Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 9: That man without faith, with special help, and even without it, can perform some moral good, if no temptation press
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The third proposition, which teaches that man can, without faith, with special help, and even without it, perform some moral good, if no temptation press, is briefly to be explained before it is proved.
It must be known, then, that it is not altogether the same thing to do a moral good and to observe a precept according to the substance of the work. For a precept can be kept according to the substance of the work even with sin — as if someone restore a deposit to a friend in order that the friend be despoiled of it by thieves. But a moral good cannot be done with sin; accordingly it is something greater to do a moral good than to keep a precept; and therefore in our proposition we made mention not so much of the precept as of the moral good. It must be known, second, that the adversaries — and especially Chemnitz, and the other sectaries of this time, who teach that it is a Pelagian heresy to deny that all the works of unbelievers are sins — affirm this even of those works which are done by unbelievers with the special help of God; and therefore we chiefly wish to prove this: namely, that not all works done without faith are sins, especially if they be done with the special help of God. For that this is most certain we in no wise doubt. Meanwhile, however, we also wish to prove that some morally good work can be done not only without faith, but even without special help, if no temptation press; for, temptation pressing, we have already shown that nothing of good can be done by the powers of nature alone. And so we shall bring forward testimonies which prove that some good works can be done by unbelievers, whether with special help or even by the powers of nature alone.
The first testimony, then, is taken from those Scriptures which testify that God rewards certain good works of the Gentiles; for God, who is most just and loves justice, and who is most wise and can in no way be deceived, would not reward evil works, since by just judgment they deserve punishment, not reward. One place is Exodus 1: And because the midwives feared God, he built them houses. The sense is: because the Egyptian midwives did not obey the unjust command of Pharao, who had ordered all the male infants of the Hebrews to be killed — judging it to be, as in very truth it was, against the will of God — therefore God, for this mercy which they exercised toward the sons of the Hebrews, gave them as a reward a copious and happy offspring, and thus built and established houses for them. Another place is Ezechiel, chapter 29: “Son of man, Nabuchodonosor king of Babylon hath made his army to serve with a great service against Tyre: every head was made bald, and every shoulder was peeled: and there hath been no reward given him, nor his army, for Tyre, for the service that he rendered me against it. Therefore thus saith the Lord God: Behold, I have given Nabuchodonosor king of Babylon the land of Egypt, and he shall take her multitude, and take the booty thereof for a prey, and rifle the spoils thereof; and it shall be wages for his army.” That army without doubt was unbelieving; and yet, because it faithfully served its king in a just war against Tyre — which city God, on account of its sins, willed to be overthrown — therefore he rendered it a reward, granting it, by a wonderful providence, the spoils of Egypt, which on account of its crimes had likewise deserved to be despoiled. And so St. Jerome, in the commentary, speaks thus: “From this — that Nabuchodonosor receives the reward of a good work — we understand that even the heathen, if they have done anything of good, are not passed over without reward by the judgment of God.” Another place likewise is Daniel 4, where Daniel, when he had foretold to king Nabuchodonosor a grave temporal punishment from God on account of his sins, exhorts him to alms, by which he might redeem, or avert, that temporal punishment: Wherefore, O king, let my counsel be acceptable to thee: redeem thou thy sins with alms, etc. But if the alms of an unbelieving man could avert a temporal punishment, certainly they were good works, not sins; for sins do not mitigate the wrath of God, but rather kindle it.
Second, it is proved from other Scriptures, which indicate that unbelievers do, or can do, some good works. Matthew 5: And if you salute your brethren only, what do you more? Do not also the heathens this? Be you therefore perfect, etc. In which place there is attributed to the heathen the good work of showing signs of benevolence toward their own; for unless this were good, the Lord would not say, “what do you more?” but, “why do you this?” The Lord, therefore, wills his own to do not contrary things, but greater. Romans 2: When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, etc. Here the Apostle openly teaches that the Gentiles by the natural light fulfill some commandments of the law. And that they so fulfill them as not to sin, Chrysostom teaches in the commentary, when he says that they fulfill all the things that are of the law — that is, as we said above, observe the commandment with all its circumstances.
