Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 1: Some things are premised before the treatment itself: the argument of the whole work, the sum of the chief difficulties, and who have written on free choice
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We have discoursed of grace and of predestination; now, concerning the liberty of choice, four heads are to be considered. First, what is the notion and nature, what the subject, what the object, what the act, what the end of free choice. Second, what are the powers of free choice, and what the necessity of grace, in natural works. Third, what in moral works. Fourth, what in supernatural. Now there are six chief and most obscure questions in the treatment of free choice, which we shall untie in various places, as the order of the disputation shall require.
The first is of the concord of free choice with the determination of the practical judgment. For if the will depends in its election on the practical judgment of reason — since the will can choose nothing save what reason has judged, all things considered, in this place and time, to be good and desirable — while reason is not free in judging, but necessarily depends on the object, nor can judge otherwise than as the thing stands, ignorance and perturbation being removed (which without doubt are not necessarily required for liberty): where, I pray, is the choice of the will? The second question is of the concord of free choice with the foreknowledge of God. For if God knows all things before they are done, and his cognition cannot be deceived, nothing will be able to be done or not done at the choice of man, but that will necessarily be done which God has foreknown will be. The third, of the concord of free choice with the determination of the divine will. For if free choice, like all other second causes, can do nothing without the concourse of the first cause, while the first cause, which is the divine will, works prior in nature, and applies the second causes to their working, nor can its efficiency be hindered by any means: where then is that liberty which is said to be left to the will, and from which free choice is named? The fourth, of the concord of free choice with the depravation of nature which from the sin of the first parent is found in man. For as a crooked leg cannot but always limp, so also the human will, made perverse and crooked through sin, seems unable in any work to avoid sin. The fifth, of the concord of free choice with divine predestination. For if predestination is most certain, and depends not on our works but on the divine will, certainly neither do the predestinated seem able not to act well, nor the non-predestinated to act well; hence liberty toward good and evil is taken away, unless a way be found by which predestination may be reconciled with liberty. The sixth, of the concord of free choice with efficacious grace. For if efficacious grace makes a man believe, hope, love, do penance, work well, and such grace cannot be rejected — since otherwise it would not truly be called efficacious grace, and (as Augustine somewhere says) it itself brings it about that it be not rejected — there seem to be no parts left for free choice in those works which pertain to salvation and piety. Of these questions, the first will be solved in this third book, chapters 8 and 9; the second and third in the fourth book, chapters 13, 14, 15, and 16; the fourth in the fifth book, chapters 10, 11, and 12; the fifth and sixth in the sixth book, chapters 14 and 15.
There have written on free — or rather, as they will have it, on enslaved — choice, of the adversaries: John Wyclif in the Trialogue, books 1 and 3; Martin Luther in the book On the Enslaved Will, and in the assertion of article 36, and elsewhere; Martin Bucer in the book on concord, in the article on free choice; Philip Melanchthon in the Commonplaces, under the title on the cause of sin, and the title on free choice; Illyricus with his fellow Centuriators, centuries 2, 3, 4, and following, chapter 4; John Brenz in the Apology for the Confession of Württemberg; Calvin, book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 2, in the Antidote to the Council of Trent, and in the response to Pighius; Martin Chemnitz in the Examination of session 6 of the Council of Trent; and others, whom I have not been permitted to see.
Of Catholics, very many have written on free choice. And first, of the ancient Greeks: Origen in book 3 On First Principles; Eusebius of Caesarea in the whole sixth book of the Preparation of the Gospel; St. Basil in the oration on free choice, and in another on the cause of evil; St. Gregory of Nyssa, books 5, 6, 7, and 8 On Philosophy; St. John Chrysostom in five orations on Providence, or fate; St. John Damascene, book 2 On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 25 and following. Of the ancient Latins: St. Augustine in the three books On Free Choice, and in another On Grace and Free Choice; St. Prosper in the book On Free Choice to Rufinus; Faustus of Riez in two books On Free Choice; Boethius Severinus in the fifth book On the Consolation of Philosophy; St. Anselm in the book On the Concord of Grace and Free Choice, and in the dialogue On Free Choice; St. Bernard in the book On Grace and Free Choice; Peter Lombard in book 2 of the Sentences, distinctions 24 and 25, and with him the theological Doctors who are called Scholastics. Of the more recent, who have written properly against the heretics of our time for the defense of free choice, many can be numbered; the names of those I have been able to see I shall write down in the order of the alphabet: Albert Pighius wrote ten books on free choice against Calvin; Alphonsus a Castro, book 9 against heresies, treats the same matter; likewise Andrew Vega, book 2 on the Council of Trent, chapters 12 and following; Bartholomew Camerarius in the book On Free Choice against Calvin; Christopher a Capite Fontium in the book On Free Choice; Conrad Kling in the Commonplaces, book 1, chapters 5 and following; the Censure of the men of Cologne against Monheim, article 3; Diego Payva, book 4 of the Institutions; Dominic Soto, book 1 On Nature and Grace, chapters 13 and following; Francis Orantes, book 1, chapters 27 and following, of the Catholic Places; Francis of Ferrara in the book On Evangelical Liberty, chapters 1 and 2; Jerome Hangest in the book On Free Choice; James Latomus against the second article of Luther; John Cochlaeus in the book On Free Choice; John Driedo in the book On the Concord of Free Choice and Predestination, and in the book On Grace and Free Choice; John Eck in the Enchiridion, article 31; John of Rochester against article 36 of Luther; Jodocus Tiletanus in the Apology for the Council of Trent, session 6; John Anthony Pantusa in the book On Free Choice and Works; Peter a Soto in the Instruction of Priests; Raphael Venustus in the book On Predestination, Grace, and Free Choice; Ruard Tapper in the explication of article 7 of the Louvain articles; Thomas Waldensis, tome 1, book 1, article 1, chapters 28 and following; William Lindanus, book 3 of the Panoplia, chapters 14 and following.
