Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book IV: Grace and Free Choice in Natural and Civil Works
Chapter 9: The testimonies of the Fathers themselves are adduced
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book IV. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
St. Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 71: “He gives good counsel to all; and God placed in man the power of election, even as also in the Angels.” And chapter 72: “If, then, it were not in us to do these things or not do them, what cause had the Apostle — and much before him the Lord himself — to give counsel to do some things, and to abstain from others?”
Clement of Alexandria, book 1 of the Stromata, page 65: “But neither praises nor censures, neither honors nor punishments, would be just, if the soul did not have free power.”
Origen, book 2 against Celsus, page 780: “Let us see,” says he, “what Celsus says next. ‘This man,’ says he, ‘being God, foretold; and what he had foretold had absolutely to come to pass. God, therefore, led his own disciples and Prophets, with whom he took food and drink, to such a point of necessity that they acted against right and piety.’ We shall answer to this also, since you bid that I pass over not even those arguments which seem to me frivolous. Celsus thinks that what someone foreknowing has foretold therefore comes to pass because it has been foretold; but we, not conceding this, say that the foreteller is not the cause of the future thing, but that the future thing — which was altogether going to happen even had no one foretold it — gave to the foreknower the cause of foretelling. For the whole lies in the foreknowledge of the seer: that, while either of the two can come to pass, this one of the two will be. We do not say that the foreknower takes away the possibility that it happen, or not.” With which words Origen dissolves the objection of Celsus, who had endeavored to prove that Christ, by foretelling the betrayal of Judas, brought necessity upon Judas himself to commit that crime of betrayal, because what Christ, being God, had foretold would be, had of necessity to come to pass. Origen answers, then, that the foretelling does not bring necessity, because a thing does not come to pass because it is foreknown, but is foreknown because it was to come to pass. Wherefore a little below he teaches that Judas so betrayed the Lord that he could have not betrayed him; and thus he brings foreknowledge into concord with contingency and liberty. The same Origen also, book 3 On First Principles, chapter 1, copiously proves that man is of free choice, and answers all the arguments which the adversaries now bring forward, and which used to be brought forward by the old heretics.
Eusebius of Caesarea, book 6 On the Evangelical Preparation, chapter 5 [al. 6], proves with excellent arguments that liberty from necessity does not fight with providence: “For,” says he, “if prosperous or adverse things are absolutely going to befall each man, and it is necessary that I do these things and you those, what need is there for anything to be accomplished by care and labor?” And below: “How, since we feel ourselves moved by our own appetition, will it not be altogether most mad to believe that we are moved by some external force, as though devoid of mind? For we so flee some things and follow others by free will that, even as we grasp grieving, rejoicing, seeing, hearing, not by reasoning but by the thing itself, so assuredly we feel ourselves moved by our own counsel either to flee or to follow. For which reasons the liberty of the rational nature cannot rightly be denied.”
St. Athanasius, in the sermon on the passion and cross of the Lord, the question being proposed whether the things divinely foreknown and foretold come to pass from necessity, answers thus: “The prophet is not the author or cause of those things, but their own will; nay rather, they themselves were the cause that the Prophets foretold such things about them. It is proper to the Prophet to foresee future things and not be deceived; but it is of men to do what they will.”
St. Basil, in the sermon on free choice: “The free choice which is placed in the power of man is placed in choosing and not choosing.” Likewise, in the oration That God Is Not the Author of Evils: “Why was the soul apt to receive evil? On account of free choice, which most greatly befits the rational nature. For, being loosed from all necessity, and having received from the creator a life voluntary and placed in its own power, it was thereby created to the image of God.”
St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the first Apologetic, not far from the beginning: “It is an argument of the singular and eximious goodness of God, that he makes virtue to be also in some part ours; and that it is not implanted in us by nature, but is cultivated by the will and the purpose of the mind, and by the liberty of choice, which has an equal motion toward either part.”
St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 9 of the Philosophy, chapter 3: “Everyone who deliberates, deliberates about things that can be done, as though the election were in his power — that he may choose what is decreed through counsel, and choosing may do it. It is necessary, therefore, that he who deliberates be the Lord of his actions. For if he shall not be the Lord of his actions, he deliberates superfluously. But if free choice of necessity attends the rational power, then either it will not be rational, or it will obtain the dominion of its own actions; and to be lord of one’s actions belongs altogether to free choice.”
