to the calling of God, or to dissent, belongs, as I have said, to one's own will. Which thing not only does not weaken what was said, What hast thou that thou hast not received?, but even confirms it. For the soul cannot receive and have the gifts of which it hears, save by consenting; and thereby, what it should have and what it should receive belongs to God; but the receiving and having assuredly belong to the one receiving and having.” In this place St. Augustine first shows that the very willing of good is the gift of God — not in the manner the Pelagians taught, because it is from free choice, which was given us by God, but because it is from a peculiar grace of God. Next he explains what that grace is, and says it is a persuasion, an inspiration, a sending in of things seen, an internal calling. Finally he excludes that opinion which teaches that the will is determined by God, and says that to consent to the calling and persuasion of God, or to dissent, belongs to one's own will.
Again the same Augustine, book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2: “Esau,” says he, “would not, and ran not; but even if he had willed and had run, he would have arrived by the help of God, who by calling would have bestowed on him even the willing and the running, had he not by contemning the calling become reprobate. For in one way God bestows that we will; in another he bestows what we have willed. That we will, he has willed to be both his and ours — his by calling, ours by following; but what we have willed he alone bestows, that is, the power to act well and to live always blessedly.” And here we see that our very willing is wrought by God, not through a physical action determining the will, but through a calling, which is a moral inclination and impulsion, to which we freely consent or dissent. The same we have in the book of Eighty-three Questions, question 68, where Augustine says that they who came to the great supper ought not to attribute it to themselves, because they came being called; for the calling was a grace, without which they could not have come. The same author in epistle 107, before the middle: “If therefore,” says he, “God so prepared and wrought the will of man that he only applied his law and doctrine to man's free choice, and did not, by that deep and secret calling, so work upon his sense that he should accommodate his assent to that same law and doctrine, without doubt it would suffice to read it, or to understand it by reading, or even to expound and preach it; nor would there be need to pray that God would convert the hearts of unbelievers to his faith.” Thou seest here that the efficacious grace of God, which converts the hearts of unbelievers, and the good will which he works in us, is a deep and secret calling, which works upon the internal sense — that is, the mind — and persuades it to accommodate its consent to the doctrine which is preached to it. The same, book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8, explaining that of John 6, Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to me: “Very far removed from the senses of the flesh,” says he, “is this school, in which the Father is heard and teaches, that one may come to the Son; there also is the Son himself, because he is his Word, through whom he so teaches; nor does he do this with the ear of the flesh, but of the heart.” Here indeed we learn not only from Augustine that efficacious grace is an inward persuasion which is applied to the ears of the heart, but we learn it also from the Gospel; for Christ in the Gospel speaks of the grace of God which makes us will to believe, when he says: Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to me. The same Augustine has like things in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14 — which place we shall cite in the fourth argument. The same author, book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 5: “That Paul should be called from heaven, and converted by so great and most efficacious a calling, was the grace of God alone,&rdquoo;rdquo; etc. Here also we see that efficacious grace is a calling. And of what sort that calling was the same Augustine explains, book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, at the end, where he speaks thus: “What did Saul will, but to assault, to drag, to bind, and to slay Christians? What a rabid will! how furious! how blind! Yet he was laid prostrate by one voice from above, and there met him such a vision that his mind and will, their savagery broken, were wrenched back and set right unto faith.” That, then, was the efficacious calling: the sending of such a vision into the mind of Paul, whereby he was suddenly persuaded and willed to believe. Finally the same Doctor, tractate 26 on John, explaining how the Father draws men to Christ: “Thou showest a green branch to a sheep, and thou drawest her; nuts are shown to a boy, and he is drawn.” And presently: “If then these things, which are revealed among earthly delights and pleasures to them that love them, draw them — since it is true that his own pleasure draws each man — does not Christ, revealed by the Father, draw? For what does the soul more strongly desire than truth?” Here we see openly explained, by apt similitudes, in what manner grace draws the soul: not by physically determining it, but by inviting and alluring, through the showing of those things which are congruous to him who is drawn.
