Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 22: The fifth class of Scriptures for free choice in moral matters
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The fifth class has two testimonies of divine Scripture, which Calvin proposed with a certain great disdain, and as it were through contempt, this proem being premised: “The testimonies which, besides, they scrape together from here and there will not give much trouble even to middling talents, which shall have well drunk in the solutions given just above.” That, forsooth, is the cunning of the serpent. For because these two places are the gravest of all, and Calvin did not hope his responses could satisfy his readers, he wished to make a show of contempt, that he might be thought rather to have not willed than to have not been able to solve the proposed knots accurately.
The former place, then, is in chapter 4 of Genesis, where we read thus: “Why art thou angry? and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou do well, shalt thou not receive? but if ill, shall not sin forthwith be present at the door? But the appetite thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it.” The latter place is in chapter 15 of Ecclesiasticus, where these words are had: “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts. If thou wilt keep the commandments, they shall preserve thee. He hath set water and fire before thee: stretch forth thy hand to which thou wilt. Before man is life and death, good and evil: that which he shall choose shall be given him.”
Let us consider the former place, in which there are almost as many arguments as words. Why, says God to Cain, art thou angry? and why is thy countenance fallen? This interrogation indicates that Cain could, had he willed, have not been angry, and not been sad. For why do we not say to the dog, “why barkest thou?” and to the lion, “why roarest thou?” — except that we know those beasts cannot at their choice bark and not bark, roar and not roar? If thou do well, shalt thou not receive? but if ill, shall not sin forthwith be present at the door? That condition “if well,” and that “if ill” — do they not also show the free choice of the will? For why do we not say to a man, “if thou make the sun stand still,” as we say, “if thou do well, thou shalt have this or that” — except that we are not ignorant that it is not in the power of man to make the sun stand still, but it is in his power to do well if he will, or ill if he will not? But the appetite thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it. Here indeed, most openly, free choice is preached in the state of corrupt nature. For what is “the appetite thereof shall be under thee,” but “the desire of sin shall be in thy power”? And what does “thou shalt have dominion over it” signify, but “thou shalt be able, if thou wilt, to resist the desire, and so bring it about that sin reign not in thy mortal body”?
Let us now see how Calvin here twists himself and sweats — he who a little before boasted that this and like places could not give trouble even to middling talents. First he says that those words — the appetite thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it — ought to be understood not of sin, but of Abel: so that the sense is, “though thou hast sinned, yet thou shalt obtain the primacy among thy brothers, and shalt have dominion over thy younger brother.” Then he admits that this place can be expounded of sin: “Lest we seem,” says he, “to embrace this interpretation because the other is contrary to us, let us grant, indeed, that God spoke of sin.” But he asks whether God said “thou shalt have dominion over it” by promising, or rather by commanding; and if by commanding, he says free choice is not thence proved, because God sometimes commands even impossible things; if by promising, he asks why what God promised was not done — for that not sin by Cain, but Cain by sin, was vanquished, his parricide cries aloud. He then objects to himself that a condition is to be understood in that promise, as though it were said: “Thou shalt carry off the victory over sin — if, however, thou strive.” He answers: “But who would receive those windings?” At the last, since it displeased him that he had so easily conceded that this place treats of the victory over and dominion of sin, he soon subjoins: “Although both the matter itself and the rule of Grammar demand that a comparison be made of Cain and Abel — because the firstborn brother would not have been set below the younger, had he not become worse by his own crime.” And this is Calvin’s whole defense.