Then let the testimonies of the Fathers come. St. Basil, homily 9 on the work of the six days: “There are also among us virtues according to nature, toward which the soul has a familiarity not from the teaching of men, but from nature itself. For as no discipline teaches us to hate disease, but we have a spontaneous aversion and detestation against the things that are troublesome to us, so also there is in the soul a certain declining from and flight of vice apart from teaching.” In which place St. Basil most openly teaches that certain virtues are natural, as mercy and the like, and thereby that neither divine faith nor special help is always necessary, since we are naturally inclined to such things. St. John Chrysostom, homily 67 to the people of Antioch: “A bad man cannot be altogether bad, but it happens that he has something of good; nor can a good man be altogether good, but he is wont to have some sins. When, therefore, the bad man enjoys prosperous things, he enjoys them to the destruction of his own head; for he receives them for this cause, that, taking here the recompense of those few good things, he may then be punished there.” Chrysostom speaks of all the bad, even unbelievers; for he says generally that there is no bad man who has not something of good; and he speaks of a work good not only in its kind, but simply, because he opposes it to sin, and assigns to it its due reward; for a reward is not owed — especially with God — to a work which is good in its kind but absolutely a sin. The author of the unfinished work, homily 26 on Matthew: “Hear the mystery which Peter expounded in Clement: if a believer do a good work, it profits him both here, delivering him from evils, and there, unto receiving the heavenly kingdom — and more there than here. But if an unbeliever do a good work, his work profits him here, and here God renders him good things for his work; but in that world it profits him nothing. Nor is he placed among the rest of the faithful on account of his work — and justly: because, moved by a natural good, he did the good, not for God’s sake.” St. Jerome, on chapter 1 of the epistle to the Galatians: “From which it is made clear that the knowledge of God is in all by nature, and that no one is born without Christ, and without having in himself the seeds of wisdom and justice and the other virtues. Whence many, without the faith and Gospel of Christ, do some things either wisely or holily — as that they obey their parents, stretch out a hand to the needy, do not oppress their neighbors, do not seize the goods of others.” In this place St. Jerome concedes not only that without faith some holy works are done, but that they are done holily; and in no way can that be said to be done holily which is done with sin. The same, on chapter 5 to the Galatians: “As, according to James, faith without works is dead, so without faith, though the works be good, they are counted dead.” Faith without works is not false, but true, though it be called dead, because it does not work eternal salvation; therefore good works also without faith are not evil, but truly good — dead, however, because they profit nothing for procuring the true life, which is in heaven.
St. Augustine teaches that certain good works are done without faith, but with the special help of God; and again others without special help, by the powers of nature alone. Of the works of the first kind we have a testimony in epistle 130 [al. 144], where he praises the continence of Polemon: “since,” says he, “it is a gift of God.” And he adds: “And if he had known this gift, he would have been not only continent, but also religious and pious, and would have had continence not only for the honorableness of the present life, but also for the merit of the eternal.” And in book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, speaking of the virtues of unbelievers: “How much more tolerably would you attribute those things, which you say are virtues in the impious, rather to the divine gift than to their will alone, though they themselves know it not?” Finally, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 7, and book 1 On Baptism, chapter 3 [al. 10], and book 4, chapter 23, he both calls the alms of Cornelius, before he believed in Christ, justice, and says they were a gift of God. But it is certainly impious to count the gifts of God among sins. Of the works of the second kind we have a testimony in the book On the Perfection of Justice, in the response next to the last, where, when Celestius, wishing to prove that the grace of God is not necessary for the good works of free choice, had objected that of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7, Let him do what he will; he sinneth not, if she marry, Augustine answered: “See, I beseech you, what a thing it is to say that the mercy of God is not necessary to him that willeth and runneth, because the Apostle says of a certain man, ‘Let him do what he will; he sinneth not, if she marry’ — as though the willing to marry were to be held a great thing, where the dispute is more laboriously carried on about the aid of the divine mercy.” And so Augustine concedes that in human works of this kind, which do not pertain to salvation, the help of grace is not always required; and yet these works are good, since they are not sins, the Apostle witnessing, who says, He sinneth not, if she marry.
Another testimony is in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 27 [al. 28], which place is to be recited a little more fully: “But if those who by nature do the things that are of the law are not yet to be held in the number of those whom the grace of Christ justifies, but rather in the number of those of whom — even impious men, not truly and piously worshipping the true God — we nevertheless either read, or know, or have heard of certain deeds which, according to the rule of justice, we not only cannot censure, but even deservedly and rightly praise: although, if it be examined with what end they are done, scarcely are any found which deserve the praise or defense owed to justice.” Where that word “scarcely” is to be noted; for truly a great part of the works of unbelievers, on account of the depraved end to which they are referred, are simply sins; yet certain ones, though few, are found which are vitiated by no evil end, and these ought to be called not sins, but simply good works. And so the same Augustine straightway subjoins: “Nevertheless, because the image of God has not been so worn away in the human soul by the stain of earthly affections that no last lineaments, as it were, have remained in it — whence it may deservedly be said that even in the very impiety of their life they do or understand some things of the law,” etc. Of which words this seems to be the sense: if we seek good works of unbelievers which have not been done for an evil end, and thereby are simply good, we shall scarcely be able to find them; yet that there are some of this kind can be gathered from this, that the image of God in the human soul has not been altogether taken away by sin. Wherefore a little after he adds these words: “For as certain venial sins, without which this life is not led, do not hinder the just man from eternal life, so some good works, without which the life of even the worst of men is most hardly found, profit the impious man nothing toward eternal salvation.” In which words the very antithesis testifies openly enough that the good works of the impious, which do not profit toward eternal life, cannot be called sins — just as the venial sins of the just, which do not bar them from life, cannot be called good works. To these add that the same Augustine, in book 5 On the City of God, chapter 15, says that God gave the Romans so ample an empire that he might reward in this life their good virtues; and whether those virtues were conjoined with the special grace of God or not, certainly they belonged to unbelievers, and they were virtues, not vices — unless we make God a rewarder of vices, which is most absurd. Add also, last, that the same author, in almost all the places where he writes that nothing of good can be done without the help of grace, is wont to add the limitation: if, namely, those good works pertain to piety and salvation — to signify, no doubt, that for good works which do not pertain to piety and salvation either the help of grace is not required, or at least that this matter can be disputed without prejudice to the faith. In the book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 26: “Let him who wishes truly to confess the grace of God so confess it, that he doubt not that nothing at all of good which pertains to piety and true justice can be done without it.” Likewise in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17: “Without him working that we may will, and cooperating when we will, we avail nothing toward the good works of piety.” The same he has in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, and elsewhere most frequently.
