Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 2: It is proved that man can by his own powers know some moral truth
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We say, then, that in the state of corrupt nature the light of practical reason has not been so extinguished but that it can, with only the general help of God, know some moral truth — although otherwise in many things it is often deceived and errs, unless it be directed by the divine illustration and governance.
The latter part of this opinion experience proves well enough, nor will there be need to discourse of it, since it is denied by no one, and much has been said by us in book 3 On the Sin of Origin, chapter 9. The former part we can prove from the divine writings, from the testimonies of the Fathers, and from reason itself.
From the divine writings we have, first, that of Psalm 4: Many say, Who sheweth us good things? The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. Where the Prophet teaches that men cannot be excused by ignorance if they do not keep the moral precepts, since from nature itself they have a light impressed on the heart, as St. Cyril expounds, book 1 on John, chapter 9. A not dissimilar place is in Psalm 57: If in very deed you speak justice, judge right things, ye sons of men. For the Prophet signifies that all men have impressed on the heart certain precepts of justice, and therefore are inexcusable when they do not keep the things of which they cannot be ignorant: “To what unjust man,” says Augustine in the commentary on this place, “is it not easy to speak justice? Or who, questioned about justice, when he has no case of his own at stake, would not easily answer what is just?” Hither also pertains that of Romans 1: When they knew God, they have not glorified him as God. For the Apostle shows that the Gentiles, through the knowledge of the one God received from creatures, could have abstained from the worship of idols, and therefore are inexcusable, in that they detained the truth of God in injustice, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man.
But there is also another signal testimony in the same epistle to the Romans, chapter 2, where the Apostle speaks thus: When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, these, having not the law, are a law to themselves; who shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, etc. In which place the Apostle demonstrates that the heathen, who did not receive the written law, know by the light of reason alone certain things which pertain to living honorably. For this that clause signifies: they shew the work of the law written in their hearts — that is, they show that they have written in the heart what is to be done, that one may live rightly and with reason. And because this place is signal, and will serve not only the question we now treat, but also the following one, it must be considered a little more diligently.
There are two explications of this place indicated by the ancients. One is that of Origen and Ambrose, in the commentary on this place; likewise of St. Augustine, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapters 26 and 27, and of St. Fulgentius, book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 26, who refer this whole place to Christians converted from the gentiles. And that clause, do by nature those things that are of the law, Augustine teaches does not exclude grace, but is set down to signify that virtue is according to nature, vice against nature. The chief reason for this opinion is that in this very chapter blessed Paul says that the doers of the law are justified; from which it follows that the gentiles who, not having the law, do the things of the law, are altogether justified. But it is agreed from this same epistle, chapters 3 and 4, that no one is justified without the faith of Christ; wherefore it is necessary that the gentiles here in question be not unbelievers, but believers.
The other exposition is the more common: that these Apostolic words are to be understood of those gentiles who, ignorant of Christ, were led by the natural light alone. So the Greeks commonly expound — as Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, in the commentary on this place, and the author of the unfinished work on Matthew, homily 8. Likewise many of the Latins, as St. Cyprian, book 3 to Quirinus; St. Jerome, in the epistle to Algasia, question 8; and Haymo on this place. St. Augustine also, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 28 [al. 27], does not reprove this latter exposition, though he approve the former more; and the same, in book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, admits both expositions; and on Psalm 118, discourse 25, he makes mention of the latter alone, and uses it to prove that all sinners are transgressors of the law, seeing that, according to this place of the Apostle, even the heathen, who seem not to have the law, carry the law of nature written in the heart. Finally, the same is the opinion of the more recent — as of St. Thomas, Cajetan, Dominic Soto, and others on this place; of John Driedo, in the book On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, treatise 4, chapter 2, part 2; and of Ruard Tapper, in the defense of the article on free choice.
