Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book II: On Predestination and Sufficient Grace
Chapter 8: The arguments against the doctrine of chapters 5 and 7 are answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Now the arguments must be solved which are wont to be made against propositions 5 and 7, in which we taught that there is no one who does not have sufficient help, according to place and time, for conversion from sins committed — but always for avoiding those which are wont to be committed under the pressure of temptation.
The first argument they take from those places which witness that men are hardened and blinded by God — Exodus 9, Isaias 6, Matthew 13, John 12, and Romans 1; for that men are blinded and hardened is nothing else than that they are deserted and abandoned by God, that they may be overcome and conquered by Satan, as St. Chrysostom expounds on chapter 1 to the Romans, and St. Augustine, book 5 against Julian, chapter 3. I answer: the blinded and hardened, as we said in chapter 6, and more fully in book 2 On the State of Sin, chapter 14, cannot be converted while the blinding and hardening last, nor do they have at every single moment sufficient help by which they could take away the blinding and hardening; yet we piously believe that God, according to place and time, visits even these, and of his benignity knocks at their heart, and so reaches out the help by which they can drive the blindness and hardness from their heart. And then above all is the opportune time, when they cannot without conversion avoid sin. And so at such a juncture of time God is never wanting; and if he does not furnish the help by which the sinner can immediately be converted, or keep the commandment which then presents itself to be kept, yet he furnishes at least the help by which he can desire and ask a greater help — which if he does not, by his own fault he has it not, and by his own fault he succumbs in the temptation.
The second argument they take from chapters 14 and 17 of Acts, where God is said in past generations to have suffered all nations to walk in their own ways, and to have overlooked those times, which for this cause are named the times of ignorance. I answer: these testimonies signify that the grace of God did not flow so largely in ancient times as it afterward flowed; but not on that account was there ever lacking that measure of grace which seemed to divine Providence sufficient and necessary. And so God suffered the gentiles to walk in their own ways, because he did not send to them Patriarchs and Prophets, nor gave them the written law; yet he left not himself without testimony, as the Apostle says in the same place — who also adds that they could have sought God and found him; and therefore, Romans 1, the same Apostle confirms that those gentiles were inexcusable, because, when they knew God, they have not glorified him as God, or given thanks.
The third argument they take from chapter 10 to the Romans: How then shall they call on him, in whom they have not believed?… and how shall they believe him, of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear, without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless they be sent? The beginning of salvation is faith; for thence is born invocation, and from invocation salvation — for whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved. But many have not sufficient help by which they could believe, since the Gospel has not yet been preached to them; and many more had not this help of old, when the evangelical preaching had not yet come to them. I answer: this argument proves only that there is not present to all the help by which they could immediately be converted and believe; but it does not prove that sufficient help unto salvation was simply lacking to any. For the gentiles to whom the Gospel has not yet been preached can know through the creatures that God is; and hence they can be stirred by God, through preventing grace, to believe concerning God that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek him; and from such faith they can be stirred, the same God directing and helping, to pray and give alms, and in that way to obtain from God a greater light of faith — which God, whether by himself, or through Angels, or through men, will readily communicate. So answers St. Thomas, in question 14 On Truth, article 11, reply to the first; and he brings the example of Cornelius, who from faith in the one God prayed and gave alms, and in that way obtained that, through the admonition of an Angel and the preaching of an Apostle, he should hear the faith of Christ, and receive also holy Baptism itself.
The fourth argument they take from chapter 11 of Matthew and chapter 16 of Acts: for we read that the Tyrians and Sidonians could have been converted if the Lord had willed to do miracles among them, and that yet the Lord would not do any signs among them; we read likewise that the Apostle Paul was expressly forbidden by the Holy Spirit to speak the word of the Lord in Asia. I answer: to the Tyrians and Sidonians God did not indeed give that help through which they would in fact have been converted; yet that the Lord did not give them help by which they could be converted is not gathered from the Gospel. Further, blessed Paul was at one time forbidden to speak the word of God in Asia, because God willed that he first preach in Macedonia, as is clear from the same chapter; for otherwise he preached also in Asia for a long time, and converted very many.
