Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book II: On Predestination and Sufficient Grace
Chapter 16: That the cause of the reprobation of the impious is to be referred partly to the sole will of God, partly to foreseen sins
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The ninth proposition: “Reprobation, which St. Augustine calls predestination unto destruction, comprehends two acts: one negative, of which there is no cause on the side of men; the other positive, whose cause is the foreseeing of original or actual sin.” Of this new proposition we shall discourse briefly in this place, since the greatest part of book 2 On the State of Sin was spent in explaining this very matter; for as we defended predestination, or the election of grace, against the Pelagians, so we are compelled to defend the most just reprobation against the Calvinists, who, contending that men were predestinated to sin and eternal death before the foreseeing of sin, fight with the very justice of God, and pour back all the crimes of men upon God as their author. But of this matter enough in the place noted; now let us briefly explain our proposition.
We say first, then, that reprobation is named by St. Augustine predestination unto destruction. For so he himself speaks in the Enchiridion, chapter 100: “He himself fulfills what he wills, using well even the evil, as supremely good, unto the damnation of those whom he has justly predestinated unto punishment, and unto the salvation of those whom he has benignly predestinated unto grace.” Yet the usage of the Schools has now prevailed, that none are called predestinated but those elected unto glory; and truly in the Scriptures this name is not found save in the good sense. And the theologians are wont to call the reprobate the foreknown — not that this name is not common to them with the elect, since the Apostle says, whom he foreknew, he also predestinated, etc., Romans 8 — but they left them the common name, that they might distinguish them from those who have deserved properly to be called predestinated. We say next that reprobation comprehends two acts, one negative, the other positive; since the reprobate are opposed to the elect both contradictorily and contrarily. For first, God has not the will of saving them; then, he has the will of condemning them. And indeed, as touching the former act, no cause of it is given on the side of men — as neither of predestination; but of the latter the cause given is the foreseeing of sin. Both must briefly be proved.
That no cause on the side of men is given of negative reprobation is proved, first, from the Apostle, Romans 9: before they had done any good or evil… not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger. And: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. For that “before they had done any good or evil” must be referred not only to goods and evils before men, but also to goods and evils in the foreknowledge of God; since otherwise a cause of predestination would be given on the side of men — which was disproved above. Thou wilt say: God hated Esau not on account of foreseen evil works, but on account of original sin. Against this: original sin was common to both; therefore, if on account of original sin God hated Esau, he ought also on account of the same sin to have hated Jacob. Thou wilt say: God could justly have hated Jacob too, but out of mercy willed to love him. But this is the very thing in question — why God loved the one, to deliver him, and hated the other, so as not to deliver him, when each was worthy of hatred and unworthy of love. For it cannot be answered that the one is not loved because he is worthy of hatred, when each is worthy of hatred. It remains, then, that the cause of this distinction is the will of God, by which he delivers the one because so it pleases him, and does not deliver the other because it pleases not. And this very thing the Apostle confirms in the same place, when he says: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, etc. And: hath not the potter power over the clay, etc. And: he hath mercy on whom he will; and whom he will, he hardeneth. Where yet it is to be observed that those words which sound something positive, as to hate and to harden, are to be taken for a negation: for to hate, in this place, is not to will to love; and to harden is not to will to have mercy, as Augustine teaches in epistle 105, and tractate 53 on John, and in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, where he says that to harden is nothing else than not to have mercy. But, thou wilt say, hardening is the punishment of sin, as is evident from the Apostle, Romans 1, and from Augustine, book 5 against Julian, chapter 3; therefore it does not arise from the sole will of God. I answer: hardening has both. For it is the punishment of preceding sin, insofar as God denies someone help and grace because, on account of preceding sins, he is worthy of such desertion; and yet it is at the same time an effect of this negative reprobation: for God, because he wills not to save him, punishes his preceding sin with such desertion — which he would not do if he decreed to save him; and therefore the Apostle has recourse to the will of God when he says, he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he hardeneth. Nor yet is there any iniquity in this matter, since God is not bound to deliver the sinner, or to soften and convert him. But thou wilt say: although to hate and to harden can be expounded by negation, yet to make vessels unto dishonor seems capable of being taken only positively; how then does the Apostle recall this also to the will of God, when he says, hath not the potter power over the clay, to make one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor? I answer: to make vessels unto dishonor can be taken in two ways. In one way, for making vessels such as the condition of the lump requires, and so leaving them — that is, forming men such as corrupted nature requires, and adding nothing; and this sounds something negative, and pertains to the former act of reprobation; and in this way the Apostle speaks. In the other way, to make vessels unto dishonor can be taken for deputing them unto dishonor — that is, unto eternal confusion; and this pertains to the latter act of reprobation; and in this way St. Augustine understood the making of vessels unto dishonor in epistle 106, whose words we shall cite a little below. It is proved second from the testimony of St. Augustine: for he, in epistle 105 to Sixtus, speaks thus: “Why he delivers this man rather than that, or delivers him not — let him who can search so great a depth of his judgments; but nevertheless let him beware the precipice.” Where thou seest that not only can the cause not be known why he delivers this man or that, but also why he does not deliver this man or that. The same also, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapters 8 and 13, writes that it is to be referred among the hidden judgments of God why God wills not to give to certain justified men the gift of perseverance; for that denial of the gift of perseverance cannot be called the punishment of sin, since the justified do not deserve such punishment; and thereby it is not punishment, but an effect of negative reprobation. It is proved last by reason: for this very thing, that someone is not predestinated, is understood as his being reprobated with negative reprobation. But predestination was made before the foreseeing of works, nor has it in any way a cause on the side of men; therefore negative reprobation also was made before the foreseeing of works, and has no cause on the side of men.