St. John Chrysostom, homily 60 on Matthew, explaining that saying, It must needs be that scandals come: “He speaks of necessity,” says he, “not that he takes away the liberty of the will and the power of free choice, nor that he subjects human life to a necessity of things, but he foretells what will altogether come to pass.” And below: “Not because he foretold the future scandals do they therefore come; but because they were to come, therefore he foretold them.” And in the second sermon On Fate: “God says: I have set before thee life and death; to whichever thou wilt, stretch forth thy hand. The demon says: it is not in thee to stretch forth thy hand, but thou dost this by a certain necessity and force. Do these seem to you more worthy of belief?”
St. Epiphanius, heresy 16: “Wherefore it is manifest to all, and clear, and by no means ambiguous, that God has exhibited to us free choice, saying: If you be willing, and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land.”
St. Cyril, book 2 on John, chapter 54: “He shows by these words the free choice of man, who can proceed to either part according to the judgment of his own mind.” And book 4, chapter 7: “We cannot, according to the dogmas of the Church and of the truth, in any way deny the free power of man, which is called free choice.” And book 9, chapter 10: “The creator has bestowed free power on the rational creature, and has committed the reins of his own will to each one, that it may be in him to choose whatever he shall approve.”
St. John Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 26: “In us are those things of which we have received the free power both to do and not to do.”
Theophylact, in the commentary on chapter 15 of Luke: “The substance of man is rational, upon which free choice follows; for everything rational is of free choice.”
Now from the Latins: Tertullian, book 2 against Marcion, before the middle: “The whole liberty of choice toward either part was granted to man, that he might constantly meet himself as his own master, both by keeping the good of his own accord and by avoiding the evil of his own accord.”
St. Cyprian, book 1, epistle 3 to Cornelius: “Man, left to his own liberty, and set in his own choice, desires for himself either death or salvation.”
St. Hilary, on Psalm 2: “To each one of us he has permitted the liberty and judgment of life, not fastening necessity toward either part.”
St. Optatus of Milevis, book 7 [al. 2] against Parmenian: “The homicide can commit the crime, and can also not commit it — and the other things of this kind, in which free choice is had.”
St. Ambrose, in the commentary on Psalm 40: “To man he gave the choice of electing what he should follow.”
St. Gaudentius of Brescia, tractate 3 on Exodus: “We have spoken of liberty of choice, because the Jews willed to do what they did; and if they had not willed, they would not have done it.” And below: “The foreknowledge of God indeed is not deceived; but neither is the liberty of the will, once granted to man, taken away — lest nothing could be judged concerning him who was not free in acting.”
St. Jerome, at the end of the epistle to Ctesiphon: “In vain do you blaspheme, and din into the ears of the ignorant that we condemn free choice. Let him be condemned who condemns it.” Likewise, in the commentary on chapter 26 of Jeremias, explaining that saying, If so be they will hearken and be converted: “The ambiguous word ‘if so be’ cannot befit the majesty of the Lord; but he speaks after our affection, that free choice may be preserved to man, lest from his foreknowledge he be forced, as it were from necessity, either to do something or not to do it. For it is not because God knows that something will be that it therefore will be; but because it will be, God knows it, as foreknowing things future.”
St. Augustine, in the book On the Greatness of the Soul, chapter 36: “Free choice was given to the soul; and they who endeavor to overthrow it with trifling reasonings are so far blind that they do not understand that they say even those vain and sacrilegious things by their own will.” Likewise, book 5 On the City of God, chapter 10: “Wherefore we are in no way compelled either, retaining the foreknowledge of God, to take away the choice of the will, or, retaining the choice of the will, to deny — which is impious — that God is foreknowing of things future; but we embrace both, we confess both faithfully and truly.” And below: “Nor does man therefore sin because God foreknew that he would sin; nay rather, it is not doubted that it is he himself who sins when he sins, because he whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived foreknew that not fate, not fortune, not something else, but the man himself would sin — who, if he will not, certainly does not sin; but if he shall have willed not to sin, this too that one foreknew.”
The author of the work which is entitled Hypognosticon, book 3, not far from the beginning: “That free choice itself is in men, we believe with certain faith, and preach without doubting.” And below: “There is, therefore, free choice; and whoever shall deny it is not a Catholic.”
St. Innocent I, in the epistle to the Council of Carthage: “We received free choice when we were born.”
St. Leo I, Pope, sermon 16 on the passion of the Lord: “Nor by foreknowing what was to be done did he compel it to be done — although he had assumed flesh for this, that it might be done.”
