Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book I: On Grace
Chapter 14: What operating grace properly is
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Concerning the sixth partition of grace, into operating and cooperating, there is a question, and no light one, which in truth was bred by the obscurity of the words of St. Augustine, from whom the theologians received that partition, and of the Apostle Paul, from whom Augustine received it. The Apostle's words are in the epistle to the Philippians, chapter 2: For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will. Which words Augustine thus explains in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17: “He, that we may will, works, beginning; who, with those who will, cooperates, perfecting.” And presently: “That we may will, he works without us; but when we will, and so will that we do, he cooperates with us.” There are many expositions of this partition.
First, the scholastic theologians call operating grace the very habit of grace, as it formally makes us just and pleasing to God — for this God does in us without us; and they will have cooperating grace to be the same habit, as it is the principle of a meritorious work — for when we do good works, not grace alone works in us, but we ourselves also truly work. This doctrine is most true, and we shall champion it below in its place against the heretics; but yet properly the partition of operating and cooperating grace, as it was received from the Apostle and Augustine, seems to pertain not to the habit of grace, but rather to special help. For the Apostle and Augustine do not attribute to operating grace that it make a man just, but that it make him will and desire justice; nor can that properly be called efficiency or operation which grace does not efficiently, but formally.
There is therefore another explication: that operating grace is not distinguished from stirring grace, nor cooperating from aiding; and because stirring grace inspires a certain beginning of good will, to which we do not freely concur, while aiding grace helps toward yielding assent and choosing what God has inspired, in which we are plainly free — therefore the authors of this judgment will have it said that God effects in us, without us, that we will, but cooperates with us when we will; where by that “that we may will” they understand the imperfect and undeliberate desire, and by that “when we will,” the perfect and deliberate election. This explication does not seem to satisfy the words of the Apostle and of St. Augustine; for both attribute to operating grace, as its proper effect, not that undeliberate and imperfect willing, but the deliberate willing whence good works are born. “God” (says the Apostle) “works in us to will and to accomplish” — where undeliberate willing is not distinguished from deliberate, but the will from the execution. And St. Augustine: “That we may will,” says he, “he works without us; but when we will, and so will that we work, he cooperates with us” — where the cooperation is adjoined to our work proceeding from a perfect, and thereby deliberate, will.
Another explication, of others, is that operating grace is that which bestows the internal act, cooperating that which bestows the external — which seems to be St. Thomas's, 1-2, question 111, article 2. But there seems not to be required any special grace for the external act; for where we efficaciously will something, the members of the body obey at a nod; and therefore St. Augustine, in the same book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 16, says that we must ask of God that we may will as much as is necessary, that by willing we may do; and in chapter 17 he says that they who will to keep the commandments and cannot, therefore cannot, because they have a depraved will. And in brief, in both chapters he teaches this: that, an efficacious will being posited, no difficulty remains. And so the general help suffices for accomplishing the external work — which help is not properly called grace, neither operating nor cooperating.
It must be said, then, that operating grace is that which effects in a man the first act of the deliberate will — such as is conversion, whether from unbelief to faith, or from other sins to penitence; and that cooperating grace is that which effects the consequent acts of the will — such as are, to will to pray, to will to seek a priest, to will to do good works, and others like: which the external acts straightway follow. So that operating grace is nothing else than the efficacious special help with respect to the first act of the will; and cooperating grace is the special help with respect to the following acts.
