Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 4: The question of the powers of the human will concerning moral good is proposed
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It follows now that we see what the will can do concerning moral good, since we have seen what the intelligence can do concerning moral truth.
Now when we ask what the will can do without the grace of God, the question can be threefold: one, what it can do without justifying grace — that is, without charity; another, what it can do not only without justifying grace, but also without faith (although among the Lutherans there is no need to distinguish justifying grace from faith, since they teach that man is justified by faith alone, and that justice cannot be lost without faith being lost at the same time); the third, what it can do not only without justifying grace and faith, but also without special help, by the powers of nature alone. Again, when we ask what the will can do concerning moral good, the question can also be threefold: one, whether it can effect the whole moral good — that is, fulfill all the moral precepts; another, whether it can fulfill, if not all, at least single ones, even the gravest, such as above all to love God above all things, at least as the author of nature; the third, whether it can perform some, temptation pressing, or only when temptation ceases.
Further, on these questions there are two opinions of the Heretics, contrary and fighting between themselves, between which the orthodox and Catholic truth walks in the middle. The Pelagians, indeed, attribute so much to free choice that they affirm that through it, even alone, man can fulfill all the moral commandments, and overcome all contrary temptations — and so can, without the grace of God, both decline from evil and do good. The witness of this heresy of the Pelagians is St. Augustine, both elsewhere and chiefly in the book On Heresies, chapter 88. Contrariwise the Lutherans, not so much extenuating as extinguishing the powers of free choice, teach that by the powers of nature alone nothing morally good can be done, and that not only without special help, but even without justifying faith, all things that are done are sins. Nay, they even add that all the works of the just also are sins, but on account of faith are not imputed; while the works of unbelievers are sins and are imputed. See Luther in the assertion of articles 6 and 36; Philip in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession and in the Commonplaces; Calvin in the Antidote of the Council of Trent, session 6, and in book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, § 1 and following; Chemnitz in the Examination of the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 7, where he discourses copiously on the works of unbelievers. And although Martin Luther in the Saxon Visitation, Philip in the Commonplaces, and Chemnitz in the Examination of the Council seem to concede that man can by his own powers fulfill the law of not killing, not stealing, and others of that kind, as to external actions — yet they do not on that account think that man can by his own powers effect any moral good and avoid sin. For in the same places they adjoin that man can indeed outwardly fulfill the precept, but cannot escape the internal uncleanness; accordingly one and the same work of an impious man, honorable and just before men, will be unclean and vicious before God.
But before we come to the Catholic opinion, it will be worth while briefly to note a few things in the writings of Melanchthon and Chemnitz. The first is that Philip, in the Augsburg Confession, article 18, and in the Apology of the same article, fights with himself. For he writes that our Theologians think with Pelagius, in that they affirm that man can, by the powers of free choice, keep some precepts according to the substance of the work; and yet he himself, in the same places, confesses that man can, by the powers of nature, withhold his hand from slaughter and from theft, and do other actions of the same kind — as though this were not precisely to fulfill the precept according to the substance of the work! For the precepts “Thou shalt not kill” and “Thou shalt not steal” command nothing else than the voluntary omission of the external work of homicide and theft; for the coveting of another’s property, and the hatred of one’s neighbor, are prohibited by other precepts. And so he does not transgress the precepts “Thou shalt not steal” and “Thou shalt not kill,” but observes them according to the substance of the work, who withholds his hand from theft and from slaughter — even if perhaps he transgress the precept “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods,” and “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.”
