Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 21: The fourth class of Scriptures for free choice in moral matters
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The fourth class contains those testimonies which teach that God, as it were, withdraws and explores what men will do, and whither they turn their endeavors. Deuteronomy 8: The Lord thy God led thee forty years through the desert, to afflict thee, and to prove thee, and that the things that were in thy heart might be made known — whether thou wouldst keep his commandments, or no. And chapter 13: The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him with all your heart. But God would explore in vain what men will to do, unless they could do the same thing and not do it. For no prudent person explores the outcome of a thing determined to one. For who ever explored whether fire is hot or cold? whether a hungry dog desires bread rather than a stone?
Calvin answers that God does not so withdraw — as though he abandoned man of his grace — that he may explore what man can do by his own powers; but he permits men to be afflicted, as though he himself did not see what evils his own suffer. And so far, well enough. But to what end does God let his own be afflicted? “That he may see,” says Calvin, “whether after long calamities the remembrance of God take hold of them, and they seek the face of their Lord.” But here the argument returns again. For if afflicted men can seek God, which before they did not, certainly they have free choice of the will; if they cannot, God lets them be afflicted in vain, that he may see whether they seek the face of their Lord; for to what end does he explore what he knows cannot come to pass? He answers that the afflicted cannot seek the face of the Lord without grace, yet can with the help of grace. But we by no means deny this; let him in his turn not deny that man can, with the help of grace, by the free choice of the will, seek God and not seek him — that is, cooperate with grace and not cooperate — and there will be peace. Or if he shall persist in denying it, let him understand that the argument has not been solved; for that difficulty always remains: why does God explore what man wills to do, if man cannot at his choice will and not will, do and not do?
Calvin then brings forward another response, and says that God does not abandon man that he may see what man can do, but that he may drive him to recognize his own oudeneia — that is, his own nothing. But neither are we ignorant that God, who knows all things, does not explore that he himself may learn something new, but that he may make us know what manner of men we are, and that others also, who do not see our hearts, may understand from external works what we are within. And so, for God to tempt someone is nothing else than to afford him an occasion of suffering or doing something from which his charity and patience — or contrariwise his self-love and impatience — may be understood. So God tempted Abraham, Tobias, Job, that their signal virtue might appear; and contrariwise he so tempted the sons of Israel in the desert, that it might appear how little of solid virtue was in them, even though they had said: All that the Lord hath commanded us we will do; nor will we walk another way. But from this tempting, by which God makes us explore and know what we are, the liberty of choice is no less proved than if God tempted that he himself might explore and know the same. For neither would we have to explore what we are, if we worked from necessity, and, occasion being offered, could incline only to one side. Moreover, God tempts that virtue or vice may appear, and that someone may deservedly be praised or censured. But that is not a work of virtue or of vice, nor worthy of praise or censure, which is done necessarily and cannot be done otherwise. For precisely on this account virtue and vice, praise and censure, have no place in beasts: because they lack liberty of choice, and cannot do other than what they do.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXI. Quarta classis Scripturarum pro libero arbi¬ trio in moralibus. Quarta classis continet ea testimonia, quae docent, Deuin quasi recedere et explorare, quid homines faciant, et quorsum studia sua convertat. Deuter. vm. Adduxit te Dominus quadraginta annis per desertum, ut affligeret te, atque tentaret, et nota fierent, quae in ani¬ mo tuo versabantur , utrum custodires mandata illius, an non. Et cap. xm, Tentat vos Domi¬ nus Deus noster, ut videat , si diligatis eum in toto corde. At frustra exploraret Deus, quid homines facere velint, nisi possent rem eam- dem facere, et non facere. Nemo enim prudens explorat eventum rei determinatae ad unum. Quis namque exploravit unquam calidus ne sit ignis, an frigidus ? appetat canis esuriens pa¬ nem potius, quam lapidem ? (1) Respondet Calvinus, Deum non sic rece¬ dere quasi destituat hominem gratia sua, ut exploret, quid ille suis viribus possit : sed permittere, ut homines affligantur, quasi ip-. se non videret quid mali patiantur sui. Atqqe huc usque satis bene. Sed quorsum Deus af» (l)Deut, VIII, 2 ; ibid. XIII, 3, CAPUT XXII. 81 fligi sinit suos? « Ut videat, inquit Calvinus, an post longas calamitates capiat eos recor¬ datio Dei, et quaerant faciem Domini sui » . Hic vero rursus redit argumentum, nam si possunt homines afflicti quaerere Deum, quod ante non faciebant, certe habent libe¬ rum voluntatis arbitrium : si non possunt, frustra Deus illos affligi sinit, ut videat, an quaerant faciem Domini sui : quorsum enim explorat, quod scit non posse fleri? Respondet, non posse afflictos quaerere fa¬ ciem Domini sine gratia, tamen posse cum auxilio gratiae. At nos id minime negamus; non neget ipse vicissim, posse hominem cum auxilio gratiae pro libero arbitrio voluntatis quaerere, Deum; et non quaerere id est, gra¬ tiae cooperari, et non cooperari, et pax erit. Yel si id negare perrexerit, intelligat argu¬ mentum non esse solutum ; semper enim ea difficultas manet, cur Deus exploret, quid ho¬ mo facere velit, si non potest homo pro arbi¬ trio velle et non velle, facere et non facere. Adfert deinde Calvinus alteram respon¬ sionem, ac dicit, Deum non destituere homi¬ nem, ut videat quid ille possit, sed ut eum adigat ad recognoscendam propriam ouoevekxv id est, suum nihil. At neque nos ignoramus, Deum, qui omnia novit, non explorare, ut ipse aliquid novi cognoscat, sed ut faciat nos cognoscere quales simus ; et ut alii quoque, qui corda nostra non vident, intelligant ex operibus externis, quales intus simus. Itaque Deum tentare aliquem, nihil est aliud, quam occasionem illi praebere aliquid patiendi, vel agendi ex quo intelligatur ejus charitas et patientia. Yel contra proprius amor et impatientia. Sic Deus tentavit Abra- hamum, Tobiam, Job, ut appareret eorum insignis virtus ; et contra sic tentavit filios Israel in deserto, ut appareret, quam parum solida; virtutis in illis esset, etiamsi dixissent: Quicquid nobis praecepit Dominus , faciemus , nec ambulabimus altera via '. Caeterum ex hac tentatione, qua Deus fa¬ cit nos explorare et cognoscere, quid simus, non minus libertas arbitrii comprobatur, quam si Deus tentaret, ut ipse hoc idem ex¬ ploraret, atque cognosceret. Nam neque no¬ bis explorandum esset quid simus, si ex ne¬ cessitate operaremur, et occasione oblata, non possemus nisi in alteram partem incli¬ nare. Praeterea tcntat Deus, ut appareat virtus, aut vitium, et merito laudari, aut vituperari aliquis possit, At non est opus virtutis, vel vitii, nec dignum laude, aut vituperatione, quod necessario fit, nec potest aliter fieri. Propterea siquidem virtus et vitium, laus ac vituperatio locum in bestiis nullum habent, quod illa libertate arbitrii carent, nec pos¬ sunt aliud agere, nisi quod agunt.