The fifth argument they take from chapter 6 of John: No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him. And below: Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to me. From this place such an argument is woven: no one can come through faith to the Son unless the Father draw him; but the Father does not draw all; therefore not all can come. The assumption is proved: for everyone who is drawn comes — everyone, says he, who has heard and learned comes; but not all come; therefore not all are drawn. I answer: the assumption is false which says the Father does not draw all; for the Father draws all, but according to place and time; yet not all come, though in very truth they can; for the Father would not will to draw unless he disposed to give the help by which they could come if they would. But everyone who has heard and learned comes; therefore everyone who is drawn comes. I answer: to be drawn is to hear; but not everyone who hears comes, but everyone who hears and learns; for if everyone who hears came, the Psalm would not say: To day if you shall hear his voice, harden not your hearts. And so all at some time hear, because God calls all according to place and time; but they alone learn and come to whom the Father so counsels that he persuades. And this is efficacious grace. Yet that all can believe — and hence that all hear from God and are drawn — is clear from that same chapter 6 of John, where the Lord exhorted all to faith; which he would not have done had he not known that all could believe. Yet another answer also can be applied, which, to confess the truth, seems to agree more with the evangelical sentence: if we say that the Lord speaks of efficacious grace, which so counsels that it persuades. But he is said not to be able to come who is not drawn by efficacious grace — not that absolutely he cannot, but because infallibly he will not come; as also, contrariwise, he who is drawn can absolutely not come, yet infallibly comes. And so the Lord, when he said to the murmuring Jews, Murmur not among yourselves. No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him, did not signify that they could not believe, but indicated that faith is the gift of God, and is not had by human industry, but by divine revelation; and that therefore there was need not of murmuring, but of prayer — because everyone that asketh receiveth. And therefore St. Augustine, tractate 26 on John, expounding this place, says: if thou art not drawn, pray that thou mayest be drawn. Thou wilt say: how can one by praying obtain faith, since no one can pray unless he have faith? The answer is easy: for those to whom the Lord was speaking already knew and believed that there is one God; but that Jesus is the Son of God, the true Messias promised in the law, they did not yet believe. Wherefore they could, from faith in the one God, pray and obtain the faith by which they might believe that Jesus is the Son of God and the Christ. From these things we answer to the argument made at the beginning: that by that argument it is only concluded that not all have the efficacious help by which they in fact believe; but it is not concluded that all have not, at least according to place and time, the help by which they can believe — or at least by which they can ask help, and say: I do believe, Lord: help my unbelief.
The sixth argument they take from the words of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4: For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it? From this place it seems manifestly gathered that sufficient help unto salvation is not given to all; for if it were given to all, the distinction of the believer from the unbeliever, and of the just from the impious, would depend wholly on free choice: for he would be believing and pious who willed to cooperate with the sufficient help; he would remain unbelieving and impious who would not cooperate with the same help. I answer: the distinction of the believer from the unbeliever, and of the just from the impious, is to be referred, as to its primary cause, to efficacious grace, as St. Augustine shows in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 5; for although all can believe and be converted who have sufficient help, yet in fact none believe or are converted save they who are so called as God saw would be apt, that they follow the caller. But of this matter we have spoken above, and shall speak also a little below.
Besides these places of the Scriptures, they bring forward also various testimonies of St. Augustine. The first testimony, from book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 15: “But he who cannot with good will resist compelling lust — this now is sin in such wise that it is also the punishment of sin.” But if some cannot resist compelling lust, certainly they have not sufficient help for not sinning. Again in the same place: “How much is it that the will avails, unless perchance, if it be pious, that it pray for help?” Therefore, if the will be not pious, has it not sufficient help even for praying? I answer: there are indeed those who cannot resist compelling lust while that lust remains; yet that lust does not necessarily cleave to them, for with the help of God they can put it off. Which help is lacking to no one at the time when a precept to be observed presents itself: “For justly does he press with the precept, who runs before with the help,” says St. Leo. But if the will is not pious, it cannot even ask help. True; yet it can become pious, if it will to consent to preventing grace.
The second testimony, from the book On the Perfection of Justice, response 15: “It is sin when either charity is not which ought to be, or is less than it ought — whether this can be avoided by the will, or cannot; for if it can, the present will does it; if it cannot, the past will does it.” I answer: St. Augustine speaks of that which cannot be avoided not absolutely, but on a supposition — because, namely, it cannot be avoided while the depraved lust rules; but through the grace of God the rule of lust can be taken away, that sin reign not in our mortal body. Certainly he who hates someone cannot from his heart do him good while the hatred lasts; yet absolutely he can, because he can lay down the hatred. So is understood that of the Gospel: How can you believe, who receive glory one from another? And that of the Prophet: how can you do good, when you have learned evil? As also Augustine understands that of John 12: They could not believe, because Isaias said… He hath blinded their eyes. For he says, tractate 53 on John, that they could not believe while the blindness of mind lasted, yet could remove the blindness. And in the place cited against us, from the book On the Perfection of Justice, after he had said that it is sin whether it can be avoided or cannot, he straightway subjoins: “And yet it can be avoided — not when the proud will is praised, but when the humble is helped.”
