Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 3: The arguments against the doctrine of the preceding chapter are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Against the things defined in the preceding chapter, Gregory of Rimini objects — and after him John Calvin — that saying of the Apostle from chapter 3 of the second to the Corinthians: We are not sufficient to think any thing of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God. I answer: the Apostle does not speak of every thought, but of that only which pertains to piety and eternal life. For blessed Paul for that reason subjoins in the same place: Who also hath made us fit ministers of the new testament, not in the letter, but in the spirit, etc. And that this place is to be understood in this way St. Augustine teaches, and after him the Synod of Orange. For thus speaks St. Augustine, book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2: “As regards religion and piety, then, of which the Apostle was speaking, we are not fit to think anything of ourselves.” And the Synod of Orange, canon 7, speaks thus: “If anyone affirm that by the vigor of nature he can think any good thing pertaining to the salvation of eternal life, or choose it, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, he is deceived by a heretical spirit, not understanding that saying: Not that we are fit to think any thing of ourselves, as of ourselves.”
But, you will say, every thought of moral truth — as that God is to be worshipped, the precepts to be kept, and the like — seems to pertain to piety and salvation. I answer: that cognition alone properly pertains to piety and salvation which is ordered to the grace of justification, or to the merit of eternal life; for that is the cognition which cannot be had without special help, as we shall afterwards confirm by many testimonies. And so the beginning of conversion to God, and any disposition whatsoever toward grace, necessarily demands the special help of God, and must be in some manner supernatural. But that God is to be worshipped, parents to be honored, the moral precepts to be observed, someone can know even though he have known nothing of Christ, nor ever thought of conversion.
Two other places Calvin objects. One from chapter 6 of Genesis: The imagination of man’s heart is only evil. The other, Psalm 93: The thoughts of men are vain. But the former place we have already often explained in the preceding books; and among other things we said that the imagination of the heart — that is, human thoughts — are called evil in the universal, since for the most part they are evil. For the figure of universal statement is very familiar to the Scriptures, and amplification is no less familiar to them. And so, just as in the same chapter it is said that all flesh had corrupted its way, though in the same place, a little after, Noe is excepted, who was a man just and perfect before God in his generation — so also every imagination of the human heart is called evil, though there is not wanting some imagination that is good. In like manner the thoughts of men are called vain, since, as they are from the powers of nature alone, they do not pertain to salvation; for the Prophet therefore subjoins: Blessed is the man whom thou shalt instruct, O Lord.
In the second place they object certain testimonies of Councils and Fathers. For in the Council of Milevis, canon 4, it is said thus: “It is the gift of God both to know what we ought to do, and to love that we may do it.” In the Council of Orange, canon 9: “It is of the divine gift when we think rightly, and keep our feet from falsity and injustice.” And canon 22: “Man has nothing of his own except lying and sin; but if anyone have truth and justice, he has it from that fountain,” etc. St. Augustine, in epistle 105: “No one,” says he, “is rightly wise, rightly understands, unless he have received the spirit of wisdom and understanding.”
I answer: the Council of Milevis by knowledge understands the cognition of the divine law. For the Pelagians confessed that the divine law, written in the old and new Testament, is a gift of God; but, that being divinely received, they said that man could by his own powers fulfill the whole law. Against which error both the Council of Milevis and St. Augustine, in the book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 26, and elsewhere, teach that it is very absurd to call a gift of God the knowledge which puffs up, and not the charity which builds up; but that in very truth each is a gift of God. And although the Pelagians said the knowledge of the law was a gift of God, they said this not by reason of the act of knowing — as though they thought man could not know moral truth without grace — but by reason of the object, since they confessed that it could not have been known what God willed to be done by us, unless he himself had revealed it to the Apostles and Prophets.