The author of the Hypognosticon, book 3, not far from the beginning: “We confess that free choice is in all men, having indeed the judgment of reason — not that by it it is fit, without God, either to begin or certainly to complete the things that pertain to God, but only in the works of the present life, both good and also evil. Good, I say, which arise from the good of nature: that is, to will to labor in the field, to will to eat and drink, to will to have a friend, to will to have garments, to will to build a house, to will to take a wife, to feed cattle, to learn the art of divers good things, to will whatever of good pertains to the present life.” Thus he. Nor does the Ariminensian satisfy, answering that these are not moral goods, but natural. For the author of this book opposes these goods to evils, when he says that free choice can, without the grace of God, will both the good and the evil things which pertain to the present life; and he certainly does not speak of natural evils — for no one chooses those evils — but of moral ones, which are properly voluntary. Which is also clear from the example the same author sets down, namely to worship an idol, and the like. He speaks, therefore, of moral goods — such as are all those enumerated, if they be clothed with the due circumstances.
St. Prosper, in the book against the Collator, chapter 26 [al. 9]: “Of human nature, whose creator is God, even after the transgression there remains the substance, there remains the form, there remains life, and sense, and reason, and the other goods of body and mind, which are not wanting even to the evil and vicious. But in them there is no perception of the true good; they can make honorable the mortal life, they cannot confer the eternal.” Note that word “make honorable”; for not sins, but only virtues, can make our life honorable. St. Fulgentius, in the book On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ, chapter 26: “But if to certain men, knowing God yet not glorifying him as God, that knowledge profited nothing toward salvation, how could those be just before God who so keep something of goodness in their manners and works that they do not refer it to the end of the Christian faith and charity? In whom there can indeed be some good things, which pertain to the equity of human society; but because they are not done from the charity of God, they cannot profit.” St. Gregory, homily 27 on the Gospels, treating that verse, This is my commandment: “There are some who love their neighbors, but through the affection of kinship and flesh; whom nevertheless the sacred oracles do not contradict in this love. But one thing is what is bestowed spontaneously on nature, another what is owed to the Lord’s precepts from the charity of obedience.” But if the sacred oracles do not contradict natural love, certainly that love contains nothing of sin, and thereby is morally good; since the sacred oracles contradict all sins. Finally, St. John Damascene, in book 3 [al. 2] On the Faith, chapter 14 [al. 30], repeats what we cited from Basil: that some virtues are so familiar to our nature that they can be called natural.
Let reasons also come, last of all. The first reason: If works done without faith and special help were always sins, this would befall either because the circumstance of the end is wanting to them, since they are not done for God’s sake, as Gregory of Rimini says; or because they are done by a sinful man, and thereby are infected and vitiated by their cause, though of their kind they be good, as Martin Chemnitz says — who also illustrates this by the similitude of the heart: for as the substance of the heart is in itself good, and yet the heart is called depraved, Jeremias 17, because it is defiled by evil works, so also contrariwise works, good in themselves, are defiled and become evil because they go out from an evil heart; or because morally good works have no proportion with the powers of our nature; or finally because they are too difficult, on account of the rebellion of the flesh and the tyranny of the demon. But none of these can be said. For as to the circumstance of the end: the heathen can, even without faith, know that God exists and has care of us, as was proved above; accordingly they will be able to work moral goods that they may obey God, the author of nature — in the way Marcus Tullius, in the dream of Scipio, admonishes that the Commonwealth is to be administered diligently, because nothing is more pleasing to the highest God than that the councils and assemblies of men be well governed. Then, it is not necessary to refer all things to God explicitly; but it is enough if the work be referred to a good proximate end; for then of itself it will be directed to God, as to the last end. For as every particular agent acts in the power of the first mover, that is, of God, so also every good end moves in the power of the last end. Otherwise not only unbelievers, but even the faithful, and all the most just, would always sin, since while working they do not think of God, but work because reason dictates that it is good and to be done. And so, unless the circumstance of an evil end be added, every morally good work is of itself referred to God, even if the author of the work neither think of it nor intend it. And that man can, by his own powers, not add the circumstance of an evil end — nay, even direct the work to a good end, according to reason — is manifest. For if he can by his own powers work an evil that is arduous and contrary to nature, why will he not be able to work a good that is easy and congruent to nature? If he can, for example, by his own powers, without the help of grace, throw all his goods into the sea, or kill himself — from which nature shrinks — why will he not be able to bestow a few coins on the needy, or call a man back from a precipice out of mercy, toward which nature itself almost compels? And if he can of set purpose answer falsely to one who questions him, why will he not be able to answer truly, if he thereby neither gain nor lose anything?