Now that the cause of positive reprobation — that is, of that other act by which God wills to sentence the reprobate to eternal punishments — is the sins of men, and not the sole will of God, is proved first from the Scriptures, which everywhere teach that eternal punishment is rendered, by the just judgment of God, to the sins of men. Matthew 25: Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire… For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, etc. And Romans 2: wrath and indignation… upon every soul of man that worketh evil, etc. And although the same Scripture teaches that eternal life is rendered, by the just judgment of God, to the good merits of men, yet God could predestinate unto eternal life without the foreseeing of works, because he could be the author to the predestinated of their doing good works; but he could not, without the foreseeing of works, condemn to gehenna, which according to the Scriptures is the punishment of sin, because he could not be the author to the reprobate of their doing evil works. Second, the same is proved from Augustine, book 3 against Julian, chapter 18, where he speaks thus: “God is good, God is just: he can deliver without good merits, because he is good; he cannot condemn without evil merits, because he is just.” Likewise in epistle 106 to Paulinus: “If this lump were so neutral that, as it deserved nothing of good, so neither anything of evil, it would not without reason seem iniquity that from it should be made vessels unto dishonor; but since through the free choice of the first man the whole flowed down into condemnation, without doubt that from it vessels are made unto honor is to be reckoned not to its own justice — for no justice preceded grace — but to the mercy of God; but that vessels are made unto dishonor is to be reckoned not to the iniquity of God — far be it that there be iniquity with God — but to his judgment.” It is proved last by reason: for to condemn someone without cause is to punish without fault; and that this is unjust, and cannot befit God, who is most just, is beyond controversy. For, as Augustine elegantly writes in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 23: “God renders evil for evil, because he is just; good for evil, because he is good; good for good, because he is good and just; only he renders not evil for good, because he is not unjust.”
We added in our proposition that the cause of reprobation is the foreseeing of original or actual sin, because God does not reprobate all positively on account of original sin — since that is truly remitted to some of the reprobate through the grace of Baptism — but some on account of the original only, as little ones not baptized; others on account of the actual only, as baptized adults; others on account of both, as unbelieving adults. On which matter see Augustine in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 13, and Prosper in the response to the second chapter of the Gauls. And if blessed Augustine for the most part seems to refer the cause of reprobation to original sin — by reason of which the whole human race was made as it were a certain condemned mass — he does so because thence begins the damnation of all the reprobate. For although some are plucked out of the mass through Baptism, and transferred to the building, as Augustine himself also writes in epistle 57 to Dardanus, question 2, yet they return again through actual sin to the mass, and therefore are so held by God as though they had never been separated from that mass. Wherefore the same Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7, says that they who at last are to perish, though they live rightly and piously, are not set apart from the mass of damnation by the foreknowledge and predestination of God — not that God then hates them and wills to condemn them, while they live rightly and piously, but because he did not elect them unto the kingdom before the foundation of the world, and foreknew that before the end of life they would