Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book I: On Grace
Chapter 13: Certain objections are answered against what has been said of efficacious grace
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Three things occur which could be objected against what we disputed in the chapter above.
The first is that efficacious grace seems not to be constituted in illumination and inspiration, or calling and persuasion, because all these pertain to the law and the letter, not to grace and the spirit: for what difference is there between that inward persuasion and an outward sermon? and yet the outward sermon is letter, not spirit. I answer that there is a very great difference between the grace of inward persuasion and an outward sermon. For the outward sermon is applied to the ears of the body; the inward, to the ears of the heart. Next, the outward sermon only sets forth the object, but does not infuse light into the mind for knowing it, nor breathes affection for loving it; but the inward and divine persuasion sometimes sets forth the object — which it has in common with the outward — and more often uses the outward as an instrument; but it always infuses light, and breathes in the beginning of a good will, which is as it were a seed, whence afterward arises the fruit of a perfect and deliberate will. And although to set forth the object of itself pertains not to the spirit but to the letter, yet it pertains to grace that that reading or sermon should present itself which is accommodated to the man's disposition — above all if the inward Teacher come to it, who opens the heart to attend to the things which are heard or read, as the Scripture speaks of Lydia the seller of purple, Acts 16. Finally, inward grace not only stirs, through illumination and the breathing of good desire, but also aids the will, and cooperates with it even physically for eliciting the act of the deliberate will — although grace is called efficacious, as we demonstrated above, rather from that stirring which is properly wont to be called a calling, than from the physical cooperation. See Augustine in epistle 107, On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 34, and On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8 — in which places he openly attributes to grace and the spirit, as distinguished from the law and the letter, that inward persuasion which we call stirring grace.
The second objection: if efficacious grace is an inward persuasion by which someone is so called as is apt for him, that he spurn not the caller, then sufficient grace, as distinguished from the efficacious, will be nothing else than an inward persuasion by which someone is so called as is not apt for him, that he spurn not the caller. But it seems absurd that God should call someone in a way not apt for him, that he spurn not the caller — or that he should call at the time when he sees the man will not follow, and not call when he sees he would follow. I answer: it is certain that many are called by God in a way not apt for them, that they spurn not the caller, and at a time when God sees they will not follow; and that they are not called at the time when they are foreseen as sure to follow, if they were called. For the Lord, Matthew 11, says that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have done penance in ashes and haircloth, if they had seen the signs which the Galileans saw — who nevertheless, having seen them, were not converted. And so the Lord did the signs before the Galileans, and called them, when he saw they would not be converted; and would not do the signs before the Tyrians and Sidonians, and call them, when he saw they would have been converted, had they been called through those signs. Nor can it be doubted that they who are arraigned for having resisted the Holy Spirit, Acts 7, were called by the Holy Spirit in that manner and at that time in which he saw it was not apt for them that they should obey. For that they were called and did not obey is certain, since otherwise they would not be reprehended for having resisted the Holy Spirit; and that the Holy Spirit foreknew they would not obey if they were called in that manner and at that time; and that the Holy Spirit did not lack the power by which he could call at the time and in the manner in which he saw they would follow — who will dare deny, unless he would deny the infinite wisdom or power of God? He called, then, how and when he saw they would not follow; and did not call how and when he saw they would follow. And what God does ought not to seem absurd, even if we be ignorant of the cause. Though in this matter we are not altogether ignorant of the cause, as can be gathered from Augustine in epistle 105 and elsewhere. For God does not call the reprobate when he sees they would follow, because he is not bound so to call them, and can justly desert them, since by nature they are children of wrath. But he calls when he sees they will not follow — both that the force of free choice may be shown, and for the sake of the elect, that they, in the perdition of the others, may understand what grace they have received from God, who not only called them, but so called them as he saw they would infallibly follow. Nor can the reprobate refer any fault of their disobedience to God, since not the foreknowledge of God, but their own will, was the cause that they did not acquiesce to the calling.
