Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 18: The first class of Scriptures for free choice in moral matters
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the second rank of the arguments of the Catholics are placed by Calvin the testimonies of the Scriptures, which he brings back to five classes, that he may confute many arguments with a single response.
The first class, then, contains those testimonies which command something to man to be done, or not done. Such are: Thou shalt not have strange gods; Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain; Honour thy father and thy mother — and the others which are numbered in Exodus 20. Testimonies of which kind Augustine collects, up to thirty-two, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 2. From these testimonies this argument is framed: “A precept is a rule of living well; but a rule is given in vain to him who cannot fail, or cannot not fail; free choice alone is that which, in the way of morals, can fail and not fail; therefore a precept is given by God to man in vain, if he lacks free choice; but God does nothing in vain; therefore man does not lack free choice.”
Calvin answers this argument, but so answers that, saying much, he says nothing. He says, first, that the law is not in vain, though it be given to a man lacking free choice, since it is not given only to be a norm of living, but also for other causes — of which one is, that through it sin may be known, as the Apostle writes, Romans 3. He says, second, that in the Scriptures there is found not only the law commanding, but also the promise of grace fulfilling; that hence we may understand that the fulfilling of the law is not from free choice, but from the gift of grace. And this he proves most copiously from the divine writings and the testimonies of St. Augustine. At the last he concludes that the law is impossible, and that thence is proved not the liberty of choice, but the necessity of grace.
But that former response is frigid enough. For even if the law have many ends, yet it has also this one: to be a norm of living; and by reason of this end it necessarily demands in man the liberty of choice. Then, do not this very thing — that through the law sin is known — and the law’s being a norm of living, come to the same? For the law through which sin is known is given for this: that, being known, it may be avoided; and in this way it is a lamp to our feet, and a rule of seeing rightly. But, says Calvin, the Apostle says that the law was given that sin might abound, Romans 5. I answer: it is not the mind of the Apostle that the law was given by God in order that through it sin might grow; for if it were so, the law would have been evil; and yet the same Apostle, Romans 7, says: The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good. Blessed Paul signifies, then, in that place, that the law was given indeed for the avoiding of sin, but could not bring it about that sin be avoided; but contrariwise was rather, accidentally, an occasion that sin should more abound. For since, as the poet says, “we ever strive toward the forbidden, and desire what is denied,” men depraved by the sin of the first man, taking occasion, were the more inflamed to sin from the prohibition of the law. And so blessed Paul twice repeats in that chapter 7 that sin, taking occasion through the law, grew the stronger. That “that,” then, does not signify the cause, but the event, when it is said, the law entered in, that sin might abound. A like place is in the third book of Kings, chapter 17: What have I to do with thee, thou man of God? Art thou come to me that my son should be killed? She knew without doubt that Elias had not come for this, to kill her son; but she wished to signify that, by occasion of the presence of a man so holy and just, her sins could not remain longer unpunished, and that therefore her son had been slain by God — as though the prophet had come for this very thing. So then blessed Paul says that by occasion of the law sins grew, as though the law had been given for this very thing. And the same sense have all those sayings: “the law worketh wrath,” “the letter killeth,” “the strength of sin is the law,” and the like.
Calvin’s latter response is plainly outside the matter. For we do not dispute in this place whether the law can be fulfilled by the powers of nature alone; nor are we ignorant that the help of grace is in every way necessary, since the law alone does not make men just, but contrariwise they who are justified through grace do the law. But our question is whether, the help of grace being posited, man is truly of free choice, so that he can fulfill the law, or, if he prefer, transgress the same. Just as, if anyone should ask whether man can at his choice see and not see, one ought not to object, “what if the light be absent?” — for the question is understood with all things posited which are necessarily required. We say, then, that, the necessary help being posited, whatever it be, man is truly and properly free in moral matters; and we prove it, because otherwise every law would have been given in vain. To this Calvin answered nothing at all, but, cunningly enough, after his manner, turned aside to another question. Further, that our argument is most efficacious can be known even from this: that St. Augustine uses almost it alone, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, to prove against certain unskilled monks that very thing which we contend to prove against the Calvinists. For thus he says, chapter 2: “God has revealed to us through the holy Scriptures that there is in man free choice of the will. But how he has revealed it, I recall — not with human, but with divine speech. First: because the divine precepts themselves would not profit man, unless he had free choice of the will.” And below: “How does he command, if there is no free choice?” And below: “Now the many commandments — what do they show, but the free choice of the human will?” And below: “Surely, where it is said, ‘do not this,’ and ‘do not that,’ and where the work of the will is demanded in the divine admonitions for doing or not doing something, free choice is sufficiently demonstrated.” Thus he.