Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book II: On Predestination and Sufficient Grace
Chapter 15: The arguments from reasons are answered; and at the same time it is shown that men are freely chosen not only to efficacious grace, but also to glory
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follow the objections drawn from reason. The first reason: election prerequires disparity in those who are to be elected; for everyone who does not err in choosing chooses that which is better; therefore the election of those to be saved was not made without some foreseeing of works, or of disposition, on our side. And the argument is confirmed from Augustine, book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, who speaks thus: “No one is elected unless already differing from him who is rejected; whence I do not see how that which is said — that he chose us before the foundation of the world — was said, except by foreknowledge.” And the same argument is confirmed again, since according to the Scriptures eternal life is the true wage of works; therefore it is not given, nor promised, nor destined, save on account of works at least foreseen.
On account of this argument there have not been wanting those who would distinguish predestination from election, and say that predestination is prior to election; and that by predestination indeed there are prepared for certain men the infallible means unto salvation, but by election glory is prepared; in fine, that predestination is plainly gratuitous, but election depends on the foreseeing of good works. Their judgment is in no way akin to the error of the Pelagians, or of Cassian and Faustus, and seems at one time to have been even Augustine's own; for in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, he speaks thus: “It is not because God finds good works in men, which he may elect, that the purpose of his justification abides; but because that abides, that he justify believers, therefore he finds works which he may now elect unto the kingdom of heaven,” etc. Nevertheless this opinion agrees little with the Scriptures, and with Augustine's later books, and with reason itself. For Scripture, Luke 12, openly makes the election unto the kingdom merely gratuitous, when it says: Fear not, little flock, for it hath pleased your Father to give you a kingdom — for both the word “it hath pleased,” and the name “Father,” and those words “little flock,” openly indicate grace, not justice. So also the Apostle, Romans 8, when he says, whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son, signifies that the love, and thereby the will of glorifying, is prior to predestination, not posterior, as that opinion teaches; for he predestinated those to be made conformable to Christ whom he foreknew with the foreknowledge of approbation, as we said above. Wherefore also in chapter 9 he says that the vessels unto honor, prepared unto glory, were separated by mercy alone from the vessels made unto dishonor and fitted for destruction. Finally, in Romans 11 he says that a remnant is saved according to the election of grace — where we see that not only predestination, but election too, is a work of grace. Further, St. Augustine, when he wrote the books to Simplicianus, was still young, and had not yet found many things in this most difficult question, which afterward with greater diligence he investigated and discovered. And so, when he had fallen upon those words in Romans 9, “that the purpose of God according to election might stand,” and could not understand how God should elect if there were no disparity in the things to be elected, he suspected that the punctuation must be changed, and that the Apostle did not mean to say that — in order that the purpose of God according to election might stand — it was therefore said, not of works but of him that calleth, “the elder shall serve the younger”; but meant to say that Jacob and Esau had done nothing of good or evil, so that thence the purpose of God might stand according to election. From which change of punctuation he gathers that the purpose of God does not stand according to election, but contrariwise, that election stands according to the purpose of God. But afterward he understood that this exposition is violent and wrested, and that there was no need to be driven to these straits, since it could be said that God, by loving or electing, makes the disparity. For thus he says in epistle 105 to Sixtus: “Who are these that answer God — seeing that, when Rebecca had twins by one lying-together of our father Isaac, and they were not yet born and had done nothing of good or evil, in order that his purpose according to election might stand — the election, namely, of grace, not of debt; the election by which he himself makes those to be elected, and does not find them — he says, not of works, but of him that calleth,” etc. And in epistle 106 to Paulinus: “Let it be understood to have been said, not of works, but of him that calleth, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, and the merit of man not go before; for he does not say the election of the human will, or of nature, since the condition of death and damnation was equal in both, but without doubt the election of grace, which does