The third objection. This explication of sufficient and efficacious grace which we have delivered seems to differ little, or even nothing, from that opinion which places the efficacy of grace not so much in the grace itself as in the human will — which opinion we refuted at the beginning of the chapter above. I answer that our judgment, which we have demonstrated to be St. Augustine's, agrees in some one thing with that first opinion, but differs from it in many. For it agrees in this, that both judgments place sufficient and efficacious grace chiefly in the stirring help, not in the aiding. But they differ between themselves in that the first opinion will have the efficacy of grace depend on the human will; ours will have it depend on the will of God. And if the question be proposed — whether, if two men have altogether the same stirring and aiding grace, at least in first act, and hear the same preacher, and see the same signs, it can come to pass that the one believe and the other not believe — that first opinion will answer that it can, because the free will remains, and can at its pleasure follow grace or resist it. Which answer contradicts the Apostle, who in 1 Corinthians 4 forbids the believer to be puffed up against the unbeliever, and gives the reason: because the faith which distinguishes them is the gift of God, which was given to the one and not given to the other. “For who,” says he, “distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?” But our judgment will answer that it can indeed come to pass that two men, having received the same inward motion, hear the same preacher and see the same signs, and the one believe, the other not believe; yet it cannot come to pass that, if two men receive altogether the same stirring grace, the one believe and the other not believe. For to grace pertains not only the motion, or inward stirring, but the circumstance of place, of time, of person, etc. For if, the same motion being received, the one believes and the other believes not, without doubt the one received the motion in that manner, place, and time which God foresaw to be congruous to his disposition; the other did not so receive it; and thereby he who believes had a far greater grace of God than he who believes not. For he who did not believe had a grace by which he could believe; but he who believed had a grace by which he could and would believe. For then God works in us the willing, when he so calls as he sees men will follow. And therefore truly the believer cannot glory or be puffed up against the unbeliever, because that which principally distinguishes him from the unbeliever is not himself through free choice, but God through the efficacious grace which he gave to him and did not give to the other. See Augustine, book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8.
Thou wilt say: if we posit what Augustine posits, book 12 On the City of God, chapter 6 — two men, namely, equal in all things, tempted by the same temptation, in the same manner, place, and time, and equally affected, and yet the one resists, the other falls — must not the cause of the diversity be referred to free choice, as in that place Augustine refers it? For without doubt the grace also was equal, if the calling was given to both in the same manner, place, and time, and while they were equally affected — otherwise they would not have been equal in all things. I answer: the cause of the diversity is to be referred to free choice, as Augustine in that place rightly proves — but not the first cause. For the first cause was that God gave to the one an inspiration which he foresaw would be embraced by him through free choice; to the other he gave the same, but one which he foresaw would be rejected by him through free choice.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
