Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 23: The sixth class of Scriptures for free choice in moral matters
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Besides those places which Calvin noted, there are certain others, which, passed over by him, we shall briefly gather into a sixth class, which could be called the class of the abandoned places.
Let the first place, then, be from chapter 30 of Deuteronomy, where Moses speaks thus: Consider that I have set before thee this day life and good, and on the other hand death and evil. And below: I call heaven and earth to witness this day, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. Choose therefore life, that both thou and thy seed may live. I do not see what can be answered to this place. This book, in the first place, is not of doubtful authority, and is received by the Calvinists as canonical and divine. Then, Moses speaks not to men in the state of innocence, but to the Hebrews who were then with him. Finally, there are no windings here; for Moses swears by heaven and earth that he has given the people the option to do what they will, in a matter supremely moral — that is, in keeping or violating the precepts — and that he has exhorted the same people to the election of obedience, which brings life, and dissuaded them from the election of contumacy, which brings death. And nothing is more proper to free choice than election, as we demonstrated in the third book.
The second place is in the book of Josue, chapter 24: The option is given you, whom you would chiefly serve, etc. This place too pertains to free choice in moral matters, since Josue signifies that the people could choose whether it would render worship to the true God, or to idols — that is, whether it would act well, or sin.
The third place is in chapter 31 of Ecclesiasticus: He that could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed; and could do evil things, and hath not done them: therefore are his goods established. I do not wonder that these places were prudently dissembled by Calvin, since not only no true, but not even any plausible response seems able to have place here. For this testimony cannot be dragged to the state of innocence, nor are there any windings in it; but free choice is asserted, so truly and properly free in moral matters, that the man is called good, and therefore worthy of praise and reward, because he could have transgressed and did not transgress, could have done evil and did not do it.
The fourth place is in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 7: He that hath determined, being steadfast in his heart, having no necessity, but having power of his own will, and hath judged this in his heart, to keep his virgin, doth well. And below: Let him do what he will; he sinneth not, if she marry. In this place it is a question of moral good, as is clear from those words, “doth well,” and below, “doth better,” and, “sinneth not,” etc. And of this moral good, to be done or not done, the Apostle says that man has free election, provided he be not hindered by some extrinsic necessity of vow, oath, or precept; for to this pertains that clause, having no necessity. He excludes the extrinsic, not because it takes away free choice, but that he may show that he who is not bound by extrinsic necessity is simply and absolutely free, so that not only can he do and not do, but also he sins not, whether he do or do not. For, as we said in the fourth book, liberty from extrinsic necessity prerequires liberty from intrinsic; and therefore he who is said to be free from the extrinsic is consequently asserted free from the intrinsic.
The fifth place is in the second epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 9: Every one as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver. The Apostle speaks of the giving of alms, which is a moral work, and admonishes that each one willingly bestow what he has determined in his heart — that is, what by free will he has chosen beforehand, since he had it in his power to will to give little or much, or even to will to give nothing at all. For that word proaireisthai which he uses pertains properly to free choice. For the voluntary in general, or the spontaneous, which befits even beasts, is distinguished from the free voluntary, which is proper to a rational or intelligent nature, and which is called proairetikon — as is clear from Aristotle, book 3 on Morals, chapters 1 and 2. And from the Scriptures, indeed, let these arguments suffice.