Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book IV: Grace and Free Choice in Natural and Civil Works
Chapter 15: One way of the concord of the divine cooperation with free choice is explained
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book IV. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
That opinion, then, being refuted, two reasons occur to us, fitted well enough to explain the concord of the divine cooperation with free choice, and to dissolve the objection proposed in the preceding chapter.
One reason is according to the opinion of Gregory of Rimini, Scotus, Gabriel, and others, on 2 Sentences, distinction 37, who teach that the divine cooperation holds itself on the side of the effect, not on the side of the cause; that is, that the concurrence of God does not determine our will, nor impress or work anything upon it, but immediately flows into the effect, and produces it at that very moment at which it is produced by our will. For hence it follows that neither does God determine or necessitate the will, nor the will God. For each freely applies his own concurrence; and if either will not concur, the work will not be done. It is like when two carry a huge stone which one could not carry: for neither adds strength to the other, nor pushes him, and it is free to each to leave the burden. Although God — unless he will to work a miracle extraordinarily — always concurs when our will concurs, since to this he in a certain manner freely obliged himself when he created the free will. From which it also follows that, although at absolutely the same moment of time and of nature God and the will begin to work, yet God works because the will works, not contrariwise. And this is what some mean when they say that the will works prior in nature to God — not by a priority of the instant in which, but of the instant from which. But it will be worth while to solve the arguments which are wont to be made against this opinion.
The first argument: Between the first cause and the second there is a certain essential order, that the first move the second, and the second not act except moved by the first; but God is the first cause, our will the second; therefore God moves the will and applies it to the work. I answer: between the principal cause and the instrumental there is that order, that the one move the other. But between the first cause and the second, when the second is not properly an instrument, the order is not that the one move the other, but that the one be prior to the other in perfection, unlimitedness, and necessity: because, namely, it is the more perfect and nobler cause; and again the more universal, since it is not limited to one or another effect; and finally supremely necessary, since without it no effect can be done. But, you will say, Scripture indicates that men are instruments of God; for in Isaias 10 Assur is called the rod of the fury of God, and in the same place is named an axe and a saw. But it is easy to answer: for men are called instruments of God not properly but metaphorically, because God can, when he will, so bend their minds as a craftsman bends his instruments. For otherwise man is also a principal cause, since he is free, and lords it over the other animals. But how God bends the minds of men and yet does not take away the liberty of choice, has been explained above.
The second argument: If God works because the will works, and not contrariwise, certainly it follows that God depends on the will, and is in some manner determined by it; but it is absurd that God depend on a creature, and that the eternal be determined by the temporal. I answer: God does not depend on, nor is he determined by, the human will, though he works because it works. For God freely founded the free will, and could have not founded it; and again he freely willed, and from eternity decreed, to concur with the work of the free will whenever it should will to work; and finally he can also, when he will, not concur, if he will that something be done outside the order established by himself. And so, that God works because the will works is not that God depends on the creature, but on his own eternal institution and will.
The third argument: God is the cause of all things which in any way have being; but that our will determine and apply itself to working is without doubt something; therefore God does this very thing. God therefore makes the will determine and apply itself, and thereby moves, determines, and applies it. I answer: in this — that the will determines itself to the work, or (which is the same) really works when before it was not working — three things can be considered: the will, its action, and the going-forth of the action from the will, or the relation and bearing of the action, as effect, to the will, as cause. Of these three, the will without doubt was made by God alone; the action too is done by God, though not by him alone; finally, the relation properly is not made, but follows; yet, as it is really the same as the action, it is made by him by whom the action itself is made. And so there is nothing which is not made by God; and yet God is not said to determine or apply the will to the work, because that relation is not referred to God, but to the will alone. It would, however, be referred also to God, if he himself used the will as an instrument for doing that very action.
The fourth argument: The act of the will is a vital and immanent action; therefore it cannot be immediately produced except by an intrinsic and vital principle. Accordingly God does not concur to produce that action immediately, but by the mediation of our will. I answer: the concurrence of God is a certain general and indifferent influx, which is modified and determined by the second causes, at least as to specification, as we said in the book On the Cause of Sin. And it is gathered also from St. Thomas, book 3 against the Gentiles, chapter 66, where he says that the second causes are “particularizers” (for so he speaks) and determiners of the action of the first agent. Further, an immanent and vital action cannot be produced except by an intrinsic principle, or by an extrinsic one modified and determined by the intrinsic itself.
