Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 8: The arguments against the proposition of chapter seven are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The arguments of the Pelagians are few, nor difficult. They object, first, the testimony of St. Jerome, from book 2 against Jovinian: “God founded us with free choice; neither to virtue nor to vices are we drawn by necessity; otherwise, where there is necessity, there is neither damnation nor crown.” St. Augustine answers, in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 65 [al. 66], that St. Jerome speaks of nature such as it was founded by God, not such as it now is, vitiated through sin. For now a certain necessity of sinning is at hand — from the vice, not from the condition of nature; from which necessity we ask to be freed when we say, Deliver me from my necessities. It could also be answered, if we concede that St. Jerome speaks of nature such as it now is, that we are not drawn to vices by necessity, since, even though of ourselves we are not able to resist temptations, we are able with the aid of God, which is always at hand — according to that of the same Jerome, in the epistle to Cyprian: “He who endures a tempest seeks the refuge of a rock or a roof; he whom an enemy pursues flees to the walls of cities: so also man, from the beginning of his creation, uses God as helper; and since it is of his grace that he was created, and of his mercy that he subsists and lives, he can do nothing of good work without him who so granted free choice that he would not deny his own grace through each several work.”
Second, it is objected: temptations arise from the concupiscence of the flesh, James saying in his epistle, chapter 1: Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. But the rational mind naturally lords it over concupiscence, according to that of Genesis 4: The appetite thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it. Therefore man can, by the powers of nature, not yield to temptation. I answer: human nature is so constituted that naturally the lower part is apt to obey the higher, and the higher to command the lower; yet the lower can also struggle against the higher, and draw it to itself — not indeed by dominating, but by alluring and coaxing. Wherefore the Philosophers rightly say that reason commands the lower appetite not with a despotic command, in the way a master commands a slave, but with a political one, in the way a magistrate commands the people, who not rarely stir up seditions and refuse to obey their rulers. And although from the nature of the thing it ought to happen that sometimes indeed the lower part cast down the higher, but that for the most part the higher keep the lower in its duty, and restrain it though unwilling and struggling — yet the contrary befalls, for four causes. First, because the lower part is vigorous for many years before the higher begins to wake; for thence it comes to pass that sense, accustomed for so many years to be carried toward its objects without the command of reason, can afterwards with difficulty bear the yoke of reason. Then, because the goods of sense are present, while the chief goods of reason are future; and present things are wont to move us much more than future. Third, because the objects of the senses are near, and are perfectly known; but those of reason are far removed and hidden, and are penetrated only thinly. Fourth, because the devil has a very great power and art of hurting, by arousing and inflaming concupiscence. Hence it comes to pass that reason, if it lean on its own powers alone, can in no way resist concupiscence — both vehement of itself, and inflamed by the devil. Wherefore what is said in Genesis — the appetite thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it — is true indeed; but it is true chiefly for this reason, that (as we said above) God does not suffer us to be tempted above that which we are able.
Third, there is wont to be objected by some the testimony of St. Thomas, who in 1-2, question 10, article 3, writes that the will cannot be necessitated by a passion, unless the passion utterly swallow up the judgment of reason. But if a passion, however vehement, never necessitates the will while the free judgment of reason remains, certainly it follows that it can be resisted by the powers of the will, even alone. I answer: St. Thomas signifies that the will is not necessitated by a passion with physical necessity, as though the will were determined to one in the way the appetite of brute animals is determined; yet he does not deny that it is necessitated morally — that is, moved infallibly — in the way a most eloquent orator, who by persuading leads men whithersoever he will, does not necessitate them physically, but morally. For they choose to do what the orator persuades them to, but driven by the efficacy of the persuasion, which they are not morally able to resist. Moreover, St. Thomas does not deny that our will also needs the divine help, that it be not necessitated by a passion; but he only says that, if reason be swallowed up, it is altogether necessitated; but if reason be not swallowed up, it is not necessitated — which is true, because, fortified by the divine help, it can not consent to the passion; of which help it is not capable when the judgment of reason is utterly bound.