This explication, as it is the more common, so also is it the truer. For that appears, first, from the purpose and intention of blessed Paul. For he wished to show, in the first part of the epistle, the necessity of the Christian faith, without which no one can be justified before God, whether he be gentile or Jew. To show this, he demonstrated in the first chapter that the princes and chief masters of the gentiles — namely the Philosophers, who were held most wise and best — had been covered with most grave crimes, even against nature. Then in the second chapter he shows the same of the Jews, who, though they had received the law written by the finger of God, nonetheless were found liable to many and very great sins. From which he concluded that all are sinners, and need the glory of God; and that whosoever have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law, but they who have sinned without the law shall perish without the law. But because it seemed hard and unfair that they who sinned without the law should be punished as transgressors, he therefore added that even they who sinned without the law — the law written on tables, namely — were not altogether without law, seeing that, from the fact that they sometimes do some works of the law, they show that they have in their hearts a law impressed by God.
Then, the same can be understood from that word, “gentiles”; for sacred Scripture almost always uses the name of gentile, set down absolutely, for unbelievers: as Matthew 6, For after all these things do the heathens seek; Luke 18, For he shall be delivered to the gentiles, and shall be mocked; 1 Corinthians 1, Unto the Jews indeed a stumbling-block, and unto the Gentiles foolishness, but unto us, etc.; 1 Corinthians 5, Fornication is heard of among you, and such as is not among the heathens; 1 Corinthians 10, Be without offence to the Jews, and to the Gentiles, and to the church of God; 1 Corinthians 12, You know that when you were heathens, you went to dumb idols, according as you were led. There comes also that clause, who have not the law, which is rightly said of gentiles not yet converted to Christ; but of gentiles who through faith and Baptism have entered the Church it cannot rightly be said, since at the very beginning the Decalogue is delivered to the Catechumens, with the symbol of the faith. Finally, that word, by nature, signifies openly enough that the Apostle speaks of the light which is had from nature. For the same Apostle declares what “by nature” is, when he says: their conscience bearing witness to them — which is the same as if he had said: they do by nature the things of the law for this reason, that if they will to do otherwise, they feel conscience crying out against them. And certainly in the Scriptures the word “naturally” is wont to be so taken that that is said to be done naturally which is done at the dictation and moving of nature: as in the epistle of Jude, What things soever they naturally know, like dumb beasts, in these they are corrupted; and 2 Peter 2, But these men, as irrational beasts, naturally tending to the snare and to destruction, blaspheming those things which they know not, shall perish in their corruption.
Nor does that argument about justification conclude for the former opinion. For when the Apostle says that the doers of the law shall be justified, he speaks of those who observe the whole law; for, as is said in James 2, he that offendeth in one point is become guilty of all. But in this place the Apostle does not teach that the gentiles who have not the law naturally observe the whole law, but that they show the work of the law written in their hearts when they do the things of the law — that is, when they work something according to the norm of the law.
To these places of Scripture it could perhaps be answered that from them it is not gathered that moral truth is known by the natural light in the particular, but only in the universal — which indeed Calvin admits, and he adduces the testimony of Aristotle, who teaches that the incontinent man judges truly of the universal proposition, but errs in the particular. But this response is easily refuted. For as to the first place, from Psalm 4: to the one asking, Who sheweth us good things? the Prophet would not give satisfaction by saying, The light of thy countenance is signed upon us, if by that light the good could not be known in the particular, in that manner in which it must be known that a good work be done. For what does that universal cognition profit toward the doing of a good work, unless the particular cognition can be naturally gathered from it? For actions are singular, not universal. By like reasoning, in the second and third testimonies sinners are accused because, though they know what is just, yet they do not work justly; but certainly they would be worthy of excuse if they knew moral truth only in the universal, and were not able to know it in the particular. Finally, in the last place blessed Paul gathers the cognition from the working; for he writes that the gentiles show the work of the law written in their hearts from the fact that they do the things that are of the law. But the works of the law are done in the particular; therefore the cognition also will be particular.