The fifth argument: The providence of God extends to all things, even singular, and contingent, and free; therefore God from eternity determined all effects, and thereby also determined the second causes to produce them. For otherwise, if free and contingent effects were not predetermined by God, but were such because the second causes are such, they would come to pass outside the intention of God — which St. Thomas demonstrates to be absurd in part 1, question 19, article 8, where he concludes that God prepared some causes necessary, others contingent or free, because he willed the effects to be such; not contrariwise, that he willed some effects to be necessary, others contingent or free, because the causes are such. I answer: God from eternity determined all effects, but not before the foresight of the determination of the second causes, especially the contingent and free; and again, he determined all effects, but not in the same way: for some he determined would be with himself working or cooperating, others with himself permitting or not hindering. Nor does the notion of providence demand that God predetermined all things before all foresight, but only that nothing be done without his foresight and cooperation, or permission. For otherwise he would also have predetermined sins before the foresight of the evil will, and would therefore have willed the evil will to be, that thence the sins already predetermined might come forth — which is a most absurd heresy, and an open blasphemy. Nor would the Lord say in the Gospel that one of the sparrows does not fall to the ground without our Father; but he would say that one of the sparrows does not fall to the ground which our Father does not cast down to the ground. And what St. Thomas says — that God instituted certain causes contingent or free, because he willed the effects to be such — seems to be understood of effects in the universal, not in the particular: that is, because God willed that in this world not all things be done necessarily, but some contingently or freely, therefore he instituted causes both necessary and contingent and free; yet in the particular he did not institute this free cause because he willed this free effect, but contrariwise he willed this effect to be free because it has a free cause. For in this way neither do contingent things come to pass outside the intention of God, nor are the second causes the first root of contingency; and yet providence does not hinder free choice. And that St. Thomas spoke in general, and not in particular, can be known from part 1, question 23, article 7, where he says that God determined the number of the essential parts of the world — as of the heavens, the elements, and all the species — yet did not determine the number of corruptible individuals, as of gnats, flies, etc., nor that this fly be born today, that one tomorrow; but only provided, and provides, in general, that no species of animals fail. And if the divine providence did not predetermine in particular the substantial individuals, though it foresaw them as future, and willed to cooperate with the second causes in their production — much less did it determine in particular all free transient actions, though it foresaw them, and decreed to cooperate, or to hinder, or to permit them if they be evil, and to draw some good out of them.
The sixth argument: If God did not predetermine all things before the foresight of the determination of the second causes, he could not certainly foreknow all things. For God does not see future free actions in the actions themselves, because they are not; nor does he see them in the second cause, that is, the human will, because it is undetermined, and, all things being posited which are required for acting, it can not act; nor does he see them in the first exemplar cause, that is, in the idea, because that represents all possibles, whether they be future or not; nor does he see them in his own eternity, which embraces all times — for although eternity coexists with all time, yet future time does not coexist with eternity except when it really exists, that is, when it is present; accordingly the future, while it is future, is not, nor can it be known in itself. Add that God knows also certain things which never will be: as when, in 1 Kings 23, to David asking, “Will the men of Ceila deliver me up?” he answered, “They will deliver thee”; and when, in Matthew 11, the Lord foretold that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have done penance, if they had seen the miracles which the Capharnaites saw. These and like conditionals God certainly foreknows, and yet in themselves they will never stand forth, nor will they ever coexist with eternity. Therefore either he sees them in his own will, as in the first efficient and most efficacious cause, or he sees them in no way.
I answer: it is an altogether difficult matter, and perhaps in this life incomprehensible, by what means God foreknows future things. And this David seems to have indicated in Psalm 138, when he says: Thy knowledge is become wonderful from me; it is strengthened, and I cannot reach to it. For that “from me,” in the Hebrew phrase, signifies “beyond me,” or “above me” — so that the sense is: the manner of thy knowledge is too wonderful for me to be able to comprehend it; how, namely, thou hast understood my thoughts afar off, and hast searched out all my paths, etc.
