Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 18: On the end of free choice; that is, why God created Angels and men endowed with free choice
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The last question remains, on the end of free choice, for explaining that particle of the definition, “unto the great glory of God.” It is asked, then, for the sake of what thing God founded Angels and men with free choice — since that alone is the thing through which sin is committed against God, and whence all evils have overflowed into the world. But the matter is plain; and what we placed in the definition of free choice is confirmed by the confession of all the Fathers: namely, that it pertains to the signal glory of God that he endowed natures gifted with intelligence with the liberty of choice.
The first reason, then, why God willed men and Angels to be free is drawn from the power and wisdom of God, which in this matter shine wondrously. For God, by this, that he founded Angels and men free, shows that his providence can in no way be hindered, even though he permit the creatures whom he rules to live plainly at their own pleasure. Does not the signal glory of God shine forth, if one consider that Angels and men do whatever they will, and yet, will they, nill they, cannot disturb the order of divine providence appointed from eternity, so that there should ever come to pass what God absolutely wills not, or fail to come to pass what he absolutely wills? It would be like the case of one who should permit innumerable little birds to fly off freely, and yet by incredible art could bring it about that all should go to those places whither he himself willed. See St. Augustine, whose this reason is, in the Enchiridion, chapters 95 and following.
The second reason is taken from the divine justice and equity, which appears clearly in this: that he so created Angels and men that they could act well and ill, and he himself, without acceptance of persons, would visit the good with rewards, the evil with punishments. So teach the holy Fathers — Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 71; Justin in the Dialogue with Trypho; and others.
The third reason can be this: that the divine goodness might be set in light. For the signal goodness of God is beheld in this, that he not only willed to communicate everlasting glory with us, but added also that we should obtain it through our own merits — that is, in the noblest manner — as St. Gregory Nazianzen noted in the first Apologetic. Nor is it repugnant to these things that God, and Christ as man, have everlasting glory not from merits, and yet have it in a manner beyond controversy noblest. For the most excellent manner of having glory is to have it from oneself; and of having glory from oneself there are many degrees. The first degree is to have it altogether naturally, so that it is of the essence of him who has it; and this first degree is proper to God alone. The second degree, which befits Christ alone, is to have it in a certain manner naturally — not so that beatitude is of the essence of the soul of Christ, but so that it flows from within; for Christ as God endowed himself as man with grace and beatitude. The third degree is of those who have it from themselves, not because they have it naturally in any way, but because through free choice, helped by the grace of God, they acquire it for themselves; and this befits Angels and men.
The fourth reason was, that the infinite greatness and the unexhausted treasure of the riches of God might appear. For if God had with himself a fixed measure of goods with which he could reward his worshipers, he would not have permitted to Angels and men the free choice by which they could increase their merits as much as they would; but since the riches of God are infinite, nor is there danger that they should ever be exhausted, he therefore granted to Angels and men the faculty by which at their pleasure they might increase their merits. It would be like the case of one so rich in gold and silver that to the poor asking an alms he should show his treasures, and suffer each to carry off what he would — as no one is forbidden to draw from a perennial fountain as much water as he desires.
The fifth reason could have been, that it might be made known that God suffices to himself, and in no way needs our goods. For men, who necessarily need the work of others, and cannot protect themselves or their own without the help of many, would altogether desire — and, if they could, would bring it about — that their servants and soldiers could not desert them; and therefore they bind them with promises, pacts, and oaths, and fasten them to themselves as far as they can. But God, because he needs no one's work, of his own accord granted to his servants the liberty of choice, that they might both remain in his service and refuse his command, as they willed.
The sixth reason arises from the preceding, and shows the infinite charity of God toward his creatures. For since God needs not men — and if he needed them, could not much trust them, seeing that through the liberty of choice they so easily fall away from their founder — it would seem equitable that he should not take so very great care of men; and yet, on account of his exceeding charity, he takes no less care of them than if without them he could not preserve his glory and his life. For what greater can be thought or feigned than that God, who needs not our goods, willed for men's sake to become man and die?