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CAPUT PRIMUM. Praemittuntur aliqua ante ipsam tractationem id est , argumentum totius operis, summa praecipuarum difficultatum , et qui scri¬ pserint de libero arbitrio. Disseruimus dc gratia, et praedestinatione, nunc de libertate arbitrii, quatuor capita consideranda sunt. Primo, quae sit ratio et natura, quod subjectum, quod objectum, quis actus, quis finis liberi arbitrii. Secundo, quas sint vires liberi arbitrii, et quae neces¬ sitas gratiae in operibus naturalibus. Tertio, quae sint in moralibus. Quarto, quae in su- pernaturalibus. Sunt autem sex praecipuae quaestiones obscurissimae in tractatione deli¬ bero arbitrio, quas variis in locis, prout ordo disputationis exiget, enodabimus. Prima est de concordia liberi arbitrii cum determinatione judicii practici. Nam si vo¬ luntas pendet in electione a judicio rationis practico, cum nihil possit voluntas eligere, nisi quod ratio judicaverit omnibus consi¬ deratis, hoc loco, et tempore, esse bonum et expetendum ; ratio autem non sit in judi¬ cando libera, sed necessario pendeat ab ob¬ jecto, nec possit aliter judicare, quam res se habeat, remota ignorantia et perturbatione, qua; sine dubio ad libertatem non necessario requiruntur : ubi, qua;so, est arbitrium vo¬ luntatis ? Altera qua:stio est de concordia liberi ar¬ bitrii, cum praescientia Dei. Nam si Deus omnia novit, antequam fiant, nec potest ejus cognitio falli ; non poterit aliquid pro arbi¬ trio hominis fleri aut non fleri, sed neces¬ sario id fiet, quod Deus futurum esse pne- novit. Tertia, de concordia liberi arbitrii, cum determinatione divina; voluntatis. Nam si li¬ berum arbitrium, ut omnes alia; secunda; causae, nihil agere potest sine concursu pri¬ ma; causa; : prima vero causa, qua; est di¬ vina voluntas, prius natura operatur, et ap¬ plicat. secundas causas ad operandum, nec ulla ratione efficientia ejus impediri potest ; ubi nam est ea libertas, qua; voluntati relin¬ qui dicitur, et a qua liberum arbitrium no¬ minatur ? Quarta, de concordia liberi arbitrii, cum depravatione natura;, qua; ex peccato primi parentis in homine reperitur. Nam quemad¬ modum curva tibia, non potest non semper claudiftare : sic etiam humana voluntas per peccatum perversa et curva effecta, non vi¬ detur posse in ullo opere vitare peccatum. Quinta, dc concordia liberi arbitrii, cum praedestinatione divina. Nam si praedestinatio certissima est, nec ob operibus nostris, sed a divina voluntate dependet, certe nec prae¬ destinati videntur posse non bene agere , necnon praedestinati bene agere, Proinde tollitur libertas ad bona et mala, nisi ratio inveniatur, qua pra;destinatio cum libertate concilietur. Sexta, dc concordia liberi arbitrii cum gra¬ tia efficaci; Nam si gratia efficax facit ho¬ minem credere, sperare, diligere, pamiten- tiam agere, bene operari, neque potest ejus¬ modi gratia rejici, quoniam alioqui non vere gratia efficax diceretur, et (ut Augustinus alicubi dicit) ipsa facit, ne rejiciatur : nulla; videntur partes esse liberi arbitrii in his operibus, qua; ad salutem et pietatem per¬ tinent. 382 LIBER III. Ex hissquaestionibus prima solvetur in lioc hi. lib. cap. 8. et 9. Secunda et tertia in iv. lib. cap. 13. 14. 13. et 1C. Quarta, in lib. v. cap. 10. 