Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book IV: Grace and Free Choice in Natural and Civil Works
Chapter 14: Three opinions on the concord of the divine cooperation with free choice are refuted
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book IV. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There remains the objection which is drawn from the alleged repugnance of the cooperation of the divine will with human liberty. And the objection is this: The divine will is the first cause of all things, and already from eternity has decreed what it wills, or wills not, to be done; therefore there can be no liberty of choice in man. For the first cause is most efficacious, and, according to the Scriptures, no one can resist the divine will.
Calvin confirms this objection from experience. For in matters by no means perplexed, both mind and reason often fail us, so that we wonder afterwards how we did not see what was before our eyes; and contrariwise, often in the most obscure matters an excellent counsel straightway shines forth, by which the whole affair is dispatched with easy labor. In like manner, as regards the carrying out: often in matters by no means arduous the courage goes limp, while in the most difficult and dangerous matters courage is at hand, superior to every difficulty. From which it can be understood that our minds are ruled and governed by God, according to that of Proverbs 20: The ear that heareth, and the eye that seeth, the Lord hath made them both. And chapter 21: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever he will, he shall turn it.
To this objection answer is wont to be made in various ways. For first, Cajetan, in part 1, question 22, article 4, teaches that this concord of free choice with the divine providence seems inexplicable, and not intelligible in this life. And indeed, if the matter so stood, still neither the providence of God nor the liberty of men would have to be denied. For it can easily happen that something is manifestly established on one side, and on the other is most doubtful and obscure; and then the one is not to be denied on account of the other: “Is that which is open,” says St. Augustine, book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14, “therefore to be denied, because that which is hidden cannot be comprehended?” But although this matter is obscure, and very deeply hidden, as Cajetan rightly admonished, yet the endeavor must be made to bring some light even to obscure things.
Durandus, on 2 Sentences, distinction 37, question 1, believed he had dispatched so great a matter with almost no labor, when he taught that no concurrence of the divine will is required for the actions of second causes, but that the natures themselves and their powers suffice, and that God, as he founded both, so conserve both. But that this opinion is false, and repugnant to the Scriptures, the testimonies of the Fathers, and reason, we taught a little before.
There is, then, a third opinion, of others, who confess that God by his concurrence determines the action of the human will, and that, this being posited, the human will cannot not act; yet that it is free absolutely — either because (as James Almain writes in the Morals, chapters 1 and 2) the concurrence of God is not among the prerequisites for the action of free choice, but among the concomitants (and that is a free power which, all prerequisites being posited, can act and not act); or because, as others teach, the concurrence of God determining the human will does not hinder man from having the full and perfect judgment of reason, and accordingly from judging one means to be contingent, another to be connected with the end from necessity. For this is the root of liberty; and wherever that root is found, there liberty also is found.
This opinion cannot win my approval, for many causes. First, because the reasons by which they defend the liberty of choice do not seem solid. For it is false, what Almain says, that the concurrence of God is not among the prerequisites. For if the human will is among the prerequisites because it is a cause of the action, why shall the concurrence of God, which is also a cause of the action, not be among the prerequisites? For we speak of the concurrence of God in first act. Nor does it seem true, what a certain one writes, that it suffices for free choice that man have the full and perfect judgment of reason. For it is further required that man be the Lord of his own action, and be able to act and not act. For this reason the Greeks call the free autexousion — that is, of his own power. But he who is determined by another to some action is certainly not the lord of that action. Wherefore, though the blessed have a full and perfect judgment in respect of the divine vision, yet they are not free concerning it, because they are determined to one, and cannot not will it. And all of us know with no less perfect a judgment the means necessarily connected with the end than the means connected contingently; and yet we are free concerning the latter, not concerning the former — because, namely, we can refrain from choosing the latter, but not the former. And so it is true that free choice is there where the root of liberty is — that is, the cognition of the contingency of the means — not because the dominion of one’s actions is not required, but because God has given that cognition of the contingency of the means to no one to whom he has not also given the dominion of his actions. For in vain would he have given that cognition, unless he had given the deliberative power; and in vain would he have given the deliberative power, unless he had given the dominion of actions and the indetermination in which true liberty consists.
