Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book IV: Grace and Free Choice in Natural and Civil Works
Chapter 10: That it is evident by the light of natural reason that man has free choice in external civil actions
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book IV. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We have demonstrated thus far, against the heretics, the liberty of choice both by testimonies of the Scriptures and of the Fathers; now, both against the same heretics and against certain very few Catholics whom we named in chapter 5, we shall demonstrate the same liberty of choice from reason and the natural light.
The first reason, then, can be drawn from the common consent of the wise, even of the heathen. For the Peripatetics teach it, as is clear from Aristotle, book 3 of the Ethics, chapters 1, 2, 3, and following. The same the Academics, as plainly appears from Plato in the Gorgias and elsewhere. The same also the Stoics, who nevertheless most keenly defended fate. For (as St. Augustine writes, book 5 On the City of God, chapter 10) the Stoics subjected all other things to fate except human minds. Wherefore Plutarch, in the book On the Opinions of the Philosophers, affirms that the Stoics thought the same as Plato concerning liberty of choice. The same, of the Stoics and Platonists, Gregory of Nyssa confirms in the book On Fate, chapters 1, 2, and 3, to whom he also adjoins the Wise Men of Egypt. Marcus Tullius also (the same Augustine witnessing, book 5 On the City of God, chapter 9) preferred to take providence from God rather than liberty from man; and so, that he might make men free, he makes them sacrilegious. For since he could not couple human liberty with divine providence, he chose that which was better known, and which he saw himself experience in himself at almost every moment. Eusebius, besides, adduces the testimonies of many heathen, book 6 On the Evangelical Preparation, chapters 6 and 7. Finally, Calvin himself, book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 2, § 2 [al. 3], confesses that the Philosophers with the highest consent taught liberty of choice.
The second reason is taken from the consent of the whole globe of the earth. For there is no commonwealth, nor ever was, no empire, which has not had public counsel, magistrates, laws, punishments, rewards — which would be altogether superfluous, if men did not have liberty of choice. Likewise, in every army the commanders and captains kindle the minds of the soldiers with speech, with promises, with drums, and with trumpets. But to what end would these things be done, if men did not move themselves to their works by counsel and deliberation of mind, and could not, at their choice, act and not act? Moreover, absolutely all men judge prudence and industry to be necessary in human works, whether they be merchants, or farmers, or craftsmen, or whoever else. Wherefore Eusebius rightly teaches, book 6 On the Evangelical Preparation, chapter 5 [al. 6], that they who hold that all things come to pass from necessity, nothing contingently and freely, pervert or overturn the whole of human life.
The third reason is drawn from experience, which compels those very men who in words deny free choice to affirm it in fact and by deeds — which Eusebius teaches from Alexander of Aphrodisias, book 6 On the Evangelical Preparation, chapter 7 [al. 9]. For even they who deny liberty of choice exhort their own, and give them precepts; they also punish them if they act wrongly; they are solicitous in dangers, cautious in doubtful matters; and if anyone do them an injury, they grow angry and prepare revenge. Which is to be seen above all in the Calvinists, who, if perchance they be wounded by one word, straightway vomit forth books full of revilings. But if they truly hold that those with whom they are angry could not have not inflicted the injury, why, I ask, are they angry? They will say, perhaps, that they too cannot help being angry. Why, then, are they not similarly angry if they suffer a like injury from a madman or a boy? And if they seriously believe that those whom they exhort, and to whom they give precepts, are driven by a certain necessity, so that they cannot do other than what they do, why do they waste time in vain both in exhorting and in prescribing? And if they themselves also exhort and prescribe from necessity, why do they not use exhortations and precepts toward fools, or cattle? Why only toward men both sane and sober? Does not experience, then, plainly compel the confession that choice is free, both in us who exhort, prescribe, and are angry, and in those whom we exhort, to whom we prescribe, and with whom we are angry — seeing that we do nothing of the kind toward those whom we do not doubt to lack free choice?