not find those to be elected, but makes them.” Of which, speaking also in what follows of the same epistle, he says: “So therefore also at this time, a remnant has been saved through the election of grace.” Thou seest how differently Augustine the old man judges from Augustine the young man? For as an old man he wrote to Sixtus and Paulinus; as a young man, to Simplicianus. The same also, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7, again expounds that — in order that the purpose of God according to election might stand — it was therefore said, not of works, but of him that calleth, “the elder shall serve the younger.” And the same, speaking of that very election which is not of works but of him that calls, says: “Now they were elected to reign with Christ.” And below, chapter 13: “These things,” says he, “I speak of those who are predestinated unto the kingdom of God.” And in book 22 On the City of God, chapter 24: “What will he give to those whom he has predestinated unto life, who has given these things even to those whom he has predestinated unto death?” And below: “Whence the Apostle, speaking of those predestinated unto that kingdom,” etc. — where the predestination which he everywhere preaches as merely gratuitous he says is not only unto grace, as that opinion which we refute will have it, but also unto life and unto the kingdom. Last, that opinion is repugnant to reason: for means, as means, cannot be desired save for the end; God therefore could not will to give certain men the infallible means unto salvation unless he first willed to give the same men salvation itself. This opinion, then, being repudiated, we answer to the argument proposed at the beginning: that the very election of God makes the disparity between those to be elected. For those whom God deigned to elect were worthy to be elected; for in the same manner none can be loved but the good — and yet God by loving makes them good. To the confirmation from Augustine answer has already been made. To the other confirmation, from the notion of a wage, I answer: eternal life is truly and properly a wage, and is acquired by the merits of good works; for this very thing is in predestination — that it be acquired through merits. But, thou wilt say, no one is said to acquire what is already owed him from another source; therefore, if by right of predestination beatitude is owed to the elect, certainly they do not acquire it by merits. I answer: from predestination no right to beatitude is acquired by the elect, nor is it owed them, save after they have won it for themselves by meriting well. There arises indeed from predestination the certainty and infallibility of the glory of the elect, since what God has purposed and decreed will altogether come to pass — but it will come to pass in the way in which he himself willed it to come to pass. It would be like the case of some eminent physician who knew for certain that a fever is cured by such a remedy, and, intending to cure someone, furnished him such a remedy: then the sick man's recovery would be certain from the will and intention of the physician; and yet the remedy applied would truly and properly be the cause of the health.
The second objection: all men have, at least according to place and time, the help by which they can be converted if they will, as we ourselves also taught above; and all the just, by the doctrine of the Church, can persevere until death if they will; therefore either election depends on the foreseeing of works, or it can be uncertain and deceived. For if he who perchance is not elect can be converted if he will, and after conversion persevere if he will, what hinders him from being converted and persevering? And contrariwise, if he who perchance is elect can not be converted, or not persevere, if he will not, what forbids him from refusing to be converted or persevere? And if either the one should will, or the other should not will, will not the divine election waver? I answer: all have, according to place and time, sufficient help by which they can be converted, and then also persevere, if they will; but in fact no one is converted, and no one perseveres, save he who has the special gift of penitence and of perseverance, which is not given to all, but only to those to whom God has judged it should be given. And whence it comes that, though all can be converted or persevere, those alone are converted and persevere who have these gifts, was explained in the book above, where the distinction of sufficient and efficacious grace was delivered. But some press: suppose someone elect at the end of life, who up to that hour has lived in crimes; either he can freely repudiate the grace of conversion, or he cannot: if he can, then an elect man can fail to be saved; if he cannot, then election takes away the liberty of choice. I answer: he can freely repudiate the grace, but it is certain he will not repudiate it, because God will call him in the way he sees to be congruous for him, that he spurn not the caller. For in this way the true grace of God is refused by no hard heart, since it is given for this, that it soften the heart. Nor is there danger that the divine wisdom should lack a way by which it could persuade each man of whatever it pleased.
