Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book IV: Grace and Free Choice in Natural and Civil Works
Chapter 16: The other way of the concord of liberty with the cooperation of God is explained, and the objection proposed in chapter 14 is solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book IV. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The other way of reconciling human liberty with the divine cooperation — and perhaps also the more probable — is according to the opinion of St. Thomas, who teaches that the divine cooperation so concurs with the second causes, even the free, that God has not only given them, and conserves, their operative powers, but also moves and applies them to the work — as can be learned from part 1, question 105, article 5, and book 3 against the Gentiles, chapter 70, and question 3 On Power, article 7. Which opinion seems very consonant both with Scripture, which says that in God we are, live, and move, Acts 17, and also with reason, and with the order which the first cause has with the second; nor need one labor, on this opinion, to show that nothing at all is done without God. But yet this opinion also has its own difficulties, which we shall briefly explain, before we set forth how, according to this opinion, free choice is saved.
Some, then, object against the opinion of St. Thomas that it cannot be understood how God moves and applies the second causes. For if God moves the second causes, he moves them either by local motion or by alterative; not local, because the second causes, for the most part unmoved as to place, can act — for fire does not need local motion to burn the tow lying near it, and much less does the human will need local motion to will something. Nor alterative either, because then some quality would have to be impressed on the second cause; but no such quality is necessary — neither on the part of God, who works all things through the act of his own will, nor on the part of the second cause, which already has its operative power from nature. You will say it is necessary both on the part of God and on the part of the second cause: on the part of God, that through that quality he may reach the effect; on the part of the second cause, that it may be determined and applied to working. Against this: God does not need a quality to reach the effect; and moreover, if he needed a quality to reach the effect, he would impress it not on the cause, but on the effect; further, the second cause, the object being present, does not seem to need another determination or application. To this objection I answer: God does not move the second cause locally, nor impress any quality upon it, but only uses it as an instrument for effecting the work. Wherefore the power impressed by God after the manner of something transient, while the second cause works, is not distinguished from the natural power itself, but is that same power, insofar as God uses it for perfecting that action. And this motion of God is necessary on the part of the second cause, which, being such — that is, second — has a necessary dependence on the first cause, in whose power it works. See what we said about the power of God impressed in the Sacraments through motion, book 2 On the Sacraments in General, chapter 11.
These things explained, that we may show that, according to this opinion of St. Thomas, free choice is rightly defended, it must be known that the influx, or power, of God, by which the will is moved and applied to the work, is received in the second causes according to their disposition. As the same St. Thomas says in question 3 On Evil, article 2: “It is to be attended to that the motion of the first mover is not received uniformly in all movable things, but in each according to its proper mode.” And in 1-2, question 10, article 4: “It pertains to the providence of God not to corrupt nature, but to preserve it; whence he moves all things according to their condition.” And below: “Because the will is an active principle not determined to one, but standing indifferently toward many, God so moves it that he does not determine it from necessity to one; but its motion remains contingent, and not necessary, except in those things toward which it is moved naturally.” Thus he.
Further, that mode, or condition, in the will, according to which the motion of God is received in it, is nothing else than a certain negative determination, preceding both the influx of God and the elicited act of the will — namely, that the will let itself be moved by the object proposed to it through reason, or not let itself. For this determination is called negative because it does not consist in a positive act, but in the negation of an act — though the will is no less free to act than not to act. St. Thomas explains this in question 1 On Evil, article 3, where he says that the not-using of the rule of reason is pre-understood in the will before the disordered election; and that for this — the not-using of the rule of reason — no other cause need be sought than the liberty of the will: because, namely, it is in its power to let itself be moved by reason, or not let itself. And again, in question 3 On Evil, article 2, the same St. Thomas says that there is required in man a certain disposition for receiving the influx of God, and that according to that disposition a good or an evil act is produced. But no positive disposition can be prerequired before the influx of God, since nothing positive can be done without God; only a negative disposition, therefore, is prerequired.