The second is that Chemnitz, in the Examination of the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 7, has babbled many things fraudulently, after his manner, and lyingly. For from this — that in that seventh canon it is declared that not all the works which precede the grace of justification are sins — he himself gathers that the Council of Trent taught contradictions, since in the first chapter of the sixth session it taught that no one can rise again from sin, either through the powers of nature or through the letter of the law. Likewise he gathers that it was defined by the Council that the works of unbelievers are not sins — which error he does not doubt to be Pelagian. But it is a wonder whence the repugnance of the Council’s words came into Chemnitz’s mind. For in the first chapter, and also the first canon, of the sixth session, the Council speaks of works done without the aid of special grace; but in the seventh canon, of works done with faith and the help of grace; accordingly it ought not to seem strange if it does not speak in the same way of the one as of the other. Then, in the first canon and chapter the Council speaks of the works by which justification, lost through sin, is repaired; in canon 7, of those by which a new sin is not committed. And it is certain that it is far more difficult to return from sin to justice than not to fall into a new sin — even as it is more difficult to be cured of a wound than not to receive a wound. Nor does the Council define that the works of unbelievers are not sins, but that not all the works which precede justification are sins; for there precede justification also those works which are done by the faithful after they have fallen into sin. For the Council does not follow the rules of Luther, who would have faith lost through every mortal sin, but the rules of the Lord, who in Luke 18 approved the prayer of the Publican, who with faith prayed for the remission of his sins. Nor does the same Council define that the works of faithful sinners are absolutely not sins, but it added, “in whatsoever manner done” — that we might understand that the Council defines only that certain works of faithful sinners are not sins: those, namely, which are done with the special help of God. For of these alone did the Council properly wish to define, since its purpose was to treat of justification and of those works which dispose to justification; and those works dispose to justification, as is had in the same Council, which take their beginning from the arousing grace of God. Add, last, that the Council could not have been accused of the Pelagian heresy even if it had taught in express words that not all the works of unbelievers are sins: both because that could have been understood of those works of unbelievers which were done from the knowledge of the one God, and with God himself arousing and helping; and also because neither Augustine, in the book On Heresies, chapter 88, where the errors of Pelagius are enumerated, nor any other ancient author, placed among the Pelagian heresies this — that the works of unbelievers, even done by the powers of nature alone, are not all sins. The ancients do indeed sometimes say that all the works of unbelievers are sins — how that is to be understood we shall explain afterwards; but nowhere do they say that Pelagius was condemned for affirming that some works of unbelievers are not sins, but for willing them to be meritorious of grace; for thence is that Pelagian error, so often reprehended by Augustine, that the grace of God is given according to our works. From these things, then, it can be clear that Chemnitz, in explaining the words of the Council, either gravely blundered or impudently lied.
I come now to the Catholic opinion, which we have said is the middle between the contrary errors of the Pelagians and the Lutherans. All Catholic Theologians, absolutely none excepted, agree in two things. First, that no works can be done by the powers of nature alone which are meritorious of grace — and this against the Pelagians. Then, that not all the works which precede justification are sins — and this against the Lutherans. Of which two opinions we shall have to speak in another place. Within these bounds, some dispute for free choice more freely, perhaps, than were fitting, as Scotus, Durandus, and Gabriel on 2 Sentences, distinction 28, and on 3, distinction 27; others perhaps attribute less to the same free choice than were proper, as Gregory of Rimini and Capreolus on 2 Sentences, distinction 28, and Marsilius on 1, question 20. But these men discourse with such modesty that they are both prepared always to acquiesce in the judgment of the Church, and, before the definition of the Church, dare not condemn their brothers, nor hold for heretics those who think the contrary. Which modesty is far from Chemnitz and the other sectaries of this time, who will have whatever they babble held for articles of faith, and are the bolder the more unskilled they are.
