Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 17: The contrary arguments are answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It remains to solve the arguments which are wont to be made against the liberty of God. But that they may be more easily solved, two things must briefly be noted beforehand.
First, then, it must be known, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in question 24 On Truth, article 3, that it is not of the notion and essence of free choice to be able to will good and evil; or to be able now to will one thing, afterward to refuse it; or not to be able to choose unless deliberation in fact precede; but that it is enough if one have the option of diverse things, and the election be made with a full and perfect judgment of reason. For to be able to will good and evil pertains to free choice not simply, but as it is in a created nature, which, since it was made from nothing, can fail and sin. And so such liberty not only does not befit God, but not even the Angels and men now blessed; nor is the power of choosing evil to be called a perfection, but an imperfection, of liberty. The same is to be understood of the change of act: for to be able to change one's act, and now to refuse what before one willed, is not of free choice simply, but of the free choice of a created nature, which, because it was made from nothing, is liable to turning and change. Finally, that deliberation precede election pertains to free choice only in human nature, which by reasoning procures knowledge for itself; for the Angels, who know cause and effect together, need no preceding deliberation, but at once take counsel, judge, and choose. It must be known, second, from the doctrine of Hervaeus in quodlibet 1, question 1, that the very willing of God can be considered in two ways. In one way absolutely, and as it is the same as the being of God; and in this way it is not free, but necessary. In the other way, as it bespeaks an order to an object; and in this way, if the object is intrinsic — namely the divine essence itself, wisdom, power, goodness, and the like — it is also necessary; but if the object is extrinsic, as are all created things, then at last the willing of God is not necessary, but free. For God cannot not will his own essence, power, goodness, wisdom, and the rest of the like; yet he can not will created things. Wherefore, when we say, “God freely wills this or that, and can not will it,” we do not signify that that thing which is his willing is in God a free thing, and can not be; but we signify that the very willing of God is not necessarily terminated at this thing or that. Nor do we speak of the possibility, but of the existence, of created things. For the possibility of things posits nothing in reality except the divine essence, participable in infinite ways; the divine wisdom, by which he knows all the ways in which the divine essence is participable; and the divine power, by which he can produce the things by which the divine essence may be participated. Now God cannot not have an essence participable in infinite ways, and a wisdom by which he knows created things to be possible, and a power by which he can in fact produce them. And why the will of God can not be terminated at the existences of things outside himself, and falls upon them freely, the reason is that those things are not necessary to God — since they are neither his end, nor means connected of necessity with that end; and thereby they are not desirable absolutely, but only on a supposition — that is, it being posited that God wills through them to manifest his glory. From these things it will be easy to answer all the arguments.
The first argument is this: the liberty of choice is placed in this, that one can will and not will, and will this and not that; but this is repugnant to the divine immutability. I answer: to will and not will, in God, signifies not a change of act, but that it is terminated, or not terminated, at such or such an object; whence the change happens not in God, but in the creature.
The second argument: the divine will cannot but be conformed to the divine wisdom; the divine wisdom cannot but judge that to be better and to be done which in very fact is better and to be done; therefore the divine will cannot choose anything but that which in very fact is better and to be done; and hence it is not free, since it can never choose but one thing. I answer: the divine wisdom judges that nothing outside God is absolutely good and to be done, except what God himself shall have willed to do; and that that is better which pleases him more. And this perhaps the Apostle signified, Ephesians 1, when he said that God works all things according to the counsel of his will. Although therefore the divine will is always conformed to the divine wisdom, yet no necessity follows thence, since the divine wisdom also is always conformed to the divine will.
The third argument: the willing of God is necessary, both because it is the same as the being of God, and also because the necessary is nobler than the contingent, and to God is to be attributed what is nobler; therefore the willing of God is not free. I answer: the willing of God is necessary as to the act itself of willing, yet not as to the order which it bespeaks to the creature. And because the being of God bespeaks no order to the creature, therefore the being of God is necessary in all ways, and in no way free; but the willing of God is in one way necessary — namely, as it is the same as his being — in another way free — namely, as it is terminated at a created thing. Nor is it repugnant to these things that the necessary is nobler than the contingent. For that is true of the essence of a thing, not of its causality; or with respect to itself, not with respect to others. For that essence is nobler which is more necessary, because it is further removed from defect and corruption; but contrariwise a cause, as cause, is the more excellent, the freer it is, since the freer it is, the less it depends on others — and assuredly it would be a great imperfection in God, if he depended of necessity on created things.
The fourth argument: God from eternity willed all things which he has done, does, and will do; therefore he is now determined to one, and cannot will otherwise. I answer: the act of God's will, as to its substance and entity, was from eternity, and is absolutely determined, because it cannot not be, or be otherwise; yet with respect to the created object it is not determined save on a supposition; absolutely, however, it can be otherwise, since (as we have often said) the will of God has toward created things not a necessary, but a contingent, order.