But, you will say, God cannot will and not will, but from eternity is determined to one; and yet, because he judges that created things are not necessary to him, he is said to have free choice concerning them. I answer: God is determined to one from eternity, but by himself, not by another; and he could have determined himself to something else; and therefore he is truly and properly the Lord of his actions toward the outside. Wherefore man also, who was created to the image of God, that he may be truly free, must not only have full and perfect judgment, but also the dominion of his own actions, so that he determine himself.
Then, this opinion seems little consonant with Scripture, which in Ecclesiasticus 15 says that man was left in the hand of his own counsel, that to whatsoever he will he may stretch forth his hand. For how is he left in the hand of his own counsel, who in all his actions is determined by another, whom he can in no way resist? The Scriptures also which we cited above, which say that man has the option of choosing this or that, without doubt signify that man is the lord of his own actions, and undetermined.
Third, it seems repugnant to the testimonies of the Fathers. For thus speaks St. John Chrysostom, homily 11 on John: “The soul, being of its own right, has in itself the power of working, nor does it obey God in anything unless it will.” Likewise, homily 42 to the people of Antioch: “We must first choose the good things, and then he brings in his own; he does not forestall our wills, lest he violate our liberty.” In which place the holy Doctor does not deny prevenient grace or the cooperation of God, which elsewhere he often confesses; but he denies a forestalling that determines to one, such that it is not truly in the power of man to do or to omit. St. Jerome, in the commentary on chapter 26 of Jeremias: “The ambiguous word (‘if so be’) cannot befit the majesty of the Lord; but he speaks after our affection, that free choice may be preserved to man, lest from his foreknowledge he be compelled, as by necessity, either to do or not to do. For it is not because God knows that something will be that it therefore will be; but because it will be, God knows it.” In this place St. Jerome denies that foreknowledge is the cause of things future, lest free choice be destroyed. But if foreknowledge would destroy free choice, were it the cause of the future human action, how much more will the predetermination of the divine will destroy it, if it be posited as the cause of human actions — since predetermination is far more repugnant to liberty than foreknowledge? The same Jerome, in the epistle to Damasus on the prodigal son: “He gave to man the liberty of his own mind, that each one might live not by the command of God, but by his own compliance — that is, not from necessity, but from will.” Where that phrase, “not by the command of God,” does not signify that man is free from the obligation of the precepts of God, but that he is free from a necessity determining to one. St. Augustine, book 7 On the City of God, chapter 30: “He so administers all things which he created, that he also lets them exercise and carry on their own motions.” But certainly it is proper to free choice to be Lord of its own action, and to determine itself to it, not to be determined by another. St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 7 of the Philosophy, chapters 1 and 2, teaches that the actions of free choice are not to be referred, as to their cause, to God, but to ourselves; and that therefore they are said to be in our power. St. John Damascene, book 2, chapter 30: “It is worth while to acknowledge that God foreknows all things, but does not predefine and predestine all things. For he foreknows even the things that are in us, but does not predefine them.”
Fourth, it is repugnant to the principal Scholastic authors. For St. Bonaventure, on 2, distinction 37, question 1, at the last: “To that which is objected — that God is the principal mover in such an action — it must be said that it is true; yet it does not follow from this that he arouses free choice to perform that operation. For arousal names some effect of grace forestalling the will itself. This indeed is required in meritorious good works; but in other works, indifferent, or even evil, there is only the cooperation of the divine power, which, existing in the creature potentially, essentially, and presentially, as it conserves it in being, so helps it in working; wherefore it is granted that there is there co-operation, not pre-vention.” Gregory of Rimini, on 2, distinctions 34 and 37, question 1, article 3: “God,” says he, “follows the determination of the will — not that the determination of the will is some entity distinct from the will and its act, which is first made by the will, as the argument seems to imagine; nor yet by understanding that the will does that act prior in nature to God, speaking properly of priority of nature, since then it would follow that it could do it with God co-acting, as is clear from the definition of the prior according to nature: but I say that God follows the determination of the will in this sense, that God does that act because the will does it, and not: because God does it, therefore the will does it. And therefore it is more properly said that God co-acts with the will in causing such an act, than that the will is said to co-act with God.” Scotus, on 2 Sentences, distinction 37, question 1, at the section “for the solution of these,” etc., discoursing of the cooperation of the first cause with a free second cause, teaches that God in no way acts before the will, and thereby that the will is not predetermined by God: “As in one instant of nature the matter ‘matters’ and the efficient effects, so two ordered efficient causes in an instant of nature cause the common effect, so that neither then causes without the other; but that the effect is not caused aright — this is not then on account of the prior cause, which, so far as lies in itself, would cause aright if the second were to cause, but on account of the defect of the second cause, which has it in its own power to co-cause with the first cause or not to co-cause; and if it does not co-cause with it, as it is bound, there is no rectitude in the common effect of both.”