Yet it seems probable to us that God does not see future free actions except in the human will. For this, in the first place, Scripture signifies, when it says that God searches the reins and hearts, and in this Psalm 138, that God searches out all our paths. For if he saw them in his own will predetermining all things, he would not be said to search our hearts and to investigate our paths, but to behold his own will. Then, it would not be wonderful that God foreknows all things, if he predetermined all things; for we too easily foreknow and foretell what we are about to do; but holy David, in that whole Psalm 138, wonders at the knowledge of God, by which he foresees all our ways, and understands our thoughts afar off, etc. Moreover, St. Augustine, book 11 of the Confessions, chapter 18, teaches this openly enough, when he says: “In whatever manner the secrets of the foreknowledge of future things stand, nothing can be seen but what is; and what already is, is not future, but present. When, therefore, future things are said to be seen, it is not the things themselves, which are not yet — that is, which are future — but perhaps their causes or signs are seen, which already are. Therefore they are not future, but present, to those already seeing; and from them the future things are foretold, conceived in the mind.” Thus he.
God, therefore, because he perfectly knows all the propensities and the whole disposition of our mind, and again is not ignorant of all the things that can occur to it in each deliberation, and finally has thoroughly in view what is more congruent and apt to move such a mind, endowed with such a propensity and disposition — infallibly gathers to which part the mind is going to incline. And this perhaps is what they mean who teach that God knows all future things, both free and necessary, both absolute and conditional, because he knows all truth, and because all things which in any way are future are in some way true; for it is true to say “this will be” when in very fact it is future. This opinion, I say, seems to coincide with ours. For the true and being are convertible; and therefore it is not true that something is now future, unless it now have some being — namely, in its cause; but that which is freely and contingently future does not have being in its cause, except when in the cause there is some determination. And since in the contingent cause itself, precisely considered, there is no determination, therefore the Philosopher truly said of future contingents that there is no determinate truth; for he looked to the contingent cause alone by itself. Yet if anyone conjoin with the contingent or free cause all the things that can occur and hinder, and see the propensities and aptitudes both of the cause itself and of all objects and circumstances — which God alone can do — there arises thence some determination, and by reason of it it will be true to say: this will be at such a time.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XV. Explicatur ima ratio concordiae divinae cooperationis cum libero arbitrio , Illa igitur sententia refutata, dure nobis rationes occurrunt satis accommodatae, ad ex¬ plicandam concordiam divinae cooperationis cum libero arbitrio, et objectionem superiore capite propositam diluendam. Una ratio est juxta sententiam Gregorii Ariminensis, Scoti, Galnielis, et aliorum, in 2. sent. dist. 37. qui docent, cooperationem divinam se tenere ex parte effectus, non ex parte causae, hoc est, concursum Dei non de¬ terminare voluntatem nostram, nec aliquid in illam imprimere, aut operari, sed imme¬ diate influere in effectum, eumque producere illo ipso momento, quo a voluntate nostra producitur. Hinc enim sequitur, ut neque Deus deter¬ minet, sive necessitet voluntatem, neque voluntas Deum. Nam et uterque concursum suum libere adhibet, et si alter nolit concur rere, opus non fiet. Simile est cum duo ferunt ingentem lapidem, quem unus ferre non pos¬ set : neuter enim alteri vires addit, aut eum impellit, et utrique liberum est onus relin¬ quere. Quamquam Deus nisi extraordinarie miraculum operari velit, semper