Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book II: On Predestination and Sufficient Grace
Chapter 9: The eighth proposition is set forth, and the definition of predestination is explained
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The eighth proposition: “Although sufficient grace is given to all, yet no reason of divine predestination can be assigned on our side.” This proposition had of necessity to be added, since there are not wanting those who judge that a merely gratuitous predestination cannot be defended if it be conceded that sufficient help unto salvation is given to all.
Now we say that no reason can be assigned, so as to exclude not only merits properly so called, but also the good use of free choice, or of grace, or of both together, foreseen by God — even if it be called not a true cause, but only a condition without which he who is predestinated would not be predestinated. But we add that phrase, “on our side,” since on God's side a cause in general can be assigned — that his mercy and justice may be shown; and in particular also it cannot be doubted that God does not lack his own reason why he willed to predestinate this man rather than that unto life, though it be hidden from us. “He has not mercy on those” (says Augustine, book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2) “to whom he judges, by an equity most hidden and most removed from human senses, that grace is not to be furnished — which equity the Apostle does not open, but wonders at, saying: O the depth of the riches!” And in epistle 105 to Sixtus: “Why he delivers this man rather than that, or delivers him not — let him who can search so great a depth of his judgments; but let him beware the precipice.” Yet the same Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 95, affirms that in eternal beatitude it will be manifest to us why this man rather than that was taken up, when the cause of both was one; and why among certain men miracles were not done which, had they been done, those men would have done penance — and were done among those who were not going to believe.
But it will be worth the labor, before we come to the proving of our proposition, briefly to explain what predestination is — so that, if any perchance unaccustomed to scholastic theology fall upon these our disputations, they may understand what it is that is in question. St. Augustine, then, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14, defines predestination thus: “It is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which most certainly are delivered whosoever are delivered.” But predestination could be defined a little more fully, out of the doctrine of the same Augustine, thus: “Predestination is the providence of God by which certain men, mercifully selected out of the mass of perdition, are directed through infallible means into eternal life.” It is called “providence,” since predestination is a species of providence, and the genus is most rightly placed at the beginning of a good definition. It is called “of God,” since to predestinate unto eternal life can be the action of none but God, who alone can communicate eternal life: For the Lord will give grace and glory, Psalm 83. It is said, “certain men,” since providence pertains to all things, but the predestination of which we now treat to men alone; for although the Angels also are said by St. Augustine to be predestinated, yet one is the account of the predestination of Angels, another of men. And we add “certain,” since not all are predestinated unto life, but only some — and these not confusedly, but distinctly, such and such: Peter, Andrew, James, etc. It is said, “out of the mass of perdition,” since predestination, by the judgment of St. Augustine and of the divine Scriptures, did not precede but followed the foreseeing of original sin, on account of which the whole human race was made as it were a certain condemned mass. Whence is that of the Apostle, Romans 9: Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? And when St. Augustine writes, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 13, that if Adam had not sinned, men would not have been born save up to the fixed number of the predestinated, he signifies indeed that predestination would still have been, even if Adam had not sinned — if, namely, God had foreseen that man would not sin; yet absolutely, predestination, such as it now is, follows the foreseeing of sin. It is said, “mercifully selected,” since (as we assert in our proposition) God found nothing in those whom he elects unto glory but the desert of death; and therefore he mercifully delivers them, not rendering them the punishment owed, but giving the grace unowed. It is said, “infallible means,” since predestination is most certain: for no one can pluck the elect sheep out of the hand of the almighty Shepherd, as he himself says, John 10. It is said, “are directed into eternal life,” since in this properly consists the notion of predestination: that it be a direction and, as it were, a conveying of the thing predestinated, through fixed means, to its end. From this our definition, so explicated, the definition of Augustine will be clear: for Augustine signifies that to predestinate is nothing else than to foreknow by what means certain men can infallibly be saved, and to will efficaciously to prepare those means.
From which again it can be understood that predestination pertains partly to the intellect, partly to the will. For to foreknow, to dispose, to direct are works of the intelligence; to select, to will, to have mercy, of the will. Which may also be observed in the divine writings. For to the intelligence pertains that of the Apostle, Romans 11: God hath not cast away his people, which he foreknew; and that of 2 Timothy 2: the sure foundation of God standeth firm… the Lord knoweth who are his. But to the will, that of Romans 9: That the purpose of God, according to election, might stand; and that of Luke 12: it hath pleased your Father to give you a kingdom. The theologians indeed dispute whether predestination pertains more to the intelligence or to the will. But the judgment of St. Thomas and of Cardinal Cajetan pleases us, in part 1, question 23, article 1, who teach that predestination is rather of the intelligence than of the will — since the same is also the judgment of St. Augustine, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 17, where he speaks thus: “To dispose his future works in his own foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived or changed — this altogether, and nothing else, is to predestinate.” The same is the judgment of the author of the Hypognosticon, book 6, who says that to predestinate is nothing else than to foresee and preordain. The same the very names signify, both Greek and Latin: for proorizein, which word the Apostle uses most frequently — what is it but to predefine and predecree? as also the Latin word “praedestinare” seems to signify the same as to send before, or preordain.