slip back to the mass, and on account of the sins which he sees they will without doubt commit he decreed to condemn them unto punishments. Further, they who contend that all the reprobate were sentenced to perpetual damnation on account of foreseen original sin alone make for themselves a plainly insoluble question; for it cannot be understood how God, on account of original sin, should will to condemn those to whom in Baptism he truly and properly forgave that very sin. For even though, the original fault being forgiven, concupiscence, ignorance, mortality, and other miseries of that kind are not straightway taken away, yet on account of these God cannot will to condemn a man, since the Apostle says of the justified: There is now therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, Romans 8.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAUT XVI. Causam reprobationis impiorum 'partim ad solam Dei voluntatem , partim ad peccata pr visa referendam esse. Nona propositio : « Reprobatio, quam S. August. praedestinationem ad interitum vo¬ cat, duos actus comprehendit, alterum ne¬ gativum, cujus nulla est causa ex parte ho¬ minum, alterum positivum, cujus causa est peccati originalis, actualisve preevisio. » De hac nova propositione hoc loco breviter disseremus, quoniam maxima pars lib. ii. de statu peccati, in hac ipsa re explicanda consumpta est ; nam quemadmodum prae¬ destinationem, sive electionem gratiae con¬ tra Pelagianas defendimus, ita reprobatio¬ nem justissimam contra Calvinianos defen¬ dere cogimur, qui cum homines ante praevi- sionem peccati ad peccatum et mortem aeternam praedestinatos esse contendant, cum ipsa Dei justitia pugnant, et omnia hominum scelera in Deum auctorem refun¬ dunt. Sed de hac re satis multa loco notato; nunc propositionem nostram breviter expli¬ cemus. Dicimus igitur primum, reprobationem a S. Augustino praedestinationem ad interi- 576 LIBER II. tum nominari. Sic enim ipse loquitur in Enchirid. cap 100 : «Implet ipse quod vult bene utens et malis, tamquam summe bonus, ad eorum damnationem, quos juste praede¬ stinavit ad poenam, et ad eorum salutem, quos benigne praedestinavit ad gratiam. » Usus tamen jam Scholarum obtinuit, ut non dicantur praedestinati, nisi qui ad gloriam sunt electi ; et vere in Scripturis non inve¬ nitur hoc nomen, nisi in bonam partem. Reprobos autem Theologi praescitos vocare solent, non quod hoc nomen non sit com¬ mune cum electis, cum Apostolus dicat : Quos praescivit et praedestinavit , etc. ad Ro- man. vili (I), sed reliquerunt eis nomen commune, ut illos ab iis distinguerent, qui proprie praedestinati dici meruerunt. Dicimus deinde, reprobationem duos ac¬ tus comprehendere, alterum negativum, al¬ terum positivum ; siquidem reprobi oppo¬ nuntur electis contradictorie et contrarie. Primum enim non habet Deus voluntatem illos salvandi; deinde habet voluntatem eos damnandi ; et quidem, quod attinet ad pri¬ orem actum, nulla datur ejus causa ex parte hominum, sicut neque praedestinationis. Posterioris autem datur causa prae visio pec¬ cati. Utrumque breviter probandum est. Igitur nen dari causam exparte hominum reprobationis negativae, probatur primo ex Apostolo ad Itoni, ix : Antequam aliquid boni vel mali egissent, non ex operibus, sed ex vo¬ cante dictum est ei, quia major serviet mino¬ ri. Et : Jacoi dilexi, Esau autem odio habui. Illud enim : Antequam aliquid boni, vel mali egissent (2), non solum referri debet ad bona et mala coram hominibus, sed etiam ad bona et mala in praescientia Dei, quoniam alioqui daretur causa praedestinationis ex parte ho¬ minum, quod supra improbatum est. Dices : Deum non odisseEsau propter ope¬ ra mala praevisa, sed propter originale pec¬ catum. Contra, nam originale peccatum erat commune utrique, igitur si propter originale peccatum odio habuit Deus Esau, debuit e- tiam propter idem peccatum odisse Ja- cob. Dices : poterat Deus juste odisse etiam Ja- cob. sed ex misericordia voluit eum diligere. At, hoc est, quod quanitur, cur Deus unum diluxerit, ut