Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book II: On Predestination and Sufficient Grace
Chapter 7: That help for avoiding new sin is always present to all
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The seventh proposition: “Help sufficient and necessary for avoiding sins is bestowed by the divine benignity on all men, and at every time, either immediately or mediately.”
We say “for avoiding sins,” not for rising again from sin; for there is much between these, and therefore this proposition does not fight with the preceding. For, that one may be able to rise again from sin, an inward stirring is necessarily required, which, as we have shown, is not always present; but that one may be able to avoid sin, that inward inspiration is not necessary: it is enough if either the adversary's strength be diminished, or the occasion of temptation removed, or some terror cast in, or something more alluring offered. And even if that stirring were required for avoiding every sin, there would still be much between the avoiding of sin and conversion from sin. For, that one might always be able to be converted, it would be required that he always have that stirring grace — which yet experience itself witnesses is not always had; but that one might always be able to avoid sins, it would not be required that he always have stirring grace, but then only when the danger of sinning were present — which danger is not always present, since sometimes no affirmative precept occurs, and no temptation against the negative ones. We say next “mediately or immediately,” since it is certain that some have not the sufficient help by which they could immediately resist the tempter and avoid the sin, yet have the help by which they can obtain from God a greater grace, greater strength, and, in fine, greater defenses, by which, helped, they will altogether resist the temptation and avoid the sins. This is clear both from the Scriptures, which bid us pray that we enter not into temptation, Matthew 6 and 26; and from Innocent, in the epistle to the Council of Carthage, where he teaches that temptations cannot be conquered by us unless the grace of God, implored, descend upon us; and from Celestine, in the epistle to the Gauls, chapter 6, where he teaches that even just men — much more sinners — are not equal to conquering temptations without prayer to God; and finally from Augustine, who, book On Nature and Grace, chapter 43: “God admonishes us,” says he, “to do what we can, and to ask what we cannot.” And book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 16: “Therefore,” says he, “he commands some things which we cannot do, that we may know what we ought to ask of him.”
These things noted, our proposition is proved, first, from the testimony of Scripture, Ecclesiasticus 15: Say not thou: It is through God, that she is not with me. For by these words the Holy Spirit signifies that no one can cast the fault of his sin upon God, as though it came about through him that we avoid not sins. Like to which place is that other in Osee 13: Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is only in me.
Second, the same is proved from the testimonies of the Fathers. St. John Chrysostom, homily 16 on the epistle to the Hebrews: “Thou canst not say, I cannot, nor accuse the Creator. For if he made us powerless, and then commands, the fault is his. How then, sayest thou, can many not? Say rather, how then will many not? For if they will, all will be able; for we have God as cooperator and helper: only let us will; only let us come to the thing itself in work.” St. Jerome, in the epistle to Cyprian: “Man,” says he, “from the beginning of his creation uses God as helper; and since it is of his grace that he was created, and of his mercy that he subsists and lives, he can do no good work without him, who so granted free choice as not to deny his grace for each single work.” St. Innocent, in the epistle to the Council of Carthage: “He furnishes daily defenses; and unless, relying and leaning on them, we strive, we shall by no means be able to conquer human errors.” St. Augustine, at the beginning of the tractate on Psalm 56: “God would not command this to be done by us, if he judged it impossible to be done by man. If, considering thy infirmity, thou faintest under the precept, be strengthened by the example; but if the example also is too much for thee, he is at hand who furnished the example, that he may furnish also the help.” St. Leo, sermon 16 on the Passion of the Lord: “Justly does he press with the precept, who runs before with the help.”