The second argument is taken from those places in which St. Augustine teaches that the grace of God which makes us will — and is thereby efficacious — is a preventing grace, and so preventing that it works without us, and hence is preventing not only in nature but sometimes also in time. For from this it manifestly follows that efficacious grace is not a physical action determining the will; since that action cannot be prior to the act of the human will save by a priority of nature — and by a priority of nature, not as signifying an instant in which that action is, but only from which it is: for the human volition itself, so to speak, as it is from God, is called the action of God, nor can it be understood that in any instant God effects that volition without its being understood that in the same instant that volition comes to be and is in us — just as it cannot be understood that God moves the will without its being moved. Therefore in epistle 107: “Grace,” says he, “merits to be increased, that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected — the will accompanying, not leading; a handmaid following, not going before.” And in the same place he several times repeats that the will is prevented by grace. From which judgment Calvin saw that it is rightly gathered that the will is prepared by grace, but not so determined that it is not free to it to assent or dissent; and therefore he boldly rejected Augustine's judgment. For thus he writes in book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, §7: “But there will be those,” says he, “who will concede that the will, averted from good by its own bent, is converted by the Lord's power alone, yet in such wise that, having been prepared, it then has its own part in the acting — as Augustine teaches, that grace precedes every good work, the will accompanying it, not leading it; a handmaid, not a forerunner.” And below: “But because the reformed will is the work of the Lord, it is wrongly attributed to man that he obeys preventing grace with a following will.” Thus he. The same Augustine, book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, writes that our very willing is both God's and ours — God's, by calling; ours, by following; where thou seest this to be the order: first God calls; then we, the calling being received, follow. The same Augustine in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 5: “That the Apostle Paul should be converted by a most efficacious calling was the grace of God alone.” He calls it the grace of God alone, because the human will did not cooperate with God in that action of calling, by which it was prevented and prepared to will to be converted. Wherefore in the same book, chapter 16, he writes thus: “It is certain that we will when we will; but he makes us will the good — he of whom it was said that the will is prepared by the Lord.” And chapter 17: “That we may will, he works without us; but when we will, and so will that we do, he cooperates with us.” What he had said before — it was the grace of God alone — he now explains by those words: that we may will, he works without us. God therefore prevents, and prepares by calling, and that without us; then we follow, yet not without his help, by assenting to the calling. Finally in epistle 107 to Vitalis, explaining that of Psalm 36, By the Lord shall the steps of a man be directed, and he shall like well his way, he observes that it is first said that the steps of man are directed by God, and then added that the man wills: “because,” as he himself speaks, “a good will is the gift of God, who directs the steps of man first for this end, that he may will his way.” And so God first directs the steps, preparing the will by inward inspiration and persuasion; then the will itself, so prepared, freely willing, assents to the inspiration and persuasion.
The third argument is taken from all those places by which in the chapter above we proved that there is given a sufficient grace distinct from the efficacious. For it cannot come to pass that a truly sufficient grace be given which is not at the same time efficacious, if the grace of God physically determines the will: for, that grace being present and working, a man has efficacious grace; it being absent, he has not even sufficient.