concurrit, quando voluntas nostra concurrit, quoniam ad hoc se libere quodammodo obligavit, quando liberam voluntatem creavit. Ex quo etiam sequitur, ut licet in eodem prorsus momento temporis et naturae, Deus et volun¬ tas operari incipiant, tamen Deus operetur, quia voluntas operatur, non contra.Ethocest, quod aliqui dicunt, 'voluntatem prius natura operari, quam Deum, non prioritate instan¬ tis in quo, sed a quo. Sed operae pretium erit solvere argumenta, quae adversus hanc sen¬ tentiam fieri solent. Primum argumentum, Inter primam cau¬ sam, et secundam est ordo quidam essentia¬ li l lis, ut prima secundam moveat, et secunda non agat nisi mota a prima ; est autem Deus prima causa; voluntas nostra, secunda; igi¬ tur Deus voluntatem movet, et applicat ad opus. Respondeo : inter causam principalem, et instrumentariam est ille ordo, utunaaltcram moveat. Inter primam autem Causam et se¬ cundam, cum secunda non est proprie in¬ strumentum, uon est ordo, ut una alteram moveat, sed ut una sit prior altera perfectio¬ ne, illimitatione et necessitate; quia videlicet sit causa perfectior et nobilior, et rursus uni¬ versalior, cum non limitetur ad unum vel alterum effectum, et denique summe neces¬ saria, cum sine ea nullus effectus fieri possit. At, inquies, Scriptura indicat, homines esse instrumenta Dei, namlsaiaex. dicitur ; Assur virga furoris Dei. Et ibidem appellatur secu¬ ris et serra. Sed facile est respondere, nam dicuntur homines instrumenta Dei, non pro¬ prie, sed metaphorice, quia potest Deus, quando vult, ita flectere eorum animos, quo¬ modo artifex flectit instrumenta sua. Nam alioquihomo est etiam causa principalis, cum sit liber et dominetur animantibus eseteris. Quomodo autem Deus flectat animos homi¬ num, et tamen non tollat arbitrii libertatem, explicatum est supra. Secundum argumentum. Si Deus operatur, quia voluntas operatur, et non contra ; certe sequitur, ut Deus pendeat a voluntate, et ali¬ quo modo ab illa determinetur : absurdum est autem, ut Deus pendeat a creatura, et a temporali determinetur aeternum. Respondeo : Deus non pendet, nec deter¬ minatur a voluntate humana, licet operetur, quia illa operatur : nam libere Deus condidit liberam voluntatem, et potuisset non conde¬ re : et rursus libere voluit, et ab aeterno de¬ crevit, concurrere ad opus liberae voluntatis, quando ipsa operari voluerit : et denique po¬ test etiam, quando vult, non concurrere, si velit praeter ordinem a se constitutum ali¬ quid fieri. Itaque Deum operari, quia volun¬ tas operatur, non est Deum pendere a crea¬ tura, sed ab aeterna sua institutione et volun¬ tate. Tertium argumentum, Deus est causa om¬ nium rerum, quae quoquo modo habent esse; at quod voluntas nostra se determinet et ap¬ plicet ad operandum, sine dubio est aliquid, igitur hoc ipsum facit Deus. Deus igitur facit, ut -voluntas se determinet et applicet, ac per hoc ipsam movet, determinat et applicat. 32 LlttER JV. Respondeo : ia eo quod est, voluntatem se determinare ad opus, sive (quod idem est) re ipsa operari, cum antea non operaretur; Tria considerari possunt, voluntas, actio ejus, et egressus actionis a voluntate, sive relatio, et habitudo actionis tamquam effe¬ ctus ad voluntatem, ut ad causam. Ex his tri¬ bus, voluntas sine dubio a solo Deo facta est; actio quoque fit a Deo, quamvis non solo ; denique relatio proprie non fit, sed consequi¬ tur : tamen ut est idem re cum actione, ab eo fit, a quo actio ipsa fit. Itaque nihil est, quod non fiat a Deo, et tamen non dicitur Deus determinare, vel ap¬ plicare voluntatem ad opus, quia relatio illa non refertur ad Deum, sed ad solam volun¬ tatem. Referretur autem etiam ad Deum, si ipse uteretur voluntate tamquam instrumen¬ to ad illam ipsam actionem faciendam. Quartum argumentum. Actus voluntatis est actio vitalis et immanens, igitur non po¬ test immediate fieri, nisi si a principio in¬ trinseco et vitali. Proinde Deus non concur¬ rit de illam actionem immediate producen¬ dam, sed mediante voluntate nostra. Respondeo : concursus Dei est generalis et indifferens quidam influxus, qui a causis se¬ cundis modificatur et determinatur, saltem quoad