The Council of Orange, however, and Augustine speak of the cognition which pertains to piety. For, as we cited a little before, the same Council, canon 7, and Augustine, book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, teach in express words that in those things which pertain to piety and eternal salvation we can think nothing of good. Which the same Augustine repeats, book 6 [al. 4] against Julian, chapter 3, and elsewhere most frequently. Whence also in epistle 105, after those words, “No one is rightly wise, rightly understands,” he adds, “No one is knowingly pious, or piously knowing,” etc. Otherwise, if the Council of Orange were to be understood of all knowledge and truth, it would follow that not even the mathematical disciplines, nor any mechanical art — in which without doubt there are many true things — could be comprehended by human talent without the special aid of grace. And so, in those things which pertain to piety and eternal salvation, no one has of his own anything but lying and sin; and it is of the divine gift when we think rightly, and keep our foot from falsity and injustice. But if anyone contend altogether that the Council of Orange is to be understood of all truth, he will also have to admit that the same Council by the gift of God understood not only the gifts of grace, but also those of nature. For in that way it will be absolutely true that we have nothing from ourselves but lying and sin; for truth and justice we have not from ourselves, but from God, whose gift is the light of reason and the natural propensity of the will.
In the third place they object reasons. The first reason is that through the sin of the first man we received the wound of ignorance, from which no one can be healed except through Christ, as Augustine teaches, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 9, book 22 On the City of God, chapter 22, and elsewhere. I answer: through the sin of the first man the human intellect was wounded and weakened, yet not extinguished. Wherefore nothing hinders it from seeing something, and judging rightly, both in natural and in moral matters. For the eye of the body also, if it be weak and injured, but not altogether blind, sees something, though not far.
The second reason: From the cognition of moral truth prudence is acquired; but no one becomes prudent without the gift of God, because the virtues are connected and bound together among themselves, so that he who has one has all; and it is agreed well enough that man cannot by his own powers acquire all the virtues. I answer: some moral truth can be known without prudence being thereby acquired; for the habits of the virtues are not procured by one act, or by a few acts. Then, it is not absurd that an imperfect virtue of prudence be had without the rest; for what the Philosophers say about the connection of the virtues is understood of perfect and complete virtues, not of imperfect and inchoate ones.
The third reason: Holy men are wont to ask from God the cognition of moral truth, according to that of Psalm 118: Give me understanding, and I will search thy law. Likewise: Teach me thy justifications. I answer: light is deservedly asked from God for knowing truth, not only moral but also theoretical — both because the things we do not know are far more numerous than those we know, and also because in those we do know we can easily be deceived, on account of various circumstances and perturbations. Add that in Psalm 118 it is not the simple cognition of some moral truth that is asked, but the understanding of the whole divine law, which contains very many most high and most profound mysteries.
The fourth reason: If any moral truth could be known by the powers of nature, it would follow that every moral truth could be known by the same powers; for the reasoning is the same for all. I answer: the reasoning is not the same for all moral truths, since some stand farther from the principles known of themselves than others; nor are there wanting various circumstances which hinder human counsels now more, now less. But even if the reasoning were the same for all, still it could not come to pass, in the state of corrupt nature, that we should escape all the errors which are wont to be committed in deliberations; for while we avoid one, we slip into another, and often we are the more shamefully deceived in that very thing in which we wished to be more cautious.
The fifth reason: If by our own powers we knew moral truth, we would have something from ourselves, and would rashly glory in it — which yet the Apostle seems to forbid, when he says in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 1: He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord. And chapter 4: What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it? I answer: the place of the Apostle makes against those who attribute to themselves things which in very truth are supernatural, and especially the gift of faith. For (as St. Augustine teaches, book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapters 4 and 5) those whom the Apostle reprehends did not glory in beauty, health, talent, or any other natural gift, but in the gifts which pertain to salvation and piety, attributing to themselves faith or sanctity; for that is why he says, Who distinguisheth thee? — that is, Who gave thee to be faithful or holy, while so many remain in unbelief and impiety? And lest perhaps it be answered, “my faith, my will, my zeal,” the Apostle subjoins: For what hast thou that thou hast not received? But although those Apostolic words seem properly to be understood of supernatural gifts, yet it is true that in no thing is one to glory, since we have received both nature and powers from God, and without his help — at least the general — we cannot bend even a finger. And so St. Cyprian, book 3 to Quirinus, chapter 4, rightly pronounced universally: “In nothing must we glory, since nothing is ours.”
