Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book II: On Predestination and Sufficient Grace
Chapter 17: What difference there is between the election, or reprobation, of men and of angels
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The tenth proposition: “Although the holy Angels also were gratuitously predestinated unto life, and the evil Angels reprobated partly from the sole will of God, partly on account of foreseen sins, yet the riches of the grace and justice of God are more shown in the election and reprobation of men than of Angels.” This tenth proposition will be the last conclusion of this disputation, and of the whole book.
Now that the Angels are elect and predestinated the Apostle teaches when he says, writing to Timothy in the first epistle, chapter 5: I charge thee before God, and Christ Jesus, and the elect angels, that thou observe these things, etc. St. Augustine also teaches it in the Enchiridion, chapter 100, where he speaks thus: “These are the great works of the Lord, sought out in all his wills — and so wisely sought out that, when the angelic and human nature had sinned, that is, had done not what he willed but what itself willed, even through that same will of the creature by which was done what the Creator willed not, he himself fulfilled what he willed — using well even the evil, as supremely good, unto the damnation of those whom he justly predestinated unto punishment, and unto the salvation of those whom he benignly predestinated unto grace.” The same Augustine also, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 13, indicates that men would still have had to be predestinated, if Adam had not sinned — and without doubt the same account holds of the Angels, and of men before the sin: “Up to the fixed number of the Saints,” says he, “which God predestinated, men would be born — not to succeed their dying parents, but to reign with them living.”
Further, that the holy Angels are not only predestinated and elect, but were predestinated and elected gratuitously — that is, before the foreseeing of good works — can be proved by this reason. Before God willed absolutely to create or predestinate the Angels, without doubt he knew that they would use free choice and grace well, and would at last be saved, if he furnished them that grace which in fact he furnished; for this knowledge is necessary in God, and thereby is prior to the absolute will of creating or predestinating the Angels, which is not necessary, but free — for the necessary is prior to the free, according to our manner of understanding. Therefore, when God willed to create the Angels, and to furnish them that grace which he furnished, without doubt he willed also to save them infallibly; for if he had not willed that, he would not have given that grace through which he had foreseen they would infallibly be saved. But to will to furnish grace to the Angels is prior to seeing the works proceeding from that grace, as is known, since the cause is prior to the effect; therefore God willed absolutely to save the Angels before he foresaw their future works. By the same reason it can be proved that the negative reprobation of the Angels does not depend on the foreseeing of sin: for God foresaw that the Angels who perished would infallibly perish if he gave them only that grace which in fact he gave them; therefore, when he willed to give them only that grace, he at the same time willed not to predestinate them unto glory, but to permit that they fall away from salvation; for if God had willed absolutely to save them, a way would not have been wanting to his wisdom by which to do it. No cause, then, can be given why God willed to give to some Angels a grace through which he saw they would infallibly be saved, and to others one through which he saw they would infallibly not be saved, except that he willed to save the former, and willed not to save the latter. But why he willed positively to condemn the evil Angels — without doubt the cause was their foreseen sin; for the punishment of damnation is not justly inflicted save where fault has preceded.
And this reasoning has place also in the predestination and reprobation of men, and can be illustrated by this similitude. Suppose some king set forth a prize to be obtained by a race, and by divine revelation foreknow that, if the contest be by a race of horses, such a man will win the prize; if by chariots, such another; if on foot, such another; if by ships, such another. Then let him appoint that the contest be by chariots, and himself furnish most fit chariots to all who come to contend: will not the contest be just? and will not they justly be deprived of the prize who are beaten in the running, and he justly crowned who has outrun the others? And yet who can doubt that the king altogether gratuitously predestinated unto the prize that man who came off victor? For no cause can be given why he willed the contest to be by a race of chariots, and not by another kind of trial — since he knew for certain that, if the contest were by chariots, that man alone would be victor who in fact was — except that he willed to gratify him. And if that king, who gave chariots altogether alike and equal to the contenders, is said to have gratuitously predestinated unto the prize whom he would, how much more will God be said to have gratuitously predestinated the elect, since he gave them a greater grace than the others? For of men indeed it cannot be doubted, as was proved above; and of the Angels St. Augustine witnesses it in book 12 On the City of God, chapter 9: “Either they received a lesser grace of the divine love than they who persisted in the same; or, if both were created equally good, while the former fell by an evil will, the latter, further helped, arrived at that fullness of beatitude.” The same also in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 10 [al. 11], when he says that God willed in the Angels to show first what their free choice could do, then what the benefit of his grace and the judgment of his justice could do, openly signifies that the beatitude of the good Angels pertains to the benefit of grace, since they were gratuitously elected to it, and thence received the gift of perseverance — which the evil Angels did not receive, who persevered not, and by the just judgment of God fell headlong into eternal destruction.