As to the defilement of the cause: a work cannot be defiled by the malice of its cause except when it proceeds from that very malice. For if one work from the good of nature, not from the adjoined malice, the work will be simply good. And in this way the alms of an unchaste man can be good, if it be done for the sake of mercy, not of unchastity; for that work is accidentally the work of an unchaste man, but of itself the work of a merciful one. And that this is most true can be understood from this: that if the malice of the cause always defiled the effect, the work would have to be not only evil, but to participate in species the very malice of the cause. And so the alms of an avaricious man would be evil in the species of avarice, and the fast of an intemperate man would be evil in the species of intemperance — which are most absurd. Nor does the similitude of the heart, adduced by Chemnitz, prove anything. For the substance of the heart is defiled by the malice of all its own works, since it is of itself the cause of all those works; but contrariwise the works of the heart are not all defiled by the malice of the heart, since not all its effects belong of themselves to that malice; rather, in many the malice concurs only accidentally, while the good of nature concurs of itself. Nor can that third thing be said — that a morally good work has no proportion with the powers of nature. For nature, although through sin it has been made worse than it was in the state of innocence, is yet not weaker than it would have been in pure natural endowments; and in pure natural endowments it would without doubt have had a proportion with the moral good, which is naturally known and desired. For to what end would reason have been given it, if it could do nothing at all according to reason? But to act according to reason is to act well morally. Finally, neither can that be said which was brought forward in the fourth place, about the excessive difficulty, on account of the vehemence of temptations. For in this place we treat only of things easy, and very agreeable to nature, and with all temptation ceasing — such as to pity a poor man met on the way, to provide for one’s children, to help one’s kindred, and other things of that kind.
The second reason is drawn from absurdities. For if no good work could be done by unbelievers, it would follow that it were better for them — the precept being removed — not to do works good from their object, than to do them; for by doing them they would sin, by not doing them they would not sin. And so unbelievers would have to be admonished not to give alms, not to make peace between the discordant, not to teach the unskilled, except when they were bound by some precept. But these things are without doubt most absurd.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT IX. Posse hominem sine fide , cum auxilio speciali, et etiam sine illo, bonum aliquod morale perficere, si nulla tentatio urgeat Tertia propositio, qua? docet, posse homi¬ nem sine fide, cum auxilio speciali, et etiam sine illo, bonum aliquod morale perficere ; si nulla tentatio urgeat; breviter explicanda est, antequam probetur. * Sciendum estigitur non esse omnino idem, facere bonum morale, et observare prae¬ ceptum secundum substantiam operis. Po¬ test enim servari pra?ceptum secundum sub¬ stantiam operis, etiam cum peccato, ut si quis amico restituat depositum, ut illo ipse a furi¬ bus spolietur. At bonum morale non potest cum peccato fieri : proinde majus quiddam est, facere bonum morale, quam servare prae¬ ceptum ; et ideo in nostra propositione non tam praecepti, quam boni moralis mentionem fecimus. Sciendum secundo, adversarios, ac prae¬ sertim Kemnitium, et alios hujus temporis sectarios, qui docent, Pelagianam haeresim esse, negare omnia infidelium opera esse pec¬ cata, id affirmare de illis etiam operibus quae fiunt ab infidelibus cum auxilio Dei speciali: ac propterea nos id potissimum probare vel¬ le, non esse videlicet peccata omnia opera, quae fiunt sine fide, praesertim sit fiant cum auxilio Dei speciali. Id enim certissimum esse minime dubitamus. Interimtamen illud etiam probare volumus, posse fieri aliquod opus bonum moraliter, non solum sine fide, sed etiam sine auxilio speciali, si nulla tentatio urgeat. Nam urgente tentatione jam ostendi¬ mus, nihil boni solis naturae viribus fieri pos¬ se. Itaque testimonia adferemus, quae pro¬ bent, aliqua bona opera ab infidelibus posse fieri, sive cum auxilio speciali, sive etiam solis natura? viribus. Primum igitur testimonium sumitur ex il¬ lis Scripturis, qua? testantur, Deum remune¬ rari bona quaedam opera Gentilium; non enim Deus, qui justissimus est, et justitiam diligit, quique sapientissimus est, et falli nul¬ lo modo potest, opera maila remuneraret, cum