It is proved third by a reason which has its foundation in the Scriptures and the testimonies of the Fathers. There are none, however blinded and hardened, who do not truly and properly sin if with deliberate mind they transgress the precepts of God; but no one sins in that which he cannot avoid; therefore there are none, however blinded and hardened, who cannot refrain from transgressing the commandments of God; and since they cannot do this by their own powers — as we now assume as certain, and shall prove below in its place — it follows that they can through the help of God, which is always prepared and ready for them. The major of this argument seems to be contrary to a judgment of St. Augustine, who, in the exposition of certain propositions of the epistle to the Romans, proposition 62, writes that Pharao, hardened, did not sin in that he obeyed not God, since with a hardened heart he could not obey. But yet it is proved: for, John 15, Christ says of the Jews: If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have no excuse for their sin. And below: If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin. And yet of these same he had said, John 12: whereas he had done so many miracles before them, they believed not in him; and below: Therefore they could not believe, because Isaias said again: He hath blinded their eyes, etc. Thou seest how these men were blinded, and yet had sin — nay, had no excuse for their sin. Likewise the Apostle, Romans 1, after he had said, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, etc., reprehends them most gravely, and shows them to have been most worthy of punishment: Who, having known the justice of God, did not understand that they who do such things, are worthy of death. Moreover St. Augustine, tractate 53 on John, discoursing of the Jews blinded and hardened, admonishes that no one, on account of such blinding, dare deny free choice or excuse sin. And book 5 against Julian, chapter 3, he says most openly that even they become guilty, and truly and properly sin, who, deserted by God, yield to their own lusts, and are overcome and conquered by the devil. Add to this that it is the common judgment of the Fathers and the Schoolmen, and is openly gathered from the divine writings, that very often sin is the punishment of sin; but that would not be true if the blinded and hardened could not sin. Finally, many absurdities would follow if the blinded did not sin, who with full judgment do not hesitate to violate the commandments of God: for the blinding would profit them, since it would make them impeccable; likewise they would be punished unjustly, since every punishment, if it be just, is the punishment of sin; lastly, they would seem to have arrived at their term before death, since by their works they could merit neither well nor ill. Therefore St. Augustine, when he says that Pharao did not sin when he obeyed not God commanding, seems to have wished to signify that Pharao could not obey from the heart, so as to be converted; and that therefore his not being converted was not imputed to him as sin, since for that time, with a hardened heart, he could not be converted — with which nevertheless it well coheres that Pharao could have done, as to the substance of the work, that which God commanded, and therefore sinned, because he did it not. Perhaps also St. Augustine afterward changed his judgment; for in the other places cited by us he speaks of the sins of the hardened far otherwise than he seems to speak in that book. The minor of the same argument — namely, that no one sins in that which he cannot avoid — is most certain, and is had in Augustine, book 3 On Free Choice, chapters 18 and 19, and book 22 against Faustus, chapter 78, book 1 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 35, and elsewhere. Wherefore that proposition is true: that to no one is ever lacking the help by which he can avoid sins.
To this argument a twofold answer is wont to be applied. One is that many men — and above all those who in the Scriptures are said to be blinded or hardened — have not the help by which they could resist the temptation, and yet truly sin, because their impotence is not antecedent but concomitant: since they do not sin because they cannot but sin (though in very truth they cannot), but because they will not, and would not will even if they could — which is clear from this, that they know not that they cannot; nay, they judge that they can. Such seem to have been those of whom, in the Gospel of John 9, the Lord says: If you were blind, you should not have sin: but now you say: We see. Your sin remaineth — that is: if in very truth you sinned from ignorance, the sin would not be imputed to you; but since you think you are not ignorant, and yet act against that which you judge should be done, your sin remains. And hence Hugh of St. Victor says, book 2 On the Sacraments, part 14 [al. 13], chapter 6: “When a man cannot, though he will, the impossibility is not imputed, on account of the will; but if he will not, the will is not excused on account of the impossibility.” This answer does not seem solid. For although concomitant ignorance does not excuse from sin, and likewise concomitant impotence of executing, yet concomitant impotence of willing altogether excuses. And, to explain the whole matter briefly: the theologians rightly say that antecedent ignorance excuses sin, and concomitant ignorance does not excuse — since antecedent ignorance effects the involuntary, being the cause that a man wills what otherwise he would not will; but concomitant ignorance leaves the act of the will altogether free, since it is not its cause, but only concurs with it by accident. For example: if someone from ignorance kills a man, thinking him a wild beast, he sins not, because the ignorance makes the act involuntary — for he would never have willed to do what he did, had he not labored under ignorance; but if someone kill a wild beast thinking it a man, he most manifestly sins, since that ignorance was not the cause of the evil will by which he willed to kill a man. The same can be said of impotence on the side of the executive power: for if that impotence be antecedent, it makes the act involuntary, and excuses from sin; if it be concomitant, it does not touch the act of the will, but is joined with it by accident, and therefore does not excuse. As, if someone does not deliver his neighbor from danger of death because he cannot, that omission is involuntary and innocent; but if he does not deliver him because he will not, not thinking whether he can or cannot, the omission is voluntary, and is not undeservedly reckoned to fault. But