But the question is — and no light one — how that is to be understood which St. Augustine says, that the first act of the deliberate will is done without us. For how is that done without us which is effected by our free deliberation and election? For the Lutherans and Calvinists are not to be listened to, who contend that good internal acts are so done without us that they are not acts of free choice, and that we do not properly do them, but necessarily receive them as sent in by God — for this error we shall afterward copiously refute in its place. Nor can it be doubted that this their judgment is most foreign to the mind of St. Augustine, about whose words we now labor. For in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2: “That we will,” says he, “he has willed to be both his and ours — his by calling, ours by following.” Likewise book 1 [al. 2] against the two epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 8 [al. 19]: “Man,” says he, “prepares his heart — yet not without the help of God, who touches the heart.” And a little after: “Although without his helping — without whom we can do nothing — we cannot open our mouth, yet we open it by his aid and by our own work; for what is it to prepare the heart and to open the mouth, but to prepare the will?” Likewise tractate 72 [al. 3] on John: “To him who believes in him who justifies the impious, his faith is reckoned unto justice. In this work we do the works of Christ, for even the believing itself in Christ is the work of Christ. He works this in us — yet not without us.” Likewise in the same place: “With Christ working in him, man cooperates unto his eternal salvation and his justification.” Thus he. It cannot be doubted, then, that St. Augustine had nothing in common with the judgment of the heretics, who think we concur only passively to the internal acts of piety.
But if these things are so, the question proposed at the beginning seems now the more entangled: for from the same Augustine we have heard both that God works without us that very willing, and that he works it not without us; that God alone works it, and that we cooperate with him — and other things which seem to be at strife. It must therefore be observed that God, according to one kind of cause, is the mover with respect to the deliberate willing itself, and the will is not mover, but only moved; while yet, according to another kind of cause, for producing that same act of willing God concurs as moving, and the will both as moved and as moving; and that therefore both are true — that God works the deliberate willing itself without us, and that he works it not without us. For if we consider the efficient and physical cause of that act, it is not only God through special help, but also the will through free choice; and in this manner that willing is God's and ours, and we cooperate with God in it, and God works it not without us, as St. Augustine speaks in the places brought a little before against the heretics. But if we consider the moral cause of that same act — that is, the cause moving by persuading, exhorting, counseling — that is God alone; and the will, according to this kind of cause, is not mover, but only moved. For the will does not itself impel itself, by persuading and exhorting, to will what it wills not; but God, speaking within to the soul through his inspirations, counsels and persuades it to will. This, then, is operating grace: which prevents our endeavor and industry, and works that we will what before we would not — without us working that we will, yet not without us freely consenting when we will.
And hence we shall understand why operating grace is required only for the first act of the will, while for the rest not operating but cooperating grace is necessary: for after we have begun to will to be converted to God, thenceforth we ourselves not only produce the remaining acts through free choice, God helping, but also stir and impel ourselves, God cooperating, toward them. And to illustrate the matter by a bodily similitude: let there be someone for whom it is expedient to sail to the east, and yet he will not do it. If someone come to him, and by many reasons brought at length persuade him, and of unwilling make him willing; and then, when he has learned that he wills to sail, procure for him a ship, moneys, and the other things which are necessary for sailors: that man assuredly will be able truly to say, “I alone brought it about that this man willed to undertake the voyage”; for even though the other heard the reasons brought, and weighed them with himself, and at length yielded assent, yet he did not persuade himself, nor move himself, but his friend moved him and persuaded him. But as touching the execution of the will, that friend cannot say, “I alone carried this man to the east,” but only, “I helped him, and cooperated that he might sail commodiously.” For he who, persuaded by his friend, resolved to sail, without doubt did not fail himself, but began to think what needed doing, and to apply endeavor and industry toward the coming voyage.