liberaret, alterum odio habue¬ rit, ut non liberaret, cum uterque odio dig¬ nus, et amore indignus esset.. Non enim re¬ sponderi potest, unum non diligi, quia dignus est odio, cum uterque dignus sit odio. Restat igitur, ut hujus discretionis causa sit voluntas Dei, qua unum liberat, quia sic ei placet ; alterum non liberat, quia non pla¬ cet. Et hoc ipsum confirmat ibidem Aposto¬ lus, cum dicit : Miserebor cujus misereor etc. Et : An non habet potestatem figulus luti etc. Et : Cujus vult miseretur , et quem vult indu¬ rat. Ubi tamen observandum est, vocabula illa, quse sonant aliquid positivum, ut odio habere et indurare, accipienda esse pro ne¬ gatione : nam odio habere, hoc loco, est, non velle diligere ; et, indurare, est, non velle misereri, ut August. docet in epist. 103. et tract. 33. in Joan. et in lib. i. ad Simplician. quaest. 2. ubi dicit, nihil esse aliud indurare, nisi non misereri. At, inquies, induratio est poena peccati, ut patet ex Apostolo ad Rom. i. et ex Au- gustin. lib. v. in Julia a. cap. 3. non igitur oritur ex sola Dei voluntate. Respondeo : in¬ duratio utrumque habet, nam et est poena peccati praecedentis, quatenus Deus alicui negat auxilium et gratiam, quia propter peccata praecedentia dignus est tali deser¬ tione; et tamen est simul effectus hujus ne¬ gativae reprobationis. Deus enim quia non vult eum salvare, punit tali desertione pec¬ catum ejus praecedens, quod non faceret, si eum salvare decerneret; atque ideo Apo¬ stolus ad voluntatem Dei recurrit, cum ait, cujus vult, miseretur, et quem vult, indu¬ rat ; nec tamen ulla est in hac re iniquitas, quoniam non tenetur Deus peccatorem libe¬ rare, aut eum emollire, atque converte¬ re. Sed dices, quamvis odio habere et indu¬ rare possint exponi per negationem, tamen facere vasa in contumeliam non videtur posse accipi nisi positive. Quomodo igitur Apostolus hoc etiam revocat ad voluntatem Dei, cum dicit, an non habet potestatem fi¬ gulus luti, facere aliud vas inhonorem, aliud in contumeliam? Respondeo: facere vasa in contumeliam, potest accipi duobus modis. Uno modo pro eo, quod est facere vasa, qualia requirit conditio masstc, et ea sic re¬ linquere, hoc est, formare homines, quales requirit natura corrupta, neque aliquid ad¬ dere ; et hoc sonat aliquid negativum, et pertinet ad priorem actum reprobationis, et hoc modo loquitur Apostolus. Altero modo (1) Rorp. Vi II, 11. - • (2; Rom. IX, 1 !. CAPUT XVI. .777 accipi potest, facere vasa in. contumeliam, pro eo, quod est deputare illa ad contume¬ liam, id est, ad confusionem aeternam, et hoc pertinet ad posteriorem actum improba¬ tionis, et hoc modo intellexit facere vasa in contumeliam S. Augustinus in epist. 106. cujus verba paulo infra citabimus. Probatur secundo ex testimonio S. Au- gust. is enim in epist. 105. ad Sixtum, sic ait : « Cur illum potius quam illum liberet, aut non liberet, scrutetur qui potest judicio¬ rum ejus tam magnum profundum, vcrum- tamen caveat praicipitium. » Ubi vides, non solum non posse sciri causam, cur illum aut illum liberet, sed etiam cur illum aut illum non liberet. Idem etiam in libro de corrept. et grat. cap. 8. et 13. scribit, referendum esse inter occulta judicia Dei, cur Deus qui¬ busdam justificatis donum perseverantia; dare nolit, non enim ista negatio doni per¬ severantia; poenapeccali dici potest, cum ju- stificati talem poenam non mereantur, ac per hoc non est poena, sed effectus reprobatio¬ nis negativa?. Probatur ultimo ratione, nam hoc ipos quod aliquis non praedestinatur, intelligitur reprobatus negativa reprobatione. At prae¬ destinatio facta est ante praevisionem ope¬ rum, neque habet ullomodo causam ex parte hominum, igitur etiam reprobatio negativa facta est ante pra; visio nem operum, neque ex parte hominum ullam causam habet. Jam vero reprobationis positivae, id est, alterius illius actus, quo Deus vult reprobos seternis suppliciis addicere, causam esse pec¬ cata hominum, non autem solam Dei volun¬ tatem, probatur primo ex Scripturis, qua; passiin docent, poenam a;ternam justo