impotence on the side of the will itself can never be so concomitant as not to be also antecedent, because it always hinders liberty, whencesoever it come; and such is the impotence of the will when it is destitute of the necessary help of God: for then it is not free to either alternative, since it can will but one thing — namely, to acquiesce in the temptation. And that someone judges he can, when in very truth he cannot, does not take away the necessity, nor restore liberty, but increases the misery and the impotence; for a man is not free because he thinks himself free — just as they who dream that they freely sin do not therefore freely sin, and therefore do not sin. Nor does the place of the Gospel from John 9 stand in the way; for, as St. Augustine rightly expounds in that place, they are called blind by the Lord who acknowledge their blindness; and seeing, who arrogate light to themselves, when in very truth they are blind. And so the Lord's sentence is this: if you were blind in your own eyes, you would not have sin, since, acknowledging the disease, you would run to the physician and be cured; but now, because you reckon yourselves seeing, you seek not the physician, and therefore your sin is not healed, but remains. And Hugh of St. Victor speaks of impossibility on the side of the executive power: for then, when a man cannot execute the thing commanded, and yet desires to execute it, the impossibility is not imputed, on account of the good will — as if one desire to give an alms to a needy man asking, but have not whence to give; but if he cannot execute the thing, and would not will even if he could, then the evil will is not excused on account of the impossibility, for the impossibility of execution does not hinder the will from being able freely to will and not will. But the impossibility which is in the will itself — of which we speak at present — altogether hinders it from being able freely to will and not will.
There is therefore another answer, of others, who say that a man sins even in that which he cannot avoid, when that impotence arises from our sin, whether actual or original; and since they who are destitute of the necessary help are destitute in punishment of original sin, therefore they say that these cannot but sin, and yet the sin is imputed to them, since through their own sin they lost the strength by which they could have not sinned. But neither is this solution solid. For sin intrinsically requires free will, nor can it be understood how anything is properly sin if it be not properly free. Hence an action which is not free in itself, but only in its cause, and was not foreseen beforehand, has no malice distinct from the malice of its cause. Wherefore St. Augustine, in book 22 against Faustus, chapter 44 [al. 43], disputing of the incest of Lot with his daughters, which was not voluntary save in its cause — that is, in the drunkenness — says that that incest was to be punished not as the incest deserved, but as the drunkenness deserved; because, namely, it was not a sin distinct from its cause. And if all the sins of the blinded and hardened were not sins save in their cause — that is, in original sin — they certainly could not be punished in gehenna save with the mildest punishment: for original sin, by the doctrine of St. Augustine, book 1 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 16, and book 5 against Julian, chapter 8 [al. 44], merits the mildest punishment, and by the common judgment of the theologians merits not the punishment of sense, but only of loss; but who will believe that the sins of the hardened, which are most gravely reprehended in the Scriptures, are not to be punished more gravely than if these men had departed in original sin alone? But, say they, the sins of the hardened are sins not only in their cause, but also in themselves, and distinct from their cause, although the impotence of resisting temptations arose from original sin. Against this: a sin in itself and distinct cannot be, unless it were willed and intended in itself. But the first man, when he sinned, neither willed nor intended to deprive himself and his posterity of the power of resisting; and much less did we, his posterity, when we contracted original sin, will or intend this impotence of resisting, or the sins which follow from it — just as he who from intemperance in food falls into a disease, on account of which he cannot pray, fast, frequent the Church, and do other things of that kind which otherwise he ought to have done, is not properly reckoned guilty because he does not these things, although by his own fault he fell into the disease and contracted the impotence for doing them; since he did not fall into the disease in order not to do them, but the impotence followed the intemperance beside his will. And so St. Augustine rightly writes, book 3 On Free Choice, chapter 19, that those things which we will to do rightly, and cannot on account of ignorance or difficulty born of original sin, are not called sins save improperly and by the figure of metonymy — in the manner we call the words which are uttered by the tongue “the tongue,” and the writing which we form with the hand “the hand”; and in chapter 18 he had said that those things alone are truly and properly called sins which can be avoided through free choice; and in book 1 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 35 [al. 11], he distinguishes the sin of origin from the sin of one's own life, in that the former is contracted by another's will, the latter by one's own: “Without one's own will,” says he, “there can be no sin of one's own life.” Nor by one's own will does he understand any act whatever of the will, but only a free act, which is in our power; for he opposes one's own to another's, and the other's — namely Adam's — was free, and therefore properly the cause of sin; therefore one's own also must be free, that it be in the same way properly the cause of sin. Add that a will is not rightly called one's own unless it is in our power; for cattle are not said to work by their own will, even though they do some things spontaneously and gladly. Finally the same Augustine, book 22 against Faustus, chapter 78: “Iniquity,” says he, “or injustice, if it were not in the will, would not be in our power; and further, if it were not in our power, no punishment would be just — which no one fails to perceive but he who is without sense.” It remains, therefore, either that all men always have the help necessary for not sinning, or else that they cannot but sin — and thereby, in sinning, sin not, nor can justly be punished.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT VII.