The third testimony, from the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11: “He had given,” says he, “a help to the first man, without which he could not persevere though he would.” And below: “But if this help had been lacking to him, he would assuredly not have fallen by his own fault; but now, they to whom such help is lacking — it is already the punishment of sin; but they to whom it is given — it is given according to grace, not according to debt.” For in this place St. Augustine seems most openly to say that the help necessary for not sinning is not given to all; for if it were given to all, its lack would not be in anyone the punishment of sin — and St. Augustine says: they to whom it is lacking — it is already the punishment of sin. And moreover Augustine distinguishes two kinds of men: one, of those to whom this help is not given, in punishment of sin — that is, out of justice; the other, of those to whom it is given out of mercy and grace: it is not, then, given to all. I answer: St. Augustine speaks not of the help necessary for avoiding single sins, but of the help necessary for avoiding all — that is, for persevering without all sin; and by the help he understands habitual grace, as we showed in the book On the Grace of the First Man. God therefore gave to the first man habitual grace, through which he could persevere in good, and without which he could not; for though he could avoid single sins without the habitual gift, yet he could not all, and without doubt would at some time have fallen. And now, this help of habitual grace, without which all sins, even deadly, cannot be avoided — to those to whom it is lacking, it is the punishment of sin; but to those to whom it is given, it is given according to grace, not according to debt. Thou wilt say: therefore men now fall not by their own fault, since the help is lacking without which they cannot at some time not fall. I answer: they fall by their own fault, since they can avoid the single sins; and thus, whenever they sin, they do that which they could have not done. Thou wilt say: but the first man also could avoid single sins, and yet it was said he would have fallen not by his own fault, if the help had been lacking by which he could avoid not only the single, but all. I answer: the first man would have fallen not by his own fault, since the necessity of at some time falling would have been natural to him; and he could deservedly have complained of the author of nature, if he had given him a nature which could not at some time not fall, and yet commanded that he nowise fall. But we fall by our own fault — not only because we can avoid the single sins, but also because the necessity of at some time falling is not natural to us, but the punishment of sin. And here truly has place what some say — that the impotence born of original sin does not excuse sin — if, namely, they speak of the impotence of avoiding all at once, not of the impotence of avoiding singles; because the former impotence does not take away free choice, as the latter impotence in very truth takes it away.
The fourth testimony, from epistle 107 to Vitalis: “We know,” says he, “that the grace of God is not given to all.” I answer: he speaks of the grace which distinguishes the believers from the unbelievers, and the just from the impious — as he also speaks in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 5, where he calls grace faith itself and charity, or that inward persuasion which makes us in very fact will to believe and be converted.
The fifth testimony, from the book On the Grace of Christ, chapters 46 and 47, where St. Augustine says that the grace of God is necessary not only that we may be able to will and to do, but also that we will and do; but all have not the grace of God by which they will and do; therefore all have not the necessary grace. I answer: the Pelagians distinguished the being able, the willing, and the doing; and the being able they said we have indeed from the gift of God, since from God we have free choice, in which is the possibility itself; but the willing and the doing they said are our own, and that in these we need not the grace of God — see the same Augustine reporting these things in the same book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 4. Against this error Augustine writes that the grace of God not only gives the being able — because, namely, it gives the liberty of choice — but also gives the willing and the doing, because free choice cannot by its own powers alone will and do. And so St. Augustine takes “to be able” in that place otherwise than we take it: for we by “to be able” understand that the very willing and doing is in the power of a will prepared and helped by God; but he by “to be able” understands, according to the mind of the Pelagians, the sole powers of free choice.
The sixth testimony, from the same epistle 107, where St. Augustine proves that faith is the gift of God from the prayers which the Church pours out for unbelievers — which, as he himself says, would be superfluous if unbelievers could without God's help will to believe. But the same absurdity seems to follow if we say that sufficient help is given to all: for to what end do we pray for unbelievers, if all already have the help by which they can believe if they will? I answer: St. Augustine most efficaciously refutes the Pelagians and the remnants of the Pelagians from the prayers of the Church. For they taught that God does not prevent men with his grace, but waits for them to come and ask the grace of God; and if it were so, in vain would the Church ask that God convert to the faith those unwilling to believe, and of unwilling make them willing. But against us that argument from the prayers of the Church concludes nothing at all. For we confess that the grace of God often effects that unbelievers, even obstinate, be converted and believe; and although we piously believe that God knocks at the hearts of all according to time and place, yet we most rightly ask of God that he knock often and yet more often, and not only knock, but also through efficacious grace open the hearts of the stubborn and hardened — above all since we know that God wills to confer many benefits on men, but at the same time wills that prayer and supplication be made for them, and wills to grant them only through the prayers of the Saints.