But we constantly assert that in this place God spoke not of Abel, but of sin. And we prove it, first, from the rule of Grammar, which Calvin objected to us. For that pronoun “thereof,” when it is said, the appetite thereof shall be under thee, and that pronoun “it,” when it is said, and thou shalt have dominion over it, refer back to that which was named a little before. But a little before mention was made of sin, not of Abel; for thus we read: If thou do well, shalt thou not receive? but if ill, shall not sin forthwith be present at the door? But the appetite thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it. The rule of Grammar, therefore, demands that those pronouns “thereof” and “it” be referred to sin, not to Abel. And what of this — that in this whole divine sentence Abel is never named? Whence, then, did it come into Calvin’s mind to think that the discourse in this place is held of Abel, and not of sin? Then we prove it from the common consent of the interpreters. St. Ambrose, book 2 On Cain, chapter 7: “Not his brother is made over to him, but his error is ascribed to him, of which he himself is his own author. Upon thee, he says, shall the crime return, which began from thee. Thou hast nothing wherein to accuse necessity rather than thine own mind.” You see how St. Ambrose both rejects Calvin’s exposition, and clearly teaches choice free from necessity. St. Jerome, in the Hebrew Questions, teaches the same, and indeed in these words: “Because thou art of free choice, I admonish that not sin have dominion over thee, but thou over sin.” St. Augustine, book 15 On the City of God, chapter 7: “Be still; for the turning thereof shall be to thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it. Over his brother, was it? Far be it! Over what, then, but sin?” Behold how openly St. Augustine pronounces absurd that opinion which Calvin most approved. St. Prosper, in book 2 On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 13, expounding that verse, “the turning thereof shall be to thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it”: “Let thy fault be recalled to thee; do not give sin the kingdom in thee, but rather take thou dominion over it.” St. Gregory, book 4 of the Morals, chapter 22 [al. 27]: “Then is the sin of the heart brought back under the possession of our right, if it be repressed when it begins. Whence also by the divine voice it is said to Cain, thinking depraved things: sin shall be present at the door; but the appetite thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it,” etc. In the same way expound Eucherius, Bede, Rupert, the Abulensian, Lyranus, Cajetan, and the glosses, ordinary and interlinear. Nor ought we to suspect that none of these Doctors kept the rule of Grammar, or that all gravely blundered.
But Calvin objects: “If it is a question of sin, when it is said, thou shalt have dominion over it, God either commands or promises. If he commands, free choice is not gathered hence, because the precept is impossible; if he promises, why was not that done which God promised?” I answer: God neither promises nor commands, but signifies that sin is in the power of the sinner; and accordingly admonishes Cain to consider that it is in his own choice to assent to the perverse desire, or not assent; and therefore to take pains that he be not conquered, but conquer — unless he wish to be gravely punished. But even if God commanded, Calvin would gain nothing thence; for no one commands impossible things, except one who does not will that to be done which he commands — that is, someone insane, or mad. And if God did not command, but promised the victory under a condition — if he would fight bravely — there would be no windings here. For what is clearer than “thou shalt conquer, if thou strive”? Did not the Apostle also say without any windings: He shall not be crowned, except he strive lawfully? Add, at the last, that free choice is proved from this place even if we granted that God here spoke not of sin, but of Abel. For God would not endeavor to soothe the mind of Cain by promising that the right of primogeniture would remain to him, and that he would have dominion over his brothers, unless he knew that he could be called back from the crime conceived, and that it was in his choice to resist the desire already arisen, or to consent to it.
The latter place, from chapter 15 of Ecclesiasticus, is most invincible, and so clear that it needs no declaration. But Calvin answers, first, that the book of Ecclesiasticus is of doubtful authority; second, that Ecclesiasticus spoke of the free choice of the first man, such as it was before sin, not of that which now is; third, that if that author will, by those words of his, not to establish free choice, but only to restrain the malignity of the flesh — which, by transferring its own evils upon God, is wont to catch at an empty defense — he too will willingly assent to him; otherwise he does not value his authority much.