We, following what the more numerous and graver Theologians teach — as Alexander in part 3 of the Summa, question 60; Albert on 2 Sentences, distinction 28; St. Thomas in 1-2, question 109, articles 2, 3, and 4, and in 2-2, question 10, article 4; St. Bonaventure on 2 Sentences, distinction 28 — shall establish three propositions. The first will be: “Man cannot, by the powers of nature alone, fulfill all the moral commandments according to the substance of the work.” The second: “Nay, he can keep no moral precept at all by his own powers alone, if he be pressed by temptation.” The third: “Yet he can, no temptation pressing, without faith, with special help, and even without it, by his own powers, so perform some moral good that in it he admit no sin at all.” These propositions we shall pursue in the following chapters, in the same order in which they have been numbered by us.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT IV. Proponitur quaestio de viribus humanae volun¬ tatis , circa bonum morale. Sequitur nunc, ut videamus, quid circa bonum morale possit voluntas, cum videri¬ mus, quid circa verum morale possit intelli- gentia. Cum autem quserimus, quid possit volun¬ tas sine gratia Dei, triplex esse potest quae¬ stio, una, quid possit sine gratia justificante, id est, sine charitate; altera, quid possit non solum sine gratia justificante, sed etiam sine fide, quamvis apud Lutheranos non sit opus distinguere gratiam justificantem a fide, cum ipsi doceant hominem sola fide justificari, et non posse perdi justitiam, quin perdatur simul et fides ; tertia, quid possit non modo sine gratia justificante et fide, sed etiam sine auxilio speciali, per solas natura; vires. Rursus cum quaerimus, quid possifvoluntas circa morale bonum , potest etiam triplex esse quaestio. Una, possit ne totum morale bonum efficere, id est, omnia praecepta mo¬ ralia implere ; altera, possitue, si non om¬ nia, certe singula, etiam gravissima, quale est in primis diligere Deum super omnia, saltem ut auctorem naturae ; tertia, possitne aliqua perficere, urgente tentatione. an so¬ lum tentatione cessante. Porro de his quaestionibus dua; sunt Hae¬ reticorum inter se contrariae, pugnantesque sententiae, inter quas media incedit veritas orthodoxa, atque Catholica. Pelagiani siqui¬ dem tantum libero arbitrio tribuunt, ut affir¬ ment, per illud, etiam solum, posse hominem omnia mandata moralia adimplere. Et om¬ nes tentationes contrarias superare, atque adeo posse sine Dei gratia, et declinare a malo, et facere bonum. Testis est hujus hai- resis Pelagianorum. S. Augustinus , tum alibi, tum praicipue in libro de hscresibus cap. 88. t Contra vero Lutherani vires liberi arbitrii non tam extenuantes, quam extinguentes docent, solis naturae viribus, nihil boni mo¬ ralis fieri posse, nec solum sine auxilio spe¬ ciali, sed etiam sine fide justificante, omnia qua; fiunt, esse peccata. Quin etiam addunt, justorum quoque opera omnia esse peccata, sed propter fidem non imputari, infidelium vero opera, peccata esse et imputari. Yide Lutherum in assertione artic. 6. et 36. Phi¬ lippum in Apologia Confessionis Augustanae, et in locis communibus, Calvinum in Anti¬ doto Concilii Tridentini, sess. 6 et in n. lib. Institutionum cap. 3. §. 1. et sequentibus, Kemnitium in Exam. Concilii Tridentini sess. 6. canon. 7. ubi copiose disserit de operibus infidelium. Quamvis autem concedere videantur Mar- tinus Lutherus in visitatione Saxonica, Phi¬ lippus in locis communibus, et Kemnitius in Examine Concilii, posse hominem suis viri¬ bus implere legem de non occidendo, non furando, et alias id genus, quoad externas actiones : tamen non ideo existimant, posse hominem suis viribus efficere bonum ali¬ quod morale, et vitare peccatum. Nam in iisdem locis adjungunt, posse quidem homi¬ nem exterius implere praeceptum, sed non effugere internam immunditiam; proinde unum, et idem opus hominis impii, coram hominibus honestum et justum, coram Deo immundum et vitiosum futurum. Sed antequam ad Catholicam sententiam veniamus, operse pretium erit breviter anno¬ tare pauca quaedam in scriptis Melanchtho- nis et Kemnitii. Primum est, Philippum in Confessione Augustana artic. 18. et in Apo¬ logia ejusdem articuli secum pugnare. Scri¬ bit enim, Theologos nostros cum Pelagio sen¬ tire, quod affirment, posse hominem viribus liberi arbitrii servare aliqua praecepta secun¬ dum substantiam operis, et tamen ipse in iisdem locis fatetur, posse hominem, per na¬ tura) vires, abstinere manum a caede et a fur¬ to, et alias ejusdem generis actiones facere. Quasi vero non hoc sit implere praeceptum secundum substantiam operis. Priecepta si¬ quidem : Non occides. Et : Non furaberis , ni¬ hil aliud imperant, nisi voluntariam omissio¬ nem externi operis, homicidii et furti ; con¬ cupiscentia enim rei aliena;, et odium pro¬ ximi, praeceptis aliis prohibetur. Itaque non praevaricatur praecepta : Non furaberis, et : CAPUT IV. 43 Non occides , sed illa observat secundum subs¬ tantiam operis, qui abstinet manum a furto, et a caede, etiamsi forte praevaricatur praece¬ ptum : Non concupisces rem proximi tui, et : Non oderis fratrem tuum in corde tuo. Alterum est, Kemnitium in Examine Con¬ cilii Tridentini sess. 6. can. 7. multa fraudu- lenter more suo et mendaciter effutiisse. Nam ex eo, quod canone illo septimo declaratur, non esse peccata omnia opera, quae gratiam justificationis