justo judicio supplicium mereantur, non prae- CAPUT IX. 53 mium. Unus locus csl Exod. i. Quia ti¬ muerunt obstetrices Deum , xdi/icavit illis do¬ mos. Sensus est, quia /Egyptue obstetrices non paruerunt injusto imperio Pharaonis, qui jusserat occidi omnes infantes masculos He¬ braeorum, existimantes id esse, ut revera erat, contra Dei voluntatem, ideo Deus pro hac misericordia, quam exercuerunt in filios Hebraeorum, dedit eis pro mercede copiosam et felicem prolem, atque ita domos illis aedi¬ ficavit, et stabilivit. Alius locus est Ezechielis, cap. 29. Fili ho¬ minis, Nabuchodonosor Rex Babylonis, ser¬ vire fecit exercitum suum, servitute magna, adversus Tyrum. Omne caput decalvatum, et omnis humerus depilatus est : et mex-ces non est reddita ei, neque exercitui ejus, de Tyro pro servitute, qua servivit milii adver¬ sus eam. Propterea haec dicit Dominus Deus : Ecce dedi Nabuchodonosor Regem Babylonis in terram Aegypti, et accipiet mul¬ titudinem ejus, et depraedabitur manubias ejus, et diripiet spolia ejus, et erit merces exercitui illius ». Exercitus iste sine dubio infidelis erat, et tamen quia fideliter regi suo servivit in bello justo contra Tyrum, quam urbem -ob sua peccata Deus everti vo¬ lebat, ideo mercedem illi reddidit, donans ei, mirabili providentia, spolia ASgypti, quae propter scelera quoque sua spoliari merue¬ rat. Itaque sanctus Hieronymus in comment. sic ait: « Exeo quod Nabuchodonosor merce¬ dem accipit boni operis, intelligimus etiam Ethnicos, si quid boni fecerint, non absque mercede Dei judicio praeteriri » . Alius item locus est Danielis iv. ubi cum Daniel praedixisset regi Nabuchodonosor gra¬ vem pamam temporalem a Deo propter pec¬ cata sua, hortatur illum ad eleemosynas, qui¬ bus redimat, sive avertat pcenain illam tcm_ poralem : Nunc , inquit, Rex consilium meum placeat tibti, peccata tua eleemosynis redime , etc. (2) Quod si eleemosynae hominis infide¬ lis avertere poterant pcenaim temporalem, certe bona opera erant, 'non peccata; non enim peccata iram Dei mitigant, sed magis accendunt. Secundo, probatur ex aliis Scripturis, quae indicant, infideles facere, aut posse facere aliqua bona opera. Matth. v. Si salutaveritis fratres vestros tantum, quid amplius facitis , nonne et Ethnici noc faciunt ? Estote ergo vos prefecti, etc. (3). Quo loco tribuitur Ethnicis bonum opus, ostendendi signa benevolentiae erga suos; nisi enim hoc bonum esset, non diceret Dominus, quid amplius facitis? sed, cur hoc facitis? Vult igitur suos Dominus, non contairia, sed majora facere. Ad Ro- man n. Cum gentes , qux legem non habent; naturaliter qux legis sunt faciunt , etc. Hic Apostolus aperte docet, Gentiles naturali lu¬ mine implere aliqua legis mandata. Quod au¬ tem ita impleant, ut non peccent, docet Chry- sostomus in comment, cum ait, eos implere omnia, quae legis sunt, id est, ut supra dixi¬ mus, mandatum cum omnibus circumstan¬ tiis observare. Accedant deinde testimonia Patrum. San¬ ctus Basilius homil. 9. de opere sex dierum ; « Sunt, inquit, et apud nos virtutes secundum naturam, ad quas familiaritas ipsi animae non ex doctrina hominum, sed ex ipsa natu¬ ra inest. Quemadmodum enim nulla disciplina nos docet morbum odisse, sed spontaneam habemus calumniam, ac detestationem ad¬ versus ea quae nobis molesta sunt : sic etiam est animae quaedam declinatio, et fuga vitii citra doctrinam » . Quo loco sanctus Basilius apertissime docet, quasdam virtutes esse na¬ turales, ut misericordiam, et similes, ac per hoc non esse semper necessariaim vel fidem divinam, vel auxilium speciale, cum ad ejus¬ modi naturaliter inclinemur. Sanctus Joannes Chrysostomus homil. 07. ad populum Antiochenum : « Non potest, in¬ quit, malus omnino malus esse, sed evenit, ut aliquid habeat boni: neque bonus esse omnino, bonus, sed nonnulla solet habere pec¬ cata. Cum itaque malus prosperis utitur re¬ bus, ad capitis sui perniciem utitur, ut enim illorum paucorum bonorum retributionem hic capiens, illic deinde puniatur, hac de causa recipit » . Loquitur Chrysostomus de omnibus malis, etiam infidelibus ; generatim enim dicit, nullum esse malum, qui non ha¬ beat aliquid boni, et loquitur de opere bono, non ex genere tantum, sed simpliciter, quia opponit illud peccato, et mercedem illi debi¬ tam assignat. Non enim merces debetur ope¬ ri, preesertim apud Deum, quod sit ex genere bonum, sed absolute peccatum. Auctor operis imperfecti, homil. 26. in Matth. « Audi, inquit, mysterium, quod Pe¬ trus apud Clementem exposuit, si fidelis fe¬ cerit opus bonum, et hic ei prodest, liberans eum a malis, et illic ad percipiendum regnum (1) Exod. I, 17. — (2) Dan. IV, 4. - (3) Mattii. V,47. 