To the first I answer: Ecclesiasticus cannot be repudiated by Calvin, if he would be consistent with himself, for two causes. First, because Calvin receives the epistle of James and of Jude, which of old were no less of doubtful authority than Ecclesiasticus; for he ought either, with the Lutherans, to repudiate all the books which at some time were doubtful, or, with the Church, to receive all those whose authority has been declared in the sacred Councils. And it is agreed that in the third Council of Carthage, canon 47, the book of Ecclesiasticus was numbered among the canonical and divine books. Second, because Calvin professes himself a disciple and follower of Augustine; and Augustine not only places this book among the canonical, in book 2 On Christian Doctrine, chapter 8, but also adduces it, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 2, for the proving of free choice itself. To Calvin’s other solution I answer: from Ecclesiasticus it is gathered not only that the first man was founded with free choice, but also that the same free choice has remained in his posterity. For he had said a little before: “Say not: It is through God that she is far from me; say not: He hath caused me to err” — that is, do not refer to God the cause of thy crime. And straightway he adjoins the reason: “For God made man, and left him in the hand of his own counsel,” etc. Which reason would effect nothing, unless Ecclesiasticus wished to signify that free choice, given at the beginning to the first man, remains even now in his posterity. Moreover, those words — If thou wilt keep the commandments, they shall preserve thee; and those — Before man is life and death; that which he shall choose shall be given him; and those — He hath set fire and water before thee: to which thou wilt, stretch forth thy hand — do they not most openly attest that Ecclesiasticus addresses the men who now are, and preaches to those who can profit from his exhortation? To the third solution I say briefly that the condition which Calvin proposes to Ecclesiasticus is inept. For the malignity of the flesh cannot be restrained from transferring its faults upon God, and boasting itself immune from sin, unless free choice of the will be granted to man. But of this matter it has often been spoken, and all things need not everywhere be repeated.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXII. » Quinta classis Scripturarum pro libero arbi¬ trio in moralibus. Quinta classis habet duo testimonia divinae Scripturae, quae magno quodam fastidio, et quasi per contemptum Calvinus proposuit, praemisso hoc prooemio : « Quae, inquit, prae¬ terea hinc inde testimonia corradunt, medi¬ ocribus etiam ingeniis non multum facessent negotii, quae superiores modo solutiones probe imbiberint » . Ista videlicet est serpen¬ tis astutia. Nam quia duo ista loca sunt om¬ nium gravissima, neque sperabat Calvinus posse lectoribus satisfacere responsiones su¬ as, ostentare voluit contemptum, ut putare¬ tur magis non voluisse, quam non valuisse propositos nodos accurate solvere. Prior igitur locus est in cap. iv. Genes, ubi sic legimus : « Quare iratus es, et quare con¬ cidit vultus tuus? Nonne si bene egeris, re¬ cipies ; sin autem male; statim in foribus peccatum aderit? sed sub te erit appetitus ejus, et tu dominaberis illius ». Posterior locus est in cap. xv. Eccles. ubi haec habentur : « Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui. Adjecit mandata, et praecepta sua. Si volueris mandata servare, conservabunt te. Apposuit tibi ignem et aquam, ad quod vo¬ lueris porrige manum tuam. Ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum, quod placue¬ rit ei, dabitur illi ». Consideremus priorem locum, in quo tot pene sunt argumenta, quot verba : Quare inquit Deus ad Cain, iratus es? et cur concidit vultus tuus? Haec interrogatio indicat, po¬ tuisse Gainum, si voluisset, non irasci, et non tristari. Cur enim non dicimus cani, quare latras? et leoni, quare rugis? nisi quia sci¬ mus, non posse bestias illas pro arbitrio la¬ trare et non latrare, rugire et non rugire ? Nonne si bene egeris, recipies ; sin autem male , statim in foribus peccatum aderit ? Illa conditio (si bene ) et illa (si male) nonne etiam LIBER V. «2 liberum ostendunt voluntatis arbitrium? cur enim non dicimus homini, si solem stare