The seventh reason was, that the perfection and adornment of the universe seemed to demand it. For since there is something which acts and is not acted upon, as God; something which is acted upon and does not act, as nature devoid of reason: it was equitable that there should also exist something which should be acted upon and act; and such is the created intelligent nature, endowed with free choice, such as is in Angels and men. Likewise, since there is something which works from nothing, and freely, as God; something which works from another, and necessarily, as all things below man: certainly it was beautiful that there should be something which should work from another, and freely — such as are Angels and men. For that something should work from nothing and necessarily — which is the fourth member of the division — cannot be, since to work from nothing is of the highest perfection, to work necessarily, of the highest imperfection.
Thou wilt say: why did God not bestow on Angels and men a free choice confirmed in good, that they might both be free and yet unable to sin? St. Augustine answered this question in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 10 [al. 7], and book 22 On the City of God, last chapter: that God willed to proceed in order, and first to show what free choice could do, then what the benefit of his grace and the judgment of his justice could do. See what we said in the book On the Sin of the First Parent, chapter 2, where we endeavored to give the cause why God created man whom he had foreseen would sin. And to the argument which was objected at the beginning of the chapter — namely, that free choice seems a hurtful thing, since it alone is that through which injury is done to God, and whence innumerable evils have overflowed upon men themselves — the answer is easy. For the liberty of choice was not given to man that he might sin, but that, by freely detesting sins, he might merit praise and glory with God. Moreover (as Eusebius rightly teaches in book 6 of the Preparation of the Gospel, chapter 6), God gave to man not the liberty of choice alone, but also kindled in his mind the light of intelligence, added synderesis, ever crying out that he should walk in the right way, incited him to virtue by the promise of rewards, and frightened him from vices by the threatening of punishments.
But it seems absurd that God should have instituted something which for the greater part is turned to evil; and such is free choice, which the greatest part of men abuse unto sinning. I answer: free choice is common to Angels and men; and therefore, for the greater part, free choice is turned absolutely not to evil, but to good; for the greater part of the Angels have always used, and will use, free choice well. But it seems at least absurd that the human species, for the greater part, should be cheated of its end on account of the liberty of choice. I answer: the last end of all things is twofold. One intrinsic and proper — which, if we treat of men, is the vision of God; the other extrinsic and common, which is the glory of God. Although therefore the human species for the greater part is cheated of its proper and intrinsic end, yet God always obtains his glory, which is beheld no less in the rewarding of the good than in the punishment of transgressors. Add that, though the greater part of men fall away from the perfect attainment of the intrinsic and proper end, yet it does not fall away from the total attainment of that end. For though the lesser part of men will reach to the vision of God, yet the greater part attains this — to be able to reason, and to live according to reason. And it is not absurd that the lesser part of the individuals of some species should not arrive at the perfect obtaining of its proper end, provided it fall not away from the total attainment.