The last argument is taken from those places in which the same St. Augustine shows whence it comes that grace is efficacious, though it determine not physically, but only morally, after the manner of persuasion. There are two chief places. The former is in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2: “Therefore,” says he, “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy, who called in that manner which was apt for those who followed the calling.” And below: “On whom he has mercy, him he so calls as he knows to be congruous to him, that he refuse not the caller.” The latter is in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14: “From which it appears that certain men have in their very disposition a divine gift of intelligence, natural to them, by which they may be moved to faith, if they either hear words or behold signs congruous to their minds; and yet, if by the higher judgment of God they are not, by the predestination of grace, set apart from the mass of perdition, neither those divine words nor deeds are applied to them by which they could believe, if only they heard or saw such things.” Besides these two places there are also others from which this same is gathered. For in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 34, when St. Augustine had said that God by inward inspirations deals with the soul that it may will, and for this cause the good will itself is the gift of God, he subjoins: “Now if anyone press us to search that depth, why one is so counseled that he is persuaded, and another not so, only two things meanwhile occur which I am pleased to answer: O the depth of the riches! and, Is there injustice with God?” Where St. Augustine could have answered that the one is persuaded, the other not so, because the one wills to assent, the other wills not; but since he knew that God can easily persuade even the unwilling to assent, and make of the unwilling a willing man, if he would set before him what he knows to be congruous to his mind and disposition, therefore he referred it to the secret of the divine counsel, saying: O the depth of the riches! The same Augustine declares this very thing plainly enough, tractate 26 on John, where he explains how God draws men to faith and makes them will to believe: for as the shepherd draws the sheep when he shows her a green branch with which he knows she is delighted, and parents allure boys by showing nuts which are congruous to that age, so also, in Augustine's judgment, God draws men by an inspiration inwardly offered, such as he knows to be apt not to be refused by them; as in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, at the end, the same Augustine writes that the Apostle Paul was straightway converted by God, because he brought it about that such a vision met his mind as was required, that that mind and will, their savagery broken, might be wrenched back and set right unto faith. Finally, all the testimonies brought in the first argument pertain hither. For it cannot be understood in what way efficacious grace consists in that inward persuasion which through free choice can be refused, and yet has an infallible effect, unless we add that God, to those whom he has decreed to draw efficaciously and infallibly, applies that persuasion which he sees to be congruous to their disposition, and which he certainly knows will not be contemned by them.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
Sequitur altera quaestio , unde sumatur
pfficacia gratiae ; de qua re trps opinio¬
nes invenio, duas extremas, et unam me¬
diam.
Prima opinio eorum est, qui gratiam effi¬
cacem constituunt in assensu et cooperatione
humana, ita ut ab eventu dicatur gratia effi¬
cax, quia videlicet sortitur effectum, et idK>
sortitur effectum, quia voluntas humana coo¬
peratur. Itaque existimanthi aructores, in po¬
testate hominis esse, ut gratiam faciat esse
efficacem, quae alioquin, ex se non esset nisi
sufficiens.
Haec opinio aliena est omnino a sententia
B. Augustini, et quantum ego existimo a sen¬
tentia etiam Scripturarum divinarum . Nam
S. Augustinus lib. de praedestinatione San¬
ctorum, cap. 8. dicit, gratiam, efficacem vi¬
delicet, a nullo duro corde respui, quia ipsa
cor emollit ; ubi vides, efficaciam tribui gra¬
tiae, non voluntati haraanae. Et lib. de Spi¬
ritu et littera c. 34, quaerens, cur Deus uni
ita suadeat, ut persuadeat, alteri non ita,
non repondet, quia unus consentit, alter non
consentit, sed exclamat : 0 altitudo divitiarum.
Itaque refert in arcanum divinae voluntatis,
cur uni detur gratia efficax, alteri non detur.
Et in epist. 107. ad Vitalem, reprehendit
eos, qui dicunt omnes homines fuisse acce¬
pturos gratiam Dei, si non illi, quibus
non datur , eam sua voluntate respue¬
rent.
1.1 HEU I.
528
Ubi sine dubio loquitur de gratia efficaci,
nam gratiam sufficientem probabimus paulo
infra ex sententia S. Augustini omnibus ho¬
minibus dari ; non igitur vult S. August.
gratiam efficacem pendere ab humana vo¬
luntate ; sed a divina. Denique tam est hoc
in operibus S. Augustini frequens et ob¬
vium ut supervacaneum sit id pluribus con¬
firmare.
Quod attinet ad Scripturas sacras, verba
illa Domini Joan. vi : Omnis qui audivit a Pa¬
tre et didicit , venit ad me (1), satis perspicue
docent, in quo sita sit efficacitas gratiae, illi
enim infallibiliter veniunt ad fidem Christi,
sive per fidem ad Christum, qui Patrem coe¬
lestem habent doctorem, ita ut infallibilitas
effectus non habeat pro causa studium di¬
scipuli. sed excellentiam magistri, allegat
enim ibidem Dominus prophetiam Isaiae cap.
liv : Est scriptum, inquit, in Prophetis, erunt
omnes docibiles Dei{ 2). Vel, ut clarius habetur
‘in textu Grseco StSax-ot toti 0eou, docti a Deo,
juxta illud Psal. xcm : Beatus homo, quem
tu erudieris, Domine (3). Vide Augustinum
tractantem hunc locum lib. de prredestinat.