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXIII. Sexta classis Scripturarum, pro libero arbi¬ trio in moralibus. Preetereaealoca, qua} Calvinus notavit, sunt alia quaedam, quae ab illo praetermissa nos in sextam classem, quae locorum derelictorum dici poterit, breviter conferemus. Primus igitur locus sit ex. cap. xxx. Deute- ron. ubi sic loquitur Moses: Considera, inquit, quod hodie proposuerim in. conspectu tuo vitam 84 LIBER V. et bonum , et e contrario mortem et malum. Et infra : Testes invoco coelum et terram , quod proposuerim vobis vitam et mortem , benedi¬ ctionem et maledictionem. Elige ergo vitam, ut et tu vivas, et semen tuum (1). Non video quid ad hunc locum responderi possit. Liber hic in primis non est dubia fidei, et a Calvinistis pro canonico, ac divino recipitur. Deinde, non loquitur Moses ad homines- in statu innocentia, sed ad Hcbraos, qui tunc erant cum ipso. Denique, nullae hic sunt am¬ bages, nam Moses jurat per coelum et terram , se dedisse populo optionem, ut facerent quod vellent, in re maxime morali, id est, in prae¬ ceptis servandis, aut violandis, et cohorta¬ tum fuisse eumdem populum ad electionem obedientiae, quae vitam adfert, et dehortatum abelectione contumaciae, quae mortem adfert. Nihil autem magis proprium est liberi arbitrii, quam electio, ut in tertio libro demonstra¬ vimus. Secundus locus est, inlib. Josuaocap. xxiv Optio, inquit, vobis datur, cui servire potis¬ simum debeatis, etc. (2). Hicadetiamlocuslibe- rum arbitrium in moralibus pertinet, quoniam Josue significat populum eligere potuisse, vellet ne Deo vero cultum adhibere, vel ido¬ lis, id est, an vellet bene agere, an peccare. Tertius locus est in cap xxxi. Ecclesiast. Qui potuit transgredi, et non est transgressus facere mala et non fecit, ideo stabilita sunt bo¬ na illius (3). Non miror haec loca prudenter a Calvino dissimulata, cum non solum, non , vera, sed ne verisimilis quidem aliqua re¬ sponsio hic locum habere posse videatur. Non enim hoc testimonium trahi potest ad statum innocentiae, neque ullae sunt in eo ambages, sedliberum arbitrium asseritur ita vere, pro- prieque liberum in moralibus, ut dicatur vir bonus, ideo dignus laude et praemio, quod potuerit transgredi, et non sit transgressus, facere malum, et non fecerit. Quartus locus est in priore epist. ad Corin¬ thios cap. vii. Qui statuit in corde suo fu'mus, non habens necessitatem, sed potestatem habens sux voluntatis, et hoc judicavit in corde suo, servare virginem suam, bene facit : Et infra : Quod vult faciat, non peccat, sinubat (4). Hoc loco agitur de bono morali, ut patet ex illis verbis, bene facit. Et infra: Melius facit. Et : Non peccat etc. De hoc autem bono morali faciendo, vol non faciendo, dicit Apostolus, habere hominem liberam electionem, modo non sit impeditus extrinseca aliqua necessi¬ tate voti, juramenti, aut praecepti. Huc enim pertinet illud : Non habens necessitatem. Ex¬ cludit autem cxtrinsccam, non quod illa tollat liberum arbitrium, sed ut ostendat, eum qui non ligatur necessitate extrinseca simpli¬ citer et absolute liberum esse, ut possit non solum facere, et non facere, sed etiam non peccet, sive faciat, sive non faciat. Nam ut diximus in 4. lib. libertas ab extrinseca ne¬ cessitate prserequiritlibertatem ab intrinseca, et ideo qui liber esse dicitur ab extrinseca, consequenter asseritur liber ab intrinseca. Quintus locus est in posteriore epist. ad Corinth. cap. ix. Unusquisque prout destina¬ vit in corde suo, non ex tristitia, aut ex neces¬ sitate, hilarem enim datorem diligit Deus (5). Loquitur Apostolus de facienda eleemosyna, quod est opus morale; et monet, ut unusquis¬ que libenter tribuat id, quod destinavit in corde suo, idest, quod libera voluntate prae¬ legit, cum in potestate haberet, parum, aut multum velle dare, aut etiam omnino nihil velle dare. Nam illud verbum upoaipslvat, quo ipse utitur, proprie, ad liberum arbitri¬ um pertinet. Distinguitur enim voluntarium in genere, sive spontaneum, quod etiam be¬ stiis convenit a voluntario libero, quod est projirium rationalis, sive intelligentis natura, quod illud dicitur exoiiono *. Hoc autem upoaipe- ■nxov, ut peripicuumest, ex Aristotele lib. m. de morib. cap. 1. et 2. Atque ex Scripturis quidem hac argumenta sufficiant.