That this is the true explication of this distinction can be gathered from Augustine himself. For in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 5, he speaks thus: “That the Apostle Paul should be called from heaven, and converted by so great and most efficacious a calling, was the grace of God alone; for his merits were great, but evil.” Where the conversion of blessed Paul is attributed to grace alone, and thereby that grace was operating — not because Paul did not concur by freely consenting, and by actively producing through free choice that act of conversion, but because his merits were great but evil; that is, because before the conversion there had preceded no merit, or study, or endeavor toward conversion. For Augustine is wont to call merit any good act by reason of which we receive something else, as is clear from epistles 105 and 106 [al. 186], where he says that faith alone is given without any preceding merit, because no good act precedes it; but that the remission of sins is not given without merit, because faith by praying merits it. And so in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 14: “Faith,” says he, “is granted even unasked, that to it, asking, other things may be granted.” And a little before he had said that by faith he means the will to believe. And so operating grace is that which makes us will to believe, because that is done in us without our asking, and much less laboring and endeavoring; cooperating grace is that which makes us will to pray, to fast, to give alms, and to seek the Sacraments, because that is not done save with our endeavor and industry cooperating. Hence the same Augustine in the same book, chapter 17, does not say that God works our willing without us, but works, that we may will, without us; for we cooperate with God by willing — that is, by freely producing the act of willing — but we do not cooperate in making ourselves will, because we do not ourselves move and stir ourselves to willing, but he alone, by inward inspiration, moves and impels us.
Perhaps also St. Thomas is not foreign to this exposition; for although in the place cited, 1-2, question 111, article 2, he referred operating grace to the internal act, cooperating to the external, yet it is probable that by the internal act he understood the first internal one, and by the external understood the other consequent ones, which the external follow. For in the same article he taught that operating grace is necessary in conversion, when the will first from evil becomes good; and in the same place he taught that cooperating grace is necessary for exterior acts, because these cannot be done unless God confirm the will in good and furnish the faculty of working well. St. Thomas, then, did not mean that cooperating grace is referred simply to exterior acts, but to interior ones, as the exterior depend on them. And in this manner, when blessed Paul says that God works in us to will and to accomplish, by the word “accomplish” is to be understood not the external execution alone, but works as well internal as external, which are born of the first act of the will. And when St. Augustine writes that God works in us that we may will, but cooperates when we so will that we do, by that “we do” is to be taken not only external action, but also the internal work, as prayer, contrition, etc.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