St. Prosper of Aquitaine, in the response to the sixth objection of the Gauls: “That free choice is nothing, or is not, is wrongly said.”
To these could be added the more recent — St. Gregory, St. Fulgentius, the Venerable Bede, St. Anselm, St. Bernard, and others — whom we purposely pass over: both because it is not obscure that they follow the doctrine of St. Augustine in all things, and because their testimonies, with several others, will be set down when we discourse of free choice in moral actions. For all those testimonies, if they shall prove that man is of free choice in good and evil actions, will much more prove what we are now about: namely, that man is of free choice in indifferent and civil actions.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT IX. Adfcnmtur testimonia ipsorum Patrum. Sanctus Irenaeus lib. iv. cap. 71. « Consi¬ lium, inquit, bonum dat omnibus, posuit au. tem Deus in homine potestatem electionis, quemadmodum et in Angelis. » Et cap. 72. « Si igitur non in nobis esset facere heee, aut non facere, quam causam habebat Aposto¬ lus, et multo prius ipse Dominus consilium dare, quae quidem facere, a quibus vero ab¬ stinere ?» Clemens Alexandrinus lib. 1. Stromatum, pag. 65. « Sed, inquit, nec laudes, nec vi¬ tuperationes, nec honores, nec supplicia justa essent, si anima non habeat liberam po testatem. » Origenes lib. II. contra Celsum pag. 780. « Videamus, inquit, quidCelsus dicat postea. Hic, inquit, cum Deus esset, praedixit, et omnino oportebat fieri quod praedixerat. Deus ergo suos discipulos, et Prophetas, cum quibus cibum et potum sumebat, eo neces¬ sitatis adduxit, ut contra jus ac pietatem fa¬ cerent. Respondebimus et ad haec, quando jubes, ut ne ipsa quidem argumenta praeter¬ eam, quae mihi videntur frivola. Celsus pu¬ tat, quod aliquis praescius praedixit, ideo fieri, quia praedictum est : nos vero hoc non concedentes, dicimus, non praedictorem cau¬ sam esse futuri, sed futurum illud quod om¬ nino eventurum erat, etiam nemine praedi¬ cente, praecognitori causam praedicendi de¬ disse, totum enim in praecognitione vatisest, cum alterutrum fieri possit, fore hoc alte¬ rum, non dicimus praecognitorem adimere possibilitatem, ut vel fiat, vel non. Quibus verbis Origenes diluit objectionem Celsi, qui probare conatus fuerat, Christum praedicendo proditionem Judae, attulisse ne¬ cessitatem ipsi Judae, ut facinus illud prodi¬ tionis committeret; quia necesse erat fieri, quod Christus Deus futurum esse praedixe¬ rat. Respondet igitur Origenes, praedictio¬ nem non adferre necessitatem, quia non ideo res fit, quia praecognita est, sed ideo praecognita est, quia futura erat. Quare paulo infra docet, Judam sic prodidisse Do¬ minum, ut potuerit non prodere, atque ita concordat praescientiam cum contingentia et libertate. Idem etiam Origenes lib. 3. de principiis cap. 1 copiose probat, hominem esse Uberi arbitrii, et respondet ad omnia argumenta, quae nunc adversarii proferunt, quaeque ab antiquis haereticis profereban¬ tur. Eusebius Caesariensis lib. vi. de praepa¬ rat. Evangel. cap. v. probat optimis argu¬ menti^, libertatem anecessitate non pugnare cum providentia : « Nam, inquit, si eventura omnino sunt prospera, vel adversa unicui¬ que homini, estque necesse haec me agere, et te illa, quid oportet cura , laboreque confi¬ ci?» Et infra: «Quomodo, inquit, cum sentia¬ mus nostra nos appetitione moveri, non omnino amentissimum erit ab exteriori qua¬ dam vi, quasi animi expertes moveri nos credere ? sic enim libera voluntate alia fu¬ gimus, alia sequimur, ut quemadmodum dolere, gaudere, videre, audire, non ratio¬ cinando, sed reipsa comprehendimus : ita a nostro ipsorum consilio, aut ad fugiendum, aut ad sequendum moveri nos profecto sen¬ tiamus. Quas ob res