And so, according to our manner of understanding, this seems to have been the order of predestination in the divine mind. First, God foresaw that, if he founded man, he would fall with all his posterity; and at the same time he saw that he could in various ways deliver either all, or some, at his own pleasure. Next, he willed to found man, and to permit that he fall, and mercifully to deliver certain out of the number of the fallen, the others being justly left in the mass of perdition. Third, he devised the remedies fit for saving the elect, among which the first place was held by the incarnation and passion of the Savior. Fourth, he approved those remedies; and then he elected Christ, and us in him, before the foundation of the world. Fifth, he disposed, ordained, and in a certain manner commanded that it be so done. Of which acts the first was of the intelligence, the second of the will, the third of the intelligence, the fourth of the will, the fifth of the intelligence. And so the first, the middle, and the last pertain to the intelligence; and in the last above all consists the notion and essence of predestination.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT IX. Proponitur octova propositio , et explicatur dc linitio praedestinationis . Octava propositio : « Quamvis gratia suf¬ ficiens omnibus detur, tamen praedestinatio¬ nis divinae nulla ratio ex parte nostri assig¬ nari potest. » Haec propositio necessario addenda fuit, quoniam non desunt qui exi¬ stiment, non posse defendi praedestinationem mere gratuitam, si concedatur dari omnibus auxilium sufficiens ad salutem. Dicimus autem, nullam rationem assignari posse, ut excludamus non solum merita pro¬ prie dicta, sed etiam bonum usum liberi ar¬ bitrii, aut gratiae, aut utriusque simul a Deo praevisum, etiamsi non dicatur vera causa, sed tantum conditio sine qua non praedesti¬ naretur is qui praedestinatur. Addimus vero illud, « ex parte nostra, » quoniam ex parte Dei assignari potest causa in genere, ut ostendatur misericordia et ju¬ stitia ipsius : in particulari quoque dubitari non potest, quin Deo non desit tua ratio, cur istum potius, quam illum praedestinare vo¬ luerit ad vitam, quamvis ea nobis occulta sit : c Eorum (inquit Augustinus in lib. i. ad Simplician. qua?st. 2.) non miseretur, quibus gratiam non esse praebendam, aequi¬ tate occultissima, et ab humanis, sensibus remotissima judicat, quam non aperit sed admiratur Apostolus, dicens ; o altitudo divi¬ tiarum. » Et in epist. 103. ad Sixtum:«Cur, inquit, illum putius quam illum liberet aut non liberet, scrutetur qui potest judiciorum ejus tam magnum profundum ; tamen caveat praecipitium. » Idem tamen Augustinus in Enchirid. c. 1)3. affirmat, in aeterna beatitudine manifestum nobis futurum cur ille potius, quam iste fue¬ rit assumptus, cum una causa esset ambo¬ bus ; et cur apud quosdam non factaj sint virtutes, quae si factae fuissent, egissent illi homines poenitentiam ; et factae sint aipud eos, qui non fuerant credituri. Operae esse meritum nisi de congruo et etiamsi non dicatur pretium autem erit, antequaun ad probandam propositionem nostram accedamus, breviter explicare, quid sit praedestinatio, ut si qui forte Scho- lasticae Theologiae non assueti in has nostras disputationes inciderint, iuteiligant quid git de quo quaeritur. LIBER II. Igitur S. Augustinus libro de bono perse¬ verantiae cap. 14. praedestinationem ita de¬ finit : « Est praescientia et praeparatio bene¬ ficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur? quicumque liberantur. » S6d posset paulo plenius ex doctrina ejusdem Augustini ita praedestinatio definiri :'« Praedestinatio est providentia Dei, qua certi homines ex massa perditionis misericorditer selecti, per infalli¬ bilia media in vitam diriguntur aeternam. » Dicitur « providentia, » quoniam praede¬ stinatio species est providentiae, et rectisime ponitur genus initio bonae definitionis. Dici¬ tur Dei, quoniam praedestinare ad vitam ae¬ ternam non potest esse actio nisi Dei, qui solus vitam aeternam communicare potest : Gratiam enim et gloriam dabit Dominus (I), Psalm. lxxxiii. Dicitur, « Certi homines, » quoniam providentia ad res omnes, praede¬ stinatio de qua nunc agimus ad solos homi¬ nes pertinet ; nam etiamsi Angeli quoque dicuntur a S. Augustino praedestinati : tamen alia ratio est praedestinationis Angelorum, alia hominum. Addimus autem « certi, » quoniam non omnes praedestinantur ad