The third objection: often the glory of the blessed depends on the sins of the impious — as the glory of the martyrs on the malice of the persecutors, the glory of the doctors on the perfidy of the heretics, the glory of virgins on the temptations of the unchaste; but God cannot be the cause of sin; therefore he does not elect the Saints unto glory save after the foreknowledge of their combats and victory. I answer: on account of this argument there are not wanting those who teach that God, from predestination, decreed for the elect only one degree of glory — that, namely, which is given to little ones through Baptism — and appointed the remaining degrees after the foreseeing of the whole life and of all the combats. But there is no need to fly to these things, if only we hold what we said above: that God, before he decreed anything by absolute will, foreknew whatever could ever happen, if these or those things were posited. For from this conditional foreknowledge God could, in predestination, define for each of the elect all that glory at which he decreed he should arrive, and then prepare for him the merits agreeing with it. Nor does it follow from this judgment that God decrees and wills the sins without which the Saints cannot have the merits which God decreed for them in predestination: for it is enough for the certainty of such merits that God foresaw it would come to pass that the martyrs would be slain by the persecutors, if he himself permitted it. And that opinion which distinguishes the degrees of glory given without foreseeing of merits from those given from foreseeing seems to us not only unnecessary, but not even probable. For by the same reasoning by which God elected little ones unto glory before he prepared their Baptism — since glory is the end, and Baptism a means to the end, and the end is prior in intention to the means — by the same reasoning God first elected the martyrs unto the palm of martyrdom before he prepared their victory, since the palm is the end and the victory the means. And then from this opinion it seems to follow that the predestination of some depends simply on the foreseeing of works: for since some are not baptized save in their own blood — which we read befell St. Emerentiana — to them certainly no other degree of glory is given but that which they acquire for themselves through martyrdom; and that degree, that opinion contends, is given from the foreseeing of the martyrdom, not from gratuitous predestination.
The fourth objection: God does not reprobate before the foreseeing of works, because reprobation pertains to justice, by the judgment of Augustine; therefore neither does he predestinate before the foreseeing of works, since he who is not reprobate is by that very fact predestinated. I answer: God reprobates before the foreseeing of works insofar as he wills not to deliver someone out of the mass of sin; and in this way, he who is not reprobate is by that very fact predestinated before the foreseeing of works. Yet he reprobates after the foreseeing of works insofar as he wills to condemn someone; nor is the account of election and of reprobation, considered in this latter way, the same, since election is a work of grace, reprobation a work of justice, as we shall show more copiously in the following chapter. And so those whom he reprobates he justly reprobates, because their sin deserves it; those whom he predestinates unto life he mercifully predestinates, because nature, infected with original sin, deserved punishment, not glory.
The fifth objection: if God predestinated without the foreseeing of our works, without doubt he would predestinate unto life either all, or the greater part of men, since he is by nature good, and his mercy is over all his works; but they are few who are saved, as is gathered from the Gospel, Matthew 7; therefore God does not predestinate save according to the foreseeing of works, or of the good or ill use of free choice. I answer: this argument would perhaps conclude something, if predestination did not presuppose original sin; for in the Angels we see it was so done, that the greater part was predestinated unto life. But since the whole human race had incurred a most just damnation through the sin of the first man, great is the mercy of God, that he willed to give unowed grace to many; and why God, though he could, even after the sin, deliver all, decreed that the lesser part should be delivered — the reason, St. Augustine says in epistle 105, is that we might understand what was owed to all.