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVIII. De fine liberi arbitrii , id est, quare Deus crea¬ verit Angelos , et homines libero arbitrio praeditos. Postrema restat quaestio de fine liberi ar¬ bitrii, ad illam definitionis particulam expli¬ candam, « Ad magnam Dei gloriam. » Quaeritur igitur, cujus rei gratia Deus con¬ diderit Angelos, et homines cum libero ar¬ bitrio : cum id solum sit, per quod in Deum peccatum committitur, et unde omnia mala redundarunt in mundum. Sed res plana est, et quod in definitione liberi arbitrii posui¬ mus, omnium Patrum confessione firmatur, videlicet, ad insignem Dei gloriam pertinere, quod naturas intelligentia praeditas, arbitrii libertate donaverit. Prima igitur ratio, cur Deus homines et Angelos liberos esse voluerit, ducitur a po¬ tentia et sapientia Dei, quae in hac re mirifi¬ ce splendent. Deus enim per hoc, quod An¬ gelos et homines liberos condidit, ostendit providentiam suam nullo nrodo impediri posse, etiamsi permittat creaturis, quas re¬ git, plane pro arbitrio vivere. An non elu¬ cet insignis Dei gloria, si quis cogitet Ange¬ los et homines facere quicquid volunt, et ta¬ men velint, nolint, ordinem divinae provi¬ dentiae ab aeternitate constitutum perturbare non posse, ut fiat aliquando, quod Deus ab¬ solute non vult, aut noi^fiat quod absolute vult? Simile esset, si quis innumerabiles aviculas libere avolare permitteret; et tamen incredibili artificio id efficere posset, ut om¬ nes ad ea loca pergerent, quo ipse vellet. Yide S. Augustinum, cujus est haec ratio, in Enchiridio cap. 95. et sequentibus. Secunda ratio sumitur a justitia et aequi¬ tate divina, quae in eo perspicue apparet, quod Angelos et homines ita creavit, ut pos¬ sent bene et male agere, et ipse sine acce¬ ptione personarum, bonos praemiis, malos suppliciis afficeret. Ita docent sancti Patres, Irenaeus lib. iv. cap. 71. Justinus in Dialogo cum Tryphone, et alii. Tertia ratio haec esse potest, ut divina bo¬ nitas illustretur. Insignis enim Dei bonitas in eo conspicitur, quod non solum voluit gloriam sempiternam nobiscum communi¬ care : sed etiam addidit, ut eam per propria merita, id est, nobilissimo modo consequere¬ mur ; ut annotavit S. Gregorius Nazianzenus in 1. Apologetico. Neque his repugnat, quod Deus et Christus homo gloriam sempiternam non habent ex meritis ; et tamen eam habent modo, sine controversia, nobilissimo. Nam modus ha¬ bendi gloriam praestantissimus est eam ha¬ bere ex se. Porro ex se gloriam habendi multi sunt gradus. Primus gradus est, eam habere omnino naturaliter, ut sit de essen¬ tia ejus, qui illa habet. Et hic primus gra¬ dus soli Deo proprius est. Alter gradus, qui soli Christo convenit, est eam habere quo¬ dammodo naturaliter, non ita ut sit de es¬ sentia anima; Christi beatitudo, sed ut fluat ab intrinseco. Christus enim ut Deus se ipse ut hominem gratia et beatitudine donavit. Tertius gradus est eorum, qui eam habent ex se, non quia naturaliter habent ullo mo¬ do, sed quia pei liberum arbitrium gratia Dei adjutum illam sibi acquirunt. Et hoc convenit Angelis et hominibus. Quarta ratio fuit, ut appareat infinita ma¬ gnitudo, et inexhaustus thesaurus divitiarum Dei. Nam si Deus haberet apud se certam mensuram bonorum, quibus remunerare posset cultores suos, non permisisset Ange¬ lis et hominibus liberum arbitrium, quo me¬ rita possent augere quantum vellent : sed CAPUT XVIII. quoniam di vitice Dei sunt infinitae, neque pe¬ riculum est, ut aliquando exhauriantur, ideo concessit Angelis et hominibus facultatem, qua pro arbitrio merita augerent. Simile es¬ set, si quis tam esset dives auri et argenti, ut pauperibus stipem petentibus thesauros suos ostenderet, sineretque ut unusquisque auferret quod vellet, quomodo nemo prohi¬ betur ex fonte perenni tantum aquee haurire, quantum cupit. Quinta ratio esse potuit, ut innotescat Deum sibi sufficere, et bonorum nostrorum nullo modo egere. Homines enim qui aliorum o- pera necessario .indigent,' neque se, aut sua tueri sine multorum adjumento possunt, omnino cuperent, et, si valerent efficerent, ut famuli, ac milites sui a se deficere non non possent et ideo promissionibus, pactis, juramentis eos devinciunt, sibique adstrin- gunt quoad valent. Deus autem, quia nul¬ lius opera eget, sponte famulis suis liberta¬ tem concessit arbitrii, ut et in obsequio permanerent, et imperium detrectarent, prout" vellent. Sexta ratio ex