Now that God has shown greater riches both of grace and of justice in the election and reprobation of men than of Angels can easily be demonstrated. For as touching grace: God predestinated certain men unto glory who were not only unworthy of glory, but even most worthy of punishment, since they were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest; but the Angels, before they were predestinated, were neither worthy of punishment nor unworthy of glory, but only not worthy. Next, men, who by nature are inferior to the Angels, God predestinated unto glory equal with the Angels — for that we shall be equal to the Angels Truth itself promised, Matthew 22; nay rather, we know that our nature, by reason of the incarnation of Christ, was predestinated unto a glory far more excellent than that of the Angels, since in that Jerusalem above the head of all men and Angels will be no Angel, but Christ Jesus, God and man. And so God, to show the immense riches of his grace, led human nature out of a deeper abyss of misery, and brought it through to a higher summit of glory, than that of the Angels. Finally, to the elect Angels God gave no other grace than the habitual, by which it came about that they could persevere if they would; but he did not give that stirring grace by which it should come about that they would will — rather he left the willing to their free choice, as St. Augustine teaches in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapters 11 and 12; but to elect men God not only gives habitual grace, by which they can work well and persevere if they will, but also so stirs them, and persuades them inwardly in the heart with an efficacious calling, that he makes them also will. Wherefore the same blessed Augustine, in the place cited, writes that beatitude itself is now for men a gift of grace — which would have been the wage of merit, as it was for the holy Angels, if the first man had willed to stand. See what we wrote in the book On the Grace of the First Man, chapters 4 and 7. And as touching justice: a far greater rigor of justice appears in the reprobation of men than of Angels — both because he reprobated the greatest part of men, the least of Angels; and also because God sentences no Angel to everlasting punishment save for a fault committed by his own will, but condemns very many men for original sin alone, which without doubt was committed by another's will. Wherefore not only with the Angels, but even before the Angels, we can and ought to sing mercy and judgment to our God.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVII. Quid intersit inter hominum et Angelorum electionem sive reprobationem. Decima propositio : « Quamvis Angeli quoque sancti gratis praedestinati sint ad vi¬ tam, Angeli vero mali, partim ex sola Dei voluntate, partim ob praevisa peccata repro¬ bati ; tamen divitiae, gratiae et justitiae Dei, magis ostenduntur in electione et reproba¬ tione hominum, quam Angelorum. » Haec decima propositio erit hujus disputationis, totiusque libri postrema conclusio. Esse autem Angelos electos ac praedesti- mitos, docet Apostolus, cum ait, scribens ad Tirnoth. in 1. epist. cap. v : Testor coram Deo , et Christo Jesu , et electis Angelis , ut cu¬ stodias haec etc. (1). Docet etiam S. August. in Enrichid. cap. 100. ubi sic ait : « Haec sunt magna opera Domini exquisita in om¬ nes voluntates ejus, et tam sapienter exqui¬ sita, ut cum Angelica et humana natura pec- cassct, id est, non quod ille, sed quod voluit ipsa, fecisset, etiam per camdem creaturae voluntatem, qua factum est quod creator