quae dicta sunt de gratia efficaci. Occurrunt tria, quae objici possent adver¬ sus ea, quae in superiore capite disputavi¬ mus. Primum est gratiam efficacem non videri in illustratione et inspiratione, seu vocatio¬ ne, ac suasione constituendam, quod ista . omnia ad legem et litteram, non ad gratiam et spiritum pertineant ; quid enim interest inter suasionem istam internam, et concio¬ nem externam ? et tamen externa concio lit¬ tera est, non spiritus. LIBER I. Respondeo, mullum omnino interesse in¬ ter gratiam interna; suasionis, et concionem externam ; nam concio externa admovetur auribus corporis, concio interna auribus cordis. Deinde, concio externa solum proponit objectum, sed non infundit lumen menti ad illud cognoscendum, neque aspirat affectum ad illud diligendum ; at interna ac divina suasio aliquando proponit objectum, quod est illi commune cum externa ; sajpius au¬ tem utitur externa pro instrumento ; sempcr autem lumen infundit, et afflat initium bo¬ na; voluntatis, quod est quasi semen, unde postea oritur fructus voluntatis perfectse et deliberata; ; quamvis autem proponere ob¬ jectum per se non ad spiritum, sed ad litte¬ ram pertineat, tamen ad gratiam pertinet, ut ea lectio, vel concio occurrat, quae est accommodata hominis ingenio, praesertim si accedat internus Doctor, qui aperiat cor intendere his quae audiuntur, aut leguntur, ut de Lidia purpuraria loquitur Scripturi^ Actor, xvi. Denique gratia interna non solum excitat per illustrationem et aspirationem boni desi¬ derii, sed etiam adjuvat voluntatem, eiquo cooperatur etiam physice ad eliciendum a- ctum voluntatis deliberatae, quamquam gra¬ tia magis dicitur efficax, ut supra demonstra¬ vimus, ex illa excitatione, quse proprie vo¬ catio dici solet, quam ex cooperatione physi¬ ca. Yide Augustinum in epist. 107. de spi¬ ritu et littera cap. 34. et de praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 8. in quibus locis aperte tribuit gratiae et spiritui, ut distinguitur a le¬ ge et littera, internam suasionem, quam nos gratiam excitantem appellamus. Secunda objectio, si gratia efficax est in- terna suasio, qua ita vocatur aliquis, ut ap¬ tum est ei, ut vocantem non spernat; gratia sufficiens, ut aib efficaci distinguitur, nihil erit aliud, nisi interna suasio, qua ita vocatur aliquis, ut aptum ei non est, ut vocantem non spernat. Atqui absurdum videtur, ut Deus vocet aliquem, ut aptum ei non est, ut vocantem non spernat, sive, ut tunc vocet, quando videt non secuturum, ' et non vocet quando videt secuturum. Respondeo : certum esse vocari a Deo mul¬ tos, ut aptum eis non est, ut vocantem non spernant, et eo tempore, quo Deus videt illos non secuturos, et non vocari eo tempore, quo pra;videntur secuturi, si vocarentur. Nam Dominus Matth. xi. dicit, Tyrios et Si¬ donios poenitentiam acturos fuisse in cinere et cilicio, si ea signa vidissent, quae Galihei videbant, qui tamen iis visis non converte¬ bantur. Itaque Dominus signa fecit coram Galilaeis, eosque vocavit, quando vidit eos non convertendos, et noluit signa facere co¬ ram Tyriis et Sidoniis, eosque vocare quan¬ do videbat eos convertendos, si per ea signa vocati fuissent. Neque dubitari potest, quin ii qui arguun¬ tur restitisse Spiritui sancto, Actor, cap. vn. vocati fuerint a Spiritu sancto eo modo et eo tempore, quo videbat eis non aptum esse ut obedirent. Nam vocatos esse, et non obe- divisse, certum est, quia alioqui non repre¬ henderentur, quod Spiritui sancto restitis¬ sent : praescivisse autem Spiritum sanctum eos non obedituros, si illo modo et illo tem¬ pore vocarentur ; nec defuisse Spiritui sancto potentiam, qua vocare posset eo tempore et modo, quo videbat illos secuturos, quis ne¬ gare audebit, nisi sapientiam aut potentiam Dei infinitam negare velit? vocavit igitur quomodo et quando vidit non secuturos, et non vocavit quomodo et quando vidit se¬ cui uros. Quod autem Deus facit, absurdum videri non debet, etiamsi causam ignoremus : quamquam in hac re non omnino causam ignoramus, ut ex Augustino colligi potest in epist. 