Sanctor, cap. 8.
Alius locus est i. Corinth. iv : Quis enim
te discernit? quid habes, quod non accepisti
etc. (4). Nam si vera esset opinio istorum,
fidelem ab infideli plane discerneret liberum
arbitrum : nam si duo sint, qui eumdem con-
cionatorem audiant, et eamdem interius in¬
spirationem habeant, et unius credat, alter
non credat, nonne dicere poterit is qui cre¬
didit, se discerni ab infideli per liberum ar¬
bitrium, quia ipse inspirationem acceperit,
quam alter rejicit? nonne gloriari poterit
contra infidelem, quod ipse Dei gratia; coo¬
peratus sit, quam ille contempsit ? et tamen
Apostolus hoc omnino prohibet, et ideo non
solum posse credere, sed etiam ipsum cre¬
dere, dicit esse donum Dei, Philippens. i. et
Deum in nobis operari non solum, ut possi¬
mus velle, sed etiam ut velimus, Phi-
lipp. 2.
Denique hrec opinio evertit omnino funda¬
mentum pra;destinationis divina;, quam S.
Augustinus ex divinis litteris solidissime com¬
probavit ; inde enim pendet certitudo, atque
infallibilitas pra;destinationis , quod electis
Deus efficacem gratiam praeparavit. Quos
enim praedestinavit, hos vocavit, vocatione il¬
la, ut Augustinus monet in libro de corre¬
ptione etgratiacap. 7. secundum propositum,
de qua dictum est : Omnia cooperantur in bo¬
num his, qui secundum propositum vocati sunt
sancti. Quos autem vocavit secundum propo¬
situm, hos justificavit, justificatione videlicet
secundum propositum, quae adjunctam habet
perseverantiam usque in finem ; quos vero
ita justificavit, hos magnificavit.
Quod si vocatio efficax non penderet a pro¬
posito Dei, sed ab humana voluntate, nullus
locus praidesti nationi relinqueretur, sed tan¬
tum praescientia;, neque Apostolus dixisset ,
ut secundum electionem propositum Dei mane¬
ret : Non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum
est ei, quia major serviunt minori, sicut scri¬
ptum est, Jacob dilexi, Esau odio habui, llom.
ix. (f). Omitto, quod esset abuti vocabulis,
vocare gratiam efficacem, eamquo a suffi¬
ciente distinguere, si nulla omnino in ipsa
gratia distinctio esset, et totum discrimen ab
humana voluntate penderet.
Est igitur alia sententia in alio extremo
aliorum, qui docent gratiam efficacem esso
actionem Dei physicam, qure determinat vo¬
luntatem ad volendum et eligendum bonum,
quod illi fuerat per gratiam excitantem inspi¬
ratum ; et quia non potest fieri, ut Deus phy¬
sice determinet voluntatem, quin ipsa volun¬
tas determinetur, ideo fieri non potest, ut
gratia ista non habeat effectum infallibi¬
lem.
Ha;c opinio videtur mihi aut esse omnino
eadem cum errore Calvini etLutheranorum,
aut parum ab illo distare. Et quemadmodum
opinio deterior destruebat gratiam efficacem
et simul praedestinationem , ita haec opinio
destruit gratiam sufficientem, et simul tollit
e medio liberum arbitrium . Nam ista deter¬
minatio voluntatis, quam gratia efficere dici¬
tur, est necessaria ad hoc ut voluntas mo¬
veatur. Siquidem sine Dei concursu nihil
omnino fieri potest; et ex sententia horum
auctorum, Dei concursus nihil est aliud, nisi
determinatio, quam Deus efficit in volunta¬
te. Quod si gratia ista necessaria est, non igi¬
tur sine ea potest fieri actio bona, ac per hoc
nulla remanet gratia vere sufficiens, qua; non
sit etiam efficax ; destruit igitur htec opinio
gratiam sufficientem.