De sexta partitione gratiae in operantem et coopcrantem, non levis est quaestio, quam sane peperit obscuritas verborum S. Augu¬ stini, a quo eam partitionem Theologi acce¬ perunt, et Apostoli Pauli, unde eam Augu¬ stinus accepit. Apostoli verba sunt in epist. ad Philippenses cap. ii. Deus est, qui ope¬ ratur in vobis velle et perficere, pro bona vo¬ luntate (1). Quae verba sic explicat Augusti¬ nus in libro de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. xvii. « Ipse ut velimus, operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens. » Et mox : « Ut velimus, sine nobis operatur ; cum autem volumus, et sicut volumus, ut fa¬ ciamus nobiscum cooperatur. » Multae sunt hujus partitionis expositiones. Primum enim Theologi Scholastici, gra¬ tiam operantem vocant ipsum habitum gra¬ tia), ut formaliter nos justos et gratos Deo fa¬ cit; id enim Deus in nobis sine nobis facit. Gratiam coopcrantem esse volunt eumdem habitum, ut operis meritorii principium est ; cum enim opera dona facimus, non sola gra¬ tia operatur in nobis, sed et nos ipsi vere operamur. Haec doctrina verissima est, et eam infe¬ rius suo loco adversus haereticos propugna- (I) Philip. 11, 13. 534 LIBER 1. bimus ; sed tamen non proprie partitio gra¬ tia} operantis et cooperantis, ut ab Apostolo et Augustino accepta est. ad habitum gratia;, sed potius ad auxilium speciale pertinere videtur. Neque enim Apostolus et Augu¬ stinus tribuunt gratia; operanti, ut faciat ho¬ minem justum, sed ut faciat cum velle et desiderare justitiam : neque efficientia sive operatio proprie dici potest id, quod gratia non efficienter, sed formaliter facit. Est igitur alia explicato, quod gratia ope¬ rans non distinguatur a gratia excitante, ne¬ que cooperans ab adjuvante; et quia gratia excitans, inspirat initium quoddam bonae voluntatis, ad quod non libere concurrimus ; gratia adjuvans juvat ad assensum praestan¬ dum et eligendum, quod Deus inspiravit, in quo plane liberi sumus : ideo dictum esse vo¬ lunt auctores hujus sententiae, Deum in nobis sine nobis efficere ut velimus, nobiscum au¬ tem cooperari cum volumus; ubi per illud, « ut velimus » intelligunt imperfectum et indeliberatum desiderium ; per illud « cum volumus ■» , intelligunt perfectam et delibe¬ ratam electionem. Haec explicatio non videtur satisfacere ver¬ bis Apostoli et S. Augustini; uterque enim tri¬ buit gratiae operanti, tamquam effectum pro¬ prium, non illud velle indeliberatum et im¬ perfectum sed velle deliberatum, unde ope¬ ra bona nascuntur : « Deus (inquit Aposto¬ lus) operatur in nobis velle et perficere. » Ubi non distinguitur velle indeliberatum a velle deliberato, sed voluntas ab executione. Et S. Augustinus: « Ut velimus, inquit, sine nobis operatur, cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut operemur, nobiscum coopera¬ tur. » Ubi cooperatio adjungitur operi nostio ex perfecta, ac per hoc, deliberata voluntate prodeunti. Alia explicatio aliorum est, gratiam ope¬ rantem esse eam, qua; tribuit actum inter¬ num, cooperantem quae tribuit externum. Quae videtur esse S. Thomae in i. 2. quaest. 411. art. 2. Sed non videtur requiri gratia aliqua spe¬ cialis ad actum externum ; ubi enim aliquid efficaciter volumus, membra corporis ad nu¬ tum obediunt, et ideo S. Augustinus in eodem libro de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 16. dicit, petendum esse a Deo, ut tantum velimus, quantum necesse est, ut volendo faciamus et cap. 17. dicit, eos qui volunt mandata servare, et non possunt, ideo non posse, quia pravam habent voluntatem. Et breviter, in utroque capite hoc docet, posi¬ ta efficaci voluntate, nullam remanere diffi¬ cultatem ; itaque sufficit auxilium generale ad opus externum perficiendum, quod au¬ xilium non dicitur proprie gratia, neque ope¬ rans, neque cooperans. Dicendum igitur est, gratiam operantem illam esse, quae efficit in homine primum ac¬ tum deliberata; voluntatis, qualis est conver¬ sio, sive ab infidelitate ad fidem ; sive a pec¬ catis caeteris ad poenitentiam : gratiam vero cooperantem esse illam, quae efficit conse¬ quentes actus voluntatis, quales sunt, velle orare, velle quaerere sacerdotem, velle bona opera facere, et alii similes. Quos continuo sequuntur actus externi, ita ut gratia operans nihil sit aliud, nisi auxilium speciale efficax respectu primi actus voluntatis ; gratia vero cooperans sit auxilium speciale respectu a- ctuum sequentium. Sed quaestio est, eaque non