noluit, impleret ipse quod voluit, bene utens et malis, tanquam summe bonus, ad eorum damnationem, quos juste praedestinavit ad poenam, et ad eorum salutem, quos beni¬ gne praedestinavit ad gratiam. » Idem quo¬ que August. lib. i. Retractat, cap. 13. indi¬ cat, homines fuisse etiam praedestinandos, si Adam non peccasset, et sine dubio eadem ratio est de Angelis, et de hominibus ante peccatum : « Usque ad certum, inquit, San¬ ctorum numerum, quem praedestinavit Deus, nascerentur homines, non parentibus suc¬ cessuri morientibus, sed cum viventibus reg¬ naturi. » Porro non solum praedestinatos atque ele¬ ctos esse S. Angelos, sed etiam gratis, id est, ante bonorum operum praevisionem praede¬ stinatos electosque fuisse, probari potest hac ratione. Antequam Deus Angelos absolute creare vel praedestinare vellet, sine dubio cognovit eos bene usuros libero arbitrio et gratia, et tandem salvandos, si eam gratiam illis praeberet, quam reipsa praebuit, haec enim cognitio necessaria est in Deo, ac per hoc prior est, quam absoluta voluntas crean¬ di, vel praedestinandi Angelos, quae non est necessaria, sed libera ; necessaria enim prio¬ ra sunt liberis, secundum modum nostrum intelligendi : igitur cum Deus voluit Angelos creare, et eam gratiam illis praebere, quam praebuit ; sine dubio voluit etiam illos infalli- biliter salvare ; nam si id non voluisset, eam gratiam non dedisset, per quam eos infalli- biliter salvandos esse praeviderat. Prius au¬ tem est velle gratiam Angelis praebere, quam videre opera ex illa gratia procedentia, ut notum est, cum causa sit prior effectu ; igi¬ tur prius voluit absolute Deus Angelos sal¬ vare, quam eorum opera futura praeviderit. Eadem ratione probari potest, reprobatio¬ nem Angelorum negativam, non pendere ex praevisione peccati, nam praevidit Deus An¬ gelos, qui perierunt, infallibiter perituros, si eam solam gratiam illis daret, quam re ipsa illis dedit : ergo cum eam solam gratiam illis dare voluit, simul voluit eos non prae¬ destinare ad gloriam, sed permittere, ut ex¬ ciderent a salute; nam si eos Deus abso¬ lute salvare voluisset, non defuisset ejus sa¬ pientiae ratio, qua id faceret. Nulla igitur (I) Rom. VIII, 1. — (2) 1 Tim. V, 21. CAPUT XVII. 579 causa reddi potest, cur Deus aliis Angelis dare voluerit gratiam, per quam videbat in- fallibili ter salvandos, aliis vero per quam videbat infallibiliter non salvandos, nisi quia voluit illos salvare, istos non voluit salvare. Cur autem voluerit Angelos malos positive damnare, sine dubio causa fuit peccatum eorum prsevisum. Non enim juste poena damnationis infligitur, nisi ubi culpa prse- ccsscrit. Atque haec ratio habet etiam locum in praxlcstinationc et reprobatione hominum; et potest hac similitudine illustrari ; si rex aliquis proponat bravium obtinendum per cursum, et revelatione divina praenoscat, si cursu equorum certetur, talem hominem adepturum bravium ; si bigis, talem ; si pe¬ dibus, talem ; si navibus, talem. Deinde in¬ stituat, ut certetur bigis, et omnibus qui decertaturi accesserint, bigas aptissimas ipse praebeat; nonne justum erit certamen, et juste privabuntur bravio, qui currendo victi fuerint, et ille juste coronabitur, qui alios currendo superaverit? et tamen quis ambigere potest, quia rex omnino gratis praedestina¬ verit ad bravium illum, qui victor evasit ? nulla enim causa reddi potest, cur voluerit cursu bigarum contendi, non alio genere pugna) : cum certo sciret, si bigis contende¬ retur, illum solum fore victorem, qui reipsa fuit ; nisi quia voluit ei gratificari. Quod si rex ille, qui bigas omnino similes, et