The fourth reason is taken from the sins of men. For it is evident that men sometimes sin; nor is it less evident that no one can sin without liberty of choice. The sting and remorse of conscience; the shame which is born from sin; the reprehensions of others; the common hatred toward those who act ill — so that even to thieves thieves are hateful — most openly testify that men sometimes sin. And that no one sins in that which he does by necessity is so manifest, and certain to all, St. Augustine teaches in the book On True Religion, chapter 14, that here no fewness of the learned, no crowd of the unlearned, dissents; and in the book On the Two Souls, chapter 11, he writes that this is sung by shepherds on the mountains, by poets in the theaters, by the unlearned in their circles, by the learned in their libraries, by masters in the schools, by Pontiffs in the temples, by the human race in the globe of the earth.
The fifth reason is drawn from the very nature of the thing. For in each thing the mode of desiring is such as is the mode of knowing; for appetition follows cognition, nor can it come to pass that anyone desire a thing unknown. Now in men there is the cognition of the end, and of the means to the end, both necessary and also contingent; therefore the appetition of men is carried from necessity toward the end, and toward those means which are connected with the end from necessity; but toward the others only contingently. And this is precisely for man to be free with the liberty of contingency: namely, to be able to accept or reject those means which reason teaches are not necessarily connected with the end. Again (as Gregory of Nyssa rightly gathers in book 7 of the Philosophy, chapter 1), deliberation is ordered to election; accordingly, where there is a deliberative power, there is also an elective power; and where there is an elective power, there is liberty of choice, since liberty of choice is nothing else than the power of election. But it is evident that there is in man a deliberative power, as experience itself testifies; therefore it is also evident that there is in man an elective power, and liberty of choice.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT X. Evidens esse lumine rationis naturalis , homi¬ nem liberi esse arbitrii in actionibus civili¬ bus in externis. Demonstravimus hucusque adversus hte- reticos libertatem arbitrii , et testimoniis Scripturarum et Patrum : nunc tum adver¬ sus eosdem haereticos, tum adversus paucis¬ simos quosdam Catholicos, quos cap. 5. no¬ minavimus, demonstrabimus eamdem arbitrii libertatem ex ratione, ac lumine naturali. Prima igitur ratio duci potest a communi consensu sapieatum, etiam ethnicorum. Id enim Peripatetici docent, ut perspicuum est ex Aristotele lib. m. Ethicor. cap. 1. 2. 3. et sequent. Idem Academici, ut plane con¬ stat ex Platone in Gorgia, et alibi. Idem etiam Stoici, qui tamen fatum acerrime de¬ fendebant. Nam (ut scribit S. Augustin.' lib. v. de Civit. Dei cap. 10.) Stoici esetera om¬ nia fato subjiciebant praeter animos huma¬ nos. Quare Plutarchus in lib. de Placitis Philosophorum, affirmat, Stoicos de liber¬ tate arbitrii idem cum Platone sensisse. Idem de .Stoicis et Platonicis confirmat Grcgorius Nyssenus in libro de fato cap. I. 2. et 3. quibus etiam adjungit Sapientes yEgypti. Marcus etiam Tullius (eodem Augustino te¬ ste lib. v. de Civit. Dei cap. 9.) maluit Deo providentiam auferre, quam homini liberta¬ tem, et ita ut faceret homines liberos, facit sacrilegos. Cum enim libertatem humanam cum providentia divina copulare non posset, elegit id quod erat notius quodque in se ipse singulis fere momentis experiri videbat. Multorum praeterea Ethnicorum testimonia adducit Eusebius lib. vr. de praeparat. Evan- 22 LiBtitt IV. gei. cap. G et 7. Denique Calvinus ipse lib. 2. Institutio», cap. 2. §. 