Auxilium ad novum peccatum evitandum
semper omnibus adest.
Septima propositio : « Auxilium sufficiens
ac necessarium ad vitanda peccata omnibus
hominibus, et omni tempore, vel immediate,
vel mediate a divina benignitate praestatur.»
Dicimus « ad peccata vitanda, » non ad re¬
surgendum a peccato : multum enim inter
haec inter est, et ideo non pugnat haec pro¬
positio cum superiore; nam, ut quis possit a
peccato resurgere, requiritur necessario in¬
terna excitatio, quae, ut ostendimus , non
semper adest ; ut autem possit quis vitare
peccatum, non est necessaria interna illa in¬
spiratio, sed satis est si vel vires adversario
minuantur, vel removeatur tentationis occa¬
sio, vel terror aliquis injiciatur, vel aliquid
magis alliciens offeratur. Quod si etiam ad
omne peccatum vitandum excitatio illa re¬
quireretur, adhuc multum interesset inter
vitationem peccati et conversionem a pecca¬
to. Nam, ut quis posset semper converti, re¬
quireretur, ut semper haberet gratiam illam
#47
excitantem, quam tamen non semper haberi
experientia ipsa testatur ; ut vero quis posset
semper vitare peccata, non requireretur ut
semper haberet gratiam excitantem, sed tunc
solum cum adesset peccandi periculum, quod
periculum non semper adest, cum aliquando
nullum occurrat praeceptum affirmativum,
et nulla tentatio contra negativa.
Dicimus deinde « mediate vel immediate,»
quoniam certum est, aliquos non habere
sufficiens auxilium, quod possit immediate
resistere tentatori, et evitare peccatum, ta¬
men habere auxilium, quo possint a Deo
majorem gratiam, majoresque vires, majora
denique praesidia impetrare, quibus adjuti
omnino tentationi resistent, et peccata vita- ,
bunt.
Id perspicuum est, tum ex Scripturis,
quae jubent nos orare, ne intremus in tenta-
tionem, Matth. vi et xxvi. Tum ex Innocen-
tio in epist. ad Cone. Carthaginiense, ubi do¬
cet, non posse vinci a nobis tentationes, nisi
gratia Dei in nos implorata descendat, et ex
Coelestino in epist. ad Gallos cap. 6. ubi do¬
cet justos etiam homines, nedum peccatores
sine oratione ad Deum, non esse vincendis
tentationibus pares ; tum denique ex Augu¬
stino qui lib. de nat. et gratia cap. 43 : « Ad¬
monet, inquit, nos Deus, facere quod possu¬
mus, et petere quod non possumus. » Et lib.
de grat. et liber, arbit. cap. 16 : « Ideo, in¬
quit, quaedam jubet quae non possumus, ut
sciamus quid ai) illo petere debeamus. »
Ilis notatis, probatur nostra propositio,
primo, ex testimonio Scripturae Eccles. xv :
Non dicas per Deum abest (1), Significat enim
his verbis Spiritus sanctus neminem posse
culpam peccati sui rejicere in Deum, quasi
per illum fiat, quo minus peccata vitemus.