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT VIII. Solvuntur argumenta contra propositionem capitis septimi. Argumenta Pelagianorum pauca sunt, nec difficilia. Objiciunt primo testimonium S. Hieronymi, ex lib. n. in Jovinianum : « Li¬ beri arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad vir¬ tutem, nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur, alioquin ubi necessitas, neque damnatio, ne¬ que corona est ». Respondet sanctus Au¬ gustinus in lib. de natura et gratia cap. 65. sanctum Hieronymum loqui de natura, qua¬ lis fuit a Deo condita, non qualis nunc eet per peccatum vitiata. Nunc enim quaedam peccandi necessitas ad est 4ex vitio, non ex conditione naturae. A qua necessitate libe¬ rari petimus, cum dicimus, « De necessita¬ tibus meis erue me » . Posset etiam responderi, si concedamus, S. Hieronymum loqui de natura, qualis nunc est, non necessitate trahi nos ad vitia, quo¬ niam etiamsi per nos resistere tentationibus non valeamus, valemus tamen cum adjutorio Dei, quod semper in promptu est, juxta illud ejusdem Hieronymi in epistola adCyprianuml « Qui sustinet tempestatem, vel petrae, vel tecti quaerit refugium ; quem hostis perse- buitur, ad muros urbium confugit : ita et homo a principio conditionis suae Deo utitur adjutore, et cum illius sit gratiae, quod cre¬ atus est, illiusque misericordiae, quod sub¬ sistit et vivit ; nihil boni operis agere potest absque eo, qui ita concessit liberum arbi¬ trium, ut suam, per singula opera, gratiam non negaret » . Secundo objicitur, tentationes oriuntur ex concupiscentia carnis, dicente Jacobo in epistola sua. cap. ii : Unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus (1). Concupiscentiae vero rationalis animus natu¬ raliter dominatur, juxta illud Genes, iv. Sub te erit appetitus [ ejus , et tu dominaberis il¬ lius (2). Igitur potest homo naturae viribus, tentationi non cedere. Respendeo: natura humana ita constituta est, ut naturaliter pars inferior apta sit obe- dire superiori, et superior imperare inferiori: tamen potest etiam inferior reluctari supe¬ riori, et eam non quidem dominando, sed al¬ liciendo et blandiendo ad se pertrahere. Quo¬ circa Philosophi recte dicunt, rationem im¬ perare appetitui inferiori, non despotico im¬ perio, quomodo imperat dominus servo, sed politico, quomodo magistratus imperat po¬ pulo, qui excitat non raro seditiones et recto¬ ribus suis obedire detrectat. Quamvis autem ex natura rei contingere deberet, ut aliquando quidem pars inferior dejiceret superiorem, sed ut plurimum infe¬ riorem superior in officio contineret, et licet invitam, et reluctantem coerceret : tamen contra accidit, Quatuor de causis. Primum, quia pars inferior multis annis viget, ante¬ quam superior evigilare incipiat : inde enim fit, ut sensus assuetus per tot annos sine im¬ perio rationis ferri in sua objecta, difficulter postea jugum rationis ferre possit. Deinde, quia sensus bona sunt praesentia, rationis (l)Jacob. I, 14. — - (2) Gen. IV, 7. 52 LIBER V. autem praecipua sunt futura et praesentia multo magis, quam futura nos movere so¬ lent. Tertio, quia sensuum objecta vicina sunt, et perfecte cognoscuntur, rationis vero longe remota et abdita, nec nisi tenuiter penetrantur. Quarto, quia diabolus maxi¬ mam habet potentiam et artem nocendi , concupiscentiam excitando atque inflam¬ mando. Hinc enim fit, ut ratio, si suis solis "viribus nitatur, concupiscentia?, et per se vehementi, et a diabolo inflammata), resis¬ tere nullo modo possit. Quare quod in Ge¬ nesi dicitur : Sub te erit appetitus ejus , et tu dominaberis illius , verum est quidem, sed ideo potissimum est verum, quoniam (ut su¬ pra diximus) Deus non sinit nos teiitari supra id, quod possumus. Tertio, objici solet a quibusdam testimo¬ nium sancti Thoma) qui in 1. 2. qua?st. 10. art. 3. scribit, voluntatem non posse ncces- sitari a passione, nisi passio absorbeat pe¬ nitus judicium rationis. Quod si passio quan¬ tumlibet vehemens, numquam necessitat vo¬ luntatem, dum manet liberum rationis judi¬ cium, certe sequitur, ut possit ei resisti vi¬ ribus voluntatis etiam solis. , Respondeo : significat sanctus Thomas a passione non nccessitari voluntatem necessi¬ tate physica, quasi voluntas determinetur ad unum, quomodo determinaturappetitus ani¬ mantium brutorum; tamen non negat neces- sitari morali ter, id est, infallibilitcr moveri, quomodo eloquentissimus orator, qui persu¬ adendo ducit homines quocumque voluerit, non eos necessitat physice, sed moraliter. Eligunt enim illi id facere, quod orator eis persuadet, sed impulsi efficacia persuasionis, cui resistere moraliter non valent. Praeterea non negat S. Thomas, etiam nostram voluntatem divino auxilio indigere, ut a passione non necessitetur : sed solum dicit, eam, si ratio absorbeatur, omnino ne- cessitari ; si vero ratio non absorbeatur, non necessitari ; quod verum est, quia divino au¬ xilio munita potest non consentire passioni, cujus auxilii non est capax, quando rationis judicium penitus est ligatum.