St. Thomas, in 1-2, question 9, article 6, to the 3rd, speaks thus: “To the third it must be said that God moves the will of man as the universal mover to the universal object of the will, which is the good; and without this universal motion man cannot will anything: but man determines himself, through reason, to will this or that, which is a true good or an apparent good.” Where that adversative particle, “but,” shows that the particular determination is to be referred to the will itself, not to God as first determining; while the universal determination toward good in common is to be referred to God, who is the universal cause. The same, in 1-2, question 10, article 4: “Because the will is an active principle not determined to one, but standing indifferently toward many, God so moves it that he does not determine it from necessity to one; but its motion remains contingent, except in those things toward which it is moved naturally.” The same, in 1-2, question 80, article 1, to the 3rd: “It must be said that God is the universal principle of every interior human motion; but that the human will is determined to an evil counsel — this is directly from the human will, and from the devil by way of one persuading, or proposing objects of appetite.” Likewise in 2-2, question 174 [al. 172], article 1, he teaches, according to Damascene, that God predestines those things which are not in our power; but the things that are to be done through our free choice he foreknows, yet does not predestine. Finally, in question 3 On Power, article 7, to the 13th, he speaks thus: “The will is said to have dominion of its act, not by the exclusion of the first cause, but because the first cause does not so act in the will as to determine it of necessity to one, as it determines nature; and therefore the determination of the act is left in the power of reason and will.” Cajetan, in the commentary on part 1, question 19, article 8, says: “The cooperation of God in each thing is according to the nature of each; for so he disposes all things sweetly. Whence, whether God cooperate necessarily or freely, nonetheless the created will freely uses that cooperation.”
Fifth, it is repugnant to reason. For in the first place, the determination of the will by God being posited, it does not seem that the liberty of choice can be saved. For that is called a free power which can act and not act; but the human will cannot act before it is determined by God, according to the doctrine of the adversaries; and after it has been determined by God, it cannot not act — because it cannot be understood that God move it and it not be moved, or that God determine it and it not be determined; therefore there will never be given a time in which it can truly act and not act. Then, if God were a necessary agent and determined the human will, it would act not freely but from necessity, as the adversaries admit. But it is all one to the will whether God move it necessarily or freely; for the act of the will will not proceed freely from the will merely because it proceeds freely from God — even as, if God freely move a beast to graze the grass, the beast will not on that account freely graze. Nor does the slave turn the mill of the bakehouse from election, because his Master from election compels him to turn the mill of the bakehouse. And so, whether God determine the will freely or from necessity, the will determined by God acts not freely but necessarily. For God indeed determines freely, because it is in his power not to determine; but the will, forestalled and determined by God, had it not in its power to bring it about that it be not forestalled and determined. Accordingly its act is free indeed as it goes forth from God, yet it is not free as it goes forth from the will itself; and therefore the will itself is not a free cause, but a necessary one.
Moreover, if that determination be posited, it will not be able to be understood how God is not the cause of sin, and how men who sin are not worthy of excuse. For if God in every positive act determines the will and moves it to act, certainly he will also determine and move it to will to steal, to fornicate, to lie, to blaspheme, etc. And who could grasp that a man is worthy of punishment, if he wills that which God, by determining and moving, makes him will? But of this matter we have said much in book 2 [al. 5] On the State of Sin.