aequales decertaturis dedit, dicitur gratis praedestinasse , quem voluit ad bravium , quanto magis Deus gratis praedestinasse di¬ cetur electos, cum eis majorem gratiam, quam aliis, dederit? nam de hominibus qui¬ dem dubitari non potest, ut supra probatum est; de Angelis autem id S. Augustinus te¬ statur in lib. xh. de Civit. Dei cap. ix : « Aut minorem, inquit, acceperunt amoris divini gratiam, quam illi, qui in eadem perstiterunt, aut si utrique boni aequaliter creati sunt, istis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti ad eam bcatitudinis plenitudinem pervenerunt. » Idem etiam libro de corre¬ ptione et gratia cap. 10 cum dicit, Deum in Angelis prius ostendere voluisse, quid pos¬ set eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid pnssct suae gratiae beneficium, justitiacque judicium : aperte significat ad gratiae bene¬ ficium pertinere beatitudinem bonorum An¬ gelorum, quoniam gratis ad eam electi sunt, et inde perseverantiae donum acceperunt, quod non acceperunt Angeli mali, qui non perseverarunt, et justo Dei judicio in alter¬ num exitium corruerunt. Jam vero majores divitias cum gratiae, tum justitiae Deum ostendisse in electione et reprobatione hominum, quam Angelorum facile demonstrari potest. Nam quod attinet ad gratiam , Deus praedestinavit homines quosdam ad gloriam, qui non solum gloria indigni, sed etiam poena dignissimi erant, cum essent natura filii irae, sicut et caeteri : Angeli vero neque poena digni, neque gloria indigni, sed solum non digni , antequam praedestinarentur, erant. Deide homines, qui natura sunt Angelis inferiores, praedestinavit Deus ad aequalem gloriam cum Angelis ; aequales enim nos An¬ gelis futuros, veritas ipsa promisit Matth. xxii. Imo vero naturam nostram, ratione incarnationis Christi, ad gloriam longe ex¬ cellentiorem praedestinatam esse scimus , quam Angelorum, siquidem in illa superna Hierusalem, caput omnium hominum et An¬ gelorum, non aliquis Angelus erit, sed Chri¬ stus Jesus, Deus et homo. Itaque Deus, ut ostenderet immensas divitias gratiae suae, naturam humanam ex profundiore abysso miseriae eduxit, et ad altius fastigium gloriae perduxit, quam Angelorum. Denique, electis Angelis Deus non aliam gratiam dedit, nisi habitualem, qua fieret, ut possent perseverare, si vellent ; non au¬ tem dedit gratiam illam excitantem, qua fie¬ ret, ut vellent, sed ut vellent, in eorum reli¬ quit libero arbitrio, ut S. Augustinus docet in lib. de correptione et gratia, cap. 11. et 12. hominibus autem electis Deus non so¬ lum gratiam habitualem donat, qua possint bene operari et perseverare si velint, sed etiam ita illos excitat, eisque intus in corde persuadet efficaci vocatione, ut faciat illos etiam velle. Quocirca idem B. Augustinus in loco citato scribit, ipsam beatitudinem ho¬ minibus nunc esse donum gratia), qua) mer¬ ces meriti futura erat, sicut fuit Angelis sanctis, si primus homo stare voluisset. Vide qua) scripsimus in libro de gratia primi ho¬ minis cap. 4. et 7. Quod vero attinet ad justitiam, longe ma¬ jor justitiae rigor apparet in reprobatione hominum, quam Angelorum, tum quia, ma¬ ximam partem hominum, minimam Angelo¬ rum reprobavit, tum etiam, quoniam Ange¬ lorum nullum Deus poena) sempiterna) addi¬ cit, nisi propter culpam propria voluntate commissam ; hominum autem plurimos dam- LIBER II. u80 nat, propter solum originale peccatum, quod etiam prm Angelis misericordiam et judi- aliena voluntate commissum fuisse non du- cium Deo nostro cantare possumus et debc- bium est. Quare non solum cum Angelis, sed mus. CONTROVERSIARUM DE GRATIA ET LIBERO ARBITRIO