Besides these testimonies of Scripture, there are not wanting also most open places of the holy Fathers. St. John Chrysostom, homily 54 on Genesis, at the very beginning: “Let no one,” says he, “pretend that he neglects virtue in ignorance, or that he has no guide and shower of the way of life. For we have a sufficient master in conscience, and it cannot come to pass that anyone be deprived of that aid. For together with the formation of man was implanted the knowledge of things to be done and not to be done.” St. Jerome, in the epistle to Algasia, question 8: “The law which is written in the heart embraces all nations, and there is no one who does not know this law. Whence the whole world is under sin, and all men are transgressors of the law; and therefore the judgment of God is just.” St. Augustine, on Psalm 57: “By the hand of our fashioner, truth wrote in our very hearts: What thou wilt not have done to thee, do not to another. This, even before the law was given, no one was permitted not to know, that there might be that whereby even those to whom the law was not given might be judged.” St. Prosper, in the book against the Collator, chapter 22: “Who would doubt that this wisdom remains to the human race, for the utility of temporal life, from the remnants of the nature founded by God? For if the talent of the rational mind were not vigorous even for ordering these earthly things, nature would be not vitiated, but extinguished.” See also Fulgentius, in the book On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ, chapter 26.
Reasons also can be added at the last. The first reason: Pharao, king of Egypt, though he was most abandoned, yet knew some moral truth in the particular, when he says, Exodus 9: I have sinned; the Lord is just: I and my people are wicked. Nor is it likely that he knew this through the special aid of God, since Scripture rather testifies to the contrary, that special help was withdrawn from him, when it says in the same place: The Lord hardened the heart of Pharao. The second reason: Every natural power can, with only the general help, exercise some act about the object proportioned to it; otherwise it would be idle and superfluous. But the human intellect is a natural power, and its proportioned object is moral truth — that is, the good according to reason, whether in the universal or in the particular. Therefore the human intellect can, with only the general help, know some moral truth, even in the particular. The third reason: Man without special help knows moral truth in the universal — that is, the first principles of moral doctrine — as all confess; therefore he will also be able, without special help, to deduce thence some conclusions, at least the easier ones. For it is the same light by which we understand the first principles, and by which, through discourse, we deduce conclusions from those principles. And in very truth it is incredible that a man should know that it is not lawful to usurp to himself another’s property, and again should know that some thing is another’s, and yet should not be able, without special help, to judge that that thing is not to be taken by him.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT II. Probatur , posse hominem suis viribus cog¬ noscere aliquod verum morale. Dicimus igitur in statu naturae corrupta? non ita extinctum esse lumen rationis pra- ctica?, quin possit cum solo auxilio Dei gene¬ rali, aliquod verum morale cognoscere, quamvis alioqui in multis saope fallatur et erret, nisi divina illustratione et gubernatione dirigatur. Posteriorem hujus sententiae partem, satis probat experientia, neque opus erit de ea disserere, cum neque ab ullo negetur, et multa sinta nobis dicta in 3. lib. de peccato originis cap. 9. Priorem partem probare pos¬ sumus ex divinis litteris, ex Patrum testimo¬ niis, et ex ipsa ratione. Ex divinis litteris habemus in primis illud Psalm. iv. Multi dicunt , quis ostendit nobis bona ? Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui Ztorame(l). Ubi Propheta docet non posse excusari per ignorantiam, homines, si non servant pra?cepta moralia, cum ab ipsa na¬ tura lumen in corde impressum habeant, ut S. Cyrillus exponit lib. i. in Joan. cap. 9. Non dissimilis locus est in Psalm. lyii. Si vere utique justitiam loquimini , recte judi¬ cate filii hominum (2). Significat enim Prophe¬ ta, omnes homines habere in corde impressa qusedam pra?cepta justitia?, et ideo inexcusa¬ biles esse, cum ea non servant, quae igno¬ rare non possunt : « Cui iniquo, inquit Augu¬ stinus in comment. hujus loci, non facile est loqui justitiam? aut quis de justitia in¬ terrogatus, quando causam non habet, non facile respondeat quid sit justum ? » Ilucetiampertinetillud ad Rom. i. Cum De¬ ma cognovissent, non Deum ylorificaverunt [3). Ostendit enim Apostolus, potuisse Gentiles per cognitionem unius Dei ex creaturis acce¬ ptam, abstinere a cultu Idolorum, et ideo • esse inexcusabiles, quod veritatem Dei in injustitia detinuerint, et mutaverint gloriam incorruptibilis Dei, in similitudinem imagi¬ nis corruptibilis hominis. Sed est et aliud insigne testimonium in eadem epistol. ad Rom. cap. n. ubi sic Apo¬ stolus loquitur : Cum gentes , qux legem non habent, naturaliter ea, qux legis sunt, faciunt, ejusmodi legem non habentes, ipsi sibi sunt lex, qui ostendunt, opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis, testimonium reddente illis conscientia, ipsorum ete (4) . Quo loco demon¬ strat Apostolus, ethnicos, qui legem scri¬ ptam non acceperunt, solo lumine rationis quredam cognoscere, quae ad honeste viven¬ dum pertinent. Id enim significat illud : Ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis ; hoc est, ostendunt, in corde se scriptum ha¬ bere, quid sit faciendum, ut recte, et cum ratione vivatur. Quia vero hic locus insignis est, et non solum quaestioni, quam nunc tractamus, sed etiam sequenti deserviet,, paulo diligentius considerandus est. Duco sunt hujus loci explicationes a vete¬ ribus indicata?. Una est Origenis et Ambro¬ sii, in comment. ad hunc locum. Item S. Augustini in lib.de spiritu et littera cap. 26. et 27. et S. Fulgentii lib. de gratia Christi cap. 26. qui totum hunc locum referunt ad Christianos, ex gentibus conversos. Illud au¬ tem : Naturaliter qux legis Sunt, faciunt, do¬ cet Augustinus non excludere gratiam, sed positum esse ad significandum, virtutem esse secundum naturam, vitium contra naturam. Ratio potissima hujus sententire est, quo¬ niam in hoc ipso capite B. Paulus dicit, fa¬ ctores legis justificari, ex quo sequitur, ut gentes, qua? legem non habentes, quse legis sunt, faciunt, omnino justificentur. Constat autem ex hac eadem epist. cap. 3. et 4. nemi¬ nem sine Christi fide justificari : Quare ne- cesse est, ut gentes, de quibus hic agitur, non sint infideles, sed fideles. Altera expositio est communior, ha?c Apo- stolica verba de gentibus illis esse intelligen- da, qua? Christum ignorantes, solo naturali lumine ducebantur. Ita exponunt Groeci com¬ muniter. ut Chrysost. Thcodor. Theophyl. et Acumen, in comment. hujus loci. Et au¬ ctor operis imperfecti in Matt. Hom. 8. Item multi ex Latinis, ut S. Cyprianus lib. 3. ad Quirinum ex Latinis, ut S. Hieronymus in e- pist. ad Algasiam qua?st. 8. et Ilaymo in hunc locum. Sanctus etiam Augustinus in libro de (i) Psal. IV, 0. - (2) Psal. LVIL 2. - (3) Rom. I, 2f . - (i) Rom. II. \i. 38 LIBER V. spiritu ct littera, cap. 28. non reprobat hanc expositionem posteriorem, tametsi priorem magis probet. Idem autem in lib. 4. adver¬ sus Julian. cap, 3. utramque expositionem admittit, et in Psalm. cxvni. Cone. 25. so¬ lius posterioris mentionem facit, eaque uti¬ tur ad probandum, omnes peccatores esse praevaricatores legis, quandoquidem jux¬ ta hunc locum Apostoli, etiam Ethnici, qui legem videntur non habere, legem naturae scriptam in corde gerant. Denique eadem est sententia recentiorum, ut S. Thom, Caje- tani, Dominici a Soto, et aliorum in hunc locum, Joan. Driedon. in lib. de capt. et re¬ demptione humani generis, tract. 