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CAPUT XIV. Refelluntur tres opiniones de concordia coo¬ perationis divinx cum libero arbitrio. Superest objectio, quae ducitur a repug¬ nantia cooperationis divinae voluntatis cum libertate humana. Est autem haec objectio : Divina voluntas est prima causa omnium re¬ rum, et jam ab aeternitate decrevit quid ve¬ lit, aut non velit fieri ; nulla igitur esse po¬ test in homine libertas arbitrii ; nam prima causa efficacissima est, et secundum Scri¬ pturas, non potest ullus divinae resistere vo¬ luntati. Confirmat hanc objectionem Calvinus ab experientia. Nam in rebus minime perplexis saepe deficit nobis et mens et ratio, ita ut miremur postea, quo modo non viderimus, quod erat ante oculos : contra autem saepe in rebus obeurissimis continuo affulget con¬ silium optimum, quo res tota facili negotio expeditur. Pari ratione quod attinet ad effe¬ ctum, saepe in renus minime arduis animu 28 LIBER IV. flaccescit ; in rebus autem difficillimis et pe¬ riculosis, animus suppetit omni difficultate superior. Ex quo intelligi potest, mentes no¬ stras a Deo regi et gubernari, juxta illud Proverb. xx : Ut auris audiat et oculus videat, Dominus facit utrumque. Et cap. xxi : Cor regis in manu Domini , quocumque voluerit in¬ clinabit illud (1). Ad hanc objectionem variis modis respon¬ deri solet. Primum enim Cajetanus in 1. par qua;st. 22. artic. 4. docet, concordiam istam liberi arbitrii cum divina providentia videri inexplicabilem, et non intelligibilem in hac vita. Et quidem si ita se res haberet, non tamen neganda esset vel providentia Dei, vel libertas hominum. Potest enim facile contingere, ut aliquid ab una parte manife¬ ste constet, ab altera sit maxime dubium et obscurum ; et tunc non est negandum unum propter alterum : « Numqnid (inquit S. Augustinus lib. de bono perseverantiae cap. 14.) ideo negandum est, quod apertum est, quia comprehendi non potest, quod occul¬ tum est ? » Sed quamvis res haec sit obscura atque ab¬ dita valde, ut Cajetanus recte monuit, tamen conandum est, rebus etiam obscuris aliquod lumen adferre. Durandus in 2. sentent. dist. 37. quaest. 1. nullo fere negotio rem tantam se expedivisse credidit, cum docuit, nullum requiri divinae voluntatis concursum ad actio¬ nes causarum secundarum, sed satis esse ipsas naturas, earumque virtutes, et ut Deus, sicut utrasque condidit, ita utrasque conservet. Sed hanc sententiam falsam esse, et Scripturis, Patrumque testimoniis, ac ra¬ tioni repugnare, paulo ante docuimus. Est igitur tertia aliorum sententia, qui latentur, Deum suo concursu determinare actionem voluntatis humante, et eo posito non posse humanam voluntatem non agere ; tamen esse liberam absolute, vel quia (ut scribit Jacobus Almaynus in moralibus, cap. 1. et 2.) Dei concursus non est de praerequi- sitis ad actionem liberi arbitrii, sed de comi¬ tantibus : illa autem est potentia libera, qure positis omnibus preerequisitis potest agere et non agere, vel quia, ut docent alii, con¬ cursus Dei determinans humanam volunta¬ tem, non impedit quominus homo plenum atque perfectum habeat judicium rationis, et pi’oinde judicet aliud medium esse contin¬ gens, aliud cum fine ex necessitate con¬ nexum. lhec enim est radix libertatis, et ubicumque radix ista reperitur, ibi etiam li¬ bertas reperitur. Haec sententia mihi probari non potest, multis de causis. Primo, quia rationes, qui¬ bus ipsi defendunt libertatem arbitrii, non videntur solidae : falsum enim est, quod Al¬ maynus dicit, concursum Dei non esse do praerequisitis. Nam si voluntas humana est de praerequisitis, quia est causa actionis, cur consursus Dei, qui est etiam causa ac¬ tionis, non erit de prserequisitis ? loquimur enim de concursu Dei in actu primo, neque verum esse videtur, quod