specificationem, ut diximus in lib. de causa peccati. Et colligitur etiam ex S. Tho- main lib. m. contra Gentes cap. 66. ubi di¬ cit causas secundas esse particulantes (sic enim loquitur) et determinantes actionem primi agentis. Porro actio immanens, et vita¬ lis non potest produci, nisi ab intrinseco principio, vel ab extrinseco modificato et de¬ terminato ab ipso intrinseco Quintum argumentum, providentia Dei ex¬ tenditur ad omnia, etiam singularia, et contingentia et libera : igitur Deus ab aeter- no determinavit omnes effectus, ac per hoc etiam determinavit causas secundas ad eos producendos. Nam alioqui si effectus liberi, et contingentes non essent praedeterminati a Deo, sed tales essent, quia tales sunt cau¬ sa; secundae ; praeter intentionem Dei fierent, quod absurdum esse demonstrat S. Thomas in 1. part. quaest. 19. artic. 8. ubi concludit, Deum praeparasse causas alias necessarias, alias contingentes, vel liberas, quia tales es¬ se voluit effectus ; non contra, ideo voluisse effectus esse alios necessarios, alios contin¬ gentes, vel liberos, quia tales sunt causae. Respondeo : Deus ab aeterno determinavit omnes effectus, sed non ante praevisionem determinationis causarum secundarum, prae¬ sertim contingentium, et liberarum : et rur¬ sus determinavit omnes effectus, sed non eo¬ dem modo ; alios enim determinavit futuros se operante, vel cooperante, alios se permit¬ tente, vel non impediente : neque ratio pro¬ videntiae postulat, ut Deus ante omnem prae¬ visionem omnia proedeterminaverit, sed so¬ lum ut nihil fiat sine ejus praevisione et coo¬ peratione, vel permissione.. Alioqui enim etiam peccata praedeterminassetante praevi¬ sionem malae voluntatis, et ideo malam vo¬ luntatem esse voluisset, ut inde peccata jam ante praedeterminata prodirent, quae est hae- resis absurdissima, et aperta blasphemia. Neque Dominus in Evangelio diceret, unum ex passeribus non cadere in terram sine Pa¬ tre nostro : sed diceret, unum ex passeribus non cadere in terram, quem Pater noster in terram non dejiciat. Quod autem S. Thomas dicit, Deum insti¬ tuisse quasdam causas contingentes, vel libe¬ ras, quia tales esse voluit eflectus; videtur intelligendum de effectibus in universum? non in particulari, id est, quia voluit Deus in hoc mundo non omnia fieri necessario, sed aliqua contingenter, vel libere, ideo causas instituit tum necessarias, tum contingentes et liberas : tamen in particulari non ideo in¬ stituit istam causam liberam, quia voluit hunc effectum liberum, sed contra voluit hunc effectum esse liberum, quia causam ha¬ bet liberam. Nam hoc modo neque res con¬ tingentes eveniunt praeter intentionem Dei, neque prima radix contingentia; sunt causa; secundae et tamen providentia non impedit liberum arbitrium. Quod autem S. Thomas locutus sit in ge¬ nere, et non in particulari, cognosci potest ex 1. part. quaest. 23. art. 7. ubi dicit, Deum determinasse numerum partium essentialium mundi, ut coelorum, elementorum, et omni¬ um specierum ; tamen non determinasse nu¬ merum individuorum corruptibilium, ut cu¬ licum, muscarum, etc. neque ut haec musca hodie nascatur, cras illa ; sed tantum in ge¬ nere providisse, et providere, ut non deficiat species ulla animalium. Quod si providentia divina non praedeterminavit in particulari individua substantialia, licet ea praeviderit futura, et voluerit cooperari causis secundis in eorum productione, multo minus deter¬ minavit in particulari omnes actiones trans¬ euntes liberas, licet eas praeviderit et decre¬ verit cooperari, vel impedire, vel permittere, CAPIT X V, si mala? sint, et bonum aliquid ex eis eli¬ cere. Sextum argumentum. Si Deus non omnia praedeterminaret ante prae visionem determi¬ nationis secundarum causarum, non posset omnia certo praescire. Nam actiones liberas futuras non videt Deus in ipsis actionibus, quia non sunt ; nec videt in causa secunda, id est, voluntate humana, quia illa indeter¬ minata est, et omnibus positis, qua? requi¬ runtur ad agendum, potest non agere ; nec videt in causa prima exemplari, id est, in idea, quia illa repraesentat omnia possibilia, sive futura sint, sive non sint : nec videt in