Cui loco similis est ille alius apud Oseam xm:
Perditio tua ex te Israel , tantummodo in me y
auxilium tuum (2).
Secundo, idem probatur ex testimoniis
Patrum. S. Jo. Chrysostomus hom. 16. in
epist. ad Hebr. : « Non potes, inquit, dicere
non possum, neque accusare conditorem. Si
enim impotentes nos fecit, et deinde impe¬
rat, culpa ejus est; quomodo ergo, inquis,
multi non possunt? quomodo ergo multi no¬
lunt? si enim voluerint, omnes poterunt, ha¬
bemus quippe cooperatorem et adjutorem
Deum ; tantum velimus, tantum opere acce¬
damus ad rem ipsam. »
(1) Eccl. XV. 11. -(2) Oseae XIU, 9.
i.ji;i:i{ ii..
.'iW
S. Hieronymus in epist. ad Cyprianum :
« Homo, inquit, a principio conditionis, Deo
utitur adjutore, et cura illius sit gratiae, quod
creatus est, illiusque misericordiae, quod
subsistit et vivit : nihil boni operis agere po¬
test absque eo, qui ita concessit liberum ar¬
bitrium, ut suam per singula opera gratiam
non negaret,
S. Innocentius in epist. ad Concil. Carth.
« Quotidiana, inquit, praestat ille praesidia,
quibus nisi freti conlisique nitamur, nequa¬
quam humanos vincere poterimus errores. »
S. Augustinus initio tractat, in Psal. lvi. :
« Non imperaret hoc, inquit, Deus ut face¬
remus, si impossibile judicaret, ut hoc ab
homine fieret. Si considerans infirmitatem
tuam, deficis sub praecepto, confortare in
exemplo, sed etiam exemplum multum est
ad te, adest ille qui praebuit exemplum, ut
praebeat et auxilium. »
S. Leo serm. 16. do passione Domini :
« Juste, inquit, instat praecepto, qui praecur¬
rit auxilio. »
Probatur tertio ratione, quae in Scripturis
et Patrum testimoniis fundamentum habet.
Nulli sunt, quamvis exeaecati et obdurati,
qui non vere proprieque peccent, si delibe¬
rato animo transgrediantur praecepta Dei,
nemo autem peccat in eo, quod vitare non
potest, igitur nulli sunt, quamvis exeaecati
et obdurati, qui non possint Dei mandata
non transgredi ; cum autem id non possint
viribus propriis, ut nunc assumimus tam¬
quam certum, et suo loco infra probabimus,
sequitur ut possint per, auxilium Dei, quod
semper illis sit paratum ac promptum.
Propositio hujus argumenti, videtur esse
contraria sententiae S. Augustini, qui in ex¬
positione quarumdam propositionum epist.
ad Rom. propos. 62. scribit, Pharaonem ob¬
duratum non peccasse in eo, quod non obe-
diebat Deo, quoniam obduratu corde obedi-
rc non poterat. Sed tamen probatur, nam
Joan. xv. Christus dicit de Judaeis : Si non
venissem et locutus fuissem, peccatum non ha¬
berent, nunc autem excusationem non habent
de peccato suo (1). Et infra : Si opera non
fecissem in eis, qux nemo alius fecit , peccatum
non haberent. Et tamen de istis iisdem dixe¬
rat Joan. xii : Cum tanta signa fecisset, non
credebant in eum. Et infra : Propterea non po¬
terant credere, quia iterum dixit Isaias, exese-
cavit oculos eorum, efc.{2).Yides, quomodo ist i
exeaecati erant, et tamen peccatum habebant,
imo excusationem non habebant de pecca¬
to suo : item Apostolus Roman. i. postca-
quam dixerat, tradidit illos in reprobum sen¬
sum etc., eos gravissime reprehendit, et poena
dignissimos fuisse demonstrat : Cum justi¬
tiam, inquit, Dei cognovissent, non intellexe¬
runt, quoniam qui talia agunt, digni sunt
•morte (3).