The sixth objection: this judgment concerning predestination seems to bring a hindrance to rebuke, exhortation, prayer, industry, and diligence, and — what is gravest of all — to bring despair, so that a man should have no mind to do anything good, but contrariwise give himself over to every kind of crimes and corruptions. For he who has not been predestinated unto life, but is reprobate, whatever he does and howsoever he lives, cannot be saved; but he who has been predestinated unto life, whatever at last he does and howsoever he passes his life, will without doubt be saved. I answer: this argument St. Augustine excellently dissolves at the end of the book On the Gift of Perseverance. We answer briefly: so far is this judgment concerning predestination from hindering rebukes, exhortations, prayers, industry, diligence, and good hope, that rather it posits and confirms them all. For God predestinated men, but so predestinated them that through these means they arrive at the end. Nor is it true that the reprobate, whatever he does, is to be condemned, and the predestinated, whatever he does, is to be saved: for none will be condemned but the evil, and none saved but the good; but this indeed is true — that all the reprobate will at some time be evil, and all the elect good. And since, while we live here, both election and reprobation are uncertain, as no one ought to despair of salvation, so also no one ought certainly to presume on his own felicity, but with fear and trembling to work out his own salvation.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XV. Solvuntur argumenta ex rationibus , et simul ostenditur , non solum ad gratiam efficacem , sed etiam ad gloriam , gratis homines eligi. Sequuntur objectiones deprompta) ex ra¬ tione. Prima ratio, electio prarequirit dis- paritatem in iis, qui eligendi sunt; unusquis¬ que enim, qui in eligendo non errat, id eligit, quod melius est : non igitur electio salvandorum facta est sine aliqua pra)visione operum aut dispositionis ex parte nostri. Et confirmatur argumentum ex Augustino in lib. r. ad Simplicianum, qua)st. 2, qui sic ait : a Nemo eligitur, nisi jam distans ab illo, qui rejicitur : Unde quod dictum est, quia elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem, non video quomodo sit dictum, nisi pra)scien- lia. » Et confirmatur iterum idem argumen¬ tum, quoniam secundum Scripturas vita ffiterna est vera merces operum ; igitur non datur, nec promittitur, nec destinatur, nisi propter opera saltem pra)visa. Propter hoc argumentum non defuerunt, qui distinguerent praedestinationem ab ele¬ ctione, ac dicerent, praedestinationem esse priorem electione, et praedestinatione qui¬ dem praeparari certis hominibus infallibilia media ad salutem ; electione vero praeparari gloriam. Denique praedestinationem esse plane gratuitam, electionem autem a bono¬ rum operum pixcvisione pendere. Horum sententia non est ullo modo errori Pelagia- norum, aut Cassiani et Fausti affinis, et vi¬ detur aliquando ipsius etiam Augustini fuis¬ se ; nam in lib. i. ad' Simplicianum, queest. 2. sic ait : « Non quia invenit Deus opera bona in hominibus, qua) eligat, ideo manet propositum justificationis ipsius ; sed quia illud manet, ut justificet credentes, ideo in¬ venit opera, qua) jam eligat ad regnum cre- lorum, etc. » Verumtamen est ha)C opinio parum con¬ gruens cum Scripturis, et libris Augustini posterioribus, et ipsa ratione. Scriptura enimLuc. xii. aperte facit electionem ad reg¬ num mere gratuitam, cum ait : Nolite timere pusillus grex, quia complacuit Patri vestro, dare vobis regnum (1). Nam et ver¬ bum, complacuit, et nomen, Pater, et voca¬ bula illa, pusillus grex, aperte indicant gra¬ tiam, non justitiam. Sic etiam Apostolus ad Roman. vm. cum ait : Quos prxscivit, et prxdestinavit, conformes feri imaginis flii sui (2), significat dilectionem, ac per hoc voluntatem glorificandi priorem esse pra)- destinatione, non