54 LIBER V. coeleste, magis autem ibi, quam hic. Si autem infidelis fecerit opus bonum, hic ei prodest opus ipsius, et hic ei reddit Deus bona pro opere suo, in illo autem sa3Culo nihil ei pro¬ dest. Necenim collocatur inter caeteros fideles, propter opus suum, et juste : Quia naturali bono motus fecit bonum, non propter Deum» . Sanctus Hieronymus in cap. i. epist. ad Galat. « Ex quo, inquit, perspicuum fit, na¬ tura omnibus inesse Dei notitiam, nec quem¬ quam sine Christo nasci, et non habere semi¬ na in se sapientiae et justitiae,, reliquarum- que virtutum. Unde multi absque fide et Evangelio Christi, vel sapienter faciunt ali¬ qua, vel sancte, ut parentibus obsequantur, ut inopi manum porrigant, non opprimant vicinos, non aliena diripiant ». Hoc loco san¬ ctus Hieronymus non solum concedit, sine fi¬ de aliqua opera sancta, fieri, "'sed etiam san¬ cte. Nullo autem modo sancto fieri dici po¬ test, quod cum peccato fit. Idem in cap. v. ad Galat. « Quomodo, inquit, juxta Jacobum fides absque operibus mortua est ; sic absque fide, quamvis bona opera sint, mortua computan¬ tur ». Fides sine operibus non est falsa, sed vera, tametsi mortua dicatur,' quia non ope¬ ratur salutem aeternam : igitur et opera bo¬ na sine fide non sunt mala, sed vere bona, mortua tamen, quia nihil prosunt ad veram vitam, qua) est in coelis, comparandam. Sanctus Augustinus docet, quaedam bona opera fieri sine fide, sed cum auxilio speciali Dei ; et rursus alia sine auxilio speciali, so¬ lis naturae viribus. De primi generis operibus habemus testimonium in epistol. 130. ubi laudat continentiam Polemonis : Quoniam, inquit, donum Dei est ». Et addit: « Quod si ille hoc donum cognovisset, fuisset non so¬ lum continens, sed etiam religiosus et pius, et continentiam habuisset, non solum ad ho¬ nestatem praesentis vitae, sed etiaim ad meri¬ tum aeternae ». et in lib. iv. contra Julianum, cap. 3. loquens de virtutibus infidelium : «Quanto, inquit, tolerabilius illas, quas dicis in impiis esse virtutes, divino muneri potius, quam eorum tribueris tantummodo volunta¬ ti, licet ipsi hoc nesciant? » Denique libro de praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 7. et lib. i. de Baptismo, cap. 3. et lib. iv. cap. 23. elee¬ mosynas Cornelii, antequam in Christum cre¬ deret, et justitiam appellat, et donum Dei es¬ se dicit. At certe impium est, dona Dei inter peccata deputare. De secundi genetis operibus habemus te¬ stimonium in lib. deperfectione justitiae, re- spon. proxima postrema), ubi cum Celcstinus probare volens, non esse necessariam Dei gratiam ad bona opera liberi arbitrii, obje¬ cisset illud Apostoli i. ad Corinth. vn. « Quod vult faciat, non peccat, si nubat, respondit Augustinus : Videte, obsecro, quale sit, vo¬ lenti et currenti misericordiam Dei non ne¬ cessariam dicere, quia de quodam ait Apo¬ stolus, quod vult faciat, non peccat, si nubat. Quasi pro magno habendum sit, velle nube¬ re, ubi de adjutorio divinae misericordiae operosius disputatur ». Itaque concedit Au- gust.in hujusmodi operibus humanis, quae ad salutem non pertinent, auxilium gratiae non semper requiri : Et tamen haec opera bona sunt, cum peccata non sint, Apostolo teste, qui ait, Non peccat si nubat. Aliud testimonium est in libro de spiritu et littera, cap. 27. qui locus paulo fusius reci¬ tandus est : « Si autem, inquit, hi, qui na¬ turaliter, quae legis sunt, faciunt, nondum sunt habendi in numero eorum, quos Chri¬ sti justificat gratia, sed in eorum potius, quo¬ rum etiam impiorum, nec Deum verum vera¬ citer, pieque colentium, quaedam tamen fa¬ cta vel legimus, vel novimus, vel audivimus, quae secundum justitia) regulam non solum vituperare non possumus, verum etiam me¬ rito, recteque laudamus : Quamquam si dis¬ cutiatur quo fine fiant, vix inveniuntur, qua) justitia) debitam laudem, defensionemve me¬ reantur » . Ubi notandum est illud, vix, vere enim ma¬ gna pars operum infidelium ob finem pravum, ad quem referuntur peccata, simpliciter sunt: quaedam tamen, tametsi pauca, inveniuntur, quae nullo malo fine vitiantur, et ea non peccata, sed opera bona simpliciter dici de¬ bent. Itaque idem Augustinus continuo ita subjungit : « Verumtamen quia non usque adeo in anima humana imago Dei terreno¬ rum affectuum labe detrita est, ut nulla in ea velut lineamenta extrema remanserint. Unde linea merito dici possint, etiam in ipsa impie¬ tate vita) suse facere aliqua legis, vel sape- re, ete ». Quorum verborum hic esse videtur sensus, si qua)ramus opera bona infidelium, qua: propter malum finem facta non sint, ac per hoc simpliciter, bona sint, vix invenire poterimus : tamen ejusmodi aliqua esse, inde colligi potest, quod imago Dei in anima hu¬ mana per peccatum non omnino sublata est. Quare paulo post ha)c adjungit: « Sicut enim non impediunt a vita a)terna justum qua)- dam peccata venialia, sine quibus ha)c vita CAPUT XI. 55 non ducitur : sic ad salutem sc ternam nihil prosunt impio aliqua opera, sine