Dei judicio peccatis hominum reddi. Matth.xxv. Ite maledicti in ignem selenium, esurivi enim et non dedistis mihi manducare, etc. Et ad Ito- man. n. Ira et indignatio in omnem animam operantis malum etc. (i). Quamvis eadem Scri¬ ptura doceat, vitam alternam justo Dei judi¬ cio reddi bonis hominum meritis, tamen po¬ tuit Deus pra?destinare ad vitam internam sine pra;visione operum, quia potuit auctor esse priedestinatis, ut bona opera facerent, non autem potuit sine pra;visione operum damnare ad gehennam, qua; est p«;na pec¬ cati secundum Scripturas, quia non potuit auctor esse reprobis, ut mala opera facerent. Secundo, idem probatur ex Augustino in lib. m. adversus Julian. cap. 18. ubi sic lo¬ quitur : « Bonus est Deus, justus est Deus, potest sine bonis meritis liberare, quia bonus est; non potest sine malis meritis damnare, quia justus est. » Item in epist. 106. ad Puu- lin. « Ha;c massa si esset ita media, ut quem¬ admodum nihil boni, ita nec mali aliquid mereretur, non frustra videretur iniquitas, ut ex ea fierent vasa in contumeliam, cum vero per liberum arbitrium primi hominis in condemnationem universa defluxerit, pro¬ cul dubio quod ex ea fiunt vasa in honorem, non ipsius justitia; ; qua; gratiam nulla pra:- cessit, sed Dei misericordia; ; quod vero in contumeliam, non iniquitati \ ei, qua; absit ut sit apud Dcuin, sed judicio deputandum est. )> Probatur ultimo ratione, nam condemnare aliquem sine causa, est punire sine culpa, quod injustum esse, et Deo, qui justissimus est, convenire non posse, extra controver¬ siam est. Nam ut eleganter Augustinus scri¬ bit in libro de gratia et libero arbitrio c. 23 : « Deus reddit mala pro malis, quia justus est ; bona pro malis, quia bonus est ; bona pro bonis, quia bonus et justus est; solum non reddit mala pro bonis, quia injustus non est. » Adjecimus in nostra propositione, causam reprobationis esse prmvisionem peccati ori¬ ginalis, vel actualis, quia non omnes Deus reprobat positive propter originale pecca¬ tum, cum illud vere nonnullis reprobis per Baptismi gratiam remittatur, sed alios' pro¬ pter originale tantum, ut parvulos non ba- ptizatos, alios propter actuale tantum, ut baptizatos adultos, alios propter utrumque ut infideles adultos. De qua re vide August. in libro de corrept. et grat. cap. 13. et Pro¬ sperum in respons. ad 2. cap. Gallorum. Quod si B. August. ut plurimum reprobatio¬ nis causam referre videtur ad peccatum ori¬ ginale, ratione cujus totum genus humanum factum est quasi qumdam massa damnata, propterea id facit, quoniam inde incipit om¬ nium reproborum damnatio. Tametsi enim aliqui eruuntur ex massa per Baptismum, et ad ledifieium transferuntur, ut ipse etiam Augustinus scribit in epist. 54. ad Dardan. qua?st. 2 ; tamen iterum per actuale pecca¬ tum revertuntur ad massam, et ideo sic ha¬ bentur a Deo, quasi nunquam ab ea massa separati fuissent. (1) Mattii. XXI. 41; Roin II, 8. LIBER II. 578 Quare idem August. in libro de corrept. et grat. cap. 7. dicit eos, qui tandem peri¬ turi sunt, quamvis recte pieque vivant, non esse a massa damnationis praescientia Dei, et praedestinatione discretos, non quod eos Deus tunc oderit., et damnare velit ; cum recte pieque vivunt, sed quia illos non ele¬ git ad regnum, ante mundi constitutionem, et praescivit ante vitae finem relapsuros ad massam, et propter peccata, quae videt eos procul dubio commissuros, damnare decrevit ad poenas. Porro qui ob solum originale peccatum a Deo praevisum, omnes reprobos damnationi perpetua} addictos fuisse contendunt, quae¬ stionem plane insolubilem sibi ipsi faciunt ; neque enim intelligi potest, quomodo Deus propter originale peccatum damnare velit cos, quibus in Baptismo peccatum ipsum vere, proprieque dimisit : nam etiamsi di¬ missa culpa originali, non continuo tollantur concupiscentia, ignorantia, mortalitas, aliae- que id genus miseriae, tamen propter ista non potest Deus hominem velle damnare, cum Apostolus de justificatis dicat : Nihil ergo damnationis est iis , qui sunt in Christo Jesu , ad Rom. viii (1).