rationalis naturae liber¬ tas jure negari non potest. » S. Athanasius in serm. de passione et cruce Domini, proposita quajstione, an quae 20 LIBER IV. sunt divinitus praacognita, et praedicta ex necessitate eveniant, ita respondet : « Non propheta istarum rerum auctor est, aut cau¬ sa, sed ipsorum voluntas, quin potius ipsi in causa fuerunt, ut talia de ipsis Propheta; praedivinai*ent. Prophetae proprium est futu¬ ra prospicere et non hallucinari, hominum autem est agere quod velint. » S. Basilius in serm. de libero arbitrio : <( Quod, inquit, in hominis potestate situm est liberum arbitrium, in eligendo et non eli¬ gendo situm est. » Item in oratione, quod Deus non sit auctor malorum : « Cur, inquit, anima ad malum suscipiendum apta fuit? propter liberum arbitrium, quod maxime ra¬ tionalem naturam decet. Soluta enim ab omni necessitate, et voluntariam, ac in sua potestate sitam vitam a conditore adepta per boc ad imaginem Dei creata est.» S. Gregorius Nazianzenus in i. Apologet, non procul ab initio : « Singularis, inquit, et eximia; Dei bonitatis argumentum est, facere ut nostra quoque aliqua ex parte sit virtus, nec natura nobis inseratur, sed voluntate, animique proposito excolatur, arbitriique libertate, parem in utramque partem motum habente. » S. Gregorius Nyssenuslib. ix. de philoso¬ phia cap, 3 : « Omnis, inquit, qui consultat, quasi in ejus potestate existente electione de operabilibus consultat, ut quod per con¬ silium decernitur eligat, et eligens faciat. Necesse igitur est eum, qui consultat, Domi¬ num esse actionum. Si enim non fuerit Do¬ minus actionum, ex superfluo consultat ; si vero hoc ex necessitate assistit vi rationali liberum arbitrium, aut enim non erit ratio¬ nalis, aut dominium suarum actionum obti¬ nebit : dominari autem actionum omnino li¬ beri arbitrii est. » S. Joannes Chrysostomus homil. 60. in Matth. explicans illnd ; « Neccsse est, ut ve¬ niant scandala. Necessitatem, inquit, dicit, non quia libertatem voluntatis, potestatem¬ que liberi arbitrii tollat : nec quia necessitati rerum humanam vitam subjiciat, sed quod omnino venturum est, pronunciat. » Et in¬ fra : « Non quia futura scandala praedixit, idcirco veniunt; sed quoniam futura erant, idcirco praedixit. » Et serm. 2. de Fato : « Deus dicit, posui ante te vitam et mortem, ad quod volueris, extende manum tuam. Daemon dicit, non est in te quod extendas manum tuam, sed necessitate quadam et vi id agis. Videntur ne tibi haec flde digniora?» S. Epiphanus haeres. 16. « Quare, inquit, omnibus manifestum, clarumque ac minime ambiguum est, quod liberum arbitrium ex¬ hibuit nobis Deus, dicens, si volueritis et audieritis me, bona terree comedetis. » S. Cyrillus lib. ii. in Joan. cap. liv. « Li¬ berum, inquit, hominis arbitrium his verbis ostendit, qui ad alterutrum secundum animi sui judicium potest proficisci. » Et lib. iv. cap. 7. « Non possumus, inquit, secundum Ecclesia1, veritatisque dogmata liberam po¬ testatem hominis, quod liberum arbitrium appellatur, ullo modo, negare. » Et lib. ix. cap. 10. « Rationali creatura; liberam pote¬ statem creator largitus est, et sum voluntatis habenas unicuique commisit, ut in eo sit, ' quidquid probaverit eligere. » S. Joan. Damascenus lib. ii. de fide cap. 20. « In nobis, inquit, sunt ea, quorum su¬ mus liberam adepti potestatem, et facere et non facere. » Thcophylactus in commcnt. ad cap. xv. Luca; : « Rationalis, inquit, ad quam subse¬ quitur liberum arbitrium substantia est ho¬ minis, omne enim rationale liberi arbitrii est.» Jam ex Latinis Tertullianus lib. n. adver¬ sus Marcionem ante medium : « Tota liber¬ tas arbitrii in utramque partem homini con¬ cessa est, ut sui dominus constanter occur¬ reret, et bono sponte servando, et malo sponte vitando. » S. Cyprianus lib. 1 epist. 