fe- cei'is, sicut dicimus, si bene egeris, habebis hoc, aut illud? nisi quia non ignoramus, non esse in potestate hominis, ut solem stare faciat, esse autem ut bene agat, si velit, vel male, si nolit? Sed sub te erit appetitus ejus, et tu domina¬ beris illius. Hic vero apertissime in statu na- turse corruptse liberum praedicatur arbi¬ trium. Quid enim est, sub te erit appetitus ejus, nisi, in potestate tua erit peccati cupi¬ ditas? et quid significat, tu dominaberis il¬ lius, nisi, poteris, si volueris, cupiditati re¬ sistere, et ita efficere, ut non regnet pecca¬ tum in tuo mortali corpore ? Videamus nunc, quam hic se torqueat, sudetque Calvinus, qui paulo ante jactavit hunc, et similes locos ne mediocribus qui¬ dem ingeniis negotium facessere posse. Pri¬ mum ait, non debere intelligi illa verba (sub te erit appetitus ejus , et tu dominaberis illius) de peccato, sed de Abel, ut sensus sit, quamvis peccaveris, tamen primatum inter fratres obtinebis, et dominaberis fratri tuo juniori. Deinde admittit hunc locum, posse exponi de peccato : « Ne videamur, inquit, hanc interpretationem complecti, quod alte¬ ra nobis contraria sit, demus sane de pec¬ cato locutum fuisse Deum ». Sed quaerit, an Deus promittendo, an potius jubendo dixe¬ rit « tu dominaberis illius » : et si quidem jubendo, non inde probari liberum arbi¬ trium dicit, quia Deus etiam impossibilia quandoque jubet ; si promittendo, quaerit, cur non sit factum quod Deus promisit. Non enim a Caino peccatum, sed a peccato Cai- num devictum fuisse, parricidium illius cla¬ mat. Objicit postea sibi, conditionem intelli- genduamessein ea promissione, quasi dictum sit : « Victoriam de peccato referes, si ta¬ men certaveris ». Respondet: « Sed quis re¬ cipiat istas ambages? Ad extremum, cum ei displiceret, quod tam facile concessisset, hoc loco de peccati victoria, et dominatu agi, mox subjungit : « Quamquam et res ipsa, et ratio Grammaticae postulant, comparationem fieri Cain et Abelis, quia primogenitus frater minori posthabitus non fuisset, nisi proprio scelere deterior ». Atque haic est tota Calvi¬ ni defensio. Nos vero constanter asseiamus, hoc loco non de Abele, sed de peccato Deum esse lo¬ cutum. Idque probamus primum ex ratione Grammaticae, quam nobis Calvinus objecit. Illud enim pronomen ejus, cum dicitur, sub te erit appetitus ejus, et illud pronomen illius, cum dicitur, et tu dominaberis illius; referunt id, quod paulo ante nominatum est. Paulo vero ante, peccati, non Abelis, mentio facta est, sic enim legimus : Si bene egeris, re¬ cipies ; sin autem male, statim in foribus pec¬ catum aderit. Sed sub te erit appetitus ejus, et tu dominaberis illius. Ratio igitur Gram¬ maticae postulat, ut illa pronomina (ejus) et (illius) ad peccatum, non ad Abelem refe¬ rantur. Quid quod in tota hac divina sen¬ tentia numquam nominatur Abel ? unde igi¬ tur venit Calvino in mentem, ut de Abele, non de peccato sermonem hoc loco haberi existi¬ maverit? Deinde probamus, ex communi consensu interpretum. S. Ambrosius lib. ii. de Cain cap. 7. a Non frater, inquit, ei addicitur, sed error adseribitur, cujus ipse sibi auctor est. In te, inquit, revertetur crimen, quod a te coepit. Noniiabes in quo necessitatem magis, quam mentem tuam arguas » . Vides, quo¬ modo S. Ambrosius et Calvini expositionem rejiciat, et liberum arbitrium a necessitate perspicue doceat? S. Hieronymus in quaestionibus Hebraicis idem docet, et quidem his verbis: «Quia, inquit, liberi arbitrii es, moneo ut non tibi peccatum, sed tu peccato domineris ». S. Augqstinus lib. xv. de Civit. Dei cap. 7. « Quiesce, inquit, ad te enim conversio ejus, et tu dominaberis illius. Numquid fra¬ tris ? absit ; cujus igitur, nisi peccati ? » En quam aperte S. Augustinus absurdum esse pronunciat eam sententiam, quam Calvinus maxime probavit. S. Prosper in n. lib. de Vocatione gen¬ tium cap. 13. enarrans illud : « Ad te erit conversio ejus, et tu dominaberis illius » , « Ad te, inquit, tua culpa revocetur, noli peccato regnum in te dare, sed tu potius in ipsum sume dominatum » . S. Gregorius lib. iv. Moral. cap. 22 : «Tunc, inquit, peccatum cordis sub juris nostri possessionem reducitur, si cum incipit reprimatur. Unde et divina voce Cain prava cogitanti dicitur, in foribus peccatum tuum aderit, sed sub te erit appetitus ejus, et tu dominaberis illius ete » . Eodem modo exponunt Eucherius, Beda, Rupertus, Ambulensis, Lyranus, Cajetanus, et glossse, ordinaria et interlinealis. Neque suspicari debemus, nullum horum Doctorum CAPUT XXIII. 