The fifth argument: indetermination signifies imperfection; for they are said to be undetermined who still waver about things to be done; therefore indetermination has no place in God. I answer: indetermination is twofold. One, which arises on the side of the cause, which has not yet attained its perfection so as to be able to go forth into act; and such is not in God, but in those who do not perfectly know the matter, and therefore still deliberate and consult. The other, which arises from the effect, which has no necessary order to the cause; and this indetermination bespeaks perfection in the cause, since it signifies that the cause is independent of the one effect and of its contrary, and superior to both.
The sixth argument: if God could do what he does not do, he would have a passive and idle power — which by no means befits God. I answer: there is in God no passive power, and much less an idle one. For that is called a passive power which is distinguished from act, and has not yet been reduced to act; but the power of God is not distinguished from act, since it is the divine essence itself, which is pure act. Nor again is power properly said to be in God with respect to the act — as though God could have the act and not have it — but only with respect to the object, because the will of God can be terminated at the producing of such or such a thing. And so power in God is nothing else than actual will, with a certain bearing toward possible things.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVII. Solvuntur argumenta contraria. Solvenda restant argumenta, quae contra Dei libertatem fieri solent. Sed ut ea facilius solvi possint, duo quaedam sunt breviter praenotanda. Primum igitur sciendum est, ex doctrina S. Thomae in quaest. 24. de veritate art. 3. non esse de ratione, et essentia liberi arbi¬ trii posse velle bonum et malum ; aut posse nunc velle unum, postea nolle; aut non pos¬ se eligere, nisi consultatio re ipsa praecedat: sed saitis esse, si quis habeat optionem di¬ versarum rerum, et electio fiat cum pleno, atque perfecto judicio rationis. Nam posse velle bonum et malum, pertinet ad liberum arbitrium, non simpliciter, sed ut est in na¬ tura creata, quae quoniam ex nihilo facta est, deficere et peccare potest. Itaque talis libertas non solum Deo non convenit, sed neque etiam Angelis et homi¬ nibus jam beatis; neque posse eligere ma¬ lum, perfectio, sed imperfectio est dicenda libertatis. Idem intelligendum est de muta¬ tione actus ; posse siquidem actum mutare, et nunc nolle quod antea volebat, non est li¬ beri arbitrii simpliciter, sed liberi arbitrii naturae creata;, quae quia facta est ex nihilo, conversioni et mutationi est obnoxia. Deni¬ que, quod electionem praecedat consultatio, non pertinet ad liberum arbitrium, nisi in natura humana, quae ratiocinando scientiam sibi parat. Nam Angeli, qui simul causam et effectum cognoscunt, non egent praecedente consultatione, sed simul consilium capiunt, judicant et eligunt. Sciendum est secundo, ex doctrina ller- vaei in quodlib. 1. quaest. I. Ipsum velle Dei, duobus modis considerari posse. Uno modo absolute, et ut est idem quod esse Dei, et hoc modo, non liberum, sed necessarium esse. Altei» modo, ut dicit ordinem ad obje¬ ctum, et hoc modo si objectum est intrinse¬ cum ipsa videlicet divina essentia, sapientia, potentia, bonitas et similia, esse etiam ne¬ cessarium ; sin autem objectum est extrinse CAPUT XVII. 61. ‘I cum, ut sunt res omnes creatae, tum demum velle Dei non esse necessarium, sed liberum. Nam Deus non potest non velle suam essen¬ tiam, potentiam, bonitatem, sapientiam, et caetera similia : potest tamen non velle res creatas. • Quare cum dicimus, Deus libere vult hoc, aut illud, et potest non velle ; non significa¬ mus rem illam, qua? est velle, in Deo esse rem liberam, et posse pon esse ; sed signifi¬ camus, ipsum velle Dei non necessario ter¬ minari ad rem istam, vel illam. Neque lo¬ quimur de possibilitate, sed de existentia rerum creatarum. Nam possibilitas rerum nihil ponit in re, nisi divinam essentiam in¬ finitis modis participabilem, divinam sapien¬ tiam, qua cognoscat omnes modos, quibus divina essentia participabilis est; et divinam potentiam, qua possit res producere, quibus divina essentia participetur. Non potest au¬ tem Deus non habere essentiam infinitis mo¬ dis participabilem et sapientiam, qua cogno¬ scat res creatas esse possibiles, et potentiam qua possit eas re ipsa producere. Cur autem possit voluntas Dei non termi¬ nari ad existentias rerum extra se, et libere