posteriorem, ut illa opinio docet. Illos enim pra;destinavit conformes fieri Christo, quos pra)scivit pra)scientia ap¬ probationis, ut supra diximus. Quare etiam (i) Duc. XH, 32. - (2) Rom. VIII, 29. CAPUT XV. 573 cap. 9. dicit,, vasa in honorem praeparata in gloriam, ex sola misericordia separata esse a vasis factis in contumeliam, atque aptatis in interitum. Denique ad Roman. xi. dicit, reliquias secundum electionem gratia) salvas fieri, ubi videmus non solum praidesti natio¬ nem, sed etiam electionem esse opus gra¬ tiae. Porro S. Augustinus cum scripsit libros ad Simplicianum, adhuc juvenis erat, neque multa invenerat in hac difficillima quaestio¬ ne, quae postea majori diligentia investiga¬ vit et reperit. Itaque cum incidisset in illa- verba ad Itoman. ix : Ut secundum electio¬ nem propositum Dei maneret , et non posset intelligere, quomodo Deus eligeret, si nulla esset disparitas in rebus eligendis, suspica- tps est mutandam esse interpunctionem, et Apostolum non velle dicere, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, ideo non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum es¬ se, major serviet minori, sed velle dicere, Jacob etEsau nihil boni aut mali egisse, ut inde secundum electionem propositum Dej maneret. Ex qua mutatione interpunctionis colligit, non propositum Dei secundum ele¬ ctionem manere, sed contra, electionem ma¬ nere, secundum propositum Dei. Sed postea intellexit, hanc expositionem esse violentam et extortam, et non fuisse necessarium redigi ad has angustias, cum dici potuisset, Deum diligendo, vel eligendo facere disparitatem : sic enim ait in epist. 103. ad Sixtum : <c Qui sunt isti, qui respon¬ dent Deo, quandoquidem ille Hebecca ha¬ bente geminos ex uno concubitu patris no¬ stri Isaac, cum illi nondum nati, nihil egissent boni vel mali, ut secundum electionem pro¬ positum ejus maneret, electionem scilicet gratiae, non debiti, electionem, qua eligen¬ dos facit ipse, non invenit; non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dicit, etc. » Et in epist. 106. ad Paulinum : « Non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum esse intelligatur, ut secun¬ dum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non meritum hominis anteiret; non enim dicit electionem voluntatis humanos, sive naturae, cum par esset in utroque mortis damnationisque conditio, sed electionem pro¬ cul dubio gratiae, quae non invenit eligendos, sed facit. » De qua et in consequentibus ejusdem epistolae loquens ait : « Sic ergo et in hoc tempore, reliquiae per electionem gra¬ tia) salva) factae sunt » Vides quam aliter sa¬ piat Augustinus senex, quam Augustinus juvenis ? nam senex scripsit ad Sixtum et Paulinum, juvenis ad Simplicianum. Idem etiam in lib. de corrept. et gratia, cap. 7. iterum exponit, ut secundum ele¬ ctionem propositum. Dei maneret, ideo non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum esse, major serviet minori. Et idem loquens de ipsa electione, qua) non ex operibus, sed ex vocante est, ait : « Electi sunt autem ad regnandum cum Christo. » Et infra cap. 13. « Ha)c, inquit, de his loquor, qui picedesti- nati sunt in regnum Dei. » Et in lib. xxn. de civit. Dei cap. 24 : « Quid dabit eis, quos praedestinavit ad vitam, qui ha)C dedit eis, quos pra?destinavit ad mortem ? Et infra : « Unde Apostolus de ipsis in regnum illud praedestinatis loquens, etc. » ubi praedesti¬ nationem, quam ubique praedicat, mere gra¬ tuitam, non solum dicit ess^ ad gratiam, ut vult illa opinio, quam refutamus, sed etiam ad vitam et ad regnum. Postremo, repugnat illa opinio rationi, nam media, ut media, non possunt appeti, nisi propter finem, non igitur potuit Deus velle dare certis hominibus media infallibilia ad salutem, nisi prius dare vellet iisdem ho • minibus ipsam salutem. Hac igitur opinione repudiata, Responde¬ mus ad argumentum initio propositum, dis¬ paritatem inter eligendos facere ipsam Dei electionem. Quos enim Deus eligere digna¬ tus est, illi fuerunt digni, qui eligerentur; nam eodem modo amari non possunt, nisi boni, et tamen Deus amando facit bonos. Ad confirmationem cx Augustino jam est respon¬ sum. Ad alteram confirmationem ex ratione mercedis, respondeo, vitam aeternam vere proprieque esse mercedem, et