Prajterea S. Augustinus tract. 53. in Joan.
disserens de Judaeis excaecatis et obduratis,
monet, ne quisquam propter ejusmodi excae¬
cationem audeat negare liberum arbitrium,
aut excusare peccatum. [Et lib. v. in Julia¬
num cap. 5. apertissime dicit, reos fieri et
vere proprieque peccare illos etiam, qui
deserti a Deo, suis cupiditatibus cedunt, a
diabolo superantur atque vincuntur.
Ad Inec, communis est sententia Patrum
et Scholasticorum, et ex divinis litteris aper¬
te colligitur , StCpenumero peccatum poe¬
nam esse peccati; atqui id verum non es¬
set, si exccecati atque obdurati peccare non
possent.
Denique multa sequerentur absurda, si
non peccarent excmcali, qui pleno judicio
mandata Dei violare non dubitant ; nam
prodesset eis excajcatio, quoniam faceret
illos impeccabiles : item injuste punirentur,
quoniam omnis poena, si justa est, poena
peccati est. Postremo viderentur ante mor¬
tem ad terminum pervenisse, quoniam suis
operibus, nec bene nec male mereri pos¬
sent.
Igitur S. Augustinus cum ait, Pharaonem
non peccasse, quando jubenti Deo non pa¬
rebat, videtur significare voluisse, non po¬
tuisse Pharaonem obedire ex corde, ita ut
converteretur, et ideo non fuisse illi imputa¬
tum in peccatum, quod non converteretur,
quoniam pro eo tempore converti obdurato
corde non poterat, cum quo tamen bene
cohaeret, ut potuerit Pharao facere secun¬
dum substantiam operis, id quod Deus ju¬
bebat, et ideo peccasse, quia non fecit. For¬
tasse etiam S. August. postea mutavit sen¬
tentiam ; nam in aliis locis a nobis citatis,
longe aliter loquitur de peccatis obdurato¬
rum, quam in eo lib. loqui videatur.
Assumptio ejusdem argumenti, quod vi¬
delicet nemo peccet in eo, quod vitare non
potest, certissima est, et habetur apud Au¬
gustinus lib. ni. de libero arbitrio cap. 18
%1) Joan. XV, 22. - (2) Joan XII, 37- - (3) Rom. I, 32.
CAPUT VJf.
ct 19. ct lib. xxu. contra Faustum ca.pl 78.
lib. l.de poc. merit. et remiss. c. 35. et alibi.
Quare veraest illa propositio, nemini unquam
deesse auxilium, quo possit vitare peccata.
Ad hoc argumentum duplex responsio ad¬
hiberi solet. Una est, multos homines, ac
praesertim cos, qui dicuntur in Scripturis
excaecati vel obdurati, non habere auxilium,
quo possint tentationi resistere, tamen vere
peccare, propterea quod eorum impotentia
non sit antecedens, sed concomitans ; cum
ipsi non ideo peccent, quia non possunt non
peccare, quamvis revera non possint; sed
quia non volunt, nec vellent etiamsi possent,
quod ex eo perspicuum est, quia nesciunt se
non posse, imo existimant se posse ; tales
videntur fuisse illi, de quibus in Evangelio
Joan. ix, Dominus ait : Si essetis eeeei , non
haberetis peccatum , nunc autem dicitis , quia
videmus ; peccatum ergo vestrum manet (1);
hoc est, si revera ex ignorantia peccaretis,
peccatum vobis non imputaretur : sed quo¬
niam putatis vos non ignorare, et tamen
agitis contra id, quod faciendum existima¬
tis, peccatum vestrum manet. Atque hinc
dicit Hugo de S. Victore lib. ii. de Sacram,
par. 14. cap. 0 : « Quando homo non potest,
si vult, propter voluntatem impossibilitas
non imputatur : si autem non vult, propter
impossibilitatem voluntas non excusatur. »
Hiee responsio non videtur solida. Nam
licet ignorantia concomitans non excuset a
peccato, et similiter impotentia exsequendi
concomitans, tamen impotentia volendi con¬
comitans omnino excusat. At, ut rem totam
breviter explicemus, recte dicunt Theologi,
ignorantiam anlccedentem excusare pecca¬
tum, ignorantiam concomitantem non excu¬
sare. Quoniam ignorantia antecedens efficit,
involuntarium, cum sit causa, ut homo velit,
quodalioqui non vellet : ignorantia vero con¬
comitans, relinquit omnino liberum actum
voluntatis, cum non sit causa ejus, sed so¬
lum per accidens cum illo concurrat. Exem¬
pli gratia, si quis ex ignorantia occidit ho¬
minem, existimans esse feram, non peccat,
quia ignorantia facit involuntarium , num-
quam enim ille facere voluisset quod fecit,
nisi ignorantia laborasset: sin autem aliquis
occidat feram existimans esse hominem ,
manifestissime peccat, quoniam ignorantia
illa non fuit causa mala; voluntatis, qua
voluit hominem interficere.