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CAPUT III. Solvuntur argumenta contra doctrinam capitis superioris. Adversus ea, quse superiore capite defini¬ ta sunt, objicit Gregorius Ariminensis, et post eum Joannes Calvinus illud Apostoli ex cap. 3. posterioris ad Corinthios : Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid ex nobis, tamquam ex nobis , sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. Respondeo : Non loquitur Apostolus de quu- (0 Psal. IV, 6. — (2) Exod. IX, 27. - (3) II Corin. IU. 5. 40 LIBER V. curaque cogitatione, sed de illa solum, qua) ad pietatem, et vitam sternam pertinet. Nam ideo subjungit eodem loco beatus Paulus : Qui idoneos nos fecit ministros novi Testamenti non littera; sed spiritu, etc. Et hoc modo hunc locum intelligeudum esse docet S. Augusti¬ nus, et post cum Synodus Arausicana. Sic enim loquitur S. Augustinus lib. ide priedc- stinatione Sanctorum cap. 2. « Quod ergo pertinet ad religionem et pietatem, de qua loquebatur Apostolus, non sumus idonei co¬ gitare aliquid ex nobis. » Synodus autem Arausicana canon. 7. sic ait: « Si quis per natura) vigorem bonum aliquod ad salutem pertinens vitse aeterna) cogitare, aut eligere posse confirmat, absque illuminatione et in¬ spiratione Spiritus sancti, haeretico fallitur spiritu, non intelligens illud : Non quod ido¬ nei simus cogitare aliquid a nobis tamquam a nobis. » At. inquies, omnis cogitatio veri moralis, ut, Deum esse colendum, praecepta servanda, et similia, ad pietatem et salutem pertinere videntur. Respondeo, illam solam cognitio¬ nem ad pietatem et salutem proprie perti¬ nere, quae ordinatur ad gratiam justificatio¬ nis, vel ad meritum vita; aeterna; ; ista est e- nim cognitio, quae sine speciali auxilio habe¬ ri non potest, ut postea multis testimoniis confirmabimus. Itaque initium conversionis ad Deum, et quaecumque dispositio ad gra¬ tiam, speciale Deiauxilium necessario postu¬ lat, et aliquo modo supernaturalis esse de¬ bet. At Deum esse colendum, ! parentes ho¬ norandos, praecepta moralia observanda, potest aliquis cognoscere, etiamsi nihil de Christo noverit, neciinquam de conversione cogitaverit. Alia duo loca objigit Calvinus. Unum ex cap. vi. Genes. Firmentum cordis humani tantum malum (2). Alterum Psalm. xcm. Co¬ gitationes hominum vanae sunt. Sed priorem locum saepe jam in superioribus libris expli¬ cavimus, atque inter alia diximus, figmen¬ tum cordis, id est, humanas cogitationes, dici malas in universum, quoniam ut pluri¬ mum sunt malae. Scripturis enim valde fa¬ miliaris est figura intellectionis, nec minus familiaris eis est amplificatio. Itaque quo¬ modo in eodem capite dicitur : Omnis caro corrupisse viam suam, cum taimen ibidem excipiatur paulo post. Noe, qui fuit vir ju¬ stus, et perfectus coram Deo in generatione sua; sic etiam dicitur mailura, omne figmentum cordis humani, quamvis non desit aliquod figmentum, id est, aliqua cogitationes homi¬ num dici vanas, quoniam, ut sunt ex solis viribus natura), non pertinent ad salutem. Ideo enim subjungit Propheta : Beatus homo, quem tu erudieris, Domine. Secundo loco objiciunt aliqua testimonia Conciliorum et Patrum. Nam in Concilio Mi- lcvitano canon. 