The seventh testimony, from book 4 against Julian, chapter 8, where St. Augustine teaches it to be false that God wills all to be saved if they themselves also will; and proves it, since, if the matter so stood, God would be more benevolent to the most wicked than to the most innocent: since he would will all adults to be saved, of whom there are many who will not; and would not will all little ones to be saved, of whom there is none who wills not. I answer: Augustine disputes against Julian, who judged that God wills absolutely to save no one, but all under the condition, if they themselves also will — preventing God, namely, with their own will; which error is evidently refuted from the predestination of little ones, who are saved through Baptism, though they by no means prevented God with their own will. Again, Julian taught that little ones have no sin, and that, if they departed without Baptism, they would have a certain eternal life of their own outside the kingdom of heaven; and therefore he said only of adults that God wills to save all, if they themselves also will. This error Augustine aptly refutes with that argument — that Julian makes God more benevolent to the most wicked than to the most innocent and purest from every stain of sin. But from our judgment this absurdity does not follow. First, because we do not reckon unbaptized little ones innocent, but sinners. Second, because we do not say that God wills to save no one with an absolute will; nay, as we shall explain a little later, we believe that God with an absolute will wills to save many, both little ones and adults, and with an absolute will wills not to save others, both little ones and adults. Third, we do not say that God with antecedent will wills to save only adults, but we extend this will also to little ones — although, as we taught above from the doctrine of St. Prosper, God provides sufficient remedies in one way for little ones, in another for adults: for to little ones he furnishes help in their parents; but adults he himself by himself calls, stirs, illuminates. Yet this is true, nor is it denied by St. Augustine: that God is at times more benevolent to some adults, even the most wicked, than to many little ones less evil; for who will dare deny that God was more benevolent to Paul, to Matthew, to Magdalen, to the thief hanging with him on the cross, than to very many little ones dying without Baptism — though it is not permitted to doubt that those adults were far worse than these little ones. But if God wills with antecedent will all to be saved, not only adults but also little ones, why does St. Augustine, in the place cited, contend that by that word “all” are understood many — that is, all who are saved — not all absolutely? I answer: because he wished to expound this place of the absolute will, according to which Julian judged that God wills to save no one; but otherwise Augustine himself also, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 33, as we showed above, expounded this same place of the antecedent will.
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CAPUT VIII. Solvuntur argumenta contra doctrinam capitis 5. et 7. Nunc argumenta solvenda sunt, quae fieri «olent contra propositionem S. et 7. quibus docuimus, neminem esse, qui non habeat auxilium sufficiens pro loco et tempore ad conversionem a peccatis commissis, semper autem ad ea vitanda quae solent tentatione urgente committi. Primum argumentum sumunt ex locis illis, quae testantur homines a Deo indurari et excaecari Exod. ix. Isa. vi, Matth. xiii. Joan. xii. et Roman. i. nam excaecari et indurari homines, nihil est aliud, nisi deseri ac desti¬ tui a Deo, ut a Satana superentur ac vincan¬ tur, ut exponit S. Chrysostomus in cap. 1. ad Rom. et S. Augustinus lib. v. in Julian. cap. 3. Respondeo : excaecati et obdurati, ut dixi¬ mus in cap. 6. et fusius in lib. ii. de statu peccati cap 14. non possunt converti duran¬ te excaecatione et obduratione, neque habent singulis momentis auxilium sufficiens, quo tollere possint excaecationem, et induratio- nem ; tamen pie credimus, Deum pro loco et tempore istos etiam visitare, et ad cor eorum pro sua benignitate pulsare, atque ita porrigere auxilium, quo possint caecita¬ tem et duritiam a suo corde repellere ; tunc autem maxime tempus est opportunum, cum non possunt sine conversione vitare pecca¬ tum. Itaque in tali temporis articulo Deus nunquam decst, et si non praebet auxilium, quo peccator possit immediate converti, aut servare mandatum, quod tunc servandum occurrit : tamen praebet saltem auxilium, quo possit