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVIII. Prima classis Scripturarum pro libero arbi¬ trio in moralibus. In secundo ordine argumentorum Catho¬ licorum collocantur a Calvino testimonia Scripturarum, qua; ipse revocat ad quinque classes, ut multa argumenta unica respon¬ sione confutet. Prima igitur classis continet ea testimonia* quae praecipiunt aliquid homini faciendum, vel non faciendum, Talia sunt : Non habebis Deos alienos , Non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum , Honora patrem tuum, et matrem luam. Et alia quae numerantur, Exod. xx. Cujus generis testimonia colligit Augustinus usque ad triginta duo in lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 2. Ex his testimoniis con¬ ficitur hoc argumentum. « Praeceptum est regula bene vivendi, frustra autem datur re¬ gula ei, qui non potest deficere, aut non po¬ test non deficere, solum liberum arbitrium est, quod in via morum potest deficere, et non deficere ; igitur frustra homini prae¬ ceptum a Deo datur, si caret libero arbitrio, nihil autem facit Deus frustra, igitur non caret homo libero arbitrio » . Respondet ad hoc argumentum Calvinus, sed ita respondet, ut multa dicendo nihil dicat. Ait primum, legem non esse frustra, quamvis detur homini carenti libero arbitrio, quoniam non datur solum ut sit norma vi¬ vendi, sed propter alias etiam causas, qua¬ rum una est, ut per eam cognoscatur pecca¬ tum, ut Apostolus scribit ad Rom. m. Ait secundo, in scripturis non tantum inveniri legem praecipientem, sed etiam promissio¬ nem gratiae adimplentis, ut hinc intelliga- mus legis impletioncm non esse ex libero arbitrio, sed ex dono gratiae. Atque hoc fu¬ sissime probat ex divinis litteris, et S. Au¬ gustini testimoniis. Ad extremum concludit, legem esse impossibilem, et non inde pro¬ bari libertatem arbitrii, sed gratiae necessi¬ tatem. Sed prior illa responsio satis frigida est. Nam etiamsi lex habeat multos fines, tamen habet etiam istum, ut sit norma vivendi, et ratione hujus finis exigit in homine necessa¬ rio arbitrii libertatem. Deinde, nonne hoc ipsum, quod est per legem cognosci pecca¬ tum, et legem normam esse vivendi, in idem recidunt ? ideo enim datur lex, per quam cognoscatur peccatum, ut cognitum vitetur, et hoc modo sit lucerna pedibus nostris, et regula recte videndi. At (inquit Calvinus) Apostolus dicit, datam esse legem, ut superabundet peccatum, ad Rom. v. Respondeo, non esse Apostoli men¬ tem, legem datam fuisse a Deo, ut per eam peccatum cresceret ; nam si ita esset, lex mala fuisset, et tamen idem Apostolus ad Roman. vii. dicit : Lex quidem sancta , et mandatum sanctum, et justum , et bonum (I). Significat igitur eo loco B. Paulus, legem datam quidem fuisse ad peccatum vitandum, sed non potuisse efficere ut peccatum vita¬ retur, sed contra potius occasionem fuisse per accidens, ut peccatum superabundaret. Quoniam enim ut ille ait : « Nitimur in ve¬ titum semper, cupimusque negata ». Homi¬ nes peccato primi hominis depravati occa¬ sione accepta, ex prohibitione legis magis ad peccandum exarserunt. Itaque B. Paulus bis repetit in illo cap. 7. occasione accepta per legem peccatum magis invaluisse. Illud igitur « ut », non significat causam, sed eventum, cum dicitur, lex subintravit, ut abundaret peccatum. Similis locus est in lib. III Regum cap. 17 : Quid mihi et tibi vir Dei ? intrasti ad me, ut interficeres filium me¬ um (2). Sciebat illa sine dubio, non ad hoc venisse Heliam, ut inter ficeret filium ejus, sed significare voluit, occasione praesentiae viri tam sancti et justi, non potuisse peccata sua manere diutius impunita , et ideo interfe¬ ctum a Deo filium suum, quasi ad hoc ipsum propheta venisset. Sic igitur dicit B. Paulus, occasione legis peccata crevisse, quasi ad hoc ipsum data lex fuisset. Et eumdem sen¬ sum habent illa omnia : « Lex iram operatur, littera occidit, virtus peccati lex ». Et si¬ milia. Posterior Calvini responsio plane est extra rem. Non enim disputamus hoc loco, possit ne lex solis natura; viribus adimpleri, nec ignoramus, auxilium gratia? esse modis om¬ nibus necessarium, cum lex sola non faciat justos, sed contra potius per gratiam justifi¬ cati faciant legem. Sed quaestio nostra est, utrum posito auxilio gratia;, homo sit vere liberi arbitrii, ita ut possit legem implere, vel eamdem, si maluerit, praevaricari. Quo¬ modo si quis quaerat, an possit homo pro (1) Rom. VII, 12. -(2) III Reg. XVII, 18. 78 LIBER V. arbitrio videre, et non videre ; non oportet objicere, quid si lumen absit ? intelligitur enim queestio positis omnibus quce necessa¬ rio requiruntur. Nos igitur dicimus, posito auxilio necessa¬ rio, quodcumque illud sit, hominem vere, proprieque liberum esse in moralibus, at¬ que id probamus, quoniam alioqui lex om¬ nis frustra data esset. Ad hoc autem Calvi¬ nus nihil omnino respondit, sed aliam quae, stionem, satis callide, pro suo more divertit. Porro nostrum argumentum efficassimum esse, vel ex eo cognosci potest, quod eo pe¬ ne solo utitur S. Augustinus in libro de gra¬ tia et libero arbitrio, ad illud ipsum proban¬ dum adversus imperitos quosdam monachos, quod nos adversus Calvinistas probare con¬ tendimus. Sic enim ait cap. 2 : « Revelavit nobis Deus per Scripturas sanctas, esse in homine liberum voluntatis arbitrium. Quo¬ modo autem revelaverit, commemoro non humano, sed divino eloqrno. Primum quia ipsa divina praecepta, homini non prodes¬ sent nisi haberet liberum voluntatis arbi¬ trium ». Et infra : « Quomodo jubet, si non est liberum arbitrium » ? Et infra : « Jam multa mandata quid ostendunt, nisi liberum arbitrium voluntatis humanae » ? Et infra : « Nempe ubi dititur, noli hoc et noli illud, et ubi ad aliquid faciendum, vel non facien¬ dum in divinis monitis opus voluntatis ex¬ igitur, satis liberum demonstratur arbi¬ trium ». Haec ille.