Quod autem tollat ex medio liberum arbi¬
trium, ita probari potest. Nam, posita gratia
determinante, non est in potestate liberi ar¬
bitrii agere vel non agere, neque est in ejus
11) Joan. VI, 45,- (2) Joan. VI, 45. -(3) Psal. XCIU, 12. - (4) I Corinth. IV, 7. - (5) Rora. IX. 11.
CAPUT XII.
329
potestate, ut ea gratia ponatur, vel non po¬
natur, igitur necessario et non libere volun¬
tas agit : sed quia de hac re fusius disputa¬
turi sumus in 5. lib. hoc loco solum probare
instituam, non esse hanc opinionem confor¬
mem doctrinae S. Augustini. Nam qui eam
opinionem sequuntur, ideo potissimum eam
sequuntur, quod eam S. Augustini esse sibi
persuaserint.
Igitur quatuor argumentis demonstrari
potest, S. Augustini mentem longe aliam
luisse, quam istorum sit : et simul explicari,
qua; sit vera sententia de efficacia gratiae.
Primum argumentum sumitur ab iis testimo¬
niis, in quibus S. Augustinus docet, gratiam
efficacem consistere in vocatione, sive per¬
suasione et illustratione interna, ac proinde
ad gratiam excitantem pertinere potius quam
ad adjuvantem, si per adjuvantem intelliga-
mus physicam Dei cooperationem. Auctores
enim opinionis, quam refutare aggredimur,
gratiam efficacem ponunt in illa physica
Dei actione, qua; producit ipsum actum vo¬
lendi.
Igitur sic loquitur S. Augustinus in libro
de spiritu et littera cap. 34. « Attendat, et
videat, inquit, non ideo tantum istam volun¬
tatem, divino muneri tribuendam, quia ex
libero arbitrio est, quod nobis naturaliter
creatum est : verum etiam quod visorum
suasionibus agit Deus, ut velimus et ut cre¬
damus. «Et ibidem : » His modis quando Deus
agit cum anima rationali ut ei credat, neque
enim credere potest quolibet libero arbitrio,
si nulla. sit suasio, vel vocatio cui credat,
profecto et ipsum velle credere Deus opera¬
tur in homine, et in omnibus misericordia
ejus praevenit nos, consentire autem vocatio¬
ni Dei, vel dissentire proprie voluntatis, est,
qua; res non solum non infirmat quod di¬
ctum est, quid habes quod non accepisti, ve¬
rum etiam confirmat. Accipere enim et ha¬
bere anima non potest dona, de quibus au¬
dit, nisi consentiendo, ac per hoc quid ha¬
beat et quid accipiat, Dei est : accipere au¬
tem et habere utique accipientis et habentis
est. ))
Hoc loco S. Augustinus primum ostendit,
ipsum velle bonum, esse donum Dei, non
quomodo Pelagiani docebant, quia sit ex
libero arbitrio, quod nobis a Deo donatum
est, sed quia sit ex peculiari gratia Dei.
Deinde explicat quidnam illa gratia sit, ac
dicit esse suasionem, inspirationem, visorum
immissionem, internam vocationem. Deni¬
que excludit opinionem illam qua; docet, .a
Deo determinari voluntatem, ac dicit con¬
sentire vocationi et suasioni Dei, vel dissen¬
tire proprie voluntatis esse.