4. cap. 2. part. 2. et Ruardi Tapperi in defensione ar¬ ticuli de libero arbitrio. Haec explicatio, ut est communior, ita quo¬ quo est verior. Nam id constat in primis ex proposito et intentione B. Pauli. Voluit enim ostendere in i. part. epist. necessitatem fi¬ dei Christianae, sine qua nemo coram Deo justificari potest, sive is gentilis sit, sive Ju¬ daeus. Ad hoc ostendendum demonstravit in i. cap. principes et magistros primarios gen¬ tilium, videlicet Philosophos, qui sapien- tissimi et optimi habebantur, gravissimis sceleribus etiam contra naturam coopertos fuisse. Deinde in 2. cap. idem- ostendit de Judaeis, qui tametsi legem scriptam digito Dei ac¬ ceperant, nihilominus multis maximis que, peccatis inveniebuntur obnoxii. Ex quibus effecit, omnes, esse peccatores, et egere glo¬ ria Dei, et quicumque in lege peccaverunt, per legem esse judicandos, qui autem sine lege peccaverunt, sino lege perituros. Quo¬ niam vero durum et iniquum esse videba¬ tur, ut qui sine lege peccaverunt, tamquam praevaricatores punirentur. Ideo addidit, eos etiam qui si ne lege, scripta videlicet in ta¬ bulis, peccaverunt, non omnino sine lege fuisse, quando quidem ex eo, quod interdum faciunt aliqua opera legis, ostendunt se ha¬ bere in cordibus legem a Deo impressam. Deinde idem intelligi potest ex illa voce, « gentes », nam Scriptura sacra nomen, gentis, absoluta positum, fere semper usur¬ pat pro infidelibus, ut Matt. vi. Haec enim omnia gentes inquirunt. Luc. xvm. Tradetur enim gentibus et illudetur. I ad Corinth. i. Judeis quidem scandalum , gentibus autem stultitiam , nobis autem elc. I ad Corinth. v. Fornicatio auditur inter vos , qualis nec inter gentes. I Corinth. x. Sine offensione estote Judaeis , et gentibus , ct Ecclesiae Dei. I ad Corinth. xii. Scitis enim cum gentes effetis , ad simulacra muta prout ducebamini, elc (1). Accedit etiam illud : Qui legem non habent, quod recte dicitur de gentibus nondum con¬ versis ad Christum ; de gentibus autem, qua; per fidem, et Baptismum in Ecclesiam in¬ traverunt recte dici non potest ; cum in ipso initio Catechumenis tradatur Decalogus , cum symbolo fidei. Denique vox illa, naturaliter, satis aperte significat, Apostolum loqui de lumine, quod habetur ex natura. Declarat enim idem Apostolus quid sit naturaliter, cum ait : Testimonium i clis reddente conscientia ipsorum. Quod est idem, ac si dixisset, ideo naturali¬ ter qua; legis sunt faciunt, quia si secus fa¬ cere, velint conscientiam reclamantem sen¬ tiunt, et certe in Scripturis vox, naturaliter , ita solet accipi, ut id fieri dicatur naturaliter, quod fit dictante, et movente natura, ut in epist. Juda; : Quaecumque naturaliter tam¬ quam muta animalia norunt , in his corrum¬ puntur (2). Et II Petr. ii. Ili vero velut irra¬ tionalia pecora, naturaliter in captionem et perniciem, in his quae ignorant , blasphemantes in corruptione sua peribunt (3). Neque argumentum illud de justificatione pro sententia priore concludit. Nam cum Apostolus dicit, factores legis justificandos, loquitur de illis, qui totam legem obser¬ vant : Nam ut dicitur Jacobi n. Qui offendit, in uno , factus est omnium reus (4). Hoc autem loco non docet Apostolus, gente§, qua; legem, non habent, naturaliter totam legem obser¬ vare, sed eas ostendere opus legis, scriptum in cordibus suis, quando quae legis sunt fa¬ ciunt, id est, cum aliquid operantur, juxta normam legis. Ad haec loca Scriptura; fortasse responde¬ ri posset, non colligi ex his, cognosci natu¬ rali lumine verum morale in particulaxi, sed solum in universali. Quod quidem Calvinus admittit et adducit testimonium Aristotelis, qui docet incontinentem vere judicare de propositione universali, sed errare in parti¬ culari. Cseterum haec responsio facile refellitur, nam quod attinet ad primum locum ex .