prcecedenti oritur, et in¬ finitam Dei charitatem erga creaturas suas ostendit. Nam cum Deus non egeat homini¬ bus, et si egeret, non multum eis fidere pos¬ set, quippe qui tam facile ob libertatem ar¬ bitrii a conditore suo deficiunt : mquum es¬ se videbatur, ut non usque adeo magnam de hominibus curam gereret, et tamen ob nimiam charitatem suam non minorem de ipsis curam gerit, quam si absque illis glo¬ riam, vitamque suam conservare non pos¬ set. Quid enim majus cogitari, fingive po- I ■: t, quam ut Deus qui bonorum nostrorum non eget, propter homines homo fieri ct mori voluerit ? Septima ratio fuit, quod id postulare vi¬ deretur perfectio et ornamentum universi. Nam cum sit aliquid, quod agit, ct i.on agi¬ tur, ut Deus ; aliquid, quod agitur, et non agit, ut natura rationis expers ; n quum erat, ut etiam exstaret aliquid, quod ageretur et ageret. Et talis est natura creata intelligens, et libero arbitrio praedita, qualis est in An¬ gelis et hominibus. Item cum sit aliquid quod ex nihilo, et libere operatur, ut Deus : aliquid, quod ex alio, et necessario operatur, ut res omnes infra hominem, certe pulchrum erat, si ali¬ quid esset, quod ex alio, et libere operare¬ tur quales sunt Angeli et homines. Nam quod aliquid ex nihilo et necessario operc- 015 tur, quod est quartum membrum, divisionis, fieri non potest, cum operari ex nihilo, sit summae perfectionis, operari necessario, summae imperfectionis. Dices: cur Deus non attribuit Angelis et hominibus liberum arbitrium confirmatum in bono, ut et liberi essent, ct tamen peccare non possent. Respondit ad hanc quaestionem S. Augustinus in lib. ir. de bono perseve¬ rantiae cap. 10. et lib. xxri. de civit. Dei cap. ult. Deum ordinate procedere voluisse, ac primum ostendere, quid posset liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium. Vide quae diximus in libro de peccato primi parentis cap. 2. ubi causam reddere conati sumus, cur Deus creaverit hominem, quem pecca¬ turum esse praeviderat. Ad argumentum autem, quod initio ca¬ pitis objiciebatur, quod. vide! icet liberum ar¬ bitrium videatur res noxia, cum id solum sit, per quod sit injuria Deo, et unde innumera¬ bilia mala in ipsos homines redundarunt ; facile respondetur. Non enim data est ho¬ mini libertas arbitrii, ut peccaret, sed ut pec¬ cata libere detestando mereretur laudem et gloriam apud Deum. Prmterea (ut Eusebius recte docet in lib. vi. de prEeparat. Evangel. cap. 5.) non dedit homini Deus solam ar¬ bitrii libertatem, sed accendit etiam in ejus mente lumen intelligentiee, addidit Synde- resim semper clamantem, ut recta via ince¬ deret; incitavit ad virtutem promissione praemiorum, exterruit a vitiis comminatione poenarum. At absurdum videtur, ut Deus aliquid in¬ stituerit, quod pro majori parte vertatur in malum : ejusmodi autem est liberum arbi¬ trium, quo maxima pars hominum abutitur ad peccandum. Respondeo, liberum arbi¬ trium commune est Angelis et hominibus; et ideo pro majori parte liberum arbitrium non in malum, sed in bonum absolute con¬ vertitur. Nam major pars Angelorem libero arbitrio bene semper, et usa est, et ute- tur . At absurdum saltem esse videtur, ut spe¬ cies humana, majori ex parte, propter ar¬ bitrii libertatem suo fine frustretur. Respon¬ deo : Finis ultimus rerum omnium Duplex est. Unus intrinsecus et proprius, qualis est, si de hominibus agatur, visio Dei ; alter ex¬ trinsecus, et communis, qui est gloria Dei. Quamvis igitur sine proprio, atque intrinse¬ co species humana majori ex parte frustre- 61G LIBER III. tretur, tamen semper obtinet Deus gloriam suam, quse non minus in bonorum renume¬ ratione, quam in pra;varicatorum animad¬ versione perspicitur. Adde quod licet major hominum pars excidat a perfecta adeptione finis intrinseci, et proprii ; tamen non excidit a totali ade-, ptione ejusmodi finis. Etsi enim minor pars hominum pertinget ad visionem Dei ; tamen major pars illud assequitur, ut ratiocinari, et vivere secundum rationem possit. Non est autem absurdum, ut minor pars individuo¬ rum alicujus speciei, ad perfectam finis pro¬ prii consecutionem non perveniat, modo a totali adeptione non excidat. INDEX