Ilursus idem Augustinus lib. i. ad Simpli-
cianum, quaest. 2 : « Noluit, inquit, Esau et
non cucurrit, sed et si voluisset et cucurris¬
set, Dei adjutorio pervenisset, qui ei etiam
velle et currere vocando praestaret, nisi vo¬
catione contempta reprobus fieret. Aliter
enim Deus praestat ut velimus, aliter praestat
quod voluerimus. Ut velimus enim et suum
esse voluit et nostrum, suum vocando, no¬
strum sequendo; quod autem voluerimus,
solus praestat, id est, posse bene ageio et
semper beate vivere. Et hic videmus, ipsum
velle nostrum, fieri a Deo, non per physicam
actionem dedeiminantem voluntatem, sed
per vocationem, qua; est moralis inclinatio
et impulsio, cui libere consentimus vel dis¬
sentimus. »
Idem habemus in lib. 83. quaestionum,
quaest. 68. ubi dicit 'Augustinus, ideo non
debere sibi tribuere eos, qui ad comam mag¬
nam venerunt, quia vocati venerunt ; voca¬
tio enim gratia fuit, sine qua venire non po¬
tuissent. Idem Auctor in epist. 107. ante me¬
dium : « St ergo, inquit, ita praepararet at¬
que operaietur Deus hominis voluntatem, ut
tantummodo legem suam, atque doctrinam
libero ejus adhiberet arbitrio, nec vocatione
illa alta atque secreta, sic ejus ageret sen¬
sum, ut eidem legi atque doctrinae accom¬
modaret assensum, procul dubio eam legei'C,
vel intelligere legendo, vel etiam exponere
ac praedicare sufficeret, nec opus esset orare
ut Deus ad fidem suam infidelium corda
converteret. »
Vides hic, gratiam Dei efficacem, quae in¬
fidelium coi'da convertit, et voluntatem bo¬
nam, quam operatur in nobis, esse vocatio¬
nem altam, atque secretam, quae sensum
internum, id est, mentem agit, atque illi
persuadet, ut consensum doctrinae, qua; sibi
praedicatur, accommodet. Idem lib. de prae¬
destinat. Sanctorum cap. 8 explicans illud
Joan. vi : Omnis qui audivit a patre et didicit,
venit ad me (1) ; Valde, inquit, remonta est
a sensibus carnis Inec schola, in qua pater
auditur et docet, ut veniatur ad filium; ib
est et ipse filius, quia ipse est verbum ejus,
per quod sic docet, nec agit hoc cum carnis
aure, sed cordis. »
Hic vero non solum discimus ex Augusti¬
no, gratiam efficacem esse internam suasio-
330
LIBER I.
nem, qua? adhibetur cordis auribus ; sed et¬
iam discimus ex Evangelio ; Christus enim
in Evangelio ; de Dei gratia, qua? facit nos
velle credere, loquitur, cum ait : Omnis qui
audivit a Patre et didicit, venit ad me. Idem
Augustinus similia habet in libro de bono
perseverantia? cap. 14. quem locum citabi¬
mus in argumento quarto ; idem auctor li¬
bro de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 3. « Ut
Paulus, inquit, de coelo vocaretur, et tam
magna et efficacissima vocatione converte¬
retur, gratia Dei erat sola, etc. » Hic etiam
videnr.s gratiam efficacem esse vocationem.
Quo autem illa fuerit yocatio, explicat
idem Augustinus lib. i. ad Simplicianum
queest. 2. ad finem, ubi sic ait : « Quid vo¬
lebat Saulus nisi ut invaderet, et traheret,
vinciret et necaret Christianos ? quam rabida
voluntas ? quam furiosa ? quam ca?ca ? qui
tamen una desuper voce prostratus, occur¬
rente utique tali viso, quo mens illa et vo¬
luntas, refracta saevitia retorqueretur et
corrigeretur ad fidem. » Illa igitur fuit vo¬
catio efficax, immissio talis visi in mente
Pauli, quo ille subito persuaderetur et vellet
credere.
Denique idem ductor tract. 26. in Joan.
explicans quomodo pater trahat homines ad
Christum : « Ramum, inquit, viridem osten¬
dis ovi, et trahis illam; nuces puero demon¬
strantur et trahitur. » Et mox : « Si ergo is¬
ta, qua? inter delicias et voluptates terrenas
revelantur amantibus trahunt, quoniam ve¬
rum est, trahit sua quemque voluptas ; non
trahit revelatus Christus a Patre ? quid enim
fortius desiderat anima, quam veritatem ? »
Hic aperte videmus aptis similitudinibus ex¬
plicatum, quemadmodum gratia trahat ani¬
mam, non eam physice determinando, sed
invitando, atque alliciendo demonstratis iis,
quae congrua sunt ei qui trahitur.