100. et alibi. Deus enim reprobos non vocat, quando videt secuturos, quia non tenetur ita eos vocare, et juste potest dese¬ rere, cum natura sint filii irae. Vocat autem quando videt non secuturos, tum ut osten¬ datur vis liberi arbitrii, tum propter electos, ut ipsi in perditione aliorum intelligant, quam gratiam acceperint a Deo, qui cos non solum vocavit, sed ita vocavit, ut videbat infallibiliter secuturos. Neque reprobi cul¬ pam ullam suae inobedientiae in Deum referre possunt , cum non praescientia Dei , sed ipsorum voluntas causa fuerit, ut vocationi non acquiescerent. Tertia objectio. Videtur ista explicatio gra¬ tia; sufficientis et efficacis, quam nos tradidi¬ mus, aut parum, aut etiam nihil differre ab opinione illa, qua; efficaciam gratia;, non tam in ipsa gratia, quam in voluntate humana ponit. Quam opinionem initio superioris ca¬ pitis refutavimus. Respondeo, sententiam nostram, quam S. Augustini esse demonstravimus, aliqua in re cum prima illa opinione convenire, sed in multis ab illa discrepare. Convenit enim CAPUT XIV. ia eo, quod utraque sententia gratiam suf¬ ficientem et efficacem ponit in auxilio exci¬ tante potissimum, non in adjuvante. Sed discrepant inter se, quod prima opinio vult efficaciam gratiae pendere a voluntate huma¬ na, nostra vero, pendere vult a voluntate Dei. Et, si proponatur qurntio, utrum si duo homines habeant, camdcm omnino gratiam excitantem et adjuvantem, saltem in actu primo, et eumdem contionatorem audiant, et eadem signa videant : utrum, inquam, fieri possit, ut unus credat, alter non credat. Prima illa opinio respondebit, fieri posse, quia libera voluntas manet, et potest pro ar¬ bitrio gratiam sequi, vel ei resistere. Qua) responsio contradicit Apostolo, qui I ad Corinth. iv. prohibet fideli ne infletur adver¬ sus infidelem, et rationem reddit, quia fides, quae eos discernit, est donum Dei, quod illi est datum, et alteri non est datum. « Quis enim, inquit, te discernit? quid habes quod non accepisti ; si accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis ? » At nostra sententia respondebit, posse quidem fieri, ut duo homines eadem interna motione accepta eumdem contionatorem au¬ diant, et eadem signa videant, et unus cre¬ dat, alter non credat ; tamen non posse fieri, ut si eamdem omnino gratiam excitantem duo homines acecipiant, unus credat, alter non credat. Siquidem ad gratiam rion solum per¬ tinet motio, sive excitatio interna, sed cir¬ cumstantia loci, temporis, personae, etc. Si enim eadem motione accepta unus credit, alter non credit, sine dubio unus accepit motionem eo modo, loco et tempore, quo Deus praevidit ejus ingenio congruere, alter non ita accepit; ac per hoc longe majorem habuit Dei gratiam, is qui credit, quam qui non credit. Qui enim non credidit, habuit gratiam perquam posseteredere ; qui autem credidit, habuit gratiam qua posset et vellet credere. Tunc enim Deusin nobis operatur vel¬ le, cum ita vocat, ut videt secuturos. Et ideo ve¬ re non potcstfidelisadversus infidelem gloriari aut inflari, quia qui eum principaliter discernit ab infideli, non est ipse per liberum arbi¬ trium, -sed Deus per gratiam efficacem, quam ei dedit et alteri non dedit. Vide Augusti¬ num libro de praedestinatione Sanctorum Ctip • • % Dices, si ponamus id quod ponit Augusti¬ 533 nus lib. 12. de Civit. Dei cap. 6. duos vide¬ licet in omnibus pares, tentatos eadem ten- tatione, eodem modo, loco, tempore, et rnque affectos, et tamen unus resistat, alter cadat ; nonne causa diversitatis referenda erit in liberum arbitrium? ut eo loco refert Augustinus : nam sine dubio etiam gratia fuit aqualis, si vocatio data est utrique eo¬ dem modo, loco, et tempore, et cum essent seque affecti, alioqui non fuissent in omnibus pares. Respondeo : causam diversitatis referendam esse in liberum arbitrium, ut Augustinus eo loco recte probat, sed non primam causam : nam prima causa fuit, quia Deus uni dedit inspirationem, quam praevidit ab illo per li¬ berum arbitrium amplectendam, alteri dedit eamdem, sed quam praevidit ab eo per libe¬ rum arbitrium rejiciendam. CAPUT XIV. Qux sit proprie gratia operans.