desiderare et petere majus auxi¬ lium, quod si non facit, sua culpa illud non habet, et sua culpa in tentatione succum¬ bit. Secundum argumentum sumunt ex cap. I I. et 17. Act. ubi dicitur Dens in praeteritis generationibus dimisisse omnes gentes in¬ gredi vias suas et despexisse tempora illa, quae idcirco tempora ignorantiae nominan¬ tur. Respondeo : haec testimonia significant gratiaun Dei non ita largiter antiquis tempo¬ 431 ribus fluxisse, ut postea fluxit, sed non pro- pterea defuit unquam ea mensura gratiae, quae divinae Providentiae sufficiens et neces¬ saria visa est. Itaque dimisit Deus gentiles ingredi vias suas, quia non misit ad eos Pa¬ triarchas et Prophetas, neque legem scri¬ ptam eis dedit : tamen non sine testimonio semetipsum reliquit, ut eodem loco dicit Apostolus, qui etiam addit, potuisse eos Deum quaerere et invenire, et ideo Rom. i. idem Apostolus inexcusabiles fuisse confir¬ mat eodem gentiles, quia cum Deum cogno¬ vissent, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt, aut gratias egerunt. Tertium argumentum sumunt ex cap. x. aid Roman. Quomodo invocabunt , in quem non crediderunt quomodo credent sine praedicante ? quomodo 'praedicabunt nisi mittantur (1) ? Initium salutis est fides, inde enim nascitur invocatio, et ex invocatione salus ; omnis enim quicumque invocaverit nomen Domini salvus erit. At multi non habent auxilium sufficiens, quo possint credere cum nondum illis sit Evangelium praedicatum : et multo plures non habuerunt olim hoc auxilium, cum nondum ad illos praedicatio evangelica pervenisset. Respondeo : hoc argumentum solum pro¬ bat, non adesse omnibus auxilium, quo pos¬ sint immediate converti et credere : non ta¬ men probat simpliciter defuisse aliquibus auxilium sufficiens ad salutem. Possunt enim gentiles quibus nondum est Evangelium praedicatum cognoscere per creaturas Deum esse, et proinde possunt a Deo per gratiam praevenientem excitari ad credendum de Deo, quia est, et quod inquirentibus se re¬ munerator sit : et ex tali fide excitari pos¬ sunt eodem dirigente et adjuvante Deo ad orandum eleemosynas faciendas, et eo modo impetrandum a Deo majus fidei lumen, quod Deus per se, vel per Angelos, vel per homi¬ nes facile communicabit. Ita respondet S. Thom. in quaest. 14. de verit. art. 11. ad. 1. et adfert exemplum Cornelii, qui ex fide unius Dei orabat et ele¬ emosynas faciebat, et eo modo impetravit, ut per Angelicam admonitionem et Aposto- licam praedicationem Christi fidem audiret, et ipsum etiam sacrum baptisma suscipe¬ ret. Quartum argumentum sumunt ex cap. xi. Matth. et ex cap. xvi. Act. legimus enim (1) Rom. X, 14. l.lUEli H. 5«? I Tyrios ct Sidonios potui&se converti, si Do¬ minus apud eos miracula facere voluisset, et tamen noluisse Dominum apud eos ulla signa facere, legimus item expresse prohi¬ bitum fuisse Apostolum Paulum a Spiritu sancto, nc verbum Domini in Asia loquere¬ tur. Respondeo : Tyriis et Sidoniis non dedit quidem Deus auxilium illud, per quod re ipsa conversi fuissent : tamen quin auxilium eis, quo converti potuerint, Dominus dederit, ex Evangelio non colligitur. Porro 13. Pau¬ lus prohibitus fuit aliquando verbum Dei loqui in Asia, quoniam volebat Deus ut an¬ tea praedicaret in Macedonia, ut perspicuum est ex eodem capite, nam alioqui in Asia quoque longo tempore praedicavit, plurimos- que convertit. Quintum argumentum sumunt ex cap. vi. Joan.: Nemo potest ad me venire, nisi Pa¬ ter, qui misit me, traxerit eum. Et infra : Om¬ nis qui audivit a Patre meo, et didicit, venit ad me (1). Ex hoc loco tale texitur argumen¬ tum, nemo potest, venire per fidem ad filium nisi Pater traxerit eum, Pater autem non omnes trahit : igitur non omnes possunt venire. Probatur assumptio, nam omnis qui trahitur venit : omnis, inquit, qui audivit et didicit venit: sed non omnes veniunt, igitur non omnes trahuntur. Respondeo: falsa est assumptio, qua; dicit, Pater autem non omnes trahit, trahit enim omnes Pater, sed pro loco et tempore ; at non omnes veniunt, licet revera possint; non enim trahere vellet Pater, nisi dare dis¬ poneret auxilium quo venire possent si vel¬ lent. At omnis qui audivit et didicit, venit, igitur omnis qui trahitur venit. Respondeo, trahi, esse audire ; non autem venit omnis qui audit, sed omnis qui audit et discit ; nam si omnis qui audit, veniret, non diceret Psalmus : Hodie si vocem ejus audieritis , no¬ lite obdurare corda vestra. Itaque omnes ali¬ quando audiunt, quia omnes Deus pro loco et tempore vocat ; sed illi soli discunt ct ve¬ niunt, quibus Pater ita suadet, ut persua¬ deat. Et luce est gratia efficax ; posse tamen omnes credere, ac