Alterum argumentum sumitur ex iis locis,
in quibus S. Augustinus docet gratiam Dei,
quae facit nos velle, ac per hoc efficax est,
esse gratiam praevenientem et adeo praeve¬
nientem, ut sine nobis operetur, proinde es¬
se praevenientem non solum natura, sed ali¬
quando etiam tempore. Hinc enim manifeste
sequitur, gratiam efficacem non esse physi¬
cam actionem determinantem voluntatem ;
ea siquidem actio non potest esse prior actu
voluntatis humanae, nisi prioritate natura? ;
et prioritate naturae, non ut significat instans
in quo sit illa actio, sed tantum a quo sit :
ipsa enim humana volitio, ut sic loquar, ut
a Deo est, dicitur actio Dei, nec intelligi
potest, ut in aliquo instanti Deus efficiat il¬
lam volitionem, quin intelligatur in eodem
instanti illa volitio fieri et esse in nobis, sicut
non potest intelligi, ut Deus moveat volun¬
tatem quin illa moveatur. Igitur in epist.
107. « Gratia, inquit, meretur augeri, ut au¬
cta mereatur et perfici; comitante, non du¬
cente ; pedissequa, non praevia voluntate. »
Et ibidem aliquoties repetit, per gratiam
praeveniri voluntatem.
Ex qua sententia vidit Calvinus recte col¬
ligi, voluntatem a gratia praeparari, non au¬
tem ita determinari, ut non sit ei liberum
assentiri, vel dissentire, et ideo Augustini
sententiam audacter rejecit, sic enim scribit
in lib. ii. Institutionum cap. 3. § 7. « Sed
erunt, inquit, qui concedent voluntatem a
bono suopte ingenio aversam, sola Domini
virtute converti, sie tamen ut praeparata,
suas deinde in agendo partes habeat, quem¬
admodum docet Augustinus, omne bonum
opus gratiam praecedere, et id comitante,
non ducente ; pedissequa, non praevia vo¬
luntate. » Et infra : « Sed quia reformata
opus est Domini, hoc perperam homini tri¬
buitur, quod gratiae praevenienti pedissequa
voluntate obsequatur. » Haec ille.
Idem Augustinus lib. i. ad Simplicianum
quaest. 2. scribit, ipsum velle nostrum, et
Dei esse et nostrum ; Dei, vocando; nostrum,
sequendo ; ubi hunc vides esse ordinem.
Primum Deus vocat, deinde nos vocatione
accepta sequimur. Idem Augustinus in libro
de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 3 : «Ut apo¬
stolus Paulus, inquit, efficacissima vocatione
converteretur, gratia Dei erat sola. » Solam
vocat gratiam Dei, quia non cooperabatur
voluntas humana Deo in illa actione vocan¬
di, qua proveniebatur et pra?parabatur, ut
vellet converti. Quare in eodem libro cap.
16. ita scribit : « Certum est nos velle cum
volumus ; sed ille facit ut velimus bonum,-
de quo dictum est, quod pra?paratur volun¬
tas a Domino. » Et cap. 17: « Ut velimus si¬
ne nobis operatur; cum autem volumus, et
sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum coopera¬
tur. » Quod antea dixerat, gratia Dei erat
sola, nunc explicat per illa verba : « Ut veli¬
mus sine nobis operatur. »
Provenit igitur Deus, et proparat vocan¬
do, idque sine nobis. Deinde nos sequimur,
non tamen sine ejus auxilio, vocationi assen-
tiendo. Denique in epist. 107. ad Vitalem,
explicans illud Psal. 37. «A Domino gressus
CAPUT XIII.
534
hominis diriguntur, et vitam ejus volet. »
Observat, primum dictum esse, gressus ho¬
minis a Deo dirigi, deinde additum hominem
velle : « Quia, ut ipse loquitur, voluntas bo¬
na donum Dei est, qui gressus hominis pro-
pterea primitus dirigit, ut viam ejus velit. »
Itaque primum dirigit Deus gressus, praepa¬
rans voluntatem interna inspiratione ac sua¬
sione, deinde ipsa voluntas praeparata inspi¬
rationi ac suasioni, libere volendo assenti-
tur.