scribit quidam, satis esse ad liberum arbitrium, ut homo plenum, atque perfectum habeat judicium rationis. Requiritur enim praeterea, ut homo sit Dominus suae actionis, et possit agere et non agere. Ideo enim Graeci liberum vocant auTE^ouaiov, id est, suae potestatis. Qui autem determinatur ab alio ad aliquam actionem, certe non est dominus illius actionis. Quo¬ circa licet beati habeant plenum, et perfe¬ ctum judicium, respectu visionis divinae, ta¬ men non sunt liberi circa illam, quia deter¬ minati sunt ad unum, nec possunt ^Ilam non velle. Et nos omnes non minus perfecto ju¬ dicio cognoscimus media necessario connexa cum fine, quam media connexa contingenter et tamen circa posteriora liberi sumus, non circa priora, quia videlicet, posteriora pos¬ sumus non eligere, non autem priora. Itaque verum est, ibi esse liberum arbi¬ trium, ubi est radix libertatis, id est, cognitio contingentiee mediorum ; non quia non re¬ quiratur dominium actionum, sed quia Deus nemini dedit illam cognitionem contingentiee mediorum, qui etiam non dederit dominium actionum. Frustra enim dedisset illam cog¬ nitionem, nisi dedisset vim consultivam, et frustra dedisset vim consultivam nisi dedisset dominium actionum, et indeterminationem, in qua consistit vera libertas. At, inquies, Deus non potest velle, et non velle, sed ab aeterno est determinatus ad unum : et tamen quia judicat res creatas non esse sibi necessarias, liberum arbitrium circa eas habere dicitur. Respondeo, Deum deter¬ minatum esse ad unum ab aeterno, sed a se ipso, non ab alio, et potuisse determinare se ipsum ad aliud, et ideo vere et proprie Do¬ minum esse actionum suarum ad extra : quare ipse etiam homo, qui ad imaginem (I)IYoy. XX. 12; ibid. XXL 1. CAPUT Xl- V. Dei creatus est, ut sit vere liber, non solum habere debet plenum et perfectum judicium, sed etiam dominium actionum suarum, ut se ipse determinet. Deinde, videtur haec sententia parum con¬ sentanea Scripturae, quae Eccles. xv. dicit, hominem relictum in manu consilii sui, ut ad quodcumque voluerit extendat manum suam. Quomodo enim relinquitur in manu consilii sui, qui in omnibus actionibus deter¬ minatur ab alio, cui resistere nullo modo potest? Scripturae etiam, quas supra citavi¬ mus, quae dicunt hominem habere optionem eligendi hoc, aut illud, sine dubio significant, hominem dominum esse suarum actionum et indeterminatum. Tertio, videtur repugnare testimoniis Pa¬ trum. Sic enim loquitur S. Joan. Chrysosto- mus hom. 11. in Joan. « Anima sui juris vim in se habet operandi, neque ulla in re Deo, nisi velit, obtemperat. » Item hom. 42. ad popul. Antioch. « Oportet, inquit, nos prius eligere bona, et ille sua tunc inducit : nostras non praevenit voluntates, ne nostram teme¬ ret libertatem. » Quo loco sanctus Doctor non negat gratiam praevenientem vel Dei cooperationem, quam alibi saepe confitetur, sed negat praeventionem determinantem ad unum, ita ut non sit vere in potestate homi¬ nis facere, vel omittere. S. Hieronymus in comment. cap. 26. Hie- remiae : « Verbum, inquit, ambiguum (for¬ san) majestati Domini non potest convenire, sed nostro loquitur affectu, ut liberum ho¬ mini servetur arbitrium, ne ex praescientia ejus quasi necessitate, vel facere vel non facere cogatur. Non enim ex eo, quod Deus scit, futurum aliquid, idcirco futurum est, sed quia futurum est, Deus novit. » Hoc loco S. Hieronymus negat, praescientiam esse causam futurorum, ne liberum destruatur arbitrium. At si praescientia destrueret libe¬ rum arbitrium, si esset causa futurae actionis humante ; quanto magis illud destruet prae- determinatio divinae voluntatis, si ponatur causa actionum humanarum, cum longe ma¬ gis libertati repugnet praedeterminatio, quam praescientia ? Idem Hieronymus in epist. ad Damasum de filio prodigo : « De¬ dit, inquit, homini mentis propriae liberta¬ tem, ut viveret unusquisque non ex imperio Dei, sed ex obsequio suo, id est, non ex ne¬ cessitate, sed ex voluntate. » Ubi illud «non ex imperio Dei » non significat, liberum esse hominem ab obligatione praeceptorum Dei, 29 sed liberum esse a necessitate determinanto ad unum. S. Augustinus lib. vn. de Civit. Dei cap. 30. « Sic, inquit, administrat omnia, quae creavit, ut etiam ipsa proprios exercere et agere motus sinat. » At certe proprium est liberi arbitrii, Dominum esse suae actionis, atque ad eam se determinare, non ab alio determinari. S. Grcgorius Nyssenus lib. vii. de Pliilo- soph. cap. 1. et 2. docet, actiones liberi ar¬ bitrii non esse referendas ut in causam,, in Deum, sed in nos ipsos ; et ideo eas dici esse in nostra potestate. S. Joannes Damascenus lib. n. cap. 30 : « Operae pretium , inquit , est agnoscere, omnia praescire Deum, non autem omnia praedefinire, ac praedestinare. Praescit enim et ea quae in nobis, non praedefinit autem haec. )> Quarto, repugnat, praecipuis auctoribus Scholasticis. Nam S. Bonaventura in 2. dist. 37. quaest. 1. ad ultimum : «Ad illud, inquit, quod objicitur, quod Deus est prin¬ cipale movens in tali actione, dicendum, quod verum est : attamen non sequitur ex hoc, quod excitet liberum arbitrium ad fa¬ ciendam illam operationem. Excitatio enim dicit aliquem effectum gratiae praevenientem ipsam voluntatem. Haec autem requiritur in bonis meritoriis : in aliis autem operibus in¬ differentibus, vel etiam malis, non est nisi sola cooperatio divinae virtutis, quae existens in creatura potentialiter, essentialiter et pree- sentialiter, sicut conservat eam in essendo ; sic adjuvat in operando, propter quod con¬ ceditur ibi esse operationem, non praeventio¬ nem. » Gregorius Ariminensis in 2. dist. 34. et 37. quaest. 1. art. 3. « Deus, inquit, sequitur de¬ terminationem voluntatis non quod determi¬ natio voluntatis sit aliqua entitas distincta a voluntate, et actu ejus, quae primo fiat a vo¬ luntate, sicut imaginari videtur argumen¬ tum ; nec etiam intelligendo , quod prius natura voluntas agat actum illum , quam Deus , proprie loquendo de priori na¬ tura ; quoniam tunc sequeretur, quod posset illum agere Deo coagente, sicut patet ex definitione prioias secundum naturam : sed ad hunc sensum dico, Deum sequi determi¬ nationem voluntatis, quoniam idqo Deus agit actum illum, quia eum voluntas agit, et non quia Deus agit, ideo voluntas agit. Et ideo dicitur magis prqprie Deuscoagere voluntati 30 LIBEll IV. talem actum causando, quam voluntas dica¬ tur coagere Deo. » Scotus in 2. sent. dist. 37. quost. 1. §. ad solutionem istorum etc. disserens de coo¬ peratione primo causo cum secunda libera, docet, nullo modo prius agere Deum, quam voluntatem, ac per hoc non prodeterminari voluntatem a Deo : « Sicut, inquit, in uno instanti naturfe materia materiat et efficiens efficit : ita duae causae efficientes ordinatae in instanti naturae causant effectum communem, Ita quod neutra tunc causat sine altera : sed quod effectus non rectus causetur, hoc non est tunc propter causam priorem, quae quan¬ tum est ex se, recte causaret, si secunda causaret, sed propter defectum causae se¬ cundae, quae in potestate sua habet concau- sare primae causae, vel non concausare, et si non concausat illi, ut tenetur, non est recti¬ tudo in effectu communi amborum. » S. Thomas in 1.2. quaest. 9. art. G. ad 3. sic loqpitur : « Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut uni¬ versalis motor ad universale objectum vo¬ luntatis, quod est bonum ; et sine hac uni¬ versali motione homo non potest aliquid velle : sed homo determinat se per rationem ad volendum hoc, vel illud, quod est vere bonum, vel apparens bonum. » Ubi illa par¬ ticula adversativa, sed , ostendit, determina¬ tionem particularem referendam esse in ip¬ sam voluntatem, non in Deum prius deter¬ minantem, determinationem autem univer¬ salem in bonum in communi, referendam esse in Deum, qui est causa universalis. Idem in 1. 