praecedunt ; colligit ipse, Conci¬ lium Tridentinum pugnantia docuisse, cum in primo capite sessionis sextae docuerit, ne¬ minem posse, neque per vires naturae, neque per litteram legis resurgere a peccato. Item colligit definitum esse a Concilio, non esse peccata opera infidelium, quem errorem Pela- gianum esse, ipse non dubitat. Sed mirum est, unde Kemnitio venerit in mentem repugnantia verborum Concilii. Nam in primo capite, et primo etiam canone sessio¬ nis sextae, Concilium loquitur de operibus factis sine specialis gratiae adjutorio ; in ca¬ none autem septimo de operibus factis cum fide, et auxilio gratiae : proinde mirum videri non debet, si non loquatur eodem modo de illis, ac de istis. Deinde in primo canone et capite loquitur Concilium de operibus, qui¬ bus justificatio, per peccatum amissa, repa¬ ratur ; in canon. 7. de illis, quibus non com¬ mittitur novum peccatum. Certum autem est longe difficilius esse a peccato ad justitiam redire, quam in no\um peccatum non inci¬ dere ; quemadmodum difficilius est a vulnere curari, quam vulnus non accipere. Neque definit Concilium opera infidelium non esse peccata, sed non esse peccata om¬ nia opera, quse justificationem praecedunt. Praecedunt enim justificationem etiam illa opera, quse fiunt a fidelibus, posteaquam in peccatum ceciderunt. Non enim Concilium sequitur regulas Lutheri, qui per omne pec¬ catum mortale voluit fidem amitti ; sed re¬ gulas Domini, qui Luc. 18. probavit oratio¬ nem Publicani, qui cum fide oravit pro re¬ missione peccatorum. Neque definit idem Concilium, opera fide¬ lium peccatorum absolute non esse peccata, sed addidit : « Quocumque modo facta». Ut intclligcremus definiri solum a Concilio quae¬ dam opera fidelium peccatorum non esse peccata, illa videlicet, quae fiunt cum auxilio speciali Dei. De his enim solis proprie Conci¬ lium definire voluit, quoniam propositum illi erat, agere de justificatione, et illis operibus quse ad justificationem disponunt, illa vero opera ad justificationem disponunt, ut in eodem CtfUcilio habetur, quse initium sumini a gratia Dei excitante. Adde ultimo, Concilium non potuisse ac¬ cusari haeresis Pelagianae, etiamsi disertis verbis docuisset, non omnia opera infidelium esse peccata ; tum quia id potuisset intelli- gi de illis infidelium operibus, quse fierent ex cognitione unius Dei, et ipso Deo exci¬ tante et adjuvante ; tum etiam quia neque Augustinus in libro de hseresibus cap. 88. ubi enumerantur errores Pelagii, neque alius antiquus auctor, inter Pelagianas hsere- ses posuit, quod opera infidelium etiam fac¬ ta solis naturae viribus, non omnia sint pec¬ cata. Dicunt quidem interdum veteres, om¬ nia infidelium opera esse peccata, quod, quo¬ modo sit intelligendum, postea explicabimus: sed nusquam dicunt, propterea Pelagium esse damnatum, quod affirmaverit, aliqua opera infidelium non esse peccata, sed quod ea voluerit esse meritoria gratiae ; inde enim est ille Pelagianus error, tam saepe ab Augu¬ stino reprehensus, gratiam Dei secundum opera nostra dari. Ex his igitur perspicuum esse poterit Kemnitium in explicandis Con¬ cilii verbis, aut graviter hallucinatum, aut impudenter esse mentitum. Venio hunc ad sententiam Catholicam, quam mediam esse diximus inter contrarios Pelagianorum ac Lutheranorum errores. Conveniunt Theologi Catholici omnes, nullo prorsus excepto, in duobus. Primum, non posse fieri ulla opera, solis naturae viribus, quse sint meritoria gratiae ; idque contra Pc- lagianos. Deinde, ntfn esse peccata omnia opera, quae justificationem praecedunt, atque id contra Lutheranos. De quibus duabus sen¬ tentiis dicendum erit in alio loco. Intra hos terminos, disputant aliqui pro libero arbitrio, fortasse liberius, quam par esset, ut Seotus, Durandus et Gabriel in 2. Sentent. distinet. 28. et in 3. distinet. 27. Alii fortasse minus tribuunt eidem libero ar¬ bitrio, quam oporteret, ut Gregorius Arimi¬ nensis, Capreolus in 2. Sentent. distinet. 28. etMarsilius in 1. quaest. 20. Sed ea modestia disserunt isti, ut et parati sint judicio Eccle¬ siae semper acquiescere, et ante Ecclesiae definitionem, non audeant fratres suos dam¬ nare, neque pro haereticis habeant, qui con¬ trarium sentiunt. Quae modestia longe est a' Kemnitio et aliis hujus temporis sectariis, qui quidquid effutiunt, pro articulis fidei ha- 44 LIBER V. beri volunt, coque sunt audaciores, quo im¬ peritiores. Nos id secuti, quod plures et graviores Theologi docent, ut Alexander in 3. part. Sum. quffist. 60. Albertus in 2. Sentent. distinet. 28. S. Thomas in 1. 2. qmest. 109. art. 2. 3. et 4. et in 2. 2. qusest. 10. artic. 4. S. Bonaventura in 2. Sentent. distinet. 28. tres propositiones constituemus. Prima erit, « Non posse hominem, solis natur® viribus, implere omnia mandata moralia, secundum substantiam operis ». Secunda, « Imo nul¬ lum omnino morale praeceptum servare posse suis solis viribus si tentatione urgeatur . Tertia, « Posse tamen, nulla tentatione 'ur¬ gente, sine fide, cum auxilio speciali, et etiam sine illo, suis viribus, aliquod bonum, morale ita perficere, ut in eo nullum omnino peccatum admittat v . Has autem propositio¬ nes in sequentibus capitibus eodem, quo nu¬ merat® a nobis sunt, ordine prosequemur.