proinde omnes a Deo audire, et trabi perspicuum est ex illo eo¬ dem cap. vi. Joan. ubi Dominus hortabatur omnes ad fidem, quod non fecisset, nisi sci¬ visset omnes potuisse credere. Potest taiflen alia etiam responsio, adhi¬ beri, qua;, ut verum fatear, magis congruere videtur Evangelica; sententia;, si dicamus Dominum loqui de gratia efficaci, qua; ita suadet ut persuadeat. Dicitur autem non posse venire, qui non trahitur per efficacem gratiam, non quod absolute non possit, sed quia infallibilitcr non veniet ; sicut etiam contra qui trahitur, potest absolute non ve¬ nire, tamen infallibilitcr venit. Itaque Dominus cum Judads murmuran¬ tibus ait : A olite murmurare invicem, nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit cum : non significavit, illos non po¬ tuisse credere, sed indicavit, fidem esse do- lfum Dei, nec haberi industria humana, sed revelatione divina, et ideo non opus esse murmuratione, sed oratione ; quia omnis qui petit accipit ; et ideo S. August. tract. 20. in Joan. exponens hunc locum, ait, si non tra¬ heris, ora ut traharis. Dices, quomodo potest quis orando impe¬ trare fidem, cum nemo possit orare, nisi habeat fidem. Facilis est responsio, nam isti quibus Dominus loquebatur, jam noverant et credebant unum esse Deum, sed Jesum filium esse Dei, verum Messiam in lege pro¬ missum, nondum credebant. Quare poterant ex fide in unum Deum orare et impetrare fi¬ dem, qua Jesum filium Dei et Christum esse crederent. Ex his, ad argumentum initio factum re¬ spondemus, eo argumento solum concludi, non habere omnes auxilium efficax, quo re ipsa credant, non tamen concludi non ha¬ bere omnes saltem pro loco et tempore au¬ xilium quo possint credere, vel certe quo possint auxilium petere et dicere, Credo Do¬ mine, adjuva incredulitatem meam. Sextum argumentum sumunt ex verbis Apostoli, i. Corinth. iv : Quis te discernit ? quid habes quod non accepisti? si autem acce¬ pisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis (2)? Ex hoc loco videtur manifeste colligi, non v dari omnibus auxilium sufficiens ad salutem ; nam si daretur omnibus, discretio fidelis ab infideli, ct justi ab impio, tota penderet a libero arbitrio. Nam ille esset fidelis et pius, qui auxilio sufficienti cooperari vellet : ille maneret infidelis et impius, qui eidem auxi¬ lio cooperari nollet. Respondeo: discretio fidelis ab infideli, et justi ab impio, referenda est, tauquam in primariam causam, in gratiam efficacem, ut (1) Joan. VI, 44. - (2) I Corin. IV, 7. CAPUT VIII. 553 S. August. ostendit in lib. de praedest. San¬ ctorum cap. 5. quamvis enim possint omnes credere et converti, qui habent auxilium sufficiens, tamen re ipsa non credunt nec convertuntur, nisi qui ita vocantur, ut Deus . vidit aptum fore, ut sequantur vocantem. Sed de hac re diximus supra, et dicemus etiam paulo infra. Praeter haec loca Scriptu¬ rarum proferunt etiam varia testimonia S. Augustini. Primum testimonium ex lib. i. retract. cap. xv. : <( Qui autem cogenti cupiditati bona voluntate resistere non potest, jam hoc ita peccatum est, ut sit etiam poena peccati. » Quod si aliqui cogenti cupiditati resistere non possunt, certe non habent auxilium sufficiens ad non peccandum. Rursus ibidem : • « Quantum est, inquit, quod valet voluntas, nisi forte si pia est, ut oret auxilium ? » Er¬ go si voluntas non sit pia, non habet auxi¬ lium sufficiens ne ad orandum quidem ? Respondeo : non desunt qui cogenti cupi¬ ditati resistere non possunt, manente ea cu¬ piditate, tamen non necessario ea cupiditas in ipsis haeret ; possunt enim cum auxilio Dei illam exuere. Quod auxilium nemini deest, quo tempore praeceptum observandum occurrit : « Juste enim instat praecepto, qui praecurrit auxilio », ait S. Leo. At si volun¬ tas non est pia, non potest ne auxilium qui¬ dem petere. Ita est, tamen potest fieri pia, si gratiae praevenienti consentire voluerit. Secundum testimonium ex lib. de perfe¬ ctione justitiae, respon. 15 : « Peccatum est cum vel non est charitas quae esse debet, vel est minor quam debet, sive hoc voluntate vitari possit, sive non possit, quia si potest, praesens voluntas hoc facit, si non potest, praeterita voluntas hoc facit. » Respondeo, loquitur S. Augustinus de eo quod non potest vitari non absolute, sed ex hypothesi, quia videlicet non potest vitari, dominante prava cupiditate, sed potest per gratiam Dei dominatus cupiditati auferri, ut non regnet peccatum in nostro mortali cor¬ pore. Certe qui odit aliquem, non potest illi ex animo benefacere, durante odio, tamen absolute potest, quia potest odium deponere. Sic intelligitur illud Evangclii : Quomodo vos potestis credere, qui gloriam ab invicem accipitis ? Et illud Propheta} : Quomodo vos potestis benefacere, cum didiceritis male ? Si¬ cut etiam intelligit August. illud Joan. xn. : Non poterant credere quia dixit Isaias, exese- cavit oculos eorum (1). Dicit enim tract. 