meritis ope¬ rum bonorum acquiri; nam hoc ipsum est in pra)destinatione, ut per merita acquiratur. At, inquies, nemo dicitur acquirere, quod jam aliunde ei debetur, ergo si jure praede¬ stinationis debetur electis beatitudo, certe illam meritis non acquirunt. Respondeo, ex praedestinatione non acquiri jus ullum electis ad beatitudinem, neque eis deberi, nisi post¬ quam illam sibi bene merendo pepererint. Oritur quidem ex praedestinatione certitudo et infallibilitas gloriae electorum, quoniam quod Deus proposuit ac decrevit, omnino (l)Uom. IX, 11, 574 LIBER II. fiet, sed fiet eo modo, quo ipse voluit fieri. Simile esset, si insignis aliquis medicus cer¬ to sciret tali pharmaco febrem curari, et in¬ tendens aliquem curare, ejusmodi pharma¬ cum illi praeberet. Tunc enim certa esset sa¬ lus aegroto ex voluntate, atque intentione Medici ; et tamen vere ac proprie pharma¬ cum illud adhibitum esset causa sanitatis. Secunda objectio, omnes homines habent saltem pro loco et tempore auxilium, quo converti possint, si velint, ut supra nos etiam ipsi docuimus, et omnes justi ex doctrina Ecclesiae perseverare possunt usque ad mor¬ tem, si velint ; igitur aut pendet ex praevi- sione operum, aut incerta esse potest et fal¬ lax electio ; nam si potest, qui forte non est electus, converti, si velit, et post conversio¬ nem perseverare si velit ; quid impedit, quo minus convertatur et perseveret ? et contra, si potest qui forte est electus, non converti, aut non perseverafet si nolit ; quid prohibet, quo minus converti aut perseverare nolit ? et, sivel ille velit, vel iste nolit, nonne divina vacillabit electio ? Respondeo: habent omnes pro loco et tem¬ pore sufficiens auxilium, quo possint con¬ verti, ac deinde etiam perseverare, si velint : sed reipsa nemo convertitur, nemoque per¬ severat, nisi qui habet speciale donum poe¬ nitentiae et perseverantiae, quod non omnibus datur, sed iis tantum, quibus Deus dandum esse judicaverit. Unde autem fiat, ut cum omnes possint converti, aut perseverare, illi soli convertantur et perseverent, qui habent ista dona, explicatum est libro superiore, ubi tradita est distinctio gratiae sufficientis et effi¬ cacis. Sed instant nonnulli : ponatur aliquis ele¬ ctus in extremo vitae, qui usque ad illam ho¬ ram in sceleribus vixerit ; vel potest iste li¬ bere gratiam conversionis repudiare , vel non potest; si potest, igitur potest electus non salvari ; si non potest, igitur electio tol* lit arbitrii libertatem. Respondeo, potest ille libere gratiam repu¬ diare, sed certum est non repudiaturum, quia Deus vocabit illum, sicut videt congruum illi esse, ut vocantem non respuat, lloc enim modo gratia Dei vera a nullo duro corde re¬ spuitur, quoniam ad hoc datu'r, ut cor emol¬ liat. Neque periculum est ne forte sapientiae divinae ratio desit, qua possit unicuique ho¬ mini persuadere quidquid ei libuerit. Tertia objectio, saepe gloria beatorum pen- detex peccatis impiorum, ut gloria martyrum ex malitia persecutorum, gloria doctorum, ex perfidia haereticorum, gloria virginum, ex tentationibus impudicorum : Deus autem non potest esse causa peccati : igitur non eli¬ git Sanctos ad gloriam, nisi post certaminum victoriaeque praenotionem. Respondeo : propter hoc argumentum non desunt, qui doceant, Deum ex praedestina¬ tione non decrevisse electis, nisi gradum unum gloriae, eum videlicet, qui datur par¬ vulis per baptismum; reliquos autem gradus post praevisionem totius vitae, atque omnium certaminum statuisse. Sed non est opus ad ista confugere, si modo teneamus, quod supra diximus, Deum, antequam aliquid absoluta voluntate decreverit, praescivisse quidquid unquam accidere posset, si haec aut illa po¬ nerentur. Ex hac enim conditionali praeno¬ tione potuit Deus in praedestinatione definire unicuique electorum omnem illam gloriam, ad quam eum pervenire decerneret, ac dein¬ de merita illi convenientia praeparare. Neque sequitur ex hac sententia, ut Deus decernat ac velit peccata , sine quibus non possunt Sancti habere merita, quae illis Deus in prae¬ destinatione decrevit : Nam satis est ad cer¬ titudinem ejusmodi meritorum, ut Deus prae¬ viderit fore, ut a persecutoribus martyres oc¬ cidantur, si ipse permiserit. Neque solum opinio illa, quae distinguit