levis, quomo¬ do sit intelligendum, quod S. Augustinus ait, primum actum deliberatae voluntatis fieri si¬ ne nobis. Quomodo enim fit sine nobis, quod nostra libera deliberatione et electione effi¬ citur. Neque enim audiendi sunt Lutherani et Galvinistae, qui contendunt actus bonos internos ita fieri sine nobis, ut nos sint actus liberi arbitrii ; neque nos eos proprie facia¬ mus, sed immissos a Deo necessario recipia¬ mus. Hunc enim errorem postea suo loco co¬ piose refellemus. Neque dubitari potest quin ista eorum sen¬ tentia alienissima sit a mente S. Augustini, de cujus verbis nunc laboramus. Nam in lib. i. ad Siraplic. quaest. 2 : « Ut velimus, inquit, et suum esse voluit, et nostrum, su¬ um vocando, nostrum sequendo. » Item lib. ii. contra duas epistoliis Pelagianorum cap. 8 : « Homo, inquit, praeparat cor, non tamen sine adjutorio Dei, qui tangit cor. » Et paulo post : « Quamvis nisi adjuvante illo, sine quo possumus facere, os non possumus aperire, tamenos aperimus illius adjumen¬ to, et opere nostro ; nam quid est praepa¬ rare cor et os asperire, nisi voluntatem pa¬ rare? » Item tract. 72 in Joan. : « Credenti in eum qui justificat impium, deputatur ejus fides ad justitiam, in hoc opere facimus ope¬ ra Christi, quia et ipsum credere in Christum opus est Christi. Hoc operatur in nobis non tamen sine nobis. » Item in eodem loco : « Operanti in se Christo cooperatur homo ad salutem aeternam ac justificationem su¬ am. » Haec ille. Non igitur dubitari potest, CAPUT XIV. wnv odo quia S. Augustinus nihil commune habuerit cum sententia haereticorum, qui nos pas¬ sive tantum concurrere existimant ad actus pietatis internos. Cmterum si haec ita se habent, quaestio initio proposita magis jam implicata videtur; nam ex eodem Augustino audivimus, ipsum, ut velimus, Deum operari sine nobis, et non operari sine nobis, Deum solum id operari, et nos ei cooperari ; ct alia, quae pugnantia esse videntur. Igitur observandum est, Deum secundum quoddam genus causae, esse moventem re¬ spectu ipsius velle deliberati, et voluntatem non esse moventem, sed tantum motam ; cum tamen secundum aliud causae, genus, ad eumdem actum volendi producendum Deus concurrat ut movens, voluntas autem tum ut mota, tum ut movens, ct ideo utrumque ve¬ rum esse, Deum operari ipsum velle delibe¬ ratum sine nobis, et non operari sine nobis. Nam si consideremus causam efficientem et physicam illius actus, ea non solum est Deus per auxilium speciale, sed etiam volun¬ tas per liberum arbitrium et hoc modo illud velle, est Dei et nostrum, et nos in coopera¬ mur Deo, et Deus illud operatur non sine nobis, ut S. Augustinus loquitur in locis pau¬ lo ante adductis contra haereticos. At si consideremus causam illius ejusdem actus moralem, id est, causam moventem suadendo, hortando, consulendo, ea solus est Deus ; voluntas autem secundum hoc genus causae non est movens, sed tantum mota. Non enim ipsa se voluntas impellit suadendo et hortando, ut velit quod non vult, sed Deus per inspirationes suas intus animae- loquens, ei suadet et persuadet, ut velit. Haec est igi¬ tur gratia operans, quae praevenit conatum, et industriam nostram, et operatur ut veli¬ mus, quod antea nolebamus, sine nobis ope¬ rantibus ut velimus, non tamen sine nobis libere consentientibus dum volumus. Atque hinc intelligemus, cur ad primum actum voluntatis tantum, requiratur gratia operans, ad reliquos autem non sit necessa¬ ria operans, sed cooperans ; nam posleaquam coepimus velle converti ad Deum, jam nos ipsi non tantum per liberum arbitrium pro- ducimusDeojuvante rcliquosactus,sed etiam nos incitamus et impellimus, Deo cooperan- te, ad eos. Ac ut corporali, similitudine rem illustre¬ mus, sit aliquis cui expediat navigare in orientem, et tamen nolit id facex-e ; si quis ad cum accedat, eique multis allatis rationi¬ bus tandem persuadeat, et de nolente vo¬ lentem faciat; deinde ubi eum velle navi¬ gare cognoverit, procuret