53. in Joan. illos non potuisse credere durante cfecitatc mentis, tamen potuisse removere caecitatem. Et in loco contra nos citato, ex libro de perfectione justitiae , posteaquam dixerat, peccatum esse, sive vitari possit, sive non possit, subjungit continuo : « Et tamen vitari potest, non quando superba voluntas laudatur, sed quando humilis adjuvatur. » Tertium testimonium ex libro de corre¬ ptione et gratia cap. 11. « Dederat, inquit, adjutorium primo homini, sine quo non pos¬ set permanere si vellet. » Et infra: « Si autem hoc adjutorium ei defuisset, non utique sua culpa cecidisset; nunc autem quibus deest tale adjutorium, jam poena peccati est, qui¬ bus autem datur, secundum gratiam datur, non secundum debitum. » Videtur enim hoc loco S. Augustinus apertissime dicere, adju¬ torium necessarium ad non peccandum non omnibus dari, nam si omnibus daretur, non esset in ullo poena peccati ejus carentia. S. Augustinus dicit, quibus autem deest, jam poena peccati est. Et praterea distinguit Augustinus duo genera hominum, unum eo¬ rum, quibus hoc adjutorium in poenam pec¬ cati, id est, ex justitia non datur, alterum eorum, quibus ex misericordia et gratia da¬ tur : non igitur omnibus datur. Respondeo : non loquitur S. Augustinus de adjutorio necessario ad vitanda singula peccata, sed de adjutorio necessario ad vi¬ tanda omnia, hoc est, ad perseverandum sine omni peccato, et per adjutorium intelli¬ git gratiam habitualem, ut ostendimus in lib. de gratia primi hominis. Dedit igitur Deus primo homini gratiam habitualem, per quam poterat perseverare in bono, et sine qua non poterat, quamvis enim posset vitare singula sine dono habituali, tamen non po¬ terat omnia, et sine dubio aliquando ceci¬ disset, nunc vero hoc adjutorium gratiae ha¬ bitualis, sine quo non possunt vitari omnia peccata, etiam laethalia, quibus deest, poena peccati est, quibus autem datur, secundum gratiam datur, non secundum debitum. Dices, ergo non sua culpa cadunt nunc homines, quia deest auxilium, sine quo non possunt aliquando non cadere. Respondeo, sua culpa cadere, quoniam possunt vitare singula, atque ita quandocumque peccant id faciunt, quod potuissent non facere. (I) Joan. XII, 37. TOH. IV. 36 LIBKIi II. Dices, at etiam primus homo poterat vita¬ re singula, et tamen dicebatur non sua cul¬ pa fuisse casurus, si auxilium defuisset, quo posset vitare non solum singula, sed etiam omnia. Respondeo : primum hominem non sua culpa fuisse casurum, quoniam necessi¬ tas aliquando cadendi luisset ei naturalis, et merito de auctore natura) queri potuisset, si dedisset ei naturam, qua) non posset ali¬ quando non cadere, et. tamen imperaret, ut no inquam caderet: At nos culpa nostra ca¬ dimus, non solum quia possumus vitare sin¬ gula, sed etiam quia necessitas aliquando cadendi non est nobis naturalis, sed poma peccati. Atque hic vere locum habet, quod qui¬ dam dicunt, impotentiam ex peccato origi¬ nali natam non excusare peccatum, si vide¬ licet loquantur de impotentia vitandi omnia simul, non de impotentia vitandi singula, quia prior impotentia non tollit liberum ar¬ bitrium, sicut re vera illud tollit impotentia posterior. Quartum testimonium ex epist. 107. ad Vitalem : « Scimus, inquit, gratiam Dei non omnibus dari. » Respondeo : loquitur de gratia qua) dis¬ cernit fideles aJ * infidelibus, et justos ab im¬ piis, sieut etiam loquitur in lib. x. de prae¬ destinatione Sanctorum cap. 5. ubi vocat gratiam ipsam fidem et churitatem, sive illam internam persuasionem, qua) facit nos reip- sa velle credere et converti. Quintum testimonium ex libro de gratia Christi cap. 40. et 47. ubi S. Augustinus gratiam Dei necessariam esso dicit, non so¬ lum ut possimus velle et facere ; sed etiam ut velimus et faciamus : at non habenl om¬ nes gratiam Dei, qua velint et faciant; igitur non habent omnes graliam necessariam. Respondeo : Pelagia ni distinguebant pos¬ se, velle, et facere ; et posse quidem dice¬ bant nos habere ex dono Dei, quoniam a Deo habemus libenun arbitrium, in quo est ipsa possibilitas ; at velle et lacero dicebant esse nostrum, neque in iis egere nos gratia Dei. Vide enmrlem Augustinum luce refe¬ rentem in eodem lib. de gratia Christi cap. -4. Contra hunc errorem scribit Augustinus gratiam Dei non solum dare, nobis posse, quia videlicet dat arbitrii libertatem, sed etiam dare velle et facere, quia liberum ar¬ bitrium non potest suis solis viribus vello et lucere. Itaque aliter accipit co luco S. Augu¬ stinus « posse », quam nos accipiamus. Nos enim per « posse », iutclligimus quod ipsum velle et facere sit in potestate voluntatis a Deo piteparata) et adjuta). Ille vero per « posse», intelligit ex mente Pclagianorum solas vires liberi arbitrii. Sextum testimonium ex eadem epist. 