2. quaest. 10. art. 4. « Quia, inquit, voluntas est activum principium Uon determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa, sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unam determinat sedmanet motus ejus contingens, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur. » Idem in 1. 2. quaest. 80. art. 1. ad 3. t< Di¬ cendum, inquit, quod Deus est universale principium omnis interioris motus humani : sed quod determinetur ad malum consilium voluntas humana, hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana, et a diabolo per mo¬ dum persuadentis, vel appetibilia proponen¬ tis. » Item in 2. 2. quaest. 174. art. 1. docet juxta Damascenum, Deum praedestinare ea, quae non sunt in nostra potestate, praescire autem, sed non praedestinare, ea quae sunt facienda per liberum nostrum arbitrium. De¬ nique in quaest. 3. de potentia art. 7. ad 13. sic ait: « Voluntas dicitur habere dominium actus, non per exclusionem causae primae, sed quia causa prima non ita agit in volun¬ tate, ut eam de necessitate ad unum deter¬ minet, sicut determinat naturam ; et ideo determinatio actus relinquitur in potestate rationis et voluntatis. » Cajetanus in comment. 1. par quaest. 19. art. 8. inquit : « Cooperatio Dei in unoquo¬ que est secundum naturam uniuscujusque, sic enim disponit omnia suaviter. Unde sive necessario, sive libere cooperetur Deus, ni¬ hilominus creata voluntas libere utitur illa cooperatione. » Quinto repugnat rationi. Nam in primis posita determinatione voluntatis a Deo facta, non videtur posse salvari libertas arbitrii. Illa enim dicitur libera potentia, qua? potest agere, et non agere ; at voluntas humana non potest agere, antequam a Deo determi¬ netur ex doctrina adversariorum ; postquam autem a Deo determinata est, non potest non agere, quia intclliginon potest, iit Deus eam moveat, et ipsa non moveatur, sive ut Deus eam determinet, et ipsa non determinetur ; igitur numquam dabitur tempus, quo ipse vere possit agere et non agere. Deinde, si Deus esset agens necessarium et determinaret humanam voluntatem, illa . non libere, sed ex necessitate ageret, ut ad¬ versarii admittunt. At perinde est voluntati, utrum Deus eam necessario, vel libere mo¬ veat ; nam actus voluntatis non ideo libere procedet a voluntate, quia libere procedit a Deo : quemadmodum si Deus libere moveat pecudem ad herbam depascendam, non pro- pterea pecus libere herbas depascet. Neque ideo servus ex electione vertit molam pistri¬ ni, quia Dominus ex electione cogit illum ad molam pistrini vertendam. Itaque sive Deus libere, sive ex necessitate determinet volun¬ tatem, voluntas a Deo determinata non libe¬ re, sed necessario agit. Nam Deus quidem libere determinat, quia est in potestate ejus non determinare : at voluntas a Deo pro¬ venta, et determinata non habuit in pote¬ state id efficere, ne proveniretur et determi¬ naretur. Proinde actus ejus liber quidem est, ut exit a Deo, non tamen est liber, ut exitab ipsa, et ideo ipsa non est causa libera, sed necessaria. Adhoc si ponatur ista determinatio, non poterit intelligi, quomodo Deus non sit cau¬ sa peccati, et quomodo homines qui peccant, non sint digni excusatione. Nam si Deus in CAPUT XV. omni actu positivo voluntatem determinat, et movet ad agendum ; certe etiam determi¬ nabit et movebit ad volendum furari, forni¬ cari, mentiri, blasphemare etc. quis autem capiat hominem dignum esse poena, si id ve¬ lit quod Deus determinando et movendo fa¬ cit eum velle? Sed de hac re multa diximus in ii. lib. de statu peccati.