Faith & the Word

Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice

Chapter 2: On the name of free choice

Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).

The name of free choice is explained by authors in three ways. Some judge that the name of free choice signifies the conjunction of two acts — that is, of the judgment of reason and the election of the will — and that by reason of the judgment it is named choice (arbitrium), by reason of the election it is called free. And so they will have it that free choice is nothing else than judgment with election, or election with judgment. So the author of the Hypognosticon, book 3, seems to have taken this word, and after him Peter Lombard, in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 24, letter E.

Others will have the name of free choice said properly of the act of reason — that is, of the judgment; for to arbitrate is the same as to judge. And why the judgment of reason should be called free, two causes are wont to be given. The former is St. Bernard's, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, who teaches that the judgment of reason is called free because it freely judges of the act of its own will. The latter is Ruard Tapper's, in the explication of article 7 of the Louvain articles, who thinks the judgment is called free both because it is indifferent to many things, and because in doubtful matters, and above all in the particular, we judge as we will.

Others, finally — whose judgment seems the best and truest — teach that by free choice is signified the act of the will alone; for that alone is truly and properly free. And this is the judgment of St. Thomas, part 1, question 83, article 3, reply to the second, and of the holy Fathers, who everywhere add to the name of choice the name of the will, and say “the free choice of the will.” Let us bring some testimonies. St. Ambrose, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3: “He works as he wills,” says he, “that is, by the free choice of the will.” St. Augustine, book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 2: “God has revealed to us through the holy Scriptures that there is in man a free choice of the will.” And book 5 On the City of God, chapter 9: “Of these two,” says he, “he chose the free choice of the will.” St. Prosper, book 1 On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 3: “The judgment of the will,” says he, “was depraved, not taken away.” The Council of Orange, canon 13: “The choice of the will in the first man,” etc. Nor ought it to seem strange that the name of choice is accommodated to the will, though properly it pertains to the intellect: for the election of the will is as it were a certain sentence and last judgment of the will itself; whence also we commonly say, “it is in my choice to do this” — that is, in my election and power. And it is called arbitrium rather than judgment, since this is the difference between judges and arbiters: that arbiters are much freer than judges. For judges are bound to follow the laws, and if they do not judge according to the laws, appeal can be made from them; but arbiters are unbound and free, and pass sentence as they will, nor is any appeal given. And so Justin spoke properly when, at the beginning of the first book, he wrote that in the first times of the world the arbitraments of princes stood in place of laws. Thus, then, the free option, or election, of the will is more rightly named choice (arbitrium) than judgment.

Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT  II. 

De  nomine  liben  arbitrii. 

Nomen  liberi  arbitrii  tribus  modis  ab  au¬ 
ctoribus  explicatur.  Aliqui  existimant,  nomen 
liberi  arbitrii  significare  conjunctionem  du¬ 
orum  actuum,  id  est,  judicii  rationis,  et  ele¬ 
ctionis  voluntatis,  et  ratione  judicii,  nominari 
arbitrium ,  ratione  electionis ,  appellari  li¬ 
berum.  Itaque  volunt,  liberum  arbitrium  ni¬ 
hil  esse  aliud,  nisi  judicium  cum  electione, 
sive  electionem  cum  judicio.  Ita  videtur  hoc 
vocabulum  accepisse  auctor  Hypognostici 
lib.  m.  et  post  eum  Petrus  Lombardus  in  ii. 
lib.  Sententiar.  dist.  24.  Iit.  E. 

Alii  volunt,  nomen  liberi  arbitrii  dici  pro¬ 
prie  de  actu  rationis,  id  est,  de  judicio.  Ar¬ 
bitrari  enim  idem  est,  quod  judicare.  Cur 
autem  judicium  rationis  dicatur  liberum, 
Duae  causae  reddi  solent.  Prior  est  S.  Ber- 
nardi  in  libro  de  gratia  et  libero  arbitrio,  qui 
docet,  judicium  rationis  dici  liberum,  quia 
libere  judicat  de  actu  suae  voluntatis.  Po¬ 
sterior  est  Ruardi  Tapperi  in  explicatione  ar¬ 
ticuli  7.  Lovanien.  qui  censet  judicium  ap¬ 
pellari  liberum,  tum  quia  est  indifferens  ad 


CAPUT  I1F. 


583 


multa,  tum  quia  in  rebus  dubiis,  ac  praeser¬ 
tim  in  particulari  judicamus,  ut  volumus. 

Alii  denique,  quorum  videtur  esse  optima, 
verissimaque  sententia,  per  liberum  arbi¬ 
trium  solius  voluntatis  actum  significari  do¬ 
cent.  Nam  is  solus  vere  et  proprie  liber  est. 
Atque  haec  est  sententia  S.  Thomae  1.  part. 
quaest.  83.  art.  3.  ad  2.  et  sanctorum  Pa¬ 
trum,  qui  passim  ad  nomen  arbitrii,  addunt 
voluntatis  nomen,  ac  dicunt  liberum  volun¬ 
tatis  arbitrium.  Adferamus  aliqua  testimo¬ 
nia. 

S.  Ambrosius  lib.  n.  de  fide  cap.  3:  «  Ope¬ 
ratur,  inquit,  pro  ut  vult,  id  est,  pro  libero 
voluntatis  arbitrio.  »  S.  Augustinus  lib.  de 
gratia  et  libero  arbitrio  cap.  2  :  «  Revelavit 
nobis  Deus  per  Scripturas  sanctas,  esse  in 
homine  liberum  voluntatis  arbitrium.  »  Et 
lib.  v.  de  Civitate  Dei  cap.  9  :  «  Ex  his  du¬ 
obus,  inquit,  elegit  liberum  voluntatis  arbi¬ 
trium.  »  S.  Prosper  lib.  i.  de  vocatione  gen¬ 
tium  cap.  3.  «  Judicium,  inquit,  voluntatis, 
depravatum  est,  non  ablatum.  «  Concilium 
Arausicanum,  can.  13.  «  Arbitrium  volun¬ 
tatis  in  primo  homine  etc.  »  Neque  mirum 
videri  debet,  nomen  arbitrii  accommodari 
voluntati,  cum  proprie  ad  intellectum  perti¬ 
neat.  » 

Nam  electio  voluntatis  est  quasi  sententia 
quasdam  et  judicium  ultimum  ipsius  volun¬ 
tatis.  Unde  etiam  vulgo  dicimus,  in  fneo  ar¬ 
bitrio  est  hoc  facere,  id  est,  in  mea  electione 
et  potestate. 

Dicitur  autem  arbitrium  potius,  quam  ju¬ 
dicium.  Quoniam  hoc  interest  inter  judices 
et  arbitros,  quod  arbitri  multo  sunt  liberi¬ 
ores,  quamjudices.  Siquidem  judices  tenen¬ 
tur  sequi  leges,  et  si  non  judicant  secundum 
leges,  ab  eis  appellari  potest ;  arbitri  vero 
soluti  sunt  et  liberi,  et  sententiam  ferunt, 
pro  ut  volunt,  neque  ulla  datur  appellatio. 
Itaque  proprie  Justinus  locutus  est,  cum 
initio  primi  libri  scripsit,  primis  mundi  tem¬ 
poribus  arbitria  Principium  pro  legibus  fuisse. 
Sic  igitur  libera  optio,  sive  electio  volun¬ 
tatis  rectius  arbitrium,  quam  judicium  nomi¬ 
natur.
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