aeternitate sua, quae ambit omnia tempora. Nam etiamsi aeternitas coexistat omni tem¬ pori, tamen tempus futurum non coexistit aeternitati, nisi quando re ipsa existit, id est, cum praesens est : proinde futurum, dum est futurum, non est, neque in se cognosci potest. Adde quod Deus cognoscit etiam quae¬ dam, quae numquam erunt, ut cum 1 Reg. 23. petenti David, num tradent me viri Cei- lam, respondit, tradent ; et cum Matth. ii. praedixit Dominus Tyrios et Sidonios poeni¬ tentiam acturos fuisse, si miracula vidissent, quae Capharnaitae viderunt. Haec et similia conditionalia Deus certo praenoscit, et tamen in se ipsis numquam exstabunt, neque aeter¬ nitati unquam coexistent. Igitur aut videt in sua voluntate, tamquam in prima causa effi¬ ciente , et efficacissima , aut nullo modo videt. Respondeo : res est omnino difficilis, et for¬ tasse in hac vita incomprehensibilis, qua ra¬ tione Deus futura praenoscat. Et hoc videtur indicasse David in Psal.cxxxvm. cum ait: Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me, confor¬ tata est , et non potero ad eam (I). Illud enim (ex me) hebraica phrasi significat (pr;e me) si¬ ve (super me) ut sensus sit, mirabilior est modus scientiae tuae, quam ut ego eum com¬ prehendere possim. Quomodo videlicet, in¬ tellexeris cogitationes meas de longe, et om¬ nes semitas meas investigaveris etc. Probabile tamen nobis videtur, Deum fu¬ turas actiones liberas non videre nisi in hu¬ mana voluntate. Id enim significat in primis Scriptura, cum dicit, Deum scrutari renes et corda, et in hoc Psalm. 138. Deum investi¬ gare omnes semitas nostras. Nam si videret eas in sua voluntate praedeterminante om¬ nia; non diceretur scrutari corda nostra et 33 investigare semitas, sed intueri voluntatem suam. Deinde non esset mirabile, Deum om¬ nia praenoscere, si omnia praedeterminaret. Nam et nos facile praescimus et praedicimus, quae facturi sumus: at S. David in toto illo Psal. cxxxvm. miratur scientiam Dei, qua praevidet omnes vias nostras, et intelligit co¬ gitationes nostras de longe etc. AdhcccS. Augustinus lib. xi. Confess. cap. 18. satis aperte hoc docet, cum ait : « Quo¬ quo modo se habeant arcana praescientiae fu¬ turorum ; videri nisi quod est, non potest ; quod autem jam est, non futurum, sed prae¬ sens est. Cum ergo videri dicuntur futura, non ipsa, quae nondum sunt, id est, quae fu¬ tura sunt, sed eorum causa?, vel signa forsi¬ tan videntur, quae jam sunt. Ideo non futura, sed praesentia sunt jam videntibus ex quibus futura praedicantur animo concepta. » Haec ille. Deus igitur quia perfecte cognoscit omnes propensiones, et totum ingenium animi no¬ stri, et rursum non ignorat omnia, quae illi possunt occurrere in singulis deliberationi¬ bus, et denique perspectum habet, quid magis congruum et aptum sit, ut moveat talem ani¬ mum tali propensione et ingenio praeditum, infallibiliter colligit, quam in partem sit ani¬ mus inclinaturus. Et hoc fortasse sibi volunt, qui docent, Deum cognoscere futura omnia tam libera, quam necessaria, et tam abso¬ luta, quam conditionalia, quia cognoscit om¬ nem veritatem ; et quia omnia, quae quoquo modo futura sunt aliquo modo vera sunt ; verum enim est dicere, hoc erit, quando re vera est futurum. Haec, inquam, sententia videtur coincidere cum nostra. Nam verum, et ens convertuntur, et ideo non est verum modo aliquid esse fu¬ turum, nisi illud, modo, habeat aliquod esse nimirum in causa ; non autem habet ejse in causa id, quod estlibere, et contingenter fu¬ turum, nisi quando in causa est aliqua de¬ terminatio. Et quoniam in ipsa contingente causa praecise considerata, nulla est deter¬ minatio, ideo vere dixit Philosophus, de fu¬ turis contingentibus, non esse determinatam veritatem ; respexit enim ad ipsam solam causam contingentem. Tamen si quis conjun¬ git cum causa contingente, vel libera omnia quae possunt occurrere et impedire, et videat propensiones et aptitudines tum ipsius cau¬ sae, tum omnium objectorum et circumstan¬ ti) Psal. CXXXVIII, 6. LIBER IV. tiarum, qilod solus Deus facere potest, ex- islet inde aliqua determinatio, et ratione il¬ lius verum erit dicere: hoc erit tali tempore.