Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 19: The second class of Scriptures for free choice in moral matters
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The second class contains those testimonies of the Scriptures in which something is promised us by God under a condition, if we shall have willed. Isaias 1: If you be willing, and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land; but if you will not, the sword shall devour you. Amos 5: Seek ye good, and not evil, that you may live. Matthew 19: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. From these and other like places, which occur everywhere in Scripture, this argument is framed: “Either it is in our power to perform the condition offered, or it is not. If the first be granted, free choice is demonstrated; if the second, that is not truly a promise under condition, but a manifest mockery — no otherwise than if someone should propose a prize, and order it to be proclaimed by the herald’s voice that they who will should run, for the prize is to be given to him who shall have surpassed the rest in running; and then should drag a certain few by force to the prize, and bind the others with bonds and chains, that they might not be able to stir.”
Calvin answers that it is not absurd that God promise something under an impossible condition; for his own reason is clear to him why he does this. For to the impious indeed he proposes promises of this kind, that he may attest to them how unworthy they are of the divine kindness — as also with his precepts he pricks the same, lest they be too sweetly delighted in their sins; but to the pious he proposes the same promises so that — since our sloth is not sharpened enough by precepts — we may be allured by the sweetness of the promises to the love of them.
But we do not ask in this place why God offers promises to the pious or to the impious; but we contend that something cannot rightly be promised under a condition except to him who uses free choice of the will. And in very truth, if God proposed to the impious an impossible condition, that he might attest to them how unworthy they are of the divine kindness, that offering of a condition would have to be expounded ironically, and would be (as we said) not so much a condition as a mockery. For it cannot be that anyone knowing and prudent should intend to speak properly, when he proposes something to be done or not done under an impossible condition. But those places of Scripture no one has hitherto expounded ironically, but all properly; nor can they be expounded ironically without the greatest violence being brought upon the divine writings. For certainly the Lord, being asked what was the way to salvation, had no cause for an ironical response; accordingly the good Master answered truly and properly when he said: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. And below: If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all, etc. Then, if God offers promises under an impossible condition to the impious, to attest to them their unworthiness — either the impious can profit from this divine testimony, by thinking, namely, on their own unworthiness, and thence conceiving fear and grief, and humbling themselves before God; or they cannot, because, namely, they either do not understand the divine testimony, or contemn it. If they can, then they have free choice; if they cannot, then such a testimony is useless, and is applied in vain. And in very truth the impious do not understand their own unworthiness, nor in any way think that the divine promises are offered them for this, that they may have a testimony of their unworthiness; wherefore God would give them this testimony without cause. Finally, it is certain that, at least to the pious, the promises under condition are not offered ironically and mockingly, but truly and properly; the pious, therefore, will be able, at their choice, to fulfill the condition, or also not fulfill it. For this is proper to a true condition: that it depend on the choice of him to whom it is proposed. And so, as the promise kindles the minds of the pious to the love of the precepts — which we by no means deny to Calvin — so the condition demonstrates the liberty of choice; which Calvin in his turn ought not to deny us, nor can, if he understand the notion and nature of a true condition.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIX. Secunda classis Scriptui- arum pro libero arbitrio in moralibus. Altera classis continet ea testimonia Scri¬ pturarum, quibus promittitur nobis aliquid a Deo sub conditione, si voluerimus. Isaiaei. Si volueritis et audieritis me , bona terrae co¬ medetis ; si nolueritis , gladius devorabit vos. Amos v. Quaerite bonitatem , et non malitiam , et vivetis. Matth. xix. Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata (1). Ex his, et aliis similibus locis, quae in Scriptura passim occurrunt, tale conficitur argumentum : u Aut est in potestate nostra praestare conditionem obla¬ tam, aut non est : si detur primum, demon¬ stratur liberum arbitrium ; si secundum, illa non est vere sub conditione permissio, sed manifesta irrisio.) Non secus ac si quis bra- vium proponeret, ac praeconis voce clamari juberet, ut qui voluerint, currant, dandum enim bravium ei, qui caeteros currendo su¬ peraverit : deinde paucos quosdam vi tra¬ heret ad" bravium, alios vinculis, et catenis constringeret, ne se commovere possent». Respondet Calvinus, non esse absurdum, ut Deus aliquid sub impossibili conditione polliceatur. Constare enim ipsi rationem suam cur hoc faciat. Nam impiis quidem proponere ejusmodi promissa, \it eis quam sint indigni divina benignitate testetur ; sicut etiam pra3ceptis suis eosdem pungit, ne ni¬ mis Suaviter in peccatis delicientur. Piis au¬ tem easdem promissiones proponere, ut quia praeceptis ignavia nostra non satis acuitur, promissionum dulcedine ad eorum amorem alliciamur. At non quaerimus nos hoc loco, cur Deus promissiones offerat piis, vel impiis : sed contendimus, non posse recte promitti ali¬ quid sub conditione, nisi ei qui libero utatur voluntatis arbitrio. Et re vera si Deus pro¬ poneret impiis impossibilem conditionem, ut eis testaretur, quam sint indigni benigni¬ tate divina, illa conditionis oblatio ironice exponi deberet, et esset (ut diximus) non tam conditio, quam irrisio. Neque enim fleri potest, ut aliquis sciens, et prudens proprie loqui intendat, cum aliquid faciendum, vel non faciendum sub impossibili conditione proponit. At loca illa Scripturae nullus adhuc ironice exposuit, sed omnes proprie. Neque possunt ironice exponi, nisi vis maxima divinis lit¬ teris adferatur. Certe enim interrogatus Dominus, qua> esset ad salutem via, nul¬ lam causam habuit ironicse responsionis. Proinde Magister bonus vere, proprieque respondit, cum ait : Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata. Et infra: Si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia etc. Deinde, si Deus promissiones sub conditione impassibibili of¬ fert impiis, ut eis indignitatem eorum teste¬ tur ; vel possunt impii ex hoc testimonio di¬ vino proficere, cogitando videlicet suam in¬ dignitatem, et inde timorem, ac dolorem concipiendo, seque coram Deo humiliandp ; vel non possunt, quia videlicet, aut noa in- telligunt testimonium divinum, aut contem¬ nunt : si possunt, ergo habent liberum ar¬ bitrium ; si non possunt, igitur inutile est ejusmodi testimonium, ac frustra adhibetur. Et re vera impii non intelligunt indignitatem (1) Isai. I, 19; Amo. V, 14; Matth. XIX, 17. CAPUT XX. 79 suam, nec ullo modo existimant, promissio¬ nes divinas ad hoc sibi offerri, ut testimo¬ nium habeant indignitatis suae. Quare sine causa Deus hoc testimonium illis daret. Denique certum est, saltem piis, non of¬ ferri promissiones sub conditione ironice et irrisorie, sed vere ac proprie : poterunt igitur pii pro arbitrio conditionem implere, vel etiam non implere. Id enim est proprium verse conditionis, ut dependeat ab arbitrio ejus, cui proponitur. Itaque sicut promissio ad amorem praeceptorum accendit animos piorum, quod nos Calvino minime negamus, ita conditio demonstrat arbitrii libertatem, quod nobis Calvinus vicissim negare non debet, nec potest, si rationem, et naturam verae conditionis intelligat.