107. ubi sanctus Augustinus probat fidem esse donum Dei ex orationibus, quas pro infide¬ libus fundit Ecclesia, qua), ut ipse dicit, su¬ pervacanea) essent, si possent infideles sine Dei auxilio velle credere. At idem absur¬ dum sequi videtur, si dicamus auxilium suf¬ ficiens omnibus dari. Quorsum enim oramus pro infidelibus, si jam habent omnes auxi¬ lium, quo possint credere si velint? Respondeo : sanctus Augustinus efficacis¬ sime Pelagianos et Pclagianorum reliquias ex orationibus Ecclesia) refellit. Illi enim do¬ cebant Deum non prtevenire homines gratia sua, sed expectare ut ipsi veniant et petant gratiam Dei, quod si ita esset, frustra Eccle¬ sia peteret, ut Deus nolentes credere con¬ verteret ad fidem, et ex nolentibus volentes faceret. At contra nos argumentum illud ex ora¬ tionibus Ecclesias nihil omnino concludit. Fatemur enim gratiam Dei sa)pe efficere ut infideles etiam obstinati convertantur et credant, et quamvis pie credamus, Deum omnium corda pro tempore et loco pulsare: tamen rectissime petimus a Deo, ut saepe ac sfepius pulset, et non solum pulset, sed etiam per efficacem gratiam . aperiat corda pertinacium ct obduratorum, praesertim cum sciamus Deum velle multa beneficia in ho¬ mines conferre, sed simul vello pro iisdem orari ct supplicari, et non nisi per orationes Sanctorum ea velle concedere. Septimum testimonium ex lib. jv. contra Jnlian. c. 8. ubi S. Augustinus falsum esse docet, Deum velle omnes salvos fieri, si ct ipsi velint, et probat quoniam si res ita se haberet, Deus esset benevolentior scelera¬ tissimis, quam inuocentissimis, quoniam vellet salvos fieri omnes adultos, quorum multi sunt qui nolunt, et non vellet salvos fieri omnes parvulos, quorum nemo est qui nolit. Respondeo : disserit Augustinus contra Ju- lian. qui existimabat Deum non velle abso¬ lute ullum salvare, sed omnes sui» condi¬ tione, si et, ipsi velint, praeveniendo videlicet Deum sua volutate, qui quidem error evi¬ denter refellitur ex prcedesliraatiouc parvu- . ..... . .. CAPIT IX. lurum, qui per Baptismum salvantur, cum tamen Deum sua voluntate minime praeve¬ nerint. liursus docebat Julianus parvulos nullum habere peccatum, et si decedebant absque Baptismo, habituros suam quamdam vitam aeternam extra regnum cadorum, et ideo solum de adultis dicebat, Deum velle omnes salvare, si et ipsi velint. Ilunc erro¬ rem accommodate refellit August. illo albu¬ mento, quod Julianus faciat Deum benevo¬ lentiorem sceleratissimis, quam innocentis- simis et purissimis ab omni labe peccati. At ex nostra sententia non sequitur hoc absurdum. Primo, quia nos parvulos non baplizalos non censemus esse innocentes, sed peccatores. Secundo, quia non dicimus Deum non velle salvare ullum absoluta voluntate, imo ut paulo post explicabimus, credimus Deum absoluta voluntate velle salvare multos, tum parvulos , tum adultos , et absoluta voluntate alios non velle salvare, tum par¬ vulos, tum adultos. Tertio, non dicimus Deum antecedente voluntate salvare velle solum adultos, sed etiam ad parvulos hanc voluntatem extendi¬ mus, quamvis ut supra ex doctrina S. Pro¬ speri docuimus, aliter Deus parvulis, aliter adultis sufficientia remedia provideat. Nam parvulis in parentibus suis praebet auxilium, adultos autem per se ipse vocat, excitat, il¬ luminat. Illud tamen est verum, neque a S. Augu¬ stino negatur, Deum interdum esse benevo¬ lentiorem aliquibus adultis, et sceleratissi¬ mis, quam multis parvulis minus malis ; quis enim inficiari audebit, benevolentiorem fuisse Deum Paulo, Matthaeo, Magdalenee, latroni in cruce sccum pendenti, quam plurimis parvulis sine baptismo molientibus, cum ta¬ men eos adultos longe deteriores fuisse istis parvulis non liceat dubitare. At si Deus vultan tecedeute voluntate om¬ nes salvos fieri, non solum adultos, sed etiam parvulos, cur S. Augustinus loco ci- lato contendit per illam vocem « omnes » intclligi mullos, id est, omnes, qui salvantur, non omnes absoluto ? ■Respondeo, quia voluit hunc locum expo¬ nere de voluntate absoluta, secundum quam Julianus existimabat Deum neminem velle salvare; alioqui autem ipse etiam Augusti¬ nus in lib. de spiritu et littera c. 33. ut supra ostendimus hunc eumdem locum dc antece¬ dente voluntate exposuit.