549
Idem dici potest de impotentia cx parte
potentia; exeeutivae, nam si illa impotentia
sit antecedens, efficit actum involuntarium,
et a peccato excusat ; si sit concomitans,
non attingit actum voluntatis, sed per acci¬
dens cum illo conjungitur, et ideo non ex¬
cusat; ut si quis non liberet proximum a •
periculo mortis quia non potest, involunta¬
ria et innocens est illa omissio. At si non
liberet eum, quia non vult, non cogitans,
possilne , an non possit , omissio est vo-<
luntaria, et non immerito deputatur ad cul¬
pam.
At impotentia ex parte ipsius voluntatis
numquam potest esse ita concomitans, ut
non sit etiam antecedens, quia semper im¬
pedit libertatem, undecumque veniat : et
talis est impotentia voluntatis, cum destitui¬
tur auxilio Dei necessario. Tunc enim non
est libera ad utrumlibet, cum non possit
velle nisi unum, id est, tentationi acquie¬
scere. Quod autem existimet aliquis se posse,
cum re vera non possit, non tollit necessita¬
tem, neque reddit libertatem, sed auget mi¬
seriam et impotentiam ; non enim ideo est
liber, quia putat se esse liberum, quomodo
qui somniant se libere peccare, non ideo
libere peccant, et ideo neque peccant.
Neque obstat locus Evangelii ex cap. 9.
Joan.; nam, ut S. Augustinus eo loco recte
exponit, ca:ci dicuntur a Domino, qui agno¬
scunt suam CcCcitatem, videntes autem qui
sibi lumen arrogant, cum re vera, cceci sint.
Itaque sententia Domini haec est, si essetis
ea;ci apud vos ipsos, non haberetis peccatum,
quoniam agnoscentes morbum curreretis ad
medicum, et curaremini; nunc autem quia
videntes vos esse censetis, non quaeritis me¬
dicum, et ideo peccatum vestrum non sana¬
tur, sed manet.
Hugo vero de S. Victore loquitur de im¬
possibilitate, ex parte potentia; exeeutivae :
tunc enim cum homo non potest imperatam
rem exequi, et tamen cupit exequi, propter
bonam voluntatem impossibilitas non impu¬
tatur ; ut si quis cupiat eleemosynam inopi
petenti dare, sed non habeat unde det ; si
vero non potest rem exequi, neque vellet,
etiamsi posset, tunc propter impossibilita¬
tem voluntas mala non excusatur , nam
impossibilitas exeeutionis non impedit vo¬
luntatem, quo minus libere possit velle et
non velle. At impossibilitas, qua; in ipsa vo-
(1) Joan. IX, 41.
450
LIBER II.
luntate est, de qua nos in prcesenti loqui¬
mur, omnino impedit ne possit libere velle
et non velle.
Est igitur alia responsio aliorum , qui
dicunt, hominem peccare etiam in eo, quod
vitare non potest, quando illa impotentia ex
• peccato nostro sive actuali, sive originali
oritur, et quoniam ii qui destituuntur auxilio
necessario, in poenam peccati originalis de¬
stituuntur, ideo dicunt eos non posse non
peccare, et tamen peccatum eis imputari,
quoniam ob peccatum suum vires amiserunt,
quibus poterant non peccare.