super eam cadat, ratio est, quia res illa? non sunt Deo necessaria?, cum neque sint finis ejus, neque media cum eo fine ex necessitate connexa ; ac per hoc non sunt appetibiles absolute, sed solum ex hypothesi, id est, posito quod velit Deus per eas, gloriam suam manifestare. Ex his facile erit ad argumenta omnia respondere. Primum argumentum tale est. Arbitrii li¬ bertas in eo posita est, ut quis possit velle et non velle, et velle hoc et non illud : at hoc repugnat immutabilitati divinae. Respondeo: velle et non velle in Deo, non significat mu¬ tationem actus, sed quod terminetur, vel non terminetur ad tale, vel tale objectum. Unde non in Deo, sed in creatura contingit mu¬ tatio. Secundum argumentum. Voluntas divina non potest non esse conformis sapientia? di¬ vinae : sapientia divina non potest non judi¬ care, id esse melius et faciendum, quod re ipsa est melius et faciendum : igitur volun¬ tas divina noa potest eligere, nisi id quod reipsa est melius et faciendum : ac proinde non est libera, cum numquam possit eligere, nisi unum. Respondeo : sapientia divina ju¬ dicat, nihil esse absolute bonum et facien¬ dum extra Deum, nisi guod ipse Deus facere voluerit, et id esse melius, quod ei magis placet. Et hoc fortasse significavit Apostolus ad Ephesios r. cum ait, Deum omniaoperari secundum consilium voluntatis sua?. Quam¬ vis igitur voluntas divina semper conformis sit sapientia? divina?, nulla tamen inde se¬ quitur necessitas, quoniam^etiam sapientia divina conformis semper est voluntati di¬ vina?. Tertium argumentum, Velle Dei est neces¬ sarium, tum quia est idem quod esse Dei, tum etiam quia necessarium est nobilius contingenti, et Deo tribuendum est, quod est nobilius; igitur velle Dei non est liberum. Respondeo : Velle Dei est necessarium, quan¬ tum ad ipsum actum volendi, non tamen quantum ad ordinem, quem dicit ad creatu¬ ram. Et quia esse Dei, non dicit ordinem ad creaturam, ideo esse Dei, necessarium est omnibus modis, et nullo modo liberum ; at velle Dei, aliquo modo est necessarium, ut videlicet est idem cum esse, alio modo libe¬ rum, ut nimirum terminatur ac rem crea¬ tam. Neque his repugnat, quod necessarium sit nobilius contingenti. 'Nam id verum est de essentia rei, non de causalitate ; sive re¬ spectu sui, non respectu aliorum. Illa enim essentia est nobilior, quae magis est necessa¬ ria, quia longius abest a defectu et corru¬ ptione : contra autem causa, ut causa, eo pra?stantior est, quo liberior est, quoniam quo est liberior, eo minus ab aliis dependet, et sane magna esset imperfectio in Deo, si a rebus creatis ex necessitate penderet. Quartum argumentum. Deus ab a?ternitate voluit omnia qua? fecit, facit, et facturus est : ergo jam est determinatus ad unum, nec po¬ test aliud velle. Respondeo : actus voluntatis Dei, quoad substantiam, et entitatem suam ab a?ternitate fuit, et est absolute determi¬ natus, quia non potest non esse, vel aliter se habere, tamen respectu objecti creati non est determinatus nisi ex hypotesi ; absolute autem potest aliter se habere, quoniam (ut saepe diximus) ad res creatas voluntas Dei non habet ordinem necessarium, sed contin¬ gentem. Quintum argumentum. Indeterminatio im¬ perfectionem significat, illi enim dicuntur indeterminari, qui adhuc ambigunt de rebus agendis : non igitur indeterminatio locum habet in Deo. Respondeo : duplex est inde¬ terminatio. Alia, qua? oritur ex parte causa?, quse nondum est assecuta perfectionem suam, ut possit exire in actum ; et talis non 614 LIBER III. est in Deo, sed in illis, qui non perfecte rein cognoscunt, et ideo deliberant adhuc et con¬ sultant. Alia, qua; oritur ex effectu, qui non habet ordinem necessarium ad causam. Et ha;c indeterminatio dicit perfectionem in causa, quoniam significat, causam esse inde- pendentem ab uno effectu et ejus contrario, et utroque superiorem. Sextum argumentum. Si Deus posset fa¬ cere quod non facit, haberet potentiam pas¬ sivam et otiosam; quod Deo nulla ratione convenit. Respondeo : nulla est in Deo po¬ tentia passiva, ac multo minus otiosa. Illa enim dicitur potentia passiva, quae distingui¬ tur ab actu, et nondum reducta est ad actum. Dei autem potentia non distinguitur ab actu, cum sit ipsa divina essentia, quae est actus purus. Neque etiam proprie dicitur esse potentia in Deo, respectu actus, quasi possit Deus habere actum, et non habere, sed solum respectu objecti, quia potest vo¬ luntas Dei terminari ad talem, vel talem rem producendam. Itaque nihil aliud est potentia in Deo, nisi voluntas actualis cum habitudine quadam ad res possibiles.