(1) Matth. VI, 3?; Luc. XVIII, 32: I Corin. I, 23; ibid. V, 1; ibid. X, 32; ibid. XII, 2. - (2) Jud. 10. - (3) II Pet. II, 12. —(4) Jacob. II, 10. ' 39 CAPUT HI. Psalm. iv : interroganti : Quis ostendit no- bit bona. Non satisfaceret Propheta, dicens : Signatum, est super : nos lumen vultus tui (1). Si eo lumine non posset cognosci bonum in particulari, eo modo, quo cognosci necesse est, ut fiat opus bonum. Quid enim prodest cognitio illa universalis, ad hoc ut fiat opus bonum, nisi colligi possit ex ea naturaliter cognitio partidblaris ? actiones enim singula¬ res sunt, non universales. Pari ratione in se¬ cundo et tertio testimonio accusantur pecca¬ tores, quod cum cognoscant quid sit justum, non tamen juste operentur : at certe digni essent excusatione, si solum in universali verum morale cognoscerent, in particulari vero id cognoscere non valerent. Denique in postremo loco B. Paulus colligit ex opera¬ tione cognitionem ; scribit enim, gentes os¬ tendere opus legis scriptum in cordibus, ex eo quod laciunt ea quai legis sunt. Atqui opera legis in particulari fiunt, erit igitur e- tiam cognitio particularis. Praeter haec testi¬ monia Scripturae, non desunt etiam apertis¬ sima loca sanctorum Patrum. Sanctus Joannes Chrysostomus homil. 34. in Genes, in ipso principio : « Nullus, inquit, praetexat, quod ignorans virtutem negligat, vel quod non habeat aliquem vitae ducem et demonstratorem. Sufficientem enim magi¬ strum habemus conscientiam, et fieri non potest, ut quis illo adjumento privetur. Nam simul cum formatione hominis implantata est scientia faciendorum, et non faciendo¬ rum. » S. Hieronymus in epist. ad Algasiamquiest. 8. «Lex, inquit, quae in corde scribitur, om¬ nes continet nationes, et nullus est, qui hanc legem nesciat. Unde omnis mundus sub pec¬ cato est, et universi homines praevaricatores legis sunt, et idcirco justum judicium Dei est. » S. Augustinus in Psalm. lvii. « Manu for¬ matoris nostri in ipsis cordibus veritas scri¬ psit, Quod tibi non vis fieri, ne facias alteri. Hoc et antequam lex daretur, nemo ignorare permissus est, ut esset unde judicarentur, et quibus lex non esset data. » S. Prosper in lib. contra Collatorem cap. 22. « Quis, inquit, ambigat, hanc sapientiam humano generi, ad temporalis vita> utilita¬ tem, ex naturae a Deo conditae superesse re¬ liquiis ? Si enim nec ad ista terrena ordinan¬ da rationalis animi vigeret ingenium, non vitiata esset, sed extincta natura. » Vide c- tiam Fulgentium in lib. de incarnatione et gratia Christi cap. 26. Addi possunt ad extremum etiam rationes. Prima ratio. Pharao rex /Egypti, quamvis perditissimus esset, cognovit tamen aliquod verum morale in particulari, cum ait Exod. ix. Pecca vi , Dominus justus, ego et populus meus impii (2): neque verisimile est, id eum cognovisse per speciale adjutorium Dei, cum potius contra testetur Scriptura, subtractum ei fuisse speciale auxilium, cum ait ibidem : Induravit Dominus cor Phciraonis. Secunda ratio, Omnis potentia naturalis potest circa objectum sibi proportionatum, cum solo generali auxilio aliquem actum exercere ; alioqui otiosa et supervacanea es¬ set : est autem intellectus humanus potentia naturalis, et ejus objectum proportionatum, est verum morale, id est, bonum, secundum rationem, sive in universum, sive in parti¬ culari. Igitur potest intellectus humanus cum solo auxilio generali verum aliquod morale, etiam in particulari cognoscere. Tertia ratio. Homo sine auxilio speciali cognoscit verum morale in universum, id est, prima principia doctrinse moralis, ut omnes fatentur : igitur poterit etiam sine auxilio speciali conclusiones aliquas, saltem faciliores, inde deducere. Idem enim est lu¬ men, per quod prima principia intelligimus, et quo per discursum conclusiones ex prin¬ cipiis illis deducimus. Et re vera incredibile est, scire hominem non licere rem alienam sibi usurpare; et rursus scire, rem aliquam esse alienam ; et tamen non posse sine spe¬ ciali auxilio judicare rena illam sibi non esse tollendam.