At neque hsec solutio solida est, nam
peccatum intrinsece requirit liberam vo¬
luntatem, nec potest intelligi quomodo ali¬
quid sit proprie peccatum, si non sit proprie
liberum. Proinde actio, quae non est libera
in se, sed solum in causa sua, nec est ante
praevisa, non habet malitiam distinctam a
malitia sua; causae. Quare S. Augustinus in
lib. xxn. contra Faustum cap. 44. disputans
de incoestuLoth cum filiabus, qui non fuit vo¬
luntarius nisi in causa, id est, in ebrietate, dicit
eum inccestum non fuisse puniendum, quan¬
tum merebatur inccestus, sed quantum mere¬
batur ebrietas, quia videlicet non fuit pecca¬
tum distinctum a causa sua.
Quod si omnia peccata excaecatorum et
obduratorum non essent peccata, nisi in
causa id est, in peccato originali, non pos¬
sent certe puniri in gehenna, nisi poena mi¬
tissima ; nam peccatum originale ex doctri¬
na S. August. lib. i. de peccat, mer. et
remiss. cap. 16. et lib. v. in Julian. cap. 8,
mitissimam poenam meretur, et ex com¬
muni Theologorum sententia non meretur
poenam sensus, sed solum damni : at quis
credat peccata obduratorum, qua; gravissime
reprehenduntur in Scripturis, non esse pu¬
nienda gravius, quam si isti in solo originali
peccato decessissent.
At, inquiunt, peccata obduratorum non
sunt peccata solum in causa, sed etiam in
se et distincta a sua causa, quamvis impo¬
tentia resistendi tentationibus orta sit ex
peccato oiginali. Contra, nam peccatum
in se et distinctum non potest esse nisi fue¬
rit volitum et intentum in se. At primus
homo eum peccavit, non voluit nec intendit
privare se, et posteros potentia resistendi
et multo minus nos ejus posteri, cum pecca¬
tum originale contraximus, voluimus aut
intendimus hanc impotentiam resistendi,
vel peccata qua; inde sequuntur : sicut ille,
qui ex intemperantia cibi incidit in morbum,
ob quem non potest orare, jejunare, Ec¬
clesiam frequentare, atque alia id genus
facere, qua; alioqui facere debuisset, non
censetur proprie reus, quia hsec non facit,
quamvis sua culpa in morbum inciderit, et
impotentiam ad hsec facienda contraxerit,
quoniam non ideo in morbum incidit, ut hsec
non faceret; sed prseter ejus voluntatem
impotentia intemperantiam consecuta est.
Itaque recte S. Augustinus in lib. m. de
libero arbitrio cap. 19. scribit, ea quae vo¬
lumus recte facere, et ob ignorantiam aut
difficultatem ex peccato originali natam, non
possumus, non dici peccata nisi improprie
et per figuram metonymiae, quomodo lin¬
guam appellamus verba, quse per linguam
efferuntur, et manum, scripturam quam ma¬
nu formamus, et cap. 18. dixerat, illa sola
vere ac proprie dici peccata, qua; per libe¬
rum arbitrium vitari possunt, et in lib. I. de
pcc. merit. et remiss. cap. 35. distinguit
peccatum originis a peccato vitae propriae,
quod illud aliena voluntate , hoc propria
contrahatur : « Sine propria, inquit, volun¬
tate, nullum vitae proprie potest esse pecca¬
tum » ; neque per propriam voluntatem in-
telligit actum voluntatis quemcumque, sed
solum actum liberum, qui sit in nostra pote¬
state, nam opponit propriam alienae, aliena
autem nimirum Adami libera fuit, et ideo
proprie causa peccati : igitur etiam propria
libera esse debet, ut sit eodem modo proprie
causa peccati.
Adde quod non recte dicitur propria vo¬
luntas, nisi quae nostrae potestatis est, nec
emm pecudes propria voluntate operari
, dicuntur, etiamsi sponte et libenter aliqua
faciant. Denique idem August. in lib. xxii.
contra Faustum cap. 78 : « Sive iniquitas,
inquit, sive injustitia, nisi esset involuntate,
non esset in potestate : porro si in potestate
non esset, nulla poena justa esset, quod non
sapit nisi qui desipit. » Restat igitur ut om¬
nes homines semper habeant auxilium ne¬
cessarium ad non peccandum , aut certe
non possint non ;peccare, ac per hoc pec¬
cando non peccent, nec juste puniri queant.
CAPUT VIII.