vi¬ tam, sed solum aliqui, et ii non confuse, sed distincte, tales ac tales, Petrus, Andreas, Jacobus etc. Dicitur, «ex massa perditionis» quoniam praedestinatio ex sententia S. Au¬ gustini et Scripturarum divinarum, non prae¬ cessit, sed secuta est praevisionem peccati originalis, ob quod universum genus huma¬ num factum est quasi quaedam massa dam¬ nata. Unde est illud Apostoli ad Rom. ix : An non habet potestatem fyulus ex eadem massa facere aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam (2) ? Quod autem S. Augustinus scribit lib. i. retractat, cap. 13. si Adam non peccasset, non fuisse nascituros homines, nisi usque ad certum numerum praedestinatorum : signi¬ ficat quidem futuram fuisse pi-aedestinatio- nem, etiamsi Adam non peccasset, si nimi¬ rum praevidisset Deus hominem non pecca¬ turum, tamen absolute praedestinatio, qualis nunc est, pi^aevisionem peccati sequitur. Dicitur, « misei‘icorditer selecti, » quo¬ niam (ut in propositione nostra asserimus) nihil invenit Deus in iis quos eligit ad glo¬ riam, nisi meritum mortis, et propterea mi¬ sericorditer eos liberat, non reddens eis de¬ bitam poenam, sed donans indebitam gra- (1) Psal. LXXXIII, 12. - (2) Rom. IX, 21. XII, 32. tiam. Dicitur « infallibilia media, » quoniam praedestinatio certissima est. Nemo enim rapei’e potest electas oves de manu pastoris omnipotentis, ut ipse dicit Joan. x. Dicitur « in vitam dii'iguntur aeternam, » quoniam in hoc proprie ratio pi'aedestinatonis consistit, ut sit directio et quasi ti’ansmissio rei prae¬ destinatae per cex’ta media ad suum finem. Ex hac nostra definitione sic explicata, perspicua erit definitio Augustinia. Significat enim August. nihil esse aliud praedestinare, nisi praescire quibus mediis infallibilitercex*ti homines salvari possint, et velle efficaciter ea media praeparare. Ex quo rursus intelligi poterit, praedesti¬ nationem partim ad intellectum pertinere, partim ad voluntatem. Nam praescire, dispo¬ nere, dirigere, opera sunt intelligentiac ; se¬ ligere, velle, misereri, voluntatis. Quod etiam in divinis litteris observare licet. Nam ad intelligentiam pertinet illud Apostoli ad Rom. ix : Non repulit Deus plebem suam, quam prae¬ scivit. Et illud II Timot. li : Firmum funda¬ mentum Dei stat, novit Dominus qui sunt ejus. Ad voluntatem vero illud Rom. ix : Ut se¬ cundum electionem propositum Dei maneret. Et illud Luc. xn. Complacuit patri vestro dare vobis regnum (3). Disputant quidem Theologi, utrum prae¬ destinatio magis ad intelligentiam, quam ad voluntatem pertineat. Sed nobis placet sen- ■ tentia S. Thomae et Cajetani Cardinalis in i. part. quaest. 23. art. 1, qui docent, praede¬ stinationem esse potius intelligentiae, quam voluntatis, quoniam eadem est etiam S. Au¬ gustini sententia in lib. de bono perseveran¬ tiae cap. 17. ubi sic loquitur : « In sua, quae falli mutari que non potest, praescientia, ope¬ ra sua futura disponere, id omnino neque aliud quicquam est, nisi praedestinare. » Eadem est sententia auctoris Hypognostici lib. vi. qui praedestinare nihil aliud esse di¬ cit, nisi providere et praeordinare. Idem si¬ gnificant ipsa nomina, tum graeca, tum la¬ tina, nam irpoopt£eiv, qua voce utitur Apo¬ stolus frequentissime, quid est nisi praede- finire, ac praedecernere ? sicut etiam vox latina, « praedestinare, » idem significa¬ re videtur, quod praemittere, sive praeordi¬ nare. Itaque secundum modum nostrum intelli- gendi, iste fuisse videtur ordo praedestina- — (3) Rom. XI, 2; II Tim. II, 19; Rom. IX, 11; Luc. CAPUT X. tionis in mente divina. Primum, praevidit Deus, si hominem conderet, eum lapsurum cum omni posteritate, et simul vidit, posse se variis modis liberare vel omnes, vel ali¬ quos pro arbitratu suo. Deinde voluit homi¬ nem condere, ac, ut laberetur permittere, et quosdam ex numero lapsorum misericordi¬ ter liberare, aliis in massa perditionis juste relictis. Tertio, excogitavit remedia, salvan¬ dis electis idonea, in quibus primum locum habuit incarnatio, et passio Salvatoris. Quar¬ to approbavit ea remedia, et tunc elegit Christum, et nos in ipso ante mundi consti¬ tutionem. Quinto disposuit, ordinavit, et quodammodo imperavit ut ita fieret. Ex quibus actibus primus fuit intelligen- tiae, sectmdus voluntatis, tertius intelligen- tiae, quartus voluntatis, quintus intelligentiae. Itaque primus, medius et ultimus ad intel- ligentiam pertinent, et in ultimo potissimum praedestinationis ratio, essentiaque consistit.