4. sic dicitur : « Donum Dei est et scire quid facere debeamus, et diligere ut faciamus. » In Concilio Arausicano can. ix. « Divini est muneris, cum recte cogita¬ mus, et pedes nostros a falsitate, et injusti¬ tia tenemus. » Et Cau. 22. « Nihil habet ho¬ mo suum, pra)ter mendacium et peccatum : si quis autem veritatem, et justitiam habet, ab eo fonte habet etc. » S. Augustinus in epist. 105.' « Nemo, in¬ quit, recte sapit, recte intelligit, nisi ac¬ ceperit spiritum sapientia) et intellectus». Respondeo : Concilium Milevitanum per scientiam intelligit cognitionem legis divina), Nam Pelagiani fatebantur, donum Dei esse legem divinam, scriptam in veteri et novo Testamento, sed ea divinitus accepta, dice¬ bant, posse hominem suis viribus totam le¬ gem implere. Contra quem errorem, tum Concilium Milevitanum, tum S. Augustinus in libro de gratia Christi cap. 26. et alibi docent, valde esse absurdum, vocare donum Dei scientiam, qna) inflat, et non charitatem, quae aedificat : re autem vera utrumque esse donum Dei; quamvis autem Pelagiani do¬ num Dei esso dicerent scientiam legis, id tamen non dicebaut ratione actus cognos¬ cendi, quasi existimarent, non posse homi¬ nem cognoscere verum morale, sine gratia), sed ratione objecti, quoniam fatebantur non potuisse sciri quid Deus vellet a nobis fieri, nisi illud ipse revelasset Apostolis et Pro¬ phetis. Concilium autem Arausicanum et Augu¬ stinus loquuntur de cognitione, qua) ad pie¬ tatem pertinet. Nam ut paulo ante citavimus, idem Concilium canon. 7, et Augustinus in lib. i. de priedestlnatione Sanctorum cap. 2. dissertis verbis docent, in iis, quse ad pieta¬ tem, et salutem aiternam pertinent, nihil posse nos boni cogitare. Quod idem reperit idem Augustinus lib. vi. in Julianum cap. 3. et alibi frequentissime. Unde etiam in epist. 103. post illa verba : « Nemo recte sapit, (1) Gei». VI, 5; Psal. X01JT. 11. 41 CAPUT7 III. recte intelUgitn; addit, «Nemo scienter pius est, vel pi^e sciens, etc. » Alioqui si Concilium Arausicanum de omni scientia, et veritate intelligendum esset, sequeretur, ne mathe¬ maticas quidem disciplinas ; aut mechanicam ullam artem, in quibus sine dubio multa sunt vera, posse humano ingenio compre¬ hendi sine speciali gratiae adjutorio. Itaque in his, qua3 ad pietatem et salutem aeternam pertinent, nemo habet de suo, nisi mendacium et peccatum, et divini muneris est, cum recte cogitamus, et pedem a falsi- tate, et injustitia tenemus. Quod si quis om¬ nino contendat, Concilium Arausicanum de omni veritate esse intelligendum, is etiam admittere debebit, idem Concilium per do¬ num Dei non solum gratise, sed etiam naturae dona intellexisse. Nam eo modo absolute verum erit, nos nihil habere ex nobis nisi mendacium et paccatum; veritatem enim, et justitiam non habemus ex nobis, sed a Deo, cujus donum est lumen rationis et na¬ turalis propensio voluntatis. Tertio loco objiciunt rationes. Prima ratio est, quoniam per peccatum primii hominis ignorantiae vulnus accepimus, a quo nisi per Christum nemo sanari potest, ut Augustinus docet lib. i. Retract. cap. 9. lib. xxii. de ci¬ vit. Dei cap. 22. et alibi. Respondeo, per peccatum primi hominis intellectus humanus laesus, ac debilitatus est, non tamen extin- ctus. Quocirca nihil impedit, quo minus ali¬ quid videat, ac recte judicet, tum in natura¬ libus, tum in moralibus. Nam et oculus cor¬ poris si debilis sit, ac laesus, sed non om¬ nino caecus, aliquid videt, quamvis non longe. Secunda ratio. Ex cognitione veri moralis acquiritur prudentia : nemo autem sine dono Dei fit prudens, quia