Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 1: The question of the knowledge of moral truth is proposed
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We have discoursed thus far on the human powers and the liberty of choice concerning natural things. Now we must deal with moral things: first, whether any moral truth can be known by the powers of nature; then, whether by the same powers any action truly good morally can be done; last, whether man is of free choice in performing or omitting such actions.
It is asked, then, whether man can, by the powers of nature, without the help of special grace, know any moral truth. Where three things are to be premised, that the state of the question may become more clearly known: what we understand by the name of Grace, what by the name of moral truth, and what by the name of cognition.
By the help of grace we do not understand justifying grace, but the divine motion and direction, such as sinners also can have. For it is agreed well enough, both from the testimony of St. Augustine, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 4, and from the common consent of all, that the unjust and sinners can know some truths — not only natural, but also moral and supernatural. But whether they can do this by their own powers, or with God helping by special help, is in controversy.
By the name of moral truth we do not take moral truth universally considered — as that God is to be worshipped, parents to be venerated, children to be loved; for that can be understood no less easily than theoretical natural truth — but moral truth with all the circumstances which are necessary that the action of the will, conformed to that truth, be an action of virtue: as when someone judges that at this time he must give an alms; or that what has been received on loan is to be restored at this time, because the reckoning of justice demands that it now be done.
Finally, by the name of cognition we do not understand simple apprehension, but also judgment — and not that last judgment upon which election follows from necessity, for that depends on the will, but the judgment preceding the command of the will, such as is wont to be exercised in the course of deliberating.
These things being noted beforehand, to the proposed question certain theologians answer that no moral truth can be known by the human intellect, in the state of corrupt nature, without the special help of God. So taught Gregory of Rimini, on 2 Sentences, distinction 26, question 1, article 1, conclusion 2, and distinction 29, question 1, article 2; whom, of the more ancient, John Capreolus followed, on 2, distinction 28, the single question, article 3, in the response to the arguments against the first conclusion; and of the more recent, Gaspar Casal, book 1 On the Fourfold Justice, chapter 32.
The contrary — that some moral truth can be known by the powers of nature and the general help of God — almost all the other Theologians hold: as Albert, on 2, distinction 28, article 1; St. Bonaventure, in the same place, article 2, question 3; Scotus, in the same place, the single question; Richard, in the same place; Durandus, in the same place, question 1; Dominic Soto, book 1 On Nature and Grace, chapter 20; and St. Thomas seems to teach the same, in 1-2, question 109, article 1. Which latter opinion seems to us most true; and we embrace and defend it the more willingly, the more it displeases the adversaries, and especially John Calvin, in book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 2, § 24, 25, and 26.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT PRIMUM. Proponitur qusestio de cognitione veri moralis. Disseruimus hactenus de viribus humanis, et libertate arbitrii, circa res naturales. Nunc de moralibus agendum erit. Primum, an possit viribus naturae cognosci verum aliquod morale. Deinde, an iisdem viribus fieri pos¬ sit actio aliqua vere bona moraliter. Pos¬ tremo, sitnc homo liberi arbitrii in hujus¬ modi actionibus peragendis vel omittendis. Quaeritur igitur, possitne homo viribus na¬ turae, sine auxilio gratiae specialis verum ali¬ quod morale cognoscere. Ubi tria praemit¬ tenda sunt, ut quaestionis status clarius inno¬ tescat ; quid intelligamus nomine Gratiae, quid nominq. veri moralis, ct quid nomine cognitionis. Per auxilium gratiae non intelligimus gra¬ tiam justificantem, sed motionem et dire¬ ctionem divinam, qualem peccatores quoque habere possunt. Satis enim constat tum ex testimonio S. Augustini lib. i. Retract. cap. 4. tum ex communi omnium consensu, in¬ justos et peccatores, aliqua vera, non solum naturalia, sed etiam moralia etsupernaturalia posse cognoscere. Sed utrum id possint vi¬ ribus suis, an Deo speciali auxilio juvante in controversia est. Nomine autem veri moralis, non acci¬ pimus verum morale universe consideratum, ut Deum esse colendum, parentes veneran¬ dos, filios diligendos ; id enim non minus fa¬ cile potest intclligi, quam verum naturale theoricum ; sed verum morale cum omnibus circumstantiis, qute necessaria) sunt, ut actio voluntatis, ei vero conformis sit actio virtutis, ut cum quis judicat, sibi hoc tempore elee¬ mosynam faciendam ; vel quod mutuo est acceptum, esse restituendum hoc tempore, quia ratio justitiae nunc id fieri postulat. Denique nomine cognitionis non intelli¬ gimus simplicem apprehensionem, sed etiam judicium, et judicium non illud ultimum, ad quod ex necessitate sequitur electio. Id enim ex voluntate dependet, sed judicium, prae- cedens imperium voluntatis, quale inter con¬ sultandum exerceri solet. His praenotatis ad propositam qutestionem quidam theologi respondent, nullum verum morale posse ab intellectu humano, in statu natura) corrupta), sine speciali Dei auxilio, cognosci. Ita docuit Gregorius Arimin. in 2. sent. dist. 26. qrnest. i. art. i. conc. 2. et dist. 29. quasst. i. art. 2. quem secutus est ex antiquioribus Joannes Capreolus in 2. dist. 28. qua)st. unica, artic. 3. in responsione ad. argumenta contra primam conclusionem, ex recentioribus Gaspar Cassaliuslib. i. de qua¬ dripartita justitia cap. 32. Contra sentiunt, posse cognosci viribus naturae, et auxilio Dei generali, aliquod ve¬ rum morale, omnes fere alii Theologi, ut Al- bertus in 2. dist. 28. artic. i. S. Bonaven- tura ibidem artic. 2. qua)st. 3. Scotus ibidem qua)st. unica. Richardus ibidem. Durandus ibidem, quaest. i. Dominicus a Soto lib. i. de natura et gratia, cap. 20. et idem docere vi- CAPUT II. 37 detur S. Tliomas iu i. 2. qurest. 109. art. i. Qua? scatentia posterior verissima nobis esse videtur, et eo libentius eam amplectimur et defendimus, quo magis displicet adversariis, ac prcesertim Joanni Calvino in 2. lib. Insti- tut. cap. 2. §. 24. 25. et 26.