3. ad' Cornei. « Homo, inquit, libertati sua; relictus, et in arbitrio proprio constitutus, sibimet ipsi vel mortem appetit, vel salutem. » S. Hilarius in Psal. n. « Unicuique, inquit, nostrum libertatem vitae, sensumque per¬ misit non necessitatem in alterutrum affi¬ gens. » * Sanctus optatus Milevitanus lib. Vli. in Parmeniam. « Homicida, inquit, potest sce¬ lus facere, potest et non facere, et eaetera hujusmodi, in quibus liberum habetur arbi¬ trium. » S. Ambrosius in comment. Psal. xl. « Ho¬ mini, inquit, ‘dedit eligendi arbitrium quid sequatur. » S. Gaudentius Brixianus tract. 3. in Exod. « Libertatem, inquit, diximus arbitrii, quia voluerunt Judaei facere quod fecerunt, et si noluissent, non fecissent. » Et infra : « Prae¬ scientia quidem Dei non fallitur, sed nec homini concessa semel voluntatis libertas aufertur, ne nihil de eo judicare possit, qui liber non fuerit in agendo, » CAPUT X. 21 S. Hieronimus in epist. ad Ctesiphontem extrema : « Frustra, inquit, blasphemas, et ignorantium auribus ingeris, nos liberum ar¬ bitrium condemnare. Damnetur ille , qui damnat. » Item commentar, cap. xxvi. Hie- remiaj, explicans illud : « Forsitan audient et convertentur : Verbum, inquit, ambiguum, lbrsitam majestati Domini non potest conve¬ nire, sed nostro loquitur affectu, ut liberum homini servetur arbitrium, ne ex praescien¬ tia ejus, quasi ex necessitate vel facere quid, vel non facere cogatur. Non enim ex eo, quod Deus scit futurum aliquid, idcirco fu¬ turum est : sed quia futurum est, Deus no¬ vit quasi praescius futurorum. » S. Augustinus in lib. de quantitate animae cap. 36. «Datum est, inquit, animae liberum arbitrium, quod qui nugatoriis ratiocinatio¬ nibus labefactare conantur, usque adeo caeci sunt, ut ne ista quidem vana, atque sacrile¬ ga, propria voluntate se dicere intelligant. » Item lib. v. de Civit. Dei cap. 10 : « Quocirca nullo modo cogimur, aut retenta praescientia „ Dei tollere voluntatis arbitrium aut retento voluntatis arbitrio, Deum, quod nefas est, negare praescium futurorum ; sed utrumque amplectimur, utrumque fideliter et veraciter confitemur. » Et infra : « Neque ideo peccat homo, quia Deus illum peccaturum praesci¬ vit; immo ideo non dubitatur ipsum peccare cum peccait, quia ille, cujus praescientia falli you potest, non fatum, non fortunam, non aliquid aliud, sed ipsum peccaturum esse praescivit, qui si nolit, omnino non peccat sed si peccare noluerit, etiam hoc ille prae¬ scivit. » Auctor operis, quod inscribitur Hypogno- sticumlib. m. non procul ab initio : « Ipsum, inquit, liberum arbitrium in hominibus esse, certa fide credimus, et praedicamus indubi¬ tanter. » Et infra : « Est igitur liberum ar¬ bitrium, quod quisquis negaverit, Catholicus non est. » S. Innocentius I. in epist. ad Concilium Carthaginiense : « Liberum, inquit, arbitrium cum nasceremur accepimus. » S. Leo Papa I. serm. 16. de passione Do¬ mini : « Nec praesciendo, inquit, quod lacien¬ dum esset, coegit, ut fieret, quamvis ad hoc carnem assumpsisset, ut fieret. » S. Pi*osper Aquitanus in responsione ad object. 6. Gallorum : « Liberum, inquit, ar¬ bitrium nihil esse, vel non esse, perperam dicitur. » * Ilis addi possent recentiores, S. Grcgorius, S. Fulgentius, Venerabilis Beda, S. Ansel- mus, S. Bernardus, et alii, quos de indu¬ stria pixetermittimus, tum, quod obscurum non sit, eos S. Augustini doctrinam in om¬ nibus sequi, tum, quia testimonia ipsorum cum aliis pluribus adseribentur, cum de li¬ bero arbitrio in actionibus moralibus disse¬ remus. Nam illa omnia testimonia, si proba¬ bunt hominem esse liberi arbitrii in actioni¬ bus bonis et malis, multo magis probabunt id, quod nunc agimus, hominem videlicet esse liberi arbitrii in actionibus indifferenti¬ bus et civilibus.