illi navem, pecu¬ nias et caetera, quae navigantibus sunt ne¬ cessaria ; is profecto vere dicere poterit, ego solus feci, ut iste navigationem susci¬ pere vellet; nam etiamsi alter rationes al¬ latas audierit, atque apud se expenderit, et tandem assensum praebuerit ; non tamen ipse sibi persuasit, neque se ipse movit, sed amicus ejus illum movit eique persuasit. Caeterum quod attinet ad exeeutionem vo¬ luntatis, non potest amicus ille dicere : Ego solus detuli istum in orientem, sed solum ego illum adjuvi, et cooperatus sum ut commodo navigaret. Siquidem ille qui ab amico per¬ suasus navigaret decrevit, sine dubio non sibi ipse defuit, sed cogitare coepit, quid facto opus esset, ct conatum atque indu¬ striam adhibere ad futuram navigationem. Hanc esse veram hujus distinctionis ex¬ plicationem ex ipso Augustino colligi po¬ test. Nam in lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. o. sic loquitur : « Ut Apostolus Paulus de coelo vocaretur, et tam magna et effica- cissima vocatione converteretur, gratia Dei erat sola, quia merita ejus erant magna, sed mala. » Ubi soli gratiae tribuitur conversio B. Pauli, ac per hoc fuit illa gratia operans, non quia Paulus concurrerit libere consen¬ tiendo, et per liberum arbitrium actum illum conversionis active producendo, sed quia merita ejus erant magna sed mala, id est, quia non praecesserat ante conversionem ullum meritum, sive studium, aut conatus ad conversionem; «olet enim Augustinus meri¬ tum appellare quemlibet actum bonum, ra¬ tione cujus aliquid aliud accipimus; ut per¬ spicuum est ex epist. lOo. et 106. ubi dicit, solam fidem dari sine ullo merito praece¬ dente, quia eam nullus bonus actus praece¬ dit : remissionem vero peccatorum non dari sine merito, quia fides orando illam meretur. Itaque in librft de gratia et libero arbitrio, cap. 14 : «Fides, inquit, et non petila con¬ ceditur, ut ei petenti alia concedantur. » Et paulo ante dixerat, se fidem appellare vo¬ luntatem credendi. Itaque gratia operans est, quae facit nos velle credere, quia id in nobis fit sine nobis peten¬ tibus, ac multo minus laborantibus et conan- tibus; gratia cooperans est, qure facit nos velle orare, jejunare, eleemosynas dare,. et Sacramenta requirere, quia, id non fit nisi / o36 LIBER I. conatu atque industria nostra cooperante. Hinc idem Augustinus in eodem libro cap. 17. non dicit, Deum operari,' velle nostrum sine nobis, sed operari, ut velimus sine no¬ bis, nos enim cooperamur Deo volendo, id est, libere producendo actum volendi, ged non cooperamur faciendo ut velimus. Quia non ipsi nos movemus, et incitamus ad vo¬ lendum, sed ipse solus interna inspiratione nos movet atque impellit. Fortasse etiam sanctus Thomas non est alienus ab hac expositione; quamvis enimloco citato 1 . 2. quEest. 111. art. 2. retulerit gratiam operantem ad actum internum, cooperantem ad externum ; tamen probabile est, per in¬ ternum actum eum intellexisse primum in¬ ternum, per externum autem intellexisse alios consequentes, quos externi sequuntur. Nam in eodem articulo docuit, gratiam ope¬ rantem necessariam esse in conversione, cum voluntas primo de mala lit bona, ct ibidem docuit, gratiam cooperantem esse necessariam ad actus exteriores, quia ii fieri non possunt, nisi Deus confirmet volunta¬ tem in bono et praebeat facultatem bene ope¬ randi. Non igitur S. Thomas voluit, gratiam coo¬ perantem simpliciter referri ad actus exte¬ riores, sed ad interiores, ut ex iis pendent exteriores, et hoc modo cum B. Paulus dicit Deum operari in nobis velle et perficere, per vocem, « perficere »,non est intelligenda sola exeeutio externa, sed tam interna quam externa opera, qum nascuntur ex primo actu voluntatis. Iit cum S. Augustinus scribit Deum operari in nobis ut velimus, cooperari autem cum ita volumus ut faciamus, per il¬ lud, « faciamus », non est accipienda actio tantum externa, sed etiam opus internum ut oratio, contritio ctc. CONTROVERSIARUM