11. et 12. Quinta et sexta, in lib. vi. cap. 14. et 13. Scripserunt de libero, sive potius servo arbitrio ex adversariis Joan. Wiclefus in Tri- alogo lib. i. et m. Martinus Lutherus in lib. de servo arbitrio, ct in assertione articuli 3G. et alibi. Martinus Bucerus in lib. de con¬ cordia, in artic. de libero arbitrio, Philippus Melanchthon in Locis, tit. de causa peccati, ct tit. de libero arbitrio. Illyricus cum sociis Centuriatoribus, centur. 2. 3. 4. et seq. cap. 4. Joan. Brentius in Apologia pro Confes¬ sione Wirtembergensi, Calvinus lib. ii. In- stitut. cap. 2. in Antidoto Concilii Tridentini, et in responsione ad Pighium. Martinus Kcm- nitius in Examin. sess. 6. Concilii Tridentini et alii, quos mihi videre non licuit. Ex Catholicis scripserunt de libero arbitrio plurimi, ac primum ex Grfecis antiquis Ori- gcnes in lib. m. de principiis, Eusebius Cae¬ sariensis in toto lib. vi. praeparat. Evang. S. Basilius in orat, de libero arbitrio, et in alia de causa mali. S. Gregorius Nyssenuslib. v. vi. vn. et viii. de Philosophia. S. Joan. Chrysostomus in quinque orationibus de Pro¬ videntia, vel fato. S. Joannes Damascenus lib. ii. de fide orthodoxa cap. 23. et seq. Ex Latinis antiquis, S. Augustinus in tri¬ bus de libero arbitrio, et in alio de gratia et libero arbitrio. S. Prosper in libro de libero arbitrio ad Ruffinum. Faustus Rhegjensis in duobus libris de libero arbitrio. Boethius Se- verinus in v. libro de consolatione Philo- sophise. S. Anselmus in libro de concordia gratiae et liberi arbitrii, et in dialogo de libero arbitrio. S. Bernardus in libro de gratia et libero arbitrio. Petrus Lombardus in lib. ii. Sent. dist. 24. et 23. et cum eo Doctores Theologi, qui Scholastici dicuntur. Ex recentioribus, qui proprie contra hae- reticos nostri temporis, pro liberi arbitrii de¬ fensione scripserunt, multi numerari pos¬ sunt. Eorum, quos videre potui, nomina per Alphabeti ordinem adseribam. Albertus Pi- ghius scripsit libros decem de libero arbi¬ trio contra Calvinum. Alphonsus a Castro lib. ix. advers. haeres, camdem materiam tractat. Item eamdem Andreas Yega lib. ii. in Concilium Trid. cap. 12. et seq. Bartho- lomaeus Camerarius in lib. de libero arbitrio contra Calvinum. Christophorus a capite fon¬ tium, in lib. de libero arbitrio. Conradus Clingius in locis communibus, lib. i. cap. 5. et sequ. Censura Coloniensium contra Mon- hemium, art. 3. Dieghus Payva lib. iv. Insti¬ tutionum. Dominicus a Sotolib. i. de natura et gratia cap. 13. et seq. Franciscus Oran- tius lib. 1. cap. 27. et seq. locorum Catholi¬ corum. Franciscus Ferrariens. in lib. de E- vangclica libertate cap. 1. et 2. Hieronymus Hangestus in lib. de libero arbitrio. Jacobus Latomus contra secundum articulum Lu- theri, Joannes Cochheus in lib. de libero ar¬ bitrio. Joannes Driedo in lib. de concordia liberi arbitrii, et praedestinationis, et in lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio. Joannes Eckius in Enchiridio art. 32. Joan. Itoffensis contra articulum 36. Lutheri. Jodocus Tiletanus in Apologia pro Concilio Trid. sess. 6. Joan. Antonius Panthusa in libro de libero arbi¬ trio et operibus. Petrus a Soto in institutione Sacerdotum. Raphael Yenustus in lib. de praedestinat, gratia et libero arbitrio. Ru- ardus Tapper. in explicat, articuli 7. Lova- niensium. Thomas Waldensis tom. 1. lib. i. artic. 1. cap. 28. et seq. WilhelmusLindanus lib. m. Panopliae cap. 14. et seq.