quibus dif¬ ficillime vita cujus libpt pessimi hominis in¬ venitur ». In quibus verbis ipsa antithesis satis aperte testatur, opera bona impiorum, quae non prosunt ad vitam aeternam, non posse dici peccata, sicut peccata venialia ju¬ storum, jquac non impediunt a vita, bona ope¬ ra dici non possunt. His adde quod idem Augustinus in lib. v. de civit. Dei, cap. 15. dicit, Deum dedisse Romanis tam amplum imperium, ut re¬ muneraret in hac vita bonas eorum vir¬ tutes, sive autem illae virtutes, cum Dei spe¬ ciali gratia conjunctae fuerint, sive non, cer¬ te infidelibus erant, et virtutes, non vitia erant, nisi Deum remuneratorem vitiorum (quod est absurdissimum) faciamus. Adde etiam ultimo, quod idem auctor in omnibus fere locis, ubi scribit, nihil fieri posse boni, sine auxilio gratiae, addere solet limitationem, si videlicet bona illa opera, ad pietatem et salutem pertineant. Ut nimirum significaret, ‘ad opera bona, quae ad pieta¬ tem et salutem non pertinent, aut gratiae auxilium non requiri, aut certe sine praeju¬ dicio fidei de hac re disputari posse. Libro de gratia Christi, cap. 26. « Gratiam Dei? inquit, sic confiteatur, qui vult veraciter confiteri, ut omnino nihil boni sine illa, quod ad pietatem pertinet, veramque justitiam, fieri posse non dubitet » . Item libro de gra¬ tia et libero arbitrio, cap. 17. « Sine illo operante, ut velimus, et coopcrante, cum vo¬ lumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus » . Idem habet in libro de praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 2. et alibi frequentissime. Auctor Hypognostici, lib. m. non procul ab initio : « Esse fatemur, inquit, liberum ar¬ bitrium omnibus hominibus, habens quidem judicium rationis, non per quod sit idoneum, quse ad Deum pertinent, sine Deo aut in¬ choare, aut certe perficere ; sed tantum in operibus vitae praesentis, tam bonis, quam etiam malis. Bonis dico, quae de bono na¬ turae oriuntur, id est, velle laborare in agro, velle manducare et bibere, velle habere ami¬ cum, velle habere indumenta, velle fabri¬ care domum, velle uxorem ducere, pecora nutrire, artem discere diversarum rerum bonarum, velle quidquid boni ad praesentem vitam pertinet. » Ilaec ille. Neque satisfacit Ariminensis, respondens, haec non esse bona moralia, sed naturalia. Nam auctor hujus libri haec bona opponit malis, cum dicit, liberum arbitrium posse sine Dei gratia velle tam bona, quam mala, quae ad vitam praesentem pertinent, et certo non loquitur de malis naturalibus. Nemo enim eligit illa mala, sed de moralibus, quae sunt proprie voluntaria. Quod etiam patet ex exemplo, quod idem auctor ponit, nimirum colere idolum, et similia. Loquitur igitur de bonis moralibus, qualia sunt illa omnia enu¬ merata, si debitis circumstantiis vestiantur. Sanctus Prosper in libro contra Collato¬ rem, cap. 26. « Naturae, inquit, humanae, cujus creator est Deus, etiam post praevari¬ cationem manet substantia, manet forma, manet vita, et sensus et ratio, caeteraque cor¬ poris, atque animi bona, quae etiam malis, vitiosisque'non desunt. Sed nonin illis veri bo¬ ni perceptio est, quae mortalem vitam hone¬ stare possunt, aeternam conferre non pos¬ sunt». Nota illud «honestare», non enim peccata, sed solae virtutes vitam nostraun ho¬ nestate possunt. Sanctus Fulgentius in libro de incarnatio¬ ne et gratia Christi, cap. 26. « Quod si, in¬ quit, quibusdam cognoscentibus Deum, nec sicut Deum glorificantibus, cognitio illa ni¬ hil profuit ad salutem : quomodo potuerunt hi justi esse apud Deum, qui sic in suis mo¬ ribus atque operibus bonitatis aliquid ser¬ vant, ut hoc ad finem Christianae fidei, c-ha- ritatisque non referant? quibus aliqua qui¬ dem bona, quae ad societatis humanae perti¬ nent aequitatem, inesse possunt, sed quia non charitate Dei fiunt, prodesse non pos¬ sunt ». Sanctus Gregorius homil. 27. inEvangclia, tractans illud : « Hoc est praeceptum meum. Sunt, inquit, nonnulli, qui diligunt proximos, sed per affectum cognationis et carnis. Qui¬ bus tamen in hac dilectione sacra eloquia non contradicunt. Sed aliud est quod sponte impenditur naturae, aliud quod praeceptis dominicis charitate debetur obedientiae » . Quod si naturali dilectioni sacra eloquia non contradicunt, certe ea dilectio nihil peccat continet, ac per hoc bona est moraliter. Si¬ quidem sacra eloquia peccatis omnibus con¬ tradicunt. Denique S. Joannes Damascenusin lib. m. de fide, cap. 14. repetit, quod ex Basilio ci¬ tavimus, virtutes aliquas ita esse natura no¬ strae familiares, ut naturales dici possint. Accedant postremo etiam rationes. Prima ratio. Si opera facta sine fide et auxilio spe¬ ciali semper essent peccata, id accideret, 56 LIBER V. vel, quia dccst illis circumstantia finis, cum propter Deum non fiant, ut dicit Grcgorius Ariminensis; vel, quia fiunt ab homine pec¬ catore, ac per hoc inficiuntur et vitiantur a sua causa, tametsi ex genere suo sint bona, ut dicit Martinus Kemnitius, qui hoc etiam illustrat similitudine cordis. Ut enim sub¬ stantia cordis in se bona est, et tamen cor dicitur pravum, Hierem. 