83 tenuisse rationem Grammaticae, aut omnes graviter esse hallucinatos. At objicit Calvinus : « Si de peccato agitur, cum dicitur, tu dominaberis illius, vel jubet Deus, vel promittit ; si jubet non colligitur hinc liberum arbitrium, quia praeceptum est impossibile, si promittit, cur non est factum quod Deus promisit? » Respondeo, Deum nec promittere, nec ju¬ bere, sed significare, peccatum esse in pote¬ state peccantis, et proinde monere Cainum, ut cogitet, in suo arbitrio esse cupiditati per¬ versae assentiri, vel non assentiri, et ideo det operam, ut non vincatur, sed vincat, nisi gra¬ viter puniri velit. Sed etiamsi Deus juberet, nihil lucraretur inde Calvinus ; nemo enim jubet impossibilia, nisi qui non vult fieri quod jubet, id est, in¬ sanus aliquis, aut furiosus. Et si Deus non juberet, sed promitteret victoriam, sub con¬ ditione, si fortiter pugnare vellet, nullae es¬ sent hic ambages. Quid enim clarius quam, vinces si certayeris ? an non etiam Apostolus sine ullis ambagibus dixit : Non coronabi¬ tur, nisi qui legitime certaverit ? Adde, adextremum, probari ex hoc loco li¬ berum arbitrium, etiamsi daremus, locutum hic esse Deum non de peccato, seddeAbele. Nequeenim Deusmitigare conaretur animum Caini, promittendo permansurum illi juspri- mogeniturae, et dominaturum illum fratribus suis, nisi sciret, potuisse eum revocari a con¬ cepto scelere, et in arbitrio ejus esse cupidi¬ tati jam exortae resistere, vel consentire. Posterior locus, excap. ISEcclesiast. invi¬ ctissimus est, et tam perspicuus, ut nulla de¬ claratione indigeat. Respondet autem Clavi- nus primo, librum Ecclesiastici esse dubiae fidei secundo, Ecclesiasticum, de libero arbi¬ trio primi hominis, quale fuit ante peccatum, non de 60, quale nunc est, esse locutum ; ter¬ tio, si velit ille auctor, suis illis verbis non as¬ truere liberum arbitrium, sed solum coercere carnis malignitatem, quae sua mala in Deum transferendo vanam defensionem captare so¬ let, ei se quoque libenter assensurum, alio- qui ejus auctoritatem non magni pendere. Ad primum rsspondeo, non posse a Cal¬ vino Ecclesiasti eum repudiari, si sibi ipse con¬ stare velit, propter, duas causas. Primo, quo¬ niam recipit Calvinus epistolam Jacobi et Judae, quae non minus dubiae fidei olim fue¬ runt, quam Ecclesiasticus, deberet enim vel cum Lutheranis repudiare omnes libros, qui aliquando dubii fuerunt, vel cum Ecclesia re¬ cipere eos omnes, quorum auctoritas in sacris Conciliis declarata est. Constat autem in Con¬ cilio Carthaginiensi III. can. 47. inter libros canonicos, et divinos librum Ecclesiastici nu¬ meratum. Secundo, quia profitetur Calvinus se discipulum ac sectatorem esse Augustini. Augustinus autem non solum hunc librum inter canonicos ponit, inlib. ii de doctr. Chri¬ stiana cap. 8. sed etiam adducit in lib. de Gra¬ tia et libero arbitrio cap. 2. ad ipsum liberum arbitrium comprobandum. Ad alteram Calvini solutionem respondeo, ex Ecclesiastico non solum colligi primum hominem, cum libero arbitrio conditum fuisse, sed etiam idem liberum arbitrium in ejus po¬ steris remansisse. Nam paulo ante dixerat : « Ne dicas, per Deum abest ; non dicas ille me implanavit », id est, non referas in Deum causam sceleris tui. Et continuo rationem ad¬ jungit : «Quoniam Deus hominem constituit, et reliquit in manu consilii sui etc. ;> Quae ra¬ tio nihil efficeret, nisi significare vellet Eccle¬ siasticus, liberum arbitrium initio datum pri¬ mo homini, nunc etiam in ejus posteris per¬ manere. Praeterea verba illa : Si volueris mandata servare, conservabunt te. Et illa : Ante homi¬ nem vita et mors, quod voluerit, dabitur ei. Et illa : Apposuit tibi igem, et aquam, ad quod volueris, porriges manum tuam ; non apertis¬ sime testantur Ecclesiasticum alloqui homi¬ nes, qui nunc sunt, et illis concionari, qui possunt ex ejus cohortatione proficere ? Ad tertiam solutionem breviter dico, ine¬ ptam esse conditionem, quam Ecclesiastico Calvinus proponit. Nomenim coerceri potest carnis malignitas, ne culpas suas transferat in Deum, seque a peccato immunem esse ja¬ ctet, nisi concedatur homini liberum volunta¬ tis arbitrium. Sed de hac re saepe dictum est, nec sunt ubique omnia repetenda.