virtutes sunt inter se connexae et colligatae, ita ut qui unam habet, omnes habeat : et satis constat, hominem suis viribus non posse omnes virtutes acquirere. Respondeo : aliquod verum morale cognosci potest absque eo, quod acquiratur prudentia. Neque enim habitus virtutum uno actu, vel paucis actibus comparantur. Deinde non est absurdum, ut imperfecta virtus prudentiae sine caeteris habeatur. Quod enim Philosophi dicunt de connexione virtutum, intelligitur de perfectis et absolutis virtutibus, non de imperfectis et inchoatis. Tertia ratio. Cognitionem veri moralis sancti viri a Deo petere solent, juxta illud Psal. cxvm. Da mihi intellectum , et scruta¬ bo)' legem tuam. Item : Justificationes tuas doce me (1). Respondeo, merito petitur a Deo lu¬ men ad cognoscendum verum, non solum morale, sed etiam theoricum, tum quia multo plura sunt quae ignoramus, quam ea quae scimus ; tum etiam, quia in iis, quae ser- mus, facile falli possumus, ob varias cir¬ cumstantias et perturbationes. Adde, quod in Psal. cxviii. non petitur simplex cognitio alicujus veri moralis, sed intelligentia totius divinae legis, quae plurima continet altissima, ac profundissima Sacramenta. Quarta ratio. Si aliquod verum morale co¬ gnosci posset viribus naturae, sequeretur, omne verum morale iisdem viribus posse cognosci, eadem enim est omnium ratio. Respondeo: Non est eadem ratio omnium moralium veritatum; siquidem aliae longius distant a principiis per se notis, quam aliae : nec desunt variae circumstantiae, quae con¬ silia humana modo magis, modo minus im¬ pediant. Sed etiamsi ratio omnium eadem esset, non tamen fieri posset in statu naturae corruptae, ut omnes errores, qui in delibe¬ rationibus committi solent, evaderemus, dum enim vitamus unum, labimur in alterum, et saepe in eo ipso turpius fallimur, in quo cau¬ tiores esse voluimus. Quinta ratio. Si nostris viribus verum mo¬ rale cognosceremus, haberemus aliquid ex nobis, et in eo temere gloriaremur. Quod tamen prohibere videtur Apostolus, cum ait in i. epist. ad Cor. cap. i. Qui gloriatur , in Domino glorietur. Et cap. 7 : Quid habes, quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti , quid gloria¬ ris, quas inon acceperis (2)? Respondeo, locus Apostoli adversus eos facit, qui sibi tribunt ea, quae re vera supernatturalia sunt, ac prae¬ sertim fidei donum. Nam (ut docet S. Augu¬ stinus lib. i. de praedest. Sanctorum cap. 4. et 5.) illi, quos Apostolus reprehendit, non gloriabantur dc forma, sanitate, ingenio, aut alio naturali dono, sed de donis, quae pertinent ad salutem et pietatem, sibi tri¬ buentes fidem, aut sanctitatem, idcirco enim ait : Quis te discernit ? hoc est, Quis tibi dedit, ut fidelis, vel sanctus esses, tam mul¬ tis in incredulitate et impietate remanenti¬ bus ? et ne forte responderetur, fides mea, voluntas mea , studium meum : subjungit Apostolus, Quid enimhabes, quodnon accepisti. (I) Psal. CXVIII, 51, 12. - (2) 1. Cor. I. 51 ; ib. IV, 7. TOM. VI. 4 42 LIBER V. Sed quamvis Apostolica illa verba proprie de donis supernaturalibus intelligenda esse videantur: verum est tamen, in nulla re glo¬ riandum'; cum et naturam, et vires accepe¬ rimus a Deo, et sine ejus auxilio saltem ge¬ nerali, ne digitum quidem curvare possimus. Itaque recte S. Cyprianus lib. m. ad Quiri¬ num cap. 4. universe pronunciavit : « In nullo gloriandum, quando nostrum nihil sit. »