17. quia malis ope¬ ribus inquinatur ; sic etiam contra opera, in se bona, inquinantur, et fiunt mala, quia exeunt a corde malo ; vel, quia bona opera moralia non habeant proportionem cum na¬ tura; nostra; viribus ; vel denique, quia ni¬ mis difficilia sint, ob carnis rebellionem, dsc- monisque tyrannidem. At nihil horum dici potest. Nam quod at¬ tinet ad circumstantiam finis, possunt Eth¬ nici etiam sine fide cognoscere, Deum esse, et curam nostri gerere, ut supra probatum , est; proinde poterunt operari bona moralia, ut Deo auctori natura; obediant. Quo modo M. Tullius in somnio Scipionis monet, ad¬ ministrandam esse Rempublicam diligenter quia summo Deo nihil est gratius, quam ut concilia, coetusque hominum bene gubernen¬ tur. Deinde non est necesse, omnia referre in Deum explicite, sed satis est, si opus re¬ feratur in bonum finem proximum; tunc enim per se dirigetur in Deum, ut in ulti¬ mum finem. Sicut enim omne agens parti¬ culare, agit in virtute primi motoris, id est, Dei , sic etiam omnis bonus finis movet in virtute ultimi finis. Alioqui non solum infi¬ deles, sed etiam fideles et justissimi quique semper peccarent, cum inter operandum de Deo non cogitant, sed- operantur, quia ratio dictat esse bonum et faciendum. Itaque nisi apponatur circumstantia finis mali, omne opus bonum morale per se refertur in Deum, etiamsi auctor operis id non cogitet, vel in¬ tendat. Quod autem possit homo, suis viribus, non apponere circumstantiam finis mali, immo etiam dirigere opus in finem bonum, secun¬ dum rationem, manifestum est : nam si po¬ test suis viribus operari malum, sed arduum et natura; contrarium, cur non poterit ope¬ rari bonum facile, congruumque naturae? Si potest, exempli gratia, suis viribus, sine auxi¬ lio gratiae, projicere omniaTiona sua in mare, vel ipse se occidere, a quo natura abhorret; cur non poterit paucos nummos largiri in¬ digenti, vel hominem a praecipitio revocare ob misericordiam, ad quam prope natura ipsa compellit? Et si potest interroganti, fal¬ sum de industria respondere, cur non pote¬ rit respondere verum, si nihil inde lucretur, aut perdat ? Quod autem pertinet ad inquinationem causae, non potest opus inquinari a malitia causae, nisi quando ab ipsa malitia procedit. Nam si ex bono naturae, non ex adjuncta • malitia, quis operetur, opus erit simpliciter bonum. Atque hoc modo eleemosyna homi¬ nis impudici bona esse poterit, si fiat mise¬ ricordiae causa, non impudicitiae. Per acci¬ dens enim opus illud est hominis impudici, per se autem misericordis. Hoc autem esse verissimum, ex eo potest intelligi, quod si semper malitia causae inquinaret effectum, oporteret opus non solum esse malum, sed in specie malitiam ipsam causae participare. Itaque eleemosyna hominis avari esset mala in specie avaritiae, et jejunium intemperantis esset malum, in specie intemperantia; : quae absurdissima sunt. Nec similitudo cordis a Kemnilio adducta, aliquid probat. Namsubstantia cordis inqui¬ natur a malitia omnium suorum operum, quoniam est per se causa omnium illorum operum ; contra autem opera cordis, non in¬ quinantur omnia a malitia cordis. Quoniam non omnis effectus sunt per se illius malitise, sed in multis malitia non concurrit, nisi per accidens, bonum autem naturse per se. Neque tertium illud dici potest, non habere proportionem opus bonum morale cum viri¬ bus naturcc. Natura siquidem, quamvis per peccatum deterior facta sit, quam esset in statu innocentia;, non tamen infirmior est, quam fuisset in puris naturalibus. In puris autem naturalibus sine dubio proportionem habuisset cum bono morali, quod naturali¬ ter cognoscitur et appetitur. Quorsum enim ratio illi data esset , si nihil omnino secun¬ dum rationem agere posset ? Agere vero se¬ cundum rationem, est moraliter bene agere. Denique nec dici potest, quod quarto loco adferebatur de nimia difficultate, ob tenta- tionum vehementiam. Nam hoc loco non agimus nisi de rebus facilibus, et natura; valde consentaneis, atque omni tentatione cessante ; qualia sunt misereri pauperis in via occurrentis, providere filiis, adjuvare cognatos, et alia id genus. Secunda ratio ducitur ab absurdis, nam si nullum opus bonum fieri posset ab infide¬ libus, sequeretur, melius illis esse, remoto pra;cepto, bona opera ex objecto non facere , CAPUT X. S7 quam facere. Nam faciendo peccarent, non faciendo non peccarent. Itaque monendi essent infideles, ne facerent eleemosynas, ne pacificarent discordes, ne imperitos doce¬ rent, nisi quando ex praecepto aliquo tene¬ rentur. Haec autem sine dubio adsurdissima sunt.