2. fatetur Philoso¬ phos summo consensu libertatem arbitrii docuisse. Altera ratio sumitur a consensu orbis ter¬ rarum universi. Nulla est enim aut fuit un¬ quam respublica, nullum imperium, quod non habuerit publicum consilium, magistra¬ tus, leges, poenas, prsemia. Quse omnino su¬ pervacanea essent, si libertatem arbitrii ho¬ mines non haberent. Item in omni exercitu imperatores et duces et oratione, et promis¬ sis, et tympanis, et tubis accendunt animos militum. Sed quorsum haec fierent, si non consilio, et deliberatione animi homines ad opera sua se ipsi moverint, et possent pro arbitrio agere et non agere? Adhsec omnes omnino homines prudentiam, atque indu¬ striam necessariam esse censent in operibus humanis, sive ii sint mercatores, sive agri- colse, sive opifices , sive quicumque alii. Quare recte docet Euseb. lib. vi. de prae¬ parat. Evang. cap. 5. eos, qui sentiunt, om¬ nia fieri ex necessitate, nihil contingenter et libere, pervertere aut evertere humanam vitam universam. / Tertia ratio ducitur ab experientia, quae illos ipsos, qui verbis liberum arbitrium ne¬ gant, re ipsa, et factis, illud affirmare com¬ pellit, id quod ex Alexandro Aphrodisseo docet Eusebius lib. vi. de praeparat. Evang. cap. 7. nam illi etiam, qui negant arbitrii li¬ bertatem, hortantur suos, eisque praecipiunt, puniunt quoque si perperam agant, solliciti sunt in periculis, cauti in rebus dubiis, et si quis eos afficiat injuria, irascuntur, et ultio¬ nem parant. Quod in Calvinianis maxime cer¬ nere est, qui si uno verbo forte laedantur, mox evomunt libros plenos conviciorum. At si vere sentiunt, eos quibus irascuntur, non potuisse injuriam non inferre, cur, quaeso, irascuntur. Dicent fortasse, se quoque non posse irasci. Cur igitur non similiter irascuntur, si a phrenetico, vel puero similem injuriam pa¬ tiantur ? et si serio credunt, eos, quos hor¬ tantur, et quibus praecipiunt , necessitate quadam impelli, ut non possint aliud facere, quam quod faciunt, cur tempus et in cohor¬ tando et praecipiendo frustra terunt? quod si ipsi quoque ex necessitate hortantur et praecipiunt ; cur non utuntur hortationibus, et praeceptis erga stultos, aut pecora? cur tantum erga homines et sanos et sobrios? Nonne igitur experientia plane cogit fateri, liberum esse arbitrium tum in nobis, qui hortamur, praecipimus, irascimur, tum in iis quos hortamur, quibus praecipimus, et quibus irascimur, quandoquidem nihil ejus¬ modi agimus erga eos, quos libero arbitrio carere non dubitamus? Quarta ratio, sumitur ex peccatis homi¬ num. Siquidem evidens est, homines quan¬ doque peccare ; nec minus est evidens nemi¬ nem posse sine arbitrii libertate peccare. Conscientiae stimulus, ac remorsus ; vere¬ cundia quae nascitur ex peccato ; reprehen¬ siones aliorum ; commune odium in eos, qui male agunt, ita ut etiam furibus sint fures invisi, apertissime testantur, homines quan¬ doque peccare. Neminem autem peccare in eo, quod necessitate facit, tam esse manife¬ stum, et omnibus certum, docet S. August. in lib. de vera i*elig. cap. 14. ut nulla hic doctorum paucitas, nulla indoctorum turba dissentiat; et in lib. de duabus animabus cap. 11. scribit, hoc a pastoribus cantari in montibus, a poetis in theatris, ab indoctis in circulis, a doctis in bibliothecis, a magi¬ stris in scholis, a Pontificibus in templis, a genere humano in orbe terrarum. Quinta ratio ducitur ab ipsa rei natura; talis est enim in unaquaque re modus appe¬ tendi, qualis est cognoscendi ; appetitio enim cognitionem sequitur, nec fieri potest, ut quis appetat rem incognitam. In hominibus autem est cognitio finis et mediorum ad fi-» nem tum necessariorum, tum etiam contin¬ gentium igitur hominum appetitio ex ne¬ cessitate fertur in finem, et in ea media, quie sunt cum fine ex necessitate connexa : in alia vero nonnisi contingenter. Atqui hoc est, hominem esse liberum libertate contingenti®, posse videlicet accipere vel rejicere ea me¬ dia, quse ratio docet non necessario cum fine esse connexa. Rursus (ut recte colligit Gregorius Nyssenus in lib. 7. de Philosophia cap. 1.) consultatio ad electionem ordinatur, proinde ubi est vis consultiva, ibi etiam est vis electiva, ubi autem est vis electiva, ibi est libertas arbitrii, cum nihil sit aliud liber¬ tas arbitrii nisi potestas electionis : evidens autem est, esse in homine vim consultivam, ut experientia ipsa testatur ; igitur evidens quoque est, esse in homine vim electivam, atque arbitrii libertatem. caMjT XI. 23