Tertium argumentum sumitur ex omnibus
illis locis, quibus capite superiore probavi¬
mus, dari gratiam sufficientem distinctam
ab efficaci. Nam fieri non potest, ut detur
gratia vere sufficiens, quae simul non sit effi¬
cax, si gratia Dei physice determinat volun¬
tatem ; ista enim gratia praesente et operan¬
te, habet homo gratiam efficacem ; ista
absente, ne sufficientem quidem habet.
Postremum argumentum sumitur ex illis
locis, in quibus idem S. Augustinus ostendit
unde fiat, ut gratia sit efficax, licet non de¬
terminet physice, sed tantum moraliter, per
modum suasionis : sunt autem duo loca
praecipua. Locus prior est in lib. i. ad Sim-
plician. quaest. 2 : « Igitur, inquit, non vo¬
lentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est
Dei, qui hoc modo vocavit, quomodo aptum
erat eis, qui secuti sunt vocationem. » Et in¬
fra : «i Cujus miseretur, sic eum vocat, quo¬
modo scit ei congruere, ut vocantem non
respuat. »
Posterior est in lib. ii. de bono perseve¬
rantiae c. i-4: («Ex quo apparet, habere quos¬
dam in ipso ingenio divinum naturaliter
munus intelligentiae, quo moveantur ad fi¬
dem, si congrua suis mentibus, vel audiant
verba, vel signa conspiciant. Et tamen si
Dei altiori judicio a perditionis massa non
sunt gratiae praedestinatione discreti, nec ip¬
sa ei adhibentur, vel dicta divina vel facta
per qure possent credere, si audirent utique
talia vel viderent. »
Praeter haec duo loca, sunt etiam»alia, ex
quibus hoc idem colligitur, nam in libro de
spiritu et littera cap. 34. cum dixisset S.
Augustinus, Deum internis inspirationibus
agere cum anima ut velit, et hac de causa
ipsam voluntatem bonam esse donum Dei,
subjungit : « Jam si ad illam profunditatem
scrutandam quisquam nos coarctet, cur illi
ita suadeatur, ut persuadetur, illi autem non
ita duo sola occurrunt interim, quae respon¬
dere placet, o altitudo divitiarum, et, num-
quid iniquitas apud Deum ? » Ubi potuisset
S. Augustinus respondere uni persuaderi,
alteri non ita, quias unus vult assentiri, al¬
ter non vult; sed quoniam noverat, posse
Deum etiam nolenti assentiri facile persua¬
dere, et ex nolente facere volentem, si vellet
ei proponere, quae scit menti ejus et ingenio
congruere ; ideo ad arcanum divini consilii
retulit dicens : O altitudo divitiarum.
Idem Augustinus hoc ipsum satis aperte
declarat tract. 26. in Joan. ubi explicat,
quomodo Deus trahat homines ad fidem, et
faciat eos velle credere, nam quemadmodum
pastor trahit ovem cum demonstrat ei ramum
viridem, quo scit illam delectari, et pueros
parentes alliciunt ostensis nucibus, quae aeta¬
ti illi congruunt : sic etiam, Augustini sen¬
tentia, Deus homines trahit inspiratione in¬
terius oblata, qualem scit aptam esse, ut ab
eis non respuatur ; quomodo lib. i. ad Sim-
plician. quaest. 2. in fine, idem Augustinus
scribit, Apostolum Paulum continuo a Deo
Hfisse conversum, quia fecit, ut tale visum
menti ejus occurreret, quale requirebatur,
ut mens illa et voluntas refracta saevitia, re¬
torqueretur et corrigeretur ad fidem.
Denique omnia testimonia in primo argu¬
mento allata huc pertinent. Neque enim in-
tclligi potest, quo pacto gratia efficax con¬
sistat in illa interna suasione, quae per libe¬
rum arbitrium respui potest, et tamen infal¬
libilem effectum habeat, nisi addamus, Deum
iis, quos efficaciter et infallibiliter trahere
decrevit, eam suasionem adhibere, quam
videt congruere ingenio eorum, et quam
certo novit ab eis non contemnendam.
CAPUT XIII.
Solvuntur objectiones quaedam abversus ea,