gradus gloriae, qui dantur sine praevisione meritorum, ab iis qui dantur ex praevisione non est necessaria, sed neque probabilis no¬ bis esse videtui\ Nam, qua ratione Deus prius elegit parvulos ad gloriam, quam Ba¬ ptismum eorum praeparet; quoniam gloria est finis, et Baptismus est medium ad finem, et prius in intentione est finis, quam medium ; eadem ratione prius Deus elegit martyres ad palmam martyrii, quam victoriam eorum prai- paret, quoniam palma est finis, et victoria est medium. Deinde ex hac opinione sequi videtur, ut aliquorum praedestinatio simpliciter ab ope¬ rum praevisione dependeat. Nam cum aliqui non baptizantur, nisi in sanguine suo, quod S. Emerentianae contigisse legimus ; illis cer¬ te non datur alius gradus gloriae, uisi quem per martyrium sibi ipsi acquirunt ; illum au¬ tem gradum ex praevisione martyrii dari, non ex gratuita praedestinatione opinio illa conten¬ dit. Quarta objectio. Deus non reprobat ante praevisionem operum, quia reprobatio ad ju¬ stitiam pertinet, ex sententia Augustini ; igitur CAPUT XVI. 575 neque praedestinat ante pracvisionem ope¬ rum, quoniam qui non est reprobus, hoc ipso est praedestinatus. Respondeo : reprobat Deus ante praevisio- nem operum quatenus non vult aliquem ex massa peccati liberare. Et hoc modo, qui non est reprobus hoc ipso est praedestinatus ante pracvisionem operum; reprobat tamen post operum pracvisionem, quatenus vult aliquem condemnare; neque est eadem ratio electio¬ nis et reprobationis hoc modo posteriore consideratae, quoniam electio est opus gra¬ tiae, reprobatio opus justitiae, ut copiosius ostendemus in cap. sequenti. Itaque quos reprobat, juste reprobat, quia peccatum ip¬ sorum id meretur; quos praedestinat, ad vitam misericorditer praedestinat, quia natu¬ ra peccato originali infecta, poenam non gloriam merebatur. Quinta objectio, si Deus absque operum nostrorum praevisione praedestinaret, sine dubio aut omnes, aut majorem partem ho¬ minum praedestinaret ad vitam, cum sit na¬ tura bonus; et misericordia ejus sit super omnia opera ejus. At pauci sunt qui salvan¬ tur, ut ex Evangelio colligitur, Matth. vn. Igitur non praedestinat Deus, nisi secundum pracvisionem operum, sive boni aut mali usus liberi arbitrii. Respondeo : hoc argumentum aliquid for¬ tasse concluderet, si praedestinatio nonprae- supponeret originale peccatum. Nam in An¬ gelis ita factum videmus, ut major pars ad vitam praedestinata fuerit. Caeterum, cum universum genus humanum damnationem justissimam per peccatum primi hominis incurrisset, magna est misericordia Dei, quod multis indebitam gratiam donare vo¬ luerit; cur autem Deus, cum posset etiam post peccatum, omnes liberare, minorem partem liberandam esse decreverit, rationem esse dicit S. Augustinus in epist. 157. ut in- telligcremus, quid omnibus deberetur. Sexta objectio, hac de praedestinatione sententia videtur impedimentum adferre correptioni , exhortationi , orationi, indu¬ stria?, diligentiaeque, et, quod est omnium gravissimum, desperationem adferre, ut non libeat aliquid boni agere, sed contra omni generi flagitiorum et corruptelarum se de¬ dere. Qui enim praedestinaitus ad vitam non fuerit, sed reprobus, quidquid egerit, et quomodocumque vixerit, salvari non pote¬ rit ; qui vero fuerit praedestinatus ad vitam, quidquid tandem egerit, et quomodocumque vitam traduxerit, sine dubitatione salvabi¬ tur. Respondeo : hoc argumentum praeclare dissolvit S. August. in lib. de bono perse- ver, extremo. Nos breviter respondemus, tantum abesse ut haec sententia de praedesti¬ natione, correptiones, exhortationes, ora¬ tiones, industriam, diligentiam, et spem bo¬ nam impediat, ut potius haec omnia ponat, atque confirmet. Deus enim praedestinavit homines, sed ita praedestinavit ut per haec media pertingant ad finem. Neque verum est, reprobum, quidquid egerit, damnandum et praedestinatum, quidquid egerit, salvan¬ dum. Non enim damnabuntur nisi mali, ne¬ que salvabuntur nisi boni ; sed hoc tamen est verum, omnes reprobos, mulos, et om¬ nes electos, bonos aliquando futuros ; et quoniam dum hic vivimus, incerta est tum electio, tum reprobatio , sicut nemo salutem desperai'e, ita etiam nemo certo debet de sua felicitate praesumere, sed cum metu et tremore salutem suam operari.