And hence it comes to pass that the will is truly free, and determines itself, even though God move it and apply it to the work — since the very motion of God is in its power; or (as Cajetan speaks, on part 1, question 19, article 8) our will freely uses the motion of God. For if it let itself be moved by the proposed object, God applies it and moves it to elicit the act; if it let not, God does not apply it, nor move it. And therefore St. Thomas, in 1-2, question 10, article 4, to the 3rd, concludes that, the motion of God being posited, it is impossible that the will be not moved; but that absolutely it is not impossible — because, namely, the will can not dispose itself, through the negative determination, for receiving the motion of God. Like to this is what we said above about the concord of the last practical judgment and free election. For as, the last practical judgment being posited, it cannot come to pass that the will not choose that which is then proposed to it by reason — and yet the election is free, since the practical judgment itself is in the power of the will, on account of the preceding negative determination — so also, the influx of God being posited, it cannot come to pass that the will not work; and yet the working is free, since the influx of God is not posited unless the will first dispose itself, through the negative determination, for receiving it.
Against this opinion could be made the two last arguments which were made against the opinion of the preceding chapter — about the providence of all things in particular, and about the manner in which God knows future contingents; but these have already been proposed and explained.
From these things, then, answer can easily be made to the objection of Calvin proposed at the beginning of chapter 14. Now the objection was this: the divine will is the first cause of all things, and already from eternity has decreed what it wills to be done; therefore there can be no liberty of choice in man; for the first cause is most efficacious, and, according to the Scriptures, no one can resist the divine will. I answer: the divine will is indeed the first cause of all things, and from eternity has decreed what it wills, or wills not, to be done; but in particular actions, and above all in free ones, it did not decree this except with the disposition and determination of the second causes first foreknown, as we showed above. Wherefore, although no one can resist the divine will, yet liberty remains entire to the human will, because God himself, whom no one can resist, willed this: that the human mind be free, and have its own actions in its power; and therefore he decreed to cooperate with it, or to apply and move it, as often as it should dispose itself through the negative determination.
Calvin added a confirmation from experience: that in matters by no means perplexed counsel often fails us, and contrariwise in obscure matters light sometimes suddenly shines forth; and similarly, as regards the affection, that often in matters by no means arduous the courage goes limp, but in difficult ones it is raised up — which would be an argument that our minds are ruled and governed by God. I answer: it is most true that our minds are ruled by the providence of God, and that sometimes ready counsel, and immense confidence in arduous matters, is supplied by God, and in easy matters is not supplied. But that does nothing against the liberty of choice; for the supplying of counsel, and the inflaming of the will, does not determine men from necessity to choose the one rather than the other — otherwise wise and eloquent men, who often lead and bend their hearers as they themselves will, would deprive them of free choice. But there is also a natural cause of that thing at which Calvin so greatly wonders. For it is natural that men, the difficulty of a matter being perceived, be aroused and strive against it, but look down on things easy and safe. And it is no wonder if counsels are at hand when the mind is vehemently bent on thinking out the matter, and if counsel does not occur when the matter is neglected. So indeed both iron is sharpened by the whetstone, and, by antiperistasis, contrary forces are more vehemently strengthened at the presence of their contraries.
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CAPUT XVI. Explicatur altera ratio concordiw libertatis cum cooperatione Dei, et solvitur . objectio cap. 14. proposita. Altera ratio conciliandi libertatem huma¬ nam cum cooperatione divina, et fortasse etiam probabilior est juxta sententiam S. Thomse, qui docet, cooperationem divinam ita concurrere cum secundis causis etiam li¬ beris, ut non solum eis dederit, et conservet virtutes operatrices, sed etiam eas moveat, et applicet ad opus, ut cognosci potest ex 1. part. quaest. 105. artic. 5. et lib. 3. contra gentes, cap. 70. et in quaest. 3. de potentia art. 7. quae sententia videtur valde consen¬ tanea, tum Scripturae, qua? dicit nos in Deo esse, vivere, et moveri, Actor. 17. tum etiam rationi et ordini, quem habet prima causa cum secundis, neque laborandum est in hac sententia, ut ostendamus, nihil omnino fleri sine Deo. Sed tamen habet etiam haec sen¬ tentia suas difficultates, quas breviter ex¬ plicabimus antequam exponamus, quemad¬ modum juxta hanc sententiam salvetur libe¬ rum arbitrium. Objiciunt igitur ah' qui contra sententiam S. Thomae, non posse intelligi quomodo De¬ us moveat, et applicet causas secundas. Nam si Deus movet causas secundas, vel movet locali motu, vel alterativo ; non loca¬ li, quia causae secundae, ut plurimum im¬ motae, secundum locum agere possunt ; ignis enim non eget motu locali, ut combu¬ rat stupam vicinam; et multo minus huma¬ na voluntas eget motu locali, ut aliquid velit. Non etiam alterativo, quia tunc aliqua qua¬ litas imprimi deberet in causa secunda. Nul¬ la autem talis qualitas necessaria est, neque ex parte Dei, qui operatur omnia per actum suae voluntatis; neque ex parte causae secun¬ da?, quae jam habet virtutem operatricem a natura. Dices, necessariam esse exparte Dei, et ex parte causae secundae ; ex parte Dei, ut per eam qualitatem attingat effectum, ex parte causae secundae, ut determinetur, et applice¬ tur ad operandum. Contra, nam Deus non eget qualitate, ut attingat effectum ; et prae¬ terea si egeret qualitate, ut effectum attin¬ geret non in causa, sed in effectu, illam im¬ primeret : porro causa secunda praesente objecto, non videtur indigere alia determi¬ natione vel applicatione. Ad hanc objectionem respondeo, Deum non movere localiter causam secundam, ne¬ que in illa qualitatem ullam imprimere, sed tantum illa uti tanquam instrumento ad opus efficiendum, quocirca virtus a Deo impressa per modum transeuntis, dum causa secunda operatur, non distinguitur ab ipsa virtute naturali, sed est illa eadem, quatenus illa Deus utitur ad illam actionem perficiendam. Est autem necessaria haec motio Dei ex par¬ te causa? secundae, quae cum sit talis, id est, secunda, habet necessariam dependentiam a causa prima, in cujus virtute operatur. Yide qua? diximus de virtute Dei in Sacramentis impressa per motum lib. 2. de Sacramentis in genere cap. 11. His explicatis, ut ostendamus, juxta hanc S. Thoma? sententiam, recte defendi liberum arbitrium, sciendum est, influxum, seu vir¬ tutem Dei, qua voluntas movetur et applica¬ tur ad opus, recipi in causis secundis, se¬ cundum earum dispositionem (ut idem S. Thomas in quaest. 3. de malo art. 2.) « At¬ tendendum, inquit, quod motus primi mo¬ ventis, non recipitur uniformiter in omnibus mobilibus, sed in unoquoque secundum proprium modum. » Et in 1. 2. quaest. 10. art. 4. (i Ad providentiam, inquit, Dei per¬ tinet, naturam non corrumpere, sed servare. Unde omnia movet secundum eorum condi¬ tionem. )> Et infra : « Quia, inquit, voluntas est activum principium non determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa ; sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed rema¬ net motus ejus contingens, et non necessa¬ rius, nisi in his, ad quae naturaliter move¬ tur. » Haec ille. Porro iste modus, seu conditio in volunta¬ te, secundum quam recipitur in ea motus Dei, nihil aliud est, nisi negativa qua?dam determinatio, praecedens tum influxum Dei, tum actum elicitum voluntatis. Nimirum quod voluntas sinat se moveri ab objecto per rationem sibi proposito, vel non sinat. Ha?c enim determinatio dicitur negativa, quia non consistit in actu positivo, sed in ne¬ gatione actus, cum tamen voluntas non mi¬ nus sit libera ut agat, quam ut non agat. CAPUT XVI. 35 Explicat id S. Thomas in quaest. i. de ma¬ lo artic. 3. ubi dicit : non uti regula rationis praeintelligi in voluntate ante inordinatam electionem : hujus autem quod est, non uti regula rationis, non oportere quaerere aliam causam, nisi voluntatis libertatem, quia vi¬ delicet in ejus potestate est, ut sinat se mo¬ veri a ratione., vel non sinat. Et rursus in quaest. 3. de malo art. 2. idem S. Thomas dicit, requiri in homine dispositionem quam¬ dam ad recipiendum influxum Dei, et juxta eam dispositionem produci bonum, vel ma¬ lum actum. Non potest autem praerequiri ante influxum Dei ulla dispositio positiva, cum nihil positivum sine Deo fieri possit. Sola igi¬ tur praerequiritur dispositio negativa. Atque hinc fit, ut voluntas sit vere libera? et se ipsa determinet, tametsi Deus illam moveat, et applicet ad opus, quoniam ipsa Dei motio in ejus potestate est, sive (ut lo¬ quitur Cajetanus in 1. part. quaest. 19. art. 8.) Dei motione voluntas nostra libere utitur. Nam si se moveri sinat ab objecto proposi¬ to, Deus eam applicat, et movet ad actum e- liciendum ; si non sinat, Deus eam non ap¬ plicat, neque movet. Et ideo S. Thomas in 1. 2. quaest. 10. art. 4. ad 3. concludit, po¬ sita Dei motione, impossibile esse ut volun¬ tas non moveatur ; absolute autem non esse impossibile. Quia videlicet potest voluntas non se disponere per negativam determina¬ tionem ad motionem Dei recipiendam. Simile est, quod supra diximus de concor¬ dia ultimi judicii practici, et liberae electio¬ nis. Sicut enim posito ultimo judicio practi- co fieri non potest, ut voluntas non eligat id, quod tunc ei a ratione proponitur ; et tamen electio libera est, quoniam ipsum judicium practieum est in potestate voluntatis, pro¬ pter negativam praecedentem determinatio¬ nem : sic etiam posito influxu Dei fieri non potest, ut voluntas non operetur; et tamen operatio libera est, quoniam influxus Dei non •ponitur, nisi prius voluntas per negativam determinationem ad illum recipiendum se disponat. Adversus hanc sententiam fieri possent duo postrema argumenta, qua) facta sunt adversus sententiam capitis superioris, de providentia rerum omnium in particulari, et de modo, quo Deus cognoscit futura contin¬ gentia : sed ea jam proposita et explicata sunt. Ex his igitur facile responderi potest ad objectionem Calvini propositam initio cap. 1 4. Erat autem ha)c objectio ; voluntas di¬ vina est prima causa omnium rerum, et jam ab a)ternitate decrevit quid velit fieri : nulla igitur esse potest in homine libertas arbitrii ; nam prima causa efficacissima est, et secun¬ dum Scripturas non potest ullus divina) re¬ sistere voluntati. , Respondeo : voluntas divina est quidem prima causa omnium rerum, et ab aeterno decrevit quid velit, aut non velit fieri; sed in particularibus, et maxime liberis actionibus, id non decrevit, nisi praecognita pi'ius dispo¬ sitione, et determinatione secundarum cau¬ sarum, ut supra ostendimus. Quocirca licet nemo possit divinae resistere voluntati, ma¬ net tamen integra libei’tas humanae volunta¬ ti, quia Deus ipse, cui nemo resistere potest, hoc voluit, ut animus humanus liber esset, et actiones suas in potestate habei’et, et ideo decrevit ei coopei-ari, vel eam applicare et movere, quotiescumque per negativam de- tenninationem se ipsa disponeret. Addebat Calvinus confirmationem ab ex- perientia, quod in rebus minime perplexis sa)pe nobis consilium deficiat : et contra in rebus obscuris nonnumquam repente lux af¬ fulgeat : et similiter quod attinet ad affe¬ ctum, saepe in rebus minime arduis animus flaccescat, in difficilibus autem erigatur. Quod argumentum esset, mentes nostras a Deo regi et gubernari. Respondeo : verissimum est Dei providen¬ tia regi animos nostros, et interdum a Deo suppeditari expeditum consilium, et ingen¬ tem fiduciam in i’ebus arduis; et in 1’ebus facilibus non suppeditari. Caeterum nihil id facit contra libei‘tatem arbitrii, nam suppe¬ ditatio consilii, et inflammatio voluntatis, non determinat ex necessitate homines ad eligendum unum potius, quam altennn. Alioqui sapientes et eloquentes homines , qui sa)pe auditores suos ducuut, ac flectunt prout ipsi volunt, libero arbitrio illos priva- rent. Sed est etiam causa naturalis ejus rei, quam tantopere Calvinus miratur. Naturale enim est, ut homines difficultate rei perspe¬ cta excitentur, et contra nitantur, facilia vero et tuta despiciant. Mirum autem non est si consilia suppetant, cum animus ad rem eo- gitandam vehementer intenditur, et si con¬ silium non occurat, cum res negligitur. Sic nimirum et